Cybamar Swiss and Intelligence Gathering

Cybamar Swiss has been identified in a US Federal Lawsuit as a possible unwitting participant in a major Hezbollah International Business Venture.

According to TBDA,  a long time visitor has been gathering intelligence here, and appears to be especially interested in this news. If the following information is connected to Cybamar in some way, it suggests that they may be more deeply involved in Jihad Activities than they are indicating. In any case, it is worth investigating more closely.


IP Address: 83.173.213.245
Browser: IE 9.0
Operating System: Win7
Location: Kloten, Zurich, Switzerland
Resolution: 1920x1080
ISP: Bluewin


Recent Navigation visits include:
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13 Jan 16:56:48
Shimron Letters (No referring link)
14 Jan 16:32:39
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www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0112/Nigeria-s-Boko-Haram-attacks-are-misunderstood-as-regional-Islamist-threat (Exit Link)

17 Jan 11:00:30
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some Exit Link/Downloads by this visitor include:

Date Time Type WebPage
2 Jan 12:48:00 Exit Link
globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas

2 Jan 12:48:43 Exit Link
www.africaintelligence.com/mce/

2 Jan 12:49:18 Exit Link
www.feesabilillah.com/

2 Jan 12:49:25 Exit Link
anikah.wordpress.com/

2 Jan 12:49:48 Exit Link
blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/


Cybamar Company information

USA

Detroit Corporate Headquaters
12130 Dixie
Redford, MI 48239
Tel: +1 313 541 4444
Fax: +1 313 541 1144

Orlando Branch
4540 W Colonial Dr.
Orlando FL, 32808
Email: david@cybamar.com
Tel: +1 407 440 3840
Fax: +1 407 440 3841

New Jersey Branch
150 Pulaski St.
Bayonne, NJ 07002
Tel: +1 201 333 6000
Fax: +1 201 333 6600


Europe

Switzerland
Cybamar Swiss GMBH
Hugostruasse 9 8050
Zurich, Switzerland

Belgium
Seaway Belgium
Address coming soon
Tel: +32 477557441


Africa

Benin
Ste Nomeco
C/41 Missebo, 09 BP 427
Cotonou, Benin
Email: moustapha.nomeco@gmail.com
Tel: +229 97 49 2020

Togo
STE Marco S.A.R.L
12 Zone Portaire Extra Transit Parc
Lome, Togo
Email: jahjah.marco@gmail.com
Tel: +228 271 48 00

Angola
World Logistics
Palanca Runa de Senatorio
Casa# s/n
Luanda, Angola

Lagos
Starcom C/O Cybamar Swiss
17B karimu Kotun
Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria
Email: Danyaf@cybamar.com
Mobile: +234 17766693
GSM: +234 8066518851
Office / Fax: +234 12712995

Middle East

Lebanon
Cybamar
Bshara El-Khoury, Damascus Street
Echmoun Bldg , 4th floor (facing Litani River Bldg)
Beirut, Lebanon
Tel: +961 1 219997
Fax: +961 1 219996

Iraq
Cybamar
12 Chareh Falestine Sahat Bayrout
Baghdad, Iraq
Email: SayedHusseiny@yahoo.com
Asia

India
HNO: 259/2, Mehrauli
New Delhi-110030
Tel: +1 201 293 0848

Hizbolla's US West African Money Laundering Auto Ring

Michigan car dealership investigated in multi-million dollar scheme to fund Hizballah
from Dhimmi Watch by Robert

Would you buy a used car from these jihadis? They're doing this in Tennessee and Tulsa, too. "Lansing used car dealership investigated in terror scheme," by Niraj Warikoo for the Detroit Free Press, December 28 (thanks to Kenneth):

A Lansing car dealership is named among 30 around the country in a federal investigation into an alleged $480 million money laundering scheme tied to Mideast terrorist group Hezbollah, federal prosecutors said.
According to a federal lawsuit filed in New York City, Oussama Salhab, the owner of Cybamar Swiss, a Redford Township transport company, "is a Hezbollah operative" who was part of an effort to funnel part of the proceeds from car sales to the Lebanese group.

