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Showing posts with label Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Show all posts

Thursday, September 09, 2010

Possible Muldova AQIM Connection?

Is there a growing connection between Muldova criminal networks and AQIM? perhaps a Small Arms and Light Weapons trade for cocaine from Venezuela trafficked through west Africa?

It would make sense - Muldova is SALF heavy and possibly cocaine light, though it has Asian routes to other drugs, AQIM has been spreading alot of money around the Sahel, building bunkers and paying friends.

And they need to rearm and resupply after recent attrition. Could it be Cocaine for Arms deal? possibly throught Mali or Liberia?

  • There has been a growing Sahael - Venezuelan Trafficking connection.
  • Belmokhtar, an AQIM Sheik owns a portion of the Sahel trafficking routs(he was a trafficker before he was with AQIM, and this is his "cash cow" business.
  • European Cocaine prices have been escalating due to a shortage of supply...until recently

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Mokhtar Belmokhtar

The claimed assassination of Michel Germaneau indicates AQIM is willing to trade Islamist objectives for fund raising.

This is a small surprise from Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM's head. He has always been a business person first, a Smuggler. He married wives from three desert tribes to keep his routes through the Sahel. Now, he is about to give up funding for military objectives alone.

This shows that the multi country task force operating in his backyard are being effective.

Hostage taking for ransom as a fund raising activity is one of the sources for funding AQIM, along with trafficking in people, drugs, cash, and even more mundane contraband like cigarettes. Hostage taking for funds, which stepped up in the last year, is about to dry up,
Mokhtar Belmokhtar. No one will pay anymore if they don't get their people back.

-Shimron Issachar

****************

Prime minister: France is at war against al-Qaida
(AP) – 2 hours ago

PARIS — France is "at war" with al-Qaida and will step up efforts to fight its North African offshoot after it executed a French hostage in the Sahara, Prime Minister Francois Fillon said Tuesday.

Fillon acknowledged that the group may have killed 78-year-old hostage Michel Germaneau before — not after — a failed last-ditch raid to try to free him.

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb said in an audio message broadcast Sunday that it had killed Germaneau in retaliation for a raid last week by Mauritanian and French forces that killed at least six al-Qaida militants.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed the killing Monday, vowing that the perpetrators "will not go unpunished."

His prime minister said Tuesday that France will reinforce efforts to work with governments in northwest Africa fighting al-Qaida in the sparsely populated swath of desert that includes the borders dividing Mauritania, Mali, Algeria and Niger.

"We are at war against al-Qaida," Fillon said on Europe-1 radio. He said France "thwarts several attacks every year," without elaborating.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said Tuesday from Mauritania that the Sahel region in question "will not be left to terrorist bands, arms and drug traffickers."

"The combat risks being long but we will continue it," Kouchner said after meeting with Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Sarkozy sent the minister to the region this week to discuss, among other things, security for French citizens.

Fillon said it was unclear when Germaneau was killed. He said French authorities considered the possibility that the hostage "had already been dead" at the time of a July 12 ultimatum issued by the terrorist group. Fillon said that was only an "assumption" based on "the abnormal, strange character of this ultimatum and of (the group's) refusal to engage in discussion with French authorities."

French forces agreed to take part in what he called a "last chance" operation in the hope they could still save Germaneau, the prime minister said.

Asked whether France would seek to find Germaneau's remains, Fillon said only that when British hostage Edwin Dyer was beheaded in the region last year, "his remains were never found."

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or North Africa, grew out of an Islamist insurgency movement in Algeria, formally merging with al-Qaida in 2006 and spreading through the Sahel region.

Amid increasing concerns about terrorism and trafficking in northwest Africa, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger opened a joint military headquarters deep in the desert in April to jointly respond to threats from traffickers and the al-Qaida offshoot.

Associated Press writer Ahmed Mohammed contributed to this report from Nouakchott, Mauritania.

The Rest @ The AP

Monday, August 31, 2009

More Leadeship Division in AQIM?

I am a fan of Silobreaker, one of about a dozen or so sites who have been interested in Al Qaeda and other Islamist group Activies in Africa for several years, before it was cool.

I recently came across this excellent summary of AQIM's activities, dated 1/15/09 by Silobreaker.

Though AQIM has been active since the date of this post, including the kidnapping of several hostages for ransom, and the Murder of Edwin Dyer.

If this murder of Edwin Dyer was commited by Abdel Hamid Abu Zaid of the Tarik Ibn Ziyad group, under Mokhtar Belmokhtar's watch, it may be that Mokhtar Belmokhtar will take action against Abu Zaid. Belmokhtar reportedly
suspended his terrorist activities in late 2006 because of differences between he and Zaid.

