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Showing posts with label Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Show all posts

Sunday, May 10, 2009

Adrian Martin was right, and bow Counter- AQIM Offensive appears to be underway.
-shimron Issachar

Mali pursues al Qaeda suspects in north - source

09 May 2009 15:59:56 GMT 09 May 2009 15:59:56 GMT
Source: Reuters

* Three army units sent in pursuit of armed group
* Hunt comes before deadline in British hostage case
* Sahara states said preparing possible joint action
By Tiemoko Diallo

BAMAKO, May 9 (Reuters) - Mali launched an operation aimed at flushing out suspected al Qaeda militants in the Sahara on Saturday and states in the region are preparing for a joint crackdown, military sources said.

A group called al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a British hostage, believed to be held in the region, on May 15 unless Britain releases a Jordanian Islamist it is holding in prison.
  • Mali's army sent three combat units from the northern town of Kidal to pursue a convoy of armed men spotted in the region close to its borders with Algeria and Niger, said the source, who requested anonymity.
  • "We are awaiting what comes out of it. We do not know whether they are Salafists or another armed group ... but we think they are Salafists," said the source.

The AQIM title was adopted when rebels with Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) affiliated themselves to the al Qaeda network.

Mali and others in the region such as Algeria, Niger and Mauritania are trying to deflect pressure from Europe and the United States to tackle Islamist militant violence there.

  • It was not immediately clear whether the Malian operation heralded a wider offensive. However, a senior military source in Niger confirmed there were preparations for a joint effort.
  • "This is a about attacking head-on a joint problem, namely the presence of terrorists linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in this vast area," said the source.

The source, who requested anonymity, did not specify when any operation could be carried out but said Niger's army chief, General Moumouni Boureima, had recently travelled to Algeria to discuss planning with officials there.


"Algeria has supplied military aid to Niger and we would like it to do the same for us." The source said Mauritania could also take part in any joint crackdown.
AQIM has been waging a campaign of bombings and shootings, primarily along Algeria's Mediterranean coast.

A security crackdown has reduced its ability to mount attacks there, forcing it to switch its focus to the Sahara, with its vast spaces and weak government control.


It has claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Canadian diplomats and four European tourists in the past five months.

  • The two diplomats and two of the tourists were released in Mali last month.
  • The remaining hostages are the Briton and a Swiss.

Security experts say the British hostage is most likely being held in the thinly populated area in the Sahara along Algeria's borders with Mali.

(Additional reporting by Abdoulaye Massalatchi in Niamey; writing by Mark John; editing by Robert Woodward)

The Rest from Alertnet

Wednesday, August 06, 2008

GAO says Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Member Plans are not Integrated

U.S. counterterrorism efforts flounder in North Africa, GAO says
By Katherine McIntire Peters
August 5, 2008

Federal agencies agree that terrorist activity in North Africa presents a growing security threat to U.S. interests. Vast ungoverned spaces, porous borders and groups aligned with al Qaeda have raised concerns about the area becoming a safe haven for terrorists to launch attacks against the United States.

But the agencies most responsible for implementing a key counterterrorism partnership program -- the State and Defense departments and the U.S. Agency for International Development -- can't seem to agree on how to implement policy there.

Disagreements between State and Defense over the control of personnel and activities, and funding fluctuations in USAID programs have hindered U.S. objectives in the region, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office. In addition, agencies have no way of measuring the effectiveness of their activities.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is the primary vehicle of U.S. counterterrorism policy in northwest Africa, GAO noted.

Through diplomacy, development assistance and military activities, the multiagency effort, led by State, aims to limit the spread of extremist ideology, strengthen government institutions and foster cooperation among the nations of the regions known as the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger); the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia); and the sub-Sahara (Nigeria and Senegal).

A central problem, GAO found, was that the three agencies developed separate plans related to their respective partnership activities. While those plans reflect some collaboration, "they do not provide an integrated, comprehensive approach to guide [the partnership program] overall," GAO reported.