The 66-page complaint lists a Lansing company called A&J Auto Sales Inc. as one of the dealers in Michigan - along with eight in and around Detroit.

However, the used car dealers are not accused in the federal complaint of being aware that they were part of a money laundering scheme and may have been unwitting participants.

It's unclear who owns A&J Auto Sales Inc. A business search turned up no results in Lansing, and the U.S. attorney's office referred to the complaint in lieu of comment.

The suit seeks the forfeiture of the assets of Cybamar.

In addition, federal officials sought the forfeiture of used car dealerships in Detroit, Dearborn Heights, Lansing and Redford Township that sold vehicles whose proceeds may have ended up going to Hezbollah.

Salhab bought vehicles from at least two of the dealerships, and his Redford company shipped many of the used cars overseas....

The complaint, filed Dec. 15, is the latest U.S. effort to target Hezbollah, a group based in Lebanon that the U.S. State Department classifies as a terrorist group and says has Iranian support. U.S. authorities say the group was behind bomb attacks against the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984.

"We are putting a stranglehold on a major source of that funding by disrupting a vast and far-flung network that spanned three continents," said Preet Bharara, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York.

The complaint says that banks and money exchanges in Lebanon tied to Hezbollah purchased cars from 30 car dealers - eight of them in metro Detroit - and sent them to west Africa. Cybamar in Redford was often used to ship the cars.

"Between 2008 and 2010, used cars valued collectively at over $1 billion were shipped from the United States to Benin (in Africa)," the complaint says. "Cybamar is ... frequently used by the car buyers."

Proceeds from car sales ended up in Lebanon, with some of the cash going to Hezbollah. Drug smuggling also was involved in some parts of the operation, the complaint said.

Salhab, who lives in Lebanon and the African country of Togo, tried to enter the U.S. in November 2009 through Metro Airport.

He was sent back after inspectors found images on his laptop of Hezbollah "Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah; audio of the Hezbollah national anthem; images of Hezbollah militants stomping on an Israeli flag," the lawsuit says.

The Rest @ Jihad Watch

Hezbollah, Venezuela, and How Small businesses Fund Terrorism

Hezbollah undertakes a multiplicity of activities in Paraguay to raise and move money:

• Case in point, Assad Barakat, who on the one hand, distributed fake dollar bills, and on the other hand, ran two legitimate businesses as fronts for his activities: an electronics wholesale store called “Casa Apollo” based in Ciudad del Este Paraguay, and Barakat Import-Export Ltda., based in Iquique Chile.
• In an excellent piece on the subject, Jeffrey Goldberg described the nefarious activities of Hezbollah in the tri-border area, including its use of seed money for small business start-ups, as well as threatening compatriots to cough-up money or see their family members back in Lebanon placed on blacklists.
• In return for start-up money, the small business gives to Hezbollah 20% of its gross revenues after the loan is paid off.
• Goldberg also noted that it was not unusual for a small business with little revenue to be wiring large sums of money back to Lebanon.
• Since 1995, from his home in Ciudad del Este Paraguay, it is believed that Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, an associate of Assad Barakat, had donated over $50 million to Hezbollah via charities such as Bonyad-e Shahid (the ‘martyr’s organization”), to which he gave $3.5 million.
  

Recent articles by Chris Zambelis and Ely Karmon have drawn attention to the growing patronage of Hezbollah by Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. This takes two forms:

• First, there is the allowance by Chavez’s regime of import-export businesses controlled by Hezbollah in the free trade zone of Margarita Island.
• Second, there is the allowance of not just a base of operations for Hezbollah among the Wayuu Indians in the West of the country, but also a presence on the Internet via MSN.

These are the very same Indians who have been caught in the middle of a turf war between the right-wing paramilitary forces of the AUC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) over the cocaine crops in the Eastern provinces of Colombia.

As a result, a synergy has developed between the Wayuu, FARC, Hezbollah and President Chavez. It is to be noted that Venezuela is now the second largest customer of the Russian arms industry, from whom among other things, it has purchased 100,000 AK-103 rifles and has agreed to build two Kalashnikov factories in Venezuela by 2010, as well as being in the process of negotiating the purchase of five Project 636 Kilo-class submarines and four Project 637 Amur submarines.