It is important to discuss which AQIM leader was part of which activity, as each of the four AQIM groups are highly autonomous. They work together sometimes, share inteligence, but are very likely to operate independantly. Though recently depelted in battles in the Sahael, the different groups are back to conducting independant ambushes in their own territories

Silobreaker's has a great set of connnection maps I am reposting here.

Thanks Able2Act

-Shimron Issachar






Description: AQIM is an Algeria-based Sunni Muslim jihadist group that originally formed in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a faction of the Armed Islamic Group, which was the largest and most active terrorist group in Algeria. The GSPC was renamed in January 2007 after the group officially joined al-Qa?ida in September 2006. The GSPC had close to 30,000 members at its height but the Algerian Government?s counterterrorism efforts have reduced the group?s ranks to fewer than 1,000.

Since the 1990s, the group has focused most of its attacks on Algerian security personnel and facilities to achieve its primary goal of overthrowing the Algerian Government and establishing an Islamic caliphate. Following its formal alliance with al-Qaida, AQIM expanded its aims and declared its intention to attack Western targets. In late 2006 and early 2007, it conducted several improvised explosive devices (IED) attacks against convoys of foreign nationals working in the energy sector. AQIM in December 2007 attacked United Nations offices in Algiers with a car bomb and in February 2008 attacked the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, with small arms.

AQIM mainly employs conventional terrorist tactics, including guerrilla-style ambushes and mortar, rocket, and IED attacks. The group added the use of suicide bombings in April 2007, with attacks against government ministry and police buildings in Algiers that killed more than 30 people. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdal announced in May 2007 that suicide bombings will become the group?s main tactic. The group claimed responsibility for a suicide truck bomb attack that killed at least eight soldiers and injured more than 20 at a military barracks in Algeria on 11 July 2007, the opening day of the All-Africa Games.

AQIM operates primarily in northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria and northern Mali. Its principal sources of funding include extortion, kidnapping, donations, and narcotics trafficking.
Leaders:
Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (2007)
Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Mus'ab Abu Da'ud ((surrender in July 2007))
Kamel Bourgass (Imprisoned (England))
Observations: 2007: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is trying to expand its attacks beyond Algeria, drawing on a rising number of recruits from all over North Africa, thus threatening regional security, but also security in Iraq and eventually even in Europe.

In Morocco and Tunisia, the number of volunteers looking to be trained in GSPC camps has steadily grown since 2005.

Compilation by Silobreaker

Although Silobreaker has relied on what it regards as reliable sources while compiling the content herein, Silobreaker cannot guarantee the accuracy, completeness, integrity or quality of such content and no responsibility is accepted by Silobreaker in respect of such content. Readers must determine for themselves what reliance they should place on the compiled content herein.

The Rest @ Silobreaker


Saturday, July 11, 2009

AQIM Hits the Press

AQIM seems to be putting the Ransom money they United Nations arranged to pay to work...

-Shimron Issachar


Just about a year after the last time and two-and-a-half years after the first time, the New York Times again treats al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb on July 10 (AQIM) to some lurid front-page publicity, "Qaeda Branch Steps Up Raids in North Africa."

The story alarmingly fails to mention the US military advisors that have been dispatched to the region in supposed response to the AQIM threat, but does say that "Algerian security forces [are] now offering military and intelligence support to poorer neighboring countries like Mali, where the insurgents have sought refuge."

Like most such Times accounts, the report is based largely on quotes from anonymous officials—such as "a senior French counterterrorism official" who said AQIM "are now part of the global jihad." One one-the-record quote is from US Africa Command chief, Gen. William E. Ward: "Is there a threat? There sure is a threat."

The report focuses on a litany of AQIM's recent audacious attacks—some of which we already noted. Iin late May, AQIM killed a Briton, Edwin Dyer, a day after its second deadline for meeting its demands expired. Dyer had been kidnapped on Jan. 22 along with a Swiss citizen and two other tourists in Niger and was held in Mali. In return for his life, AQIM had demanded the release of Abu Qatada, a Jordanian-born Palestinian cleric held in Britain, as well as $14 million. (Qatada's release was also sought by the militants in Iraq who took members of the Christian Peacemaker Teams hostage in 2005.)

  • About two weeks later, gunmen in Timbuktu, Mali, killed a senior Malian army intelligence officer who had arrested several suspected AQIM members.
  • Within days, Malian armed forces retaliated, capturing a militant base near the Algerian border and killing more than two dozen fighters.
  • On June 23, assailants in Nouakchott, Mauritania's capital, killed Christopher Ervin Leggett, an American aid worker, in what authorities called an attempted kidnapping.
  • In Algeria about the same time, militants using roadside bombs and automatic rifles ambushed a convoy of paramilitary police forces about 110 miles east of Algiers, killing 18 members of the security forces.
  • And last weekend, presumed AQIM fighters attacked a Malian army patrol in that country's northern desert, killing nearly a dozen soldiers and capturing several others.
  • AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdal has also threatened a "flagrant war" against France in retaliation for an effort by France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to ban burqas.