What's more, State and Defense have not been able to agree on which department exercises authority over military personnel temporarily assigned to conduct partnership activities. Both agree that State is responsible for security and coordination of all government personnel assigned to diplomatic and consular posts abroad, except for personnel under the command of a U.S. military commander. They also agree that Defense is responsible for all activities carried out by military personnel deployed by a combatant commander.

  • State asserts that military personnel are subject to an ambassador's supervision because they seek clearance from the ambassador to enter the country.
  • Defense argues that such personnel are not under an ambassador's authority.

The consequences of this disagreement have been felt on the ground. In Niger in 2007, Defense suspended most of its partnership activities after the ambassador limited the number of Defense personnel allowed to enter the country. State said the limits were set because the embassy was worried about the country's fragile political environment as well as limited space and staff available to support Defense personnel.

In Chad, the ambassador recently called for a "strategic pause" in implementing partnership programs, "stating the need to reassess available embassy personnel to support DoD activities in country," GAO found.


"Lacking guidance from agency headquarters, country team officials have tried to establish agreements between State and DoD," but those agreements have not been considered valid by Defense and State officials in Washington.

Inconsistent funding also has plagued the counterterrorism partnership program. For example, USAID had to suspend support for partnership development activities in Mali in 2006, because the activities weren't funded (even though the agency received funding for the activities in 2005 and 2007). Agency officials told GAO the funding inconsistencies caused the Mali government to question the agency's commitment.

The partnership is not funded directly by Congress; rather agencies pay for the program at their discretion through various appropriations accounts. From 2005 through 2007, the three agencies together obligated about $230 million for partnership activities; in 2008, they have committed to spending about $123 million. Defense obligations for 2005-2007 and commitments for 2008 accounted for the bulk of that funding: $256 million. State and USAID, whose funding is determined by State's director of foreign assistance, together contributed $96 million during the same period.

Besides addressing the inconsistent funding problem for USAID and resolving the issue of authority over military personnel, GAO recommended that State spearhead the development of a comprehensive strategy for the partnership program and "include clear goals, objectives and milestones, including output and outcome indicators, and identify resources needed to achieve the program's goals."

"Given the growing threat of terrorism in northwest Africa, as well as the possibility of [the partnership program's] expansion to other countries and agencies, addressing these factors is essential to strengthening U.S. agencies' collaborative efforts to combat terrorism in the region," GAO concluded.

The value of the partnership program likely will grow in importance. State's 2007 country reports on terrorism, released in April, described the growing threat posed by al Qaeda in North Africa. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, or AQIM, formed in 2006 as an alliance between al Qaeda and the group formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. AQIM claimed responsibility for the near-simultaneous bombings of the Algerian Constitutional Council and the United Nations headquarters in Algeria on Dec. 11, indicating that foreign interests now are being targeted.

The Rest @ GovernmentExecutive.com

Monday, August 04, 2008

AQIM and their Global Strategy

It is about time the CFR did an update to the profile of AQIM.
Here is a summary.

-Shimron

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or L'Organisation Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (Formerly Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat)


Introduction
What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?
What's the connection between AQIM and al-Qaeda?
What are AQIM's goals?
What are the group's tactics?
Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?
Who are the group's main leaders?
How is the group funded?
Does AQIM have a significant presence in Iraq?

Introduction
Terrorist activity in North Africa has been reinvigorated in the last few years by a local Algerian Islamist group turned pan-Maghreb jihadi organization: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A Sunni group that previously called itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the organization has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, declared its intention to attack Western targets, and sent a squad of jihadis to Iraq.

Experts believe these actions suggest widening ambitions within the group's leadership, now pursuing a more global, sophisticated, and better-financed direction.

Long categorized as part of a strictly domestic insurgency against Algeria's military government, AQIM claims to be the local franchise operation for al-Qaeda, a worrying development for a region that has been relatively peaceful since the bloody Algerian civil war of the 1990s drew to a close.