It makes you wonder whether those Americans who buy gas at Citgo gas stations know that a portion of their hard earned dollars are going to fund terror aimed squarely at the United States.
Clearly, the passing of H.R. 3146 is an essential first step in the look forward process.

The Rest @ The Terrorist Finanace Blog

Chekry Harb of Hizbullah is Busted

COLOMBIA : US AND Colombian investigators have dismantled an international cocaine smuggling and money-laundering ring that allegedly used part of its profits to finance Hizbullah, the Lebanon-based Shia militia.

• After a two-year investigation, authorities have arrested at least 36 suspects in recent days, including an accused Lebanese kingpin in Bogota, Chekry Harb, who acted as the hub of an unusual alliance between South American cocaine traffickers and Middle Eastern militants, Colombian investigators alleged.
  

Authorities accuse Mr Harb of being a "world-class money-launderer" whose ring washed hundreds of millions of dollars a year, from Panama to Hong Kong, while paying a percentage to Hizbullah.

• Mr Harb was charged with drug-related crimes in a sealed indictment filed in Miami in July, but terror-related charges have not been filed.
• The suspects allegedly worked with a Colombian cartel and a paramilitary group to smuggle cocaine to the US, Europe and the Middle East.
• Mr Harb travelled to Lebanon, Syria and Egypt and was in phone contact with Hizbullah figures, according to Colombian officials.

"The profits from the sales of drugs went to finance Hizbullah," said Gladys Sanchez, lead investigator for the special prosecutor's office here. "This is an example of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists."

FARC is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the guerrilla group that was alleged to have had links with the IRA.

Iran, a Hizbullah sponsor, and donations from the Lebanese diaspora are two sources for a multimillion-dollar budget that pays for the militia's armed and political wings and social projects such as hospitals in Beirut.

However, investigations have shown that Hizbullah also funds itself through:

• drug dealing
• arms trafficking
• contraband smuggling
• other rackets in the Americas, Africa and elsewhere.
  

Western anti-terror agents have expressed concern about signs of an increasing Hizbullah presence in South America.

• In June, the US Treasury Department designated two Venezuelans of Lebanese descent, one a diplomat, as Hizbullah financiers and supporters.
• The case began as a money-laundering investigation, but agents discovered the alleged links between Mr Harb and Hizbullah operatives as they followed the money.
• Harb's group allegedly paid Hizbullah 12 per cent of its profits, investigators said, without giving a dollar figure.

- (LA Times, Washington Post Service)

The Rest @The Irish Times

Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela

The following Sanctioning Event occured in June, 2008
of note is the IP address associated with ongoing activity related to these events:

208.195.70.218

-Shimron Issachar


Washington - The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hizballah, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, along with two travel agencies owned and controlled by Kan'an.

• 
  "It is extremely troubling to see the Government of Venezuela employing and providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and fundraisers.
• We will continue to expose the global nature of Hizballah's terrorist support network, and we call on responsible governments worldwide to disrupt and dismantle this activity," said Adam J. Szubin, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Today's action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists, those owned or controlled by or acting for or on behalf of terrorists, and those providing financial, technological, or material support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.

Assets the designees hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions in property or interests in property blocked under the order.

Identifying Information
GHAZI NASR AL DIN

• Ghazi Nasr al Din is a Venezuela-based Hizballah supporter who has utilized his position as a Venezuelan diplomat and the president of a Caracas-based Shi'a Islamic Center to provide financial support to Hizballah.
• Nasr al Din served until recently as Charge d' Affaires at the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, Syria, and was subsequently appointed the Director of Political Aspects at the Venezuelan Embassy in Lebanon.
• Nasr al Din has counseled Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts and has provided donors with specific information on bank accounts where the donors' deposits would go directly to Hizballah.
• Ghazi Nasr al Din has met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, as well as facilitated the travel of Hizballah members to and from Venezuela.
• In late January 2006, Nasr al Din facilitated the travel of two Hizballah representatives to the Lebanese Parliament to Caracas to solicit donations for Hizballah and to announce the opening of a Hizballah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.
• The previous year, Nasr al Din arranged the travel of Hizballah members to attend a training course in Iran.
  