Times sources conjecture that the "mayhem may be partly a result of a vicious rivalry" between two AQIM subcommanders in Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, "a clash that underscores the kind of autonomous jihad cells that counterterrorism officials say are particularly hard to combat." The rivalry may exist, but the attacks seem to be directed at common enemies, not fellow militants.


Lauren C. Ploch, an Africa specialist with the Congressional Research Service, said AQIM's ideology is unlikely to win much sympathy with the populace of the Sahel states. "Nevertheless," she said, "the vast spaces in northern Mali, Mauritania, Niger and southern Algeria are extremely difficult to police, so it’s quite possible that we may see surges in extremist activity in certain countries depending on how well their neighbors are able to control their own territories."

The Rest @ The World War Four Report

Friday, April 24, 2009

Mokhtar Belmokhtar Was Robert Fowler's Kidnapper

Freed Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay left Mali Friday aboard a Canadian government plane bound for Germany this weekend to be reunited with their families.

The two men were suddenly freed this week by their al-Qaeda-linked captors after four months of captivity. Two Europeans separately captured by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were simultaneously let go.

Reports from Algeria suggest that an unnamed European government paid AQIM factions a multimillion-dollar ransom. While this transaction has not been officially confirmed, countries such as Germany and Austria have been reported to have made similar payments in parallel cases.

“The AQIM has been really hard up for money,” Evan Kohlman, a senior investigator with the U.S.-based NEFA Foundation, told The Globe and Mail.
Robert Fowler, left, and Louis Guay, centre, greet Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré, right, in Bamako, Mali, on Thursday.

The security think-tank analyzed and circulated the terrorist group's Feb. 18 statement after the winter capture of the Canadians and Europeans.

  • “We are glad to tell our Muslim nation of the success of the mujahideen [holy warriors] in executing two kinds of operations on Niger soil,” read the statement, circulated widely on jihadist Internet forums at the time.
  • Mr. Kohlman said the AQIM, an outgrowth of the Algerian Islamist insurgency, is more pragmatic and regionally minded than other al-Qaeda groups.
  • Because it relies on ransoms to finance its terrorist operations in West Africa, he said, it often chooses to deal away, rather than kill, hostages.
  • He pointed out that two Austrian hostages were freed last year in circumstances strikingly similar to this week's release.

A picture of multilateral hostage-rescue talks among European, Canadian and West African officials was slowly emerging Friday.

  • Negotiators may have had a back channel to AQIM leaders, one report suggested.
  • Burkina Faso was involved from the beginning of negotiations,” a presidential aide in that country told Agence France-Press.
  • “We sent emissaries to meet those who were holding them. The emissaries went as far as Algeria.”

Those remarks were made as Mr. Fowler and Mr. Guay personally thanked Burkina Faso's president, Blaise Compaore, on Friday.

They stopped over en route to Europe after their release in Mali on Wednesday.
Before the release, the Canadian government had been mounting a massive diplomatic effort and rescue operation in West Africa. Officials in Ottawa said Canada paid no ransom.


Distinct AQIM factions may have held the Europeans and Canadians.

  • AFP suggested that a faction led by a one-eyed gunrunner based in desert redoubts, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 36, who is sought by Interpol, may have been holding the hostages.
  • The Europeans are said to have been captured by a Abid Hammadou, a 43-year-old core AQIM leader based in northern Mali.

Although two women, a Swiss and a German, were released this week, two men, one Swiss and one British, remain captives.

Mr. Hammadou, also known as Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, was publicly blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Department last year.

  • The department's website alleges that Mr. Hammadou runs training camps, played a role in killing 15 Mauritanian soldiers, and helped kidnap 32 German tourists six years ago.
  • Reports at the time suggested a €5-million ($8-million) ransom was paid to AQIM's precursor, the Group for Preaching and Combat.

“Most was spent buying supplies for our brothers in Algeria,” one GSPC official was quoted as saying at the time. “We also bought weapons and ammunition.”

Mr. Fowler and Mr. Guay were appointed last year to a UN mission to kick-start negotiations between Niger and a group of Islamist nomad rebels.
While travelling in a UN jeep they were kidnapped and eventually traded up to AQIM.


The Rest @ The Globe and Mail

Friday, January 30, 2009

BELMOKHTAR MOKHTAR connected to Robert Fowler Disappearence?

The United Nations may be exploring the possiblity That the kidnaping of UN Diplomat Robert Flower and Luis Guay may have a BELMOKHTAR MOKHTAR connection.

Friday, September 19, 2008

Analysis from Western Sahara

- Zouërate is the town closest to Tourine, where the assault happened. It's a mining town of economic importance to Mauritania, nowadays with a significant Sahrawi population who have moved out from the Tindouf refugee camps.