European officials are taking AQIM's international threats seriously and are worried about the growing number of Europe-based cells, states this Europol Report (PDF) .

What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?
AQIM originated as an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. Its insurrection began after Algeria's military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 when it seemed that the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take power. In 1998, the group declared its independence from another terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), believing the GIA's brutal tactics were hurting the Islamist cause. The GSPC gained support from the Algerian population by vowing to continue fighting the government while avoiding the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The group has since surpassed the GIA in influence and numbers to become the primary force for Islamism in Algeria.

A government amnesty program and a persistent counterterrorism campaign by the Algerian army significantly decreased the number of local terrorists, which at its highest point in the 1990s was estimated as high as 28,000. According to the U.S. State Department, which compiles yearly statistics on terrorist groups, AQIM's membership is now in the hundreds.

But there are indications that terrorism in North Africa is on the rise and that AQIM is using the Iraq war and other unpopular Western policies to recruit new membership. "Despite the official happy talk," says Olivier Guitta, a Washington-based foreign affairs consultant, "kidnappings by Islamists to raise money for their cause are a routine occurrence in Algeria.


And not a day goes by without terrorists' attacking military personnel, government employees, or ordinary civilians, whom they regard as allies of the government."

What's the connection between AQIM and al-Qaeda?

Collusion between AQIM and al-Qaeda is not a new phenomenon. According to a 2007 report by Emily Hunt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden provided funding for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and was involved in the GSPC's early formation. Many of the group's founding members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially approved GSPC's merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006.
AQIM has since claimed responsibility for attacks under its new name.

What are AQIM's goals?

Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria's secular military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, a theocracy based on Islamic law that for twelve centuries spanned the Muslim world. Counterterrorism experts, however, say the group's folding into the global al-Qaeda structure may indicate a shift to take up the banner of global jihad and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq. "Pressed by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Algeria-centric GSPC has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself," said Henry A. Crumpton, U.S. ambassador for counterterrorism, during April 2006

Senate subcommittee testimony (PDF).

Algerian authorities consider the name change to be a last-ditch attempt to revitalize a domestic insurgency. However, AQIM's vocal support of al-Qaeda and declaration of solidarity (PDF) with Islamic extremists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya indicate broader intent. "Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother," AQIM's current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal, said in a July 2008 interview with the New York Times. In keeping with this statement, the group has issued several communiqués that expand its targets—originally the Algerian military and France—to include the United States. AQIM has accused America of propping up the "apostate" Algerian regime and leading a crusade against Muslims.

What are the group's tactics?

AQIM employs conventional terrorist tactics (PDF) in Algeria, including guerilla-style ambushes against military personnel and truck bombs against government targets, according to the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) at the Manhattan Institute. GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. The ransom paid for their release is unknown but estimated to be from $5 million to as much as $10 million; the group may have used these funds to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment.

In December 2006, the group attacked two buses carrying contractors near Algiers, wounding several foreign nationals. Four months later, the group killed twenty-three people with twin bombings in Algiers. One of the bombs exploded outside the prime minister's office, a move CFR Senior Fellow Steven A. Cook describes as "a major escalation." In December 2007, the group was behind a double suicide bombing in Algiers that killed forty-one people, including seventeen UN staff members. These attacks, as well as a June 2008 twin suicide bombing of an army outpost, suggest the group is relying more on suicide attacks as its preferred method. The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism says this development is a nod to al-Qaeda and a wish to emulate the success of suicide bombings in Iraq.

Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?