• AKAs: Haj Ghazi Nasseredine
  
• Ghazi Nassereddine
• Gazi Nasseridine
• Gazi Nasser El-Din
• Ghazil Nasser Al-Din
• Haj Ghazzi Nassereddine
• Ghassan Attef Salame Nasserddine
• Ghassan Nasr El Din Ghassan
• Ghazi Nasserddine
• Ghazi `Atef Nasraldine
• Atef Salameh Nasserdine Ghasan
• Hajj Ghazi `Atif Nasr al-Din
• Venezuelan Cedula: 18.190.527
• Venezuelan Passport: B-0472561
• DOB: 13DEC 1962
• POB: Lebanon

FAWZI KAN'AN

• Fawzi Kan'an is a Venezuela-based Hizballah supporter and a significant provider of financial support to Hizballah. Kan'an has facilitated travel for Hizballah members and sent money raised in Venezuela to Hizballah officials in Lebanon.
• Kan'an has met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks. Further, Kan'an has also traveled with other Hizballah members to Iran for training.
  
  AKAs:
  
• Fazi Canaan
• Faouzi Can'an
• Fouzi Kanan
• Fauzi Kanaan
• Fawzi Kan'an\
• Fauzi Ganan
• Maustaf Fawzi (Faouzi) Kanaan
  
• DOB1:
  7 June 1943
  DOB 2:
  February 1943
  DOB3:
  l June l943
  POB 1:
  Lebanon
  POB 2:
  Baalbeck, Lebanon
  POB 3:
  Betechelida, Lebanon
  Passport no:
  0877677
  

Nationality:
Venezuelan (Naturalized)
Naturalization no.:
2108, 16 December 1977
Identification no:
V-6.919.272
Residence 1:
Calle 2, Residencias Cosmos, Fifth Floor, Apartment 5D,La Urbina Caracas, Venezuela
Residence 2:

Esquina Bucare, Building 703, Second Floor, Apartment 20Caracas, Venezuela
BIBLOS TRAVEL AGENCY
Biblos Travel Agency is a Venezuela-based travel agency owned and operated by Fawzi Kan'an, which he has used to courier funds to Lebanon.

AKAs:
Biblios Travel Biblos Travel CABiblos Travel, C.A.
Location:
Avenida Baralt, Esquina Maderero, Edificio Santa Isabel II, PB, Loc. 1 Caracas, VenezuelaHILAL

TRAVEL AGENCY
Formed in April 2001, Hilal Travel Agency is a Venezuela-based travel agency owned and operated by Fawzi Kan'an.
AKAs:

Hilal Travel C.A.
Address:
Avenida Baralt, Esquina Maderero, Edificio Santa IsabelCaracas, Venezuela
Business ID no.:
80074366

US Treasuy Department Press Release

Sunni and Shia Islamist Connection Rooted in Lebanon

Hussein al-Khalil first established Hizballah’s security apparatus in Bekka [9] during the summer of 1982, coordinating operations with Islamic AMAL before it was formally
subordinated to Hizballah under Hussein Musawi after 1984. [10] The Musawi and Hamadi clans became the core clans of the embryonic Hizballah organization, [11] and this structure magnified the difficulty for hostile services attempting to penetrate Hizballah.

It made the exercise akin to penetrating a family. Hizballah’s security apparatus reflected the configuration of Shi’a clans and Hizballah’s operational emphasis in each of Lebanon’s three distinct geographic regions of Shi’a dominance. The geographic regions themselves became subdivided into sectors, creating a compartmentalized operational environment. The Bekka region with the largest IRGC component was characterized by a focus on logistics and training. [12] The southern region of Lebanon had an operational emphasis on the confrontation with Israel, and the organizational focus in the Beirut region was primarily political. In all of the regions, the security apparatus focused initially on internal security, then on covert and military operations.

Hizballah developed multiple and overlapping security organs aimed at maintaining organizational integrity. Hizballah’s operational security requires a strict separation between Hizballah’s political and military wings. Consequently, the ability of Hizballah’s political wing to exercise administrative control over the military wing and its security organs is problematic.