-Meaning Mauritania. The Mourabitoun was an Islamic medieval movement that emerged in Mauritania and went on to found a dynasty in modern-day Morocco; an obvious local role-model for today's jihadists.

Also note that the soldiers are alleged to be taken prisoners, not killed as initially reported. This is also what international and Mauritanian media has begun to talk about.
  • It could be based on this statement, but I did read somewhere that army units returning to Tourine could not find bodies or equipment, even while there was blood on the scene. Finally, let's keep in mind that so far this is just something someone posted on a website -- not authenticated as an AQIM statement.
  • Adrian pointed out that there have been rumors of Mokhtar Belmokhtar stepping back, being replaced by Yahia Jouadi as leader in the south. Now a communiqé supposedly from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, ex-GSPC) attributes the recent attack in Mauritania to this latter commander, labeling him the Emir of the Sahara. Either they're split threeways in some amicable division of labor, or Jouadi has moved up front (or some organizationally fuzzy combination of the two);
  • It seems reasonably clear that Belmokhtar, for whatever reason, is no longer the Emir of AQIM's southern branch. I wish to apologize to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Yahia Jouadi and Abdelmalek Droukdel, and their families, for any damage or inconvenience my statements may have caused.

    Well, what do you know -- commenter Adrian turns out to have a blog with lots of interesting stuff on the Touareg rebellions in Mali & Niger. He also has a meaty thesis on the whole thing, available in PDF. Read! Learn!

    The Rest @ The Western Shara Blogspot

    More(Adrian) @ Arab Media Shack

Sunday, February 03, 2008

Al Qaeda Meeting in Southern Algeria Interrupted

Sun 3 Feb 2008, 10:39 GMT

ALGIERS (Reuters) - Algerian troops killed five al Qaeda fighters, including the organisation's chief in Mali, during a hunt for men who shot at army helicopters in Algeria's desert south, the top-selling daily El Khabar said on Sunday.

The five were killed on Friday in the Rhourd Ennous area 700 km (440 miles) south of Algiers, El Khabar, which has good security sources, quoted a military source as saying. A sixth guerrilla was arrested in the operation, the newspaper said.

The hunt, led by a major-general, began when a group of armed men in all-terrain vehicles opened fire at army reconnaissance helicopters flying over the desert in the Rhourd Ennous region on January 29 and then fled.

The hunt was still in progress, the paper said. It quoted hospital sources as saying the dead men included people of "African nationalities."

"It is probable that they are from Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania," one of the sources was quoted as saying. An army spokesman could not immediately be reached.

The newspaper said the men had links to an al Qaeda group operated by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the Afghan war against Soviet occupation who is believed to be hiding in the border areas between Algeria, Mali and Niger.

Algeria's main Islamist militant group opusually erates in remote mountains east of Algiers and the southern desert, and is involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.

El Khabar and Echorouk newspapers both reported that security forces had arrested dozens of suspected smugglers in Algeria's southern desert in the past few weeks to probe links between smuggling and what it called terrorist activities.

The Rest @ Reuters Africa

Sunday, December 24, 2006

Ammari Saifi Still has an Interpol Arrest Warant Out for Him

In the early months of 2004, a lone convoy of Toyota pickup trucks and SUVs raced eastward across the southern extremities of the Sahara. The convoy, led by a wanted Islamic militant named Ammari Saifi, had just slipped from Mali into northern Niger, where the desert rolls out into an immense, flat pan of gravelly sand. Saifi, who has been called the "bin Laden of the Sahara," was traveling with about 50 jihadists, some from Algeria, the rest from nearby African countries such as Mauritania and Nigeria.

There are virtually no roads in this part of the desert, but the convoy moved rapidly. For nearly half a year Saifi and his men had been the object of an international hunt coordinated by the United States military and conducted primarily by the countries that share the desert. Soldiers from Niger, assisted by American and Algerian special forces, had fought with Saifi twice in the past several weeks. Each time, the convoy escaped. Now it was heading further east, toward a remote mountain range in northern Chad.

At the time, Saifi was by far the most sophisticated and resourceful Islamic militant in North Africa and the Sahel, an expansive swath of territory that runs along the Sahara's southern fringe. In the Sahel, the Sahara's windswept dunes gradually reduce to semi-desert, and then, further south, become arid savanna.

The terrain extends roughly 3,000 miles across Africa—from Senegal through Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and into Sudan. It is awesome in its scale, poverty, and lack of governance. Troubled by restive minorities, environmental degradation, economic collapse, coups, famine, genocide, and geographic isolation, the Sahel has been described by one top U.S. military commander as "a belt of instability." (Last year, the U.N. ranked Niger as having the world's worst living conditions; Mali and Chad were among the five worst.)