Some experts warn the group's growing confidence could increase its willingness to target Westerners both inside and outside Algeria. The group has called for jihadis who can't reach the battlefields of Iraq to target Jews, Christians, and apostates (PDF) in their own regions.
  • AQIM has taken over, and some say revitalized, many Europe-based cells of the former GIA for both fundraising and recruiting.
  • In spite of its growing global presence, some experts doubt AQIM's ability to carry out a Qaeda-scale attack. "They haven't done anything spectacular," says Hugh Roberts, an expert on North African politics and former head of the International Crisis Group's North Africa project. "They have not actually pulled off a single terrorist attack in Europe in the eight years they've existed. And that's a fact that you have to put in balance against European security services that say the group is a major threat."
  • On the other hand, Bruce Reidel, a former CIA counterterrorism official now with the Brookings Institution, writes that AQIM has been steadily building up its capability to carry out attacks in Western Europe and even North America. In June 2008, Spanish authorities uncovered a terrorist cell in Spain, arresting eight men and detaining ten accused of providing logistical and financial support to AQIM. This follows French police uncovering a similar cell in the outskirts of Paris in December 2007. Arrests of suspected terrorists with ties to AQIM have been made throughout Europe in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Some analysts point to thwarted attacks and arrests of AQIM-linked terrorists as evidence the group is capable of attacks in Western Europe.

Who are the group's main leaders?

After the 1979-1989 insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan, hundreds of North African volunteers known as "Afghan Arabs" returned to the region and radicalized Islamist movements. Most of the group's main leaders are believed to have trained in Afghanistan. Abdelmalek Droukdal, also known as Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, is the current chief of the group. University-educated as a science student and well known for his bomb-making abilities, he has led the group since 2004, when its previous leader, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed in a firefight with Algerian forces.

Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak el-Para because he was trained as an Algerian

paratrooper, is a former leader of the group that remains an important figure. Saifi is best known for organizing the lucrative 2003 kidnapping of European tourists in the Algerian Sahara. He was known as the "Bin Laden of the desert" and classified as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" by the United States, a title shared by top al-Qaeda commanders before he was captured in Chad in 2004 and eventually extradited to Algeria. In February 2008, AQIM militants kidnapped two Austrian tourists in Tunisia and listed el-Para's release as one of their demands. Algerian courts recently sentenced him to death, though the last execution in the country occurred in 1993.


How is the group funded?

Smuggling and petty crimes are a lucrative source of income, according to the CPT report. The porous, unpoliced borders of the Sahara region make smuggling vehicles, cigarettes, drugs, and arms particularly easy. Europe-based cells provide funds to AQIM through drug dealing, counterfeiting money, and other illegal activities, French and Italian police forces reported to Europol in 2008. The ransom paid as a result of the 2003 kidnapping provided a significant windfall for the group. To continue its tradition of self-financing, writes counterterrorism consultant Olivier Guitta, AQIM operatives may be turning more to kidnapping as a source of income. The group reportedly requested five million pounds for the ransom of two Austrian tourists in 2008. Algerian authorities have accused Iran and Sudan of giving material support to

AQIM, but experts say that is unlikely.

Does AQIM have a significant presence in Iraq?
Yes. AQIM has funneled North African insurgents to Iraq to fight as suicide bombers, foot soldiers, and mid-level commanders, says Hunt. Although counting foreign fighters is difficult, Evan Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant, estimates that North Africans represent between 9 percent and 25 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq, although the vast majority are still of Saudi and Jordanian origin. Adil Sakir al-Mukni, a key link between AQIM and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was deported by the Syrian government in 2005 for helping shuttle foreign fighters into Iraq. AQIM reportedly called on the Zarqawi network to attack French nationals in Iraq and applauded the 2005 killing of two Algerian diplomats there.


Authors: Andrew HansenLauren
The Rest @ The Council on Foreign Relations

Friday, July 25, 2008

AQIM Cuts off the Head of Algerian Farmer

Bani, Algeria.

A group of AQIM terrorists sabotaging a rural house and beheaded a 66 year old Farmer evening of July 12, reports Maghrebia, which claims the Algerian Press is concealing the incident.
Algerian press concealing heavily on the attack.

At approximately 8 pm more than twenty men under the age of 40 years raided the house of one small farmers in the region.