Additionally, Hizballah is, at least in part, heavily influenced by Iran, which has created divisions over any external political and administrative control over the military and security components of the organization. Because the impetus for the creation of Hizballah was Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, administrative control over the Hizballah’s military and security components are divided between both the Hizballah political leadership and the Pasdaran Iran’s objectives were to further Shi’a Islamist revolution, while Syrian President Hafez al-Assad facilitated Pasdaran operations in the Bekka to immunize his troops in Lebanon against Shi'a militants.[13] Al-Assad’s support of both AMAL and the Hizballah was important because of the greater affinity of Assad’s Alawite tribe for the secularists of AMAL.

A common element across all of Hizballah’s security entities is their reliance on fighters drawn from the Shi’a communities throughout Lebanon. The initial model for Hizballah’s security services was Fatah’s Jihaz al-Razd and the AMAL security entity based loosely on it. [14] Because Hizballah is not a state, a basic intelligence dilemma that faces the organization is the problematic task of establishing and maintaining secure territory and secure facilities. The problem is ameliorated somewhat by using secure facilities in territories of friendly states like Iran. [15] Hizballah’s first security concern was necessarily a counterintelligence function [16] to maintain organizational integrity. Hizballah counterintelligence capabilities were influenced by the Pasdaran Quds and applied by Hizballah to local Lebanese circumstances in the context of Syrian occupied Lebanon. Hizballah has successfully executed both defensive and offensive counterintelligence operations. Successful defensive counterintelligence operations are documented as far back as the middle 1980s, when Imad Mugniyah disrupted United States operations involving Lebanese nationals working the Lebanese-Cyprus ferry lines. [17] By 1997, Hizballah counterintelligence could effectively use double agents to mislead the Israelis, successfully executing operations against 13 Israeli Shayetet naval commandos near Sidon, leaving 12 Israelis dead [18] The Hizballah kidnapping of Mossad operative Colonel Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000 illustrates a more recent successful defensive counterintelligence operation. Tannenbaum had apparently tried to run a “false flag” operation against Hizballah from Europe by claiming to represent a European country. Hizballah lured Col. Tannenbaum to Beirut, where he was taken into custody by Hizballah security personnel. [19]
There are also several known instances of successful Hizballah offensive counterintelligence operations. Hizballah, for example, managed to compromise IDF Lieutenant Colonel Omar al-Heib, who traded surveillance data on IDF military installations for narcotics later distributed by al-Heib’s organization. The IDF believes that data compromised by Lt. Col. al-Heib allowed for successful Hizballah targeting of Mt. Meron [20] at the outset of the Israel-Hizballah war of 2006.[21] Recently, Hizballah successfully placed Nadia N. Prouty in the CIA. In a classic operation reminiscent of the U.S-Soviet Cold War, Prouty legally entered the U.S. and then gained citizenship through a sham marriage. She thereafter applied for work and successfully infiltrated the FBI and used that position to leverage a job at the CIA. [22]

Western services have also seen achievement. The defection of Abu al-Kassam Misbahi (Farhad, a co-founder of Iran’s VEVAK intelligence organ) in Germany during the middle 1990s [23] was a significant accomplishment. The 2007 defection in Ankara of General Ali Reza Ashgari [24] of Pasdaran Quds, who was instrumental in building Hizballah’s organization in Bekka during the early-middle 1980s, was also important. Most recently, the February 2008 assassination of Imad Mugniyah (Hajj Radwan), presumably by Mossad’s Kidon element, was a significant coup for Western intelligence. [25]

Hizballah’s intelligence collection abilities have improved over time as well. Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon taught Hizballah the importance of tactical intelligence collection, precipitating Hizballah’s careful and ongoing effort to understand how the IDF conducted operations in southern Lebanon. Intelligence collected by Hizballah respecting IDF operational methods prior to the IDF withdrawal in 2000 paid off with the Hizballah victory in the 2006 war.

Hizballah covert operations are carried out using multiple descriptors for its security apparatus. Hizballah followed some early Fatah conventions wherein Fatah’s Jihaz al-Razd security entity operated using the Black September Organization moniker during the 1970s.