The region is also home to some 70 million Muslims, and since 9-11 there have been reports that Islamic radicals from other parts of Africa, as well as from the Middle East and South Asia, are proselytizing there, or seeking refuge from their home countries, or simply attempting to wage jihad.

Saifi seemed to belong to this final, most worrying, category.

  • He had spent much of his adult life trying to unseat the secular Algerian government, and in 2003 he orchestrated a terrorist act of stupendous bravado: taking 32 European adventure travelers hostage in the Algerian Sahara, shuttling half of them hundreds of miles south, into Mali, and after 177 days of captivity, exchanging the tourists for suitcases filled with 5 million euros in ransom—an immense sum of money in the Sahel, by some estimates a quarter of Niger's defense budget.
  • Most of the tourists were German, and the German government, which reportedly paid the ransom, filed an international arrest warrant for Saifi. The United States declared him a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, a classification shared by bin Laden and his senior commanders.
  • The United Nations put his name on a roster known as "The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated With the Taliban and Al-Qaida."
    The hostage taking was not just brazen, it had strategic implications. Bin Laden's top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, once noted that "a jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational matters,"
  • it appeared that Saifi, with his loose connections to Al Qaeda, could make the Sahara's wild south just such a place.
  • After releasing the hostages, Saifi remained in the Malian desert for several months, using the ransom to buy "new vehicles, lots of weapons," a U.S. intelligence officer told me.
  • Saifi established an alliance with nomadic tribesmen by marrying the teenage daughter of a sheikh near the Mauritanian border, and soon enough his small militia had gained enough strength to give the Malian army a "bloody nose," a European diplomat in Mali said.
  • For a decade, Saifi's organization, the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or GSPC, had killed scores of Algerian officials and soldiers; it was among the deadliest organizations in the world, with operatives in Europe and North America. Saifi appeared to be extending its reach further into Africa.

For the Defense Department, Saifi's activities became the central and most vivid justification for expanding the U.S. military presence in the Sahel.

  • In 2004, American Special Forces and Marines visited Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger to train local armies how to bring order to the desert, and that program will grow this year.
  • Meanwhile, covertly, the American military experimented with a new form of battle. Some analysts call it "netwar"—an innovative melding of U.S. intelligence and manpower with local forces. Netwar, according to its proponents, promises to be an effective way to fight terrorists, but it also risks causing political chaos, or worse, lethal military confusion. The hunt for Saifi may be one of its most important modern prototypes.

While senior U.S. military commanders monitored Saifi's growing influence in the Sahel, they pressured the Malian government to take aggressive action. According to a U.N. official, the Malian government was hesitant to attack the convoy because it "feared that the GSPC might retaliate." A former U.S. diplomat in the region said the Defense Department was "unhappy because basically, the Malians haven't gone and kicked butt in the desert."

  • Where Mali's impoverished army was too timid, or unable, to act, the U.S. military stepped in.
  • American Navy P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft, dispatched from Italy, tracked Saifi's movements, and U.S. "military experts," according to a local press report, conducted operations on the ground.
  • American military teams in northern Mali helped Algerian and local security forces chase Saifi's militia into Niger, where they engaged in several gunfights.
  • They found that the convoy, though battered, was well equipped for desert warfare. Saifi had fitted the vehicles with GPS navigational devices that enabled his men to locate secret caches of water and supplies in the vast, uninhabited stretches of desert.
  • In truck beds, 12.7mm machine guns and 14.5mm Russian anti-aircraft guns threatened adversaries that approached by land and air.

With the multinational force closing in, and American reconnaissance planes observing from above, Saifi's convoy raced across Niger toward the Chadian border. As the vehicles pushed forward, weapons rattled in their mountings and the roar of engines cut through the desert silence.

Stray rocks and loose sand battered the vehicles' exteriors. Windshields clouded over with sediment. During a recent battle, fire had damaged some gear, and certain electrical devices began to fail. One truck broke down near a forlorn place in Niger known as the Tree of Ténéré, where an ancient and solitary acacia once stood. The truck was abandoned.

Occasionally, if Saifi believed there was time for prayer, he might stop the convoy. At these moments, his men would walk some way from the trucks, lay in a row their small woven rugs over the ocher dust, shriveled scrub, and stones, and bow toward Mecca. Sometimes, as they prayed, fierce winds would blow through the folds of their desert gowns, and the sun would cast their shadows across the sand.

In the desert mountains, Chadian rebels proved more adept than government soldiers.


But on at least one occasion, military strategists in Germany clashed with the State Department over how to deal with an Algerian militant named Mokhtar Belmokhtar, "The One-Eyed."