A witness said "the men were heavily armed and wearing military clothes. They thought they were soldiers who raided the process. Immediately after entering the house they took the mobile phone and told the family to stay in the kitchen, where three guards ransacked the house. Terrorists have not delayed much in our demand for money and jewelry

The Terrorists wanted the money obtained by the Farmer father under a programme to assist farmers. They seized 200 thousand dinars an d hunting rifles.They then were told to stay inside the house, and threatened to kill any of us if we tried to get out. "

They took the Head of the family and left. Security forces found later in the man's body lying on the ground had cut his head off.

The Community of 5000 has been terrified since

The incident reminded many of the residents dark days nineties, during which the terrorists did not refrain from cutting of the heads of children, women and elders.

In an attempt to understand this criminal act talked with Moroccan security affairs expert live tour. An unnamed security person suggested to the family that this was probably retaliation for failing to comply with blackmail payments. He added that Elements of the group usually targeted farmers, traders and owners of the liberal professions"

No group claimed responsibility for the organization after the killing, but this area is a former stronghold of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has now become Al Qaeda in the Maghreb ( AQIM )

Local newspapers have avoided talk about the event but some people who said that this is due to the Interior Ministry, which usually deal with public information on terrorism has not issued any official statement on the incident.

More @ The Medialine

The Rest @ Maghrebia

-This suggests a new Fund Raising Strategy for AQIM, and ads evidence to the possibility that AQIM is in need of cash, having recently been reinforced in numbers by veteran insurgents returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.

-Shimron

Sunday, May 25, 2008

US State Dept Terrorist Assesment of Africa

The 2007 US State Dept Assessment of Terrorist Threats in Africa was published on April 30th, 2008.

What follows is a summary. Here is the full report

-Shimron

Al-Qaida (AQ) operatives in East Africa and al-Shabaab militants in Somalia continued to pose the most serious threat to American and allied interests in the region. The late 2006 defeat of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) as a governing force in Mogadishu by Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, and the ensuing insurgency that engulfed Mogadishu and parts of south central Somalia for the remainder of the year continued to make Somalia a permissive operating environment and a potential safe haven for both Somali and foreign terrorists already in the region. Somalia remains a concern, as its unsecured borders and continued political instability provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or organization. AQ is likely to keep making common cause with cells of Somali extremists in an attempt to disrupt international peacemaking efforts in Somalia.

There were few significant international terrorist incidents in Africa, but civil conflict, ethnic violence, and activity amongst domestic terrorist groups continued in a number of countries. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) officially merged with AQ in September 2006 and subsequently, in early 2007, changed its name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This event signaled the importance of a comprehensive and coordinated approach to the threats posed in the region. The huge swath of largely open territory in the Sahel provides AQIM with an important base for smuggling, logistics, recruiting, and training fighters. AQIM focused its major attacks on Algeria, but continued to operate in the Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist operations in the Trans-Sahara and, possibly, for operations outside the region.

Hizballah continued to engage in fundraising activities in Africa, particularly in West Africa, but did not engage in any terrorist attacks within the region.
Many African governments improved their cooperation and strengthened their counterterrorism efforts. Both the African Union (AU) and African regional organizations continued initiatives to improve counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing.
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy to combat violent extremism and defeat terrorist organizations by strengthening individual-country and regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security and intelligence organizations, promoting democratic governance, and discrediting terrorist ideology. The overall goals are to:

  • Enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the trans-Sahara
  • Facilitate cooperation between those countries and our Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) .

TSCTP’s main elements include:

  • Continued specialized Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA),
  • Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP),
  • Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) activities in the trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs;
  • Public diplomacy programs that expand outreach efforts in the trans-Sahara region and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse region.

Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most African Muslim communities and countering the development of extremism, particularly in youth and rural populations; Democratic governance programs that strive, in particular, to provide adequate levels of USG support for democratic and economic development in the Sahel, strengthening those states to withstand internal threats; and,

Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence sharing.