The creation of Hizballah in the summer of 1982 under IRGC guidance necessarily saw preliminary operations limited to the coalescence of Hizballah’s constituent entities under multiple names. Hizballah’s only opposition at that juncture were small scale actions aimed at controlling territory and organizing personnel with AMAL and other local militias. [26]

The security apparatus was then focused on a very narrow core of Hizballah operations, organized with fighters drawn primarily from the Hamadi and Musawi clans. These same fighters conducted operations using different organizational names.

The core functions were configured and nurtured by elements of the Bekka’s Pasdaran Qud’s [27] sustaining Hizballah’s Lebanese operations. The attack on the U.S. Embassy in the spring of 1983, and attacks on both the multinational forces and the Israeli intelligence center established in occupied Tyre in the fall of that year, were Hizballah’s first major operations against foreigners. These covert operations executed by the security apparatus initiated an operational pattern characterizing subsequent major events. The pattern was direct IRGC support in financing and logistics facilitated by Syrian non-interference [28] in Hizballah operations. During the middle 1980s, this pattern was followed by the security apparatus in its management of kidnapping operations directed against foreigners. [29]

As Lebanon became relatively more stable, the tasks of the security apparatus evolved to include security functions supporting Hizballah’s social and political operations as well as military operations. With Hizballah’s emergence as a political party representing the bulk of Lebanon’s Shi’a, the security apparatus accrued some functions analogous to an Interior Ministry. Police functions became necessary to maintain both the integrity of the party and Lebanon’s Shi’a body politic in territories controlled by Hizballah. Within this “domestic” side of the security apparatus was an entity Amad Hamzeh described as an “engagement and coordination unit” under the authority of Hajj Wafic Safa. [30] It eventually turned ordinary criminals threatening Hizballah persons or property over to Lebanon’s ostensive authorities. [31] The security apparatus thereby divided functionally between these police functions and functions supporting military and covert operations. Additionally, about two hundred Hizballah fighters operate in a preventive security apparatus under Mahmud Haidar (Abu Ali) in an executive protection role modeled on Fatah’s Force 17 that provides security for Hizballah politicians. Elements of the security apparatus also served as an asset for the IRGC Quds. Hizballah’s Unit 1800, for example, was established primarily to serve Iranian foreign policy goals by coordinating Hizballah assistance to multiple Sunni Palestinian Islamists organizations in the West Bank and Gaza.

The operational genesis was rooted in the deportation by Israel of four-hundred Hamas militants into southern Lebanon in 1992. Those Sunni Palestinian Islamists were housed and indoctrinated through the good offices of Hizballah. This allowed ties to be forged across the not so insignificant religious division between Shi’a and Sunni Islamists. The Sunni have historically seen the Shi’a as an illegitimate heretical sect, and much blood has been shed between the two main sects of Islam throughout the centuries over these religious disputes. In this instance, however, Israel’s role as a common enemy, superseded the two sect’s theological differences, and this coordination against Israel facilitated a rarely seen cooperation between the Sunni and Shi’a.

Conclusion

The security architecture created by the Hizballah organization reflects its development in Lebanon’s operational environment. The structure of the security apparatus was a function initially of the kinship patterns within the Hamadi and Musawi clans and their associated Islamist groups welded to a security architecture created by the Pasdaran Quds within Syrian and Israeli-occupied Lebanon. Additional Shi’a clans and families were incorporated into Hizballah as the organization expanded. Hizballah’s security architecture evolved with the reconstruction of Lebanon in the 1990s and the changing role of the Shi’a in Lebanese society. The emergence of a more developed and assertive Shi’a polity saw the expansion of the Hizballah security apparatus into a more nuanced and sophisticated organization even as relations between Hizballah and Iran strengthened.
The various Hizballah security entities interact today with external services which necessarily shape the configuration of Hizballah’s security apparatus at any given point in time. Hizballah’s fundamental intelligence challenge is filtering analysis through an Islamist veneer thereby degrading the analytical product. Hizballah has emphasized Hebrew language skills for some of its fighters, yet comprehending Hebrew is not the same thing as grasping Israeli thought. Archie Roosevelt [32] argued long ago that a lust for knowing which seeks understanding unclouded by worldview must animate the intelligence enterprise. Hizballah’s security apparatus must lust to know Israel even as it understands Hebrew. In a larger sense, the Hizballah security apparatus must create a raison d’être that goes beyond moribund dreams of a Lebanese Islamic Republic or its utility furthering Iran’s imperial ambitions. Hizballah’s security apparatus must affirm Shi’a political and social aspirations in Lebanon to survive.