  • Mokhtar had ties to the GSPC, and for years had run a transnational smuggling and banditry operation from the deserts of northern Mali.
  • The U.S. military believed that after 9-11 Mokhtar was recruiting and arming religious radicals in the area; it wanted to attack his camps.
  • The State Department argued that the intelligence on Mokhtar was not conclusive, and the American embassy in Mali insisted that an air strike on Mokhtar would "radicalize people you don't want to radicalize," according to a U.S. government official in the Sahel.
  • In the end, the attack was called off. Vicki Huddleston, who was then U.S. ambassador to Mali, said that rather than arming terrorists, Mokhtar was supporting the Kunta Arabs, a nomadic group that was fighting other desert tribes.

Huddleston has since retired from government, and declined to discuss her official conversations with European Command, but when asked about the dispute, she said, "If you're correct that we discouraged [the Defense Department], it was a good thing. If we had bombed a bunch of Kuntas, I think the whole place would have gone crazy. They're certainly not terrorists."

Still, the information on Mokhtar's activities was worrying, and taken with other intelligence from the region, it said a great deal about the Sahel's vulnerabilities.

In October 2002 an American counterterrorism team visited Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania to invite those countries into a program called the Pan Sahel Initiative. The program was officially "designed to protect borders, track the movement of people, combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation and stability."

  • Small groups of Special Forces and Marines, operating under European Command, would deploy to each state, where they would train select, 150-man companies.
  • They would provide the African troops with equipment, such as night-vision goggles, ammunition, and communications gear.
  • They would facilitate military cooperation by putting the region's top defense chiefs in touch with each other. (Within the Sahel, open channels of communication between militaries barely exist.) They would, essentially, lay the foundation for a network that could stymie the growth of regional terrorism.

The four countries were eager to participate, and the Pan Sahel Initiative was budgeted for roughly $6.5 million for its first year. Initially, it seemed like an abstract, preventative exercise, but as preparations were under way circumstances on the ground changed.

In early 2003, news emerged that Saifi had kidnapped the 32 tourists. Suddenly the initiative's planners had a real target. Wald has called the hostage taking a "blessing in disguise." It provided European Command with not only an important test case, but also the strongest argument for its newfound mission in Africa.


When Saifi's convoy finally crossed from Niger into Chad's rugged Tibesti Mountains, it found itself cornered by a small contingent of Chadian soldiers. The two sides fought an intense battle, one that would last for three days. When the Defense Department learned that the Chadian military had intercepted Saifi and his men, orders were rushed to Ramstein Air Base in Germany to prepare two heavy C-130 Hercules aircraft with roughly 20 tons of aid for the Chadian army. Normally, it takes two days for the Air Force to prepare such a mission. Ramstein had to have the planes in the air immediately. There was danger that Saifi might flee again. The convoy had reportedly backed into a large cave for cover, and the soldiers had taken losses—three killed and 16 injured. The Chadian soldiers were ill equipped, with little food, ammunition, or medical supplies. In contrast, Saifi and his men were well armed, with rocket-propelled grenades, automatic rifles, ammunition, night-vision goggles, and advanced communications gear. Ramstein had the C-130s airborne in one hour, and 10 hours later, the planes approached an austere military outpost in northern Chad, the Faya-Largeau Airport.

As the pilots prepared to land, the limitations of the Chadian military became evident. Brush and sand encroached on the tarmac. In the 100-degree heat, three dozen Chadian soldiers rushed to help unload the C-130s, but doing the job by hand would be disastrously slow. The crew performed an improvised "offload" and the supplies were rushed to the front. By the battle's end, the soldiers had killed or captured 43 militants. But Saifi and some of his men, once again, slipped away. Hungry, destitute, and uncertain of their precise location, the militants wandered off on foot, only to confront further hardships. In Tibesti's desert mountains—some as high as 10,000 feet—there are virtually no natural sources of food or water. The region is controlled by a secular rebel group known as the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad, or MDJT, which has been fighting the Chadian government since 1998. It wasn't long before the rebels found Saifi, put him in chains, and announced that the Sahara's most notorious hostage taker had, himself, been taken hostage.

Ammari Saifi Still has an Interpol Arrest Warant Out for Him

In the early months of 2004, a lone convoy of Toyota pickup trucks and SUVs raced eastward across the southern extremities of the Sahara. The convoy, led by a wanted Islamic militant named Ammari Saifi, had just slipped from Mali into northern Niger, where the desert rolls out into an immense, flat pan of gravelly sand. Saifi, who has been called the "bin Laden of the Sahara," was traveling with about 50 jihadists, some from Algeria, the rest from nearby African countries such as Mauritania and Nigeria.

There are virtually no roads in this part of the desert, but the convoy moved rapidly. For nearly half a year Saifi and his men had been the object of an international hunt coordinated by the United States military and conducted primarily by the countries that share the desert. Soldiers from Niger, assisted by American and Algerian special forces, had fought with Saifi twice in the past several weeks. Each time, the convoy escaped. Now it was heading further east, toward a remote mountain range in northern Chad.