Te Rest frpm Carl Anthony Wege

Venezuela-based HezbollahSanctioned by OFAC

This Venezuelan connectionnection to Hezballah is important to Africa, because the travel agency connections may facilitate fund rasing travel in West Africa, among other places. I wonder if FARC-Hezbollah connections occur in Venezuela...

The Followings was Posted on the Office of Foreign Asset Control (US Treasy Department) web site:

June 18, 2008
hp-1036

Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela

Washington - The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hizballah, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, along with two travel agencies owned and controlled by Kan'an.

"It is extremely troubling to see the Government of Venezuela employing and providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and fundraisers. We will continue to expose the global nature of Hizballah's terrorist support network, and we call on responsible governments worldwide to disrupt and dismantle this activity," said Adam J. Szubin, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Today's action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists, those owned or controlled by or acting for or on behalf of terrorists, and those providing financial, technological, or material support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. Assets the designees hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions in property or interests in property blocked under the order.

Identifying Information

GHAZI NASR AL DIN

• Ghazi Nasr al Din is a Venezuela-based Hizballah supporter who has utilized his position as a Venezuelan diplomat and the president of a Caracas-based Shi'a Islamic Center to provide financial support to Hizballah.
• Nasr al Din served until recently as Charge d' Affaires at the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, Syria, and was subsequently appointed the Director of Political Aspects at the Venezuelan Embassy in Lebanon.
• Nasr al Din has counseled Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts and has provided donors with specific information on bank accounts where the donors' deposits would go directly to Hizballah.
• Ghazi Nasr al Din has met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, as well as facilitated the travel of Hizballah members to and from Venezuela.
• In late January 2006, Nasr al Din facilitated the travel of two Hizballah representatives to the Lebanese Parliament to Caracas to solicit donations for Hizballah and to announce the opening of a Hizballah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.
• The previous year, Nasr al Din arranged the travel of Hizballah members to attend a training course in Iran.
  
  AKAs: Haj Ghazi Nasseredine
  Ghazi Nassereddine
  Gazi Nasseridine
  Gazi Nasser El-Din
  Ghazil Nasser Al-Din
  Haj Ghazzi Nassereddine
  Ghassan Attef Salame Nasserddine
  Ghassan Nasr El Din Ghassan
  Ghazi Nasserddine
  Ghazi `Atef Nasraldine
  Atef Salameh Nasserdine Ghasan
  Hajj Ghazi `Atif Nasr al-Din
  
• Venezuelan Cedula: 18.190.527
  Venezuelan Passport: B-0472561
  DOB: 13DEC 1962
  POB: Lebanon

FAWZI KAN'AN

• Fawzi Kan'an is a Venezuela-based Hizballah supporter and a significant provider of financial support to Hizballah.
• Kan'an has facilitated travel for Hizballah members and sent money raised in Venezuela to Hizballah officials in Lebanon.
• Kan'an has met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks. Further, Kan'an has also traveled with other Hizballah members to Iran for training.
  
  AKAs:
  Fazi Canaan
  Faouzi Can'an
  Fouzi Kanan
  Fauzi Kanaan
  Fawzi Kan'an
  Fauzi Ganan
  Maustaf Fawzi (Faouzi) Kanaan
  
  DOB1:
  7 June 1943
  DOB 2:
  February 1943
  DOB3:
  l June l943
  POB 1:
  Lebanon
  
  POB 2:
  Baalbeck, Lebanon
  
  POB 3:
  Betechelida, Lebanon
  
  Passport no:
  0877677
  
  Nationality:
  Venezuelan (Naturalized)
  
  Naturalization no.:
  2108, 16 December 1977
  
  Identification no:
  V-6.919.272
  
  Residence 1:
  Calle 2, Residencias Cosmos, Fifth Floor, Apartment 5D,
  La Urbina Caracas, Venezuela
  
  Residence 2:
  Esquina Bucare, Building 703, Second Floor, Apartment 20
  Caracas, Venezuela
  
  BIBLOS TRAVEL AGENCY
  
  Biblos Travel Agency is a Venezuela-based travel agency owned and operated by Fawzi Kan'an, which he has used to courier funds to Lebanon.
  
  AKAs:
  Biblios Travel
  Biblos Travel CA
  Biblos Travel, C.A.
  
  Location:
  Avenida Baralt, Esquina Maderero, Edificio Santa Isabel II,
  PB, Loc. 1 Caracas, Venezuela
  
  HILAL TRAVEL AGENCY
  
  Formed in April 2001, Hilal Travel Agency is a Venezuela-based travel agency owned and operated by Fawzi Kan'an.
  
  AKAs:
  Hilal Travel C.A.
  
  Address:
  Avenida Baralt, Esquina Maderero, Edificio Santa Isabel
  Caracas, Venezuela
  
  Business ID no.:
  80074366

Portrait of Hezbollah Reverese Money Laundering Scheme in Africa

A Zakat Fund committee from a very Large Dubai based Bank issues A Credit Line to an account in a Western Bank.

Small local Shiite-0wned businesses buy cars (Mostly Honda, Toyota and Nissan) at Auction in the Suburbs of Dallas, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Mobile, New Orleans and Phoenix.

The credit line, which originated in the Zakat Fund, is used to pay off the credit cards used by the Shiite business men to buy the auctioned cars.

Using non-Shia owned import/export companies, They sell the cars at a profit to Lebanese businessmen in West Africa, who:

• Sell the cars to markets in places like Nigeria, Sierra Leon, Liberia, Ghana, Algeria, Morocco, etc.
• Some vehicles are traded for other cars which are in turn made available to Jihadis
• Hezbollah Tax collectors, which make regular cash collections in Africa, take the cash to Iranian-based banks in Venezuela, Lebanon, and Syria.

These funds are used to Fund Terror activities around the world...

Check out who is buying lots of auctioned cars in places like Marietta Georgi and Lewisville Texas.

-Shimron

When is the time to Out Maneuver Iran...

Iran and Hezbollah, it's world-wide proxy, have been expanding, gaining in financial resources and infamous prestige. They have been executing a multifaceted flexible strategy that will soon make it capable to respond to anything any nation or multinational organization can do.

Experimenting with Chemical weapons, developing nuclear weapons (eventually) and a decentralized way to exercise its influence. There have even be military exercises in the Straights of Hormuz to rehearse their Military forces.

Yet who is willing to go to war? strategic surgical military action will serve as a defensive strategy, but an offensive, multifaceted strategy that will require Iran to redeploy its resources in response.

The Sunnis will have to act when the US leaves Irag....

So When is the time to Out Maneuver Iran? ...Before the US leaves

Liberia-Sierra Leon: the next front for Jihad?

UN sanctions against Liberia exporting diamonds were renewed last week. This seems like small news, until you read the reason why.....

"There are some forms of diamond mining taking place around Kungbor in Gbarpolu County [northwestern Liberia], because the government does not have the capacity in that area to curtail them", a government diamond monitor who requested anonymity told IRIN.
Officials have said there is currently what they have described as a 'diamond rush' in the southern provinces of the country. Thousands of diggers, many of them former combatants, are being equipped with shovels and pans by unlicensed dealers, they say."

read the rest (from Reuters alertnet)

• The area where this is occuring is an area of Islamic Stronghold
• Diamonds have historically been used to fund arms and miltary capability in this region
• Many ex-sodliers are running these illegal minning activities
• Some sources living in Liberia report regular traffic in and out of the Monrovia International airport, without going through customs.
• Al Quaida itself has or has had diamond brokers working in Liberia
• Hezbollah makes regular collection runs through west Africa including Liberia
• Kadafi has funded at least 27 Mosques in Liberia in the last several years

So is Liberia-Sierra Leon the next front for Jihad? This is a similar partern that eventually led to what happened in the Horn of Africa. The Horn is in the flames of Jiahd as I write these words. It was planned there for sometime. I hope some are watching Liberia and Sierra Leon. I know I am.

-Shimron Issachar