At the time, Saifi was by far the most sophisticated and resourceful Islamic militant in North Africa and the Sahel, an expansive swath of territory that runs along the Sahara's southern fringe. In the Sahel, the Sahara's windswept dunes gradually reduce to semi-desert, and then, further south, become arid savanna.

The terrain extends roughly 3,000 miles across Africa—from Senegal through Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and into Sudan. It is awesome in its scale, poverty, and lack of governance. Troubled by restive minorities, environmental degradation, economic collapse, coups, famine, genocide, and geographic isolation, the Sahel has been described by one top U.S. military commander as "a belt of instability." (Last year, the U.N. ranked Niger as having the world's worst living conditions; Mali and Chad were among the five worst.)

The region is also home to some 70 million Muslims, and since 9-11 there have been reports that Islamic radicals from other parts of Africa, as well as from the Middle East and South Asia, are proselytizing there, or seeking refuge from their home countries, or simply attempting to wage jihad.

Saifi seemed to belong to this final, most worrying, category.

  • He had spent much of his adult life trying to unseat the secular Algerian government, and in 2003 he orchestrated a terrorist act of stupendous bravado: taking 32 European adventure travelers hostage in the Algerian Sahara, shuttling half of them hundreds of miles south, into Mali, and after 177 days of captivity, exchanging the tourists for suitcases filled with 5 million euros in ransom—an immense sum of money in the Sahel, by some estimates a quarter of Niger's defense budget.
  • Most of the tourists were German, and the German government, which reportedly paid the ransom, filed an international arrest warrant for Saifi. The United States declared him a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, a classification shared by bin Laden and his senior commanders.
  • The United Nations put his name on a roster known as "The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated With the Taliban and Al-Qaida."
    The hostage taking was not just brazen, it had strategic implications. Bin Laden's top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, once noted that "a jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational matters,"
  • it appeared that Saifi, with his loose connections to Al Qaeda, could make the Sahara's wild south just such a place.
  • After releasing the hostages, Saifi remained in the Malian desert for several months, using the ransom to buy "new vehicles, lots of weapons," a U.S. intelligence officer told me.
  • Saifi established an alliance with nomadic tribesmen by marrying the teenage daughter of a sheikh near the Mauritanian border, and soon enough his small militia had gained enough strength to give the Malian army a "bloody nose," a European diplomat in Mali said.
  • For a decade, Saifi's organization, the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or GSPC, had killed scores of Algerian officials and soldiers; it was among the deadliest organizations in the world, with operatives in Europe and North America. Saifi appeared to be extending its reach further into Africa.

For the Defense Department, Saifi's activities became the central and most vivid justification for expanding the U.S. military presence in the Sahel.

  • In 2004, American Special Forces and Marines visited Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger to train local armies how to bring order to the desert, and that program will grow this year.
  • Meanwhile, covertly, the American military experimented with a new form of battle. Some analysts call it "netwar"—an innovative melding of U.S. intelligence and manpower with local forces. Netwar, according to its proponents, promises to be an effective way to fight terrorists, but it also risks causing political chaos, or worse, lethal military confusion. The hunt for Saifi may be one of its most important modern prototypes.

While senior U.S. military commanders monitored Saifi's growing influence in the Sahel, they pressured the Malian government to take aggressive action. According to a U.N. official, the Malian government was hesitant to attack the convoy because it "feared that the GSPC might retaliate." A former U.S. diplomat in the region said the Defense Department was "unhappy because basically, the Malians haven't gone and kicked butt in the desert."

  • Where Mali's impoverished army was too timid, or unable, to act, the U.S. military stepped in.
  • American Navy P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft, dispatched from Italy, tracked Saifi's movements, and U.S. "military experts," according to a local press report, conducted operations on the ground.
  • American military teams in northern Mali helped Algerian and local security forces chase Saifi's militia into Niger, where they engaged in several gunfights.
  • They found that the convoy, though battered, was well equipped for desert warfare. Saifi had fitted the vehicles with GPS navigational devices that enabled his men to locate secret caches of water and supplies in the vast, uninhabited stretches of desert.
  • In truck beds, 12.7mm machine guns and 14.5mm Russian anti-aircraft guns threatened adversaries that approached by land and air.

With the multinational force closing in, and American reconnaissance planes observing from above, Saifi's convoy raced across Niger toward the Chadian border. As the vehicles pushed forward, weapons rattled in their mountings and the roar of engines cut through the desert silence.

Stray rocks and loose sand battered the vehicles' exteriors. Windshields clouded over with sediment. During a recent battle, fire had damaged some gear, and certain electrical devices began to fail. One truck broke down near a forlorn place in Niger known as the Tree of Ténéré, where an ancient and solitary acacia once stood. The truck was abandoned.

Occasionally, if Saifi believed there was time for prayer, he might stop the convoy. At these moments, his men would walk some way from the trucks, lay in a row their small woven rugs over the ocher dust, shriveled scrub, and stones, and bow toward Mecca. Sometimes, as they prayed, fierce winds would blow through the folds of their desert gowns, and the sun would cast their shadows across the sand.

In the desert mountains, Chadian rebels proved more adept than government soldiers.


But on at least one occasion, military strategists in Germany clashed with the State Department over how to deal with an Algerian militant named Mokhtar Belmokhtar, "The One-Eyed."

  • Mokhtar had ties to the GSPC, and for years had run a transnational smuggling and banditry operation from the deserts of northern Mali.
  • The U.S. military believed that after 9-11 Mokhtar was recruiting and arming religious radicals in the area; it wanted to attack his camps.
  • The State Department argued that the intelligence on Mokhtar was not conclusive, and the American embassy in Mali insisted that an air strike on Mokhtar would "radicalize people you don't want to radicalize," according to a U.S. government official in the Sahel.
  • In the end, the attack was called off. Vicki Huddleston, who was then U.S. ambassador to Mali, said that rather than arming terrorists, Mokhtar was supporting the Kunta Arabs, a nomadic group that was fighting other desert tribes.

Huddleston has since retired from government, and declined to discuss her official conversations with European Command, but when asked about the dispute, she said, "If you're correct that we discouraged [the Defense Department], it was a good thing. If we had bombed a bunch of Kuntas, I think the whole place would have gone crazy. They're certainly not terrorists."

Still, the information on Mokhtar's activities was worrying, and taken with other intelligence from the region, it said a great deal about the Sahel's vulnerabilities.

In October 2002 an American counterterrorism team visited Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania to invite those countries into a program called the Pan Sahel Initiative. The program was officially "designed to protect borders, track the movement of people, combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation and stability."

  • Small groups of Special Forces and Marines, operating under European Command, would deploy to each state, where they would train select, 150-man companies.
  • They would provide the African troops with equipment, such as night-vision goggles, ammunition, and communications gear.
  • They would facilitate military cooperation by putting the region's top defense chiefs in touch with each other. (Within the Sahel, open channels of communication between militaries barely exist.) They would, essentially, lay the foundation for a network that could stymie the growth of regional terrorism.

The four countries were eager to participate, and the Pan Sahel Initiative was budgeted for roughly $6.5 million for its first year. Initially, it seemed like an abstract, preventative exercise, but as preparations were under way circumstances on the ground changed.

In early 2003, news emerged that Saifi had kidnapped the 32 tourists. Suddenly the initiative's planners had a real target. Wald has called the hostage taking a "blessing in disguise." It provided European Command with not only an important test case, but also the strongest argument for its newfound mission in Africa.


When Saifi's convoy finally crossed from Niger into Chad's rugged Tibesti Mountains, it found itself cornered by a small contingent of Chadian soldiers. The two sides fought an intense battle, one that would last for three days. When the Defense Department learned that the Chadian military had intercepted Saifi and his men, orders were rushed to Ramstein Air Base in Germany to prepare two heavy C-130 Hercules aircraft with roughly 20 tons of aid for the Chadian army. Normally, it takes two days for the Air Force to prepare such a mission. Ramstein had to have the planes in the air immediately. There was danger that Saifi might flee again. The convoy had reportedly backed into a large cave for cover, and the soldiers had taken losses—three killed and 16 injured. The Chadian soldiers were ill equipped, with little food, ammunition, or medical supplies. In contrast, Saifi and his men were well armed, with rocket-propelled grenades, automatic rifles, ammunition, night-vision goggles, and advanced communications gear. Ramstein had the C-130s airborne in one hour, and 10 hours later, the planes approached an austere military outpost in northern Chad, the Faya-Largeau Airport.

As the pilots prepared to land, the limitations of the Chadian military became evident. Brush and sand encroached on the tarmac. In the 100-degree heat, three dozen Chadian soldiers rushed to help unload the C-130s, but doing the job by hand would be disastrously slow. The crew performed an improvised "offload" and the supplies were rushed to the front. By the battle's end, the soldiers had killed or captured 43 militants. But Saifi and some of his men, once again, slipped away. Hungry, destitute, and uncertain of their precise location, the militants wandered off on foot, only to confront further hardships. In Tibesti's desert mountains—some as high as 10,000 feet—there are virtually no natural sources of food or water. The region is controlled by a secular rebel group known as the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad, or MDJT, which has been fighting the Chadian government since 1998. It wasn't long before the rebels found Saifi, put him in chains, and announced that the Sahara's most notorious hostage taker had, himself, been taken hostage.

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