The African Union

The African Union (AU) has several counterterrorism legal instruments including a Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), a 2002 Protocol to the Convention and a 2004 Plan of Action. The Addis Ababa-based AU Commission provided guidance to its 53 member states and coordinated limited technical assistance to cover member states’ counterterrorism capability gaps.

The Algiers-based African Center for Study and Research in Terrorism (ACSRT) was approved and inaugurated in October 2004 to serve as a think tank, an information collection and dissemination center, and a regional training center. The AU is working with member states to eliminate redundancies between the ACSRT and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA), which was first established at the AU Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005. The Department of State and the National Defense University’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) have collaborated with the AU to run counterterrorism workshops.


In 2005, with Danish funding, the AU hired a consultant to draft a counterterrorism Model Law to serve as a template to assist member states in drafting language to implement counterterrorism commitments.

In December 2006, an AU-sponsored group of experts drafted counterterrorism language, which was in the process of being legislated. The group of experts decided to retain options for both broad and specific laws and determined that new legislation was needed to combat money laundering and other financial crimes.

Some AU member states maintained that Africa’s colonial legacy made it difficult to accept a definition of terrorism that excluded an exception for “freedom fighters.” Nonetheless, the AU is on record strongly condemning acts of terrorism.


Although the AU Commission had the strong political will to act as an effective counterterrorism partner, AU staffing remained below requisite levels; consequently, capacity remained relatively weak. The AU created a counterterrorism unit at its Addis Ababa headquarters to coordinate and promote member state counterterrorism efforts more effectively.

The AU welcomed technical and financial assistance from international partners/donors to bolster both AU headquarters and ACSRT activities approved by member states.

Angola


Angola's borders remained porous and vulnerable to movements of small arms, diamonds, and other sources of terrorist financing. Angola’s high rate of dollar cash flow makes its financial system an attractive site for money laundering. The Government of Angola’s capacity to detect financial crimes is limited, although it did make several high-profile arrests of dollar counterfeiters in 2007.

Angola has not signed the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The government's limited law enforcement resources were directed towards border control and stemming the flow of illegal immigrants into the country, which increased exponentially since the 2002 peace treaty ending Angola's protracted civil war.

Lack of infrastructure, corruption, and insufficient capacity continued to hinder Angola's border control and law enforcement capabilities.

Botswana

The Botswana government was cooperative in international counterterrorism efforts. The Botswana government established the National Counter Terrorism Committee to address terrorism issues and weapons of mass destruction. In December, President Festus Mogae signed a law creating a new intelligence agency responsible for domestic and foreign intelligence gathering. The Botswana Defense Force designated a squadron as its counterterrorist unit and sent several officers to IMET-sponsored counterterrorism training.

Terrorists may use Botswana as a transit point due to its porous borders as evidenced by a 2006 report of organized smuggling of immigrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the number of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants living in Botswana. Individuals suspected of providing financial support to terrorist groups may have business interests in Botswana companies.

The Bank of Botswana lists suspected terrorist assets and keeps all banking institutions in the country informed by circulating an updated list of suspicious accounts. Although there is no Financial Intelligence Unit, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes had a unit that investigated suspicious transactions.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso continued to lack the resources necessary to protect its borders and to monitor movement of terrorists. There was no formal method for tracking movement into and out of the country at border checkpoints, or at either of the country's two commercial airports. Burkina Faso was not a safe haven for any terrorist groups, but had the potential of becoming a safe haven owing to its close proximity to several countries where terrorist groups operate and because its borders are porous, especially in the sparsely populated north.Despite its lack of resources, Burkina Faso was serious about fighting terrorism, cooperated with the United States where possible, and participated in training, seminars, and exercises, such as the regional Flintlock Exercises held in Mali this past year.

The government participated in regional efforts at combating terrorism with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and other international organizations, such as INTERPOL (it participated in an Interpol General Assembly meeting that was held in November). In 2007, Burkina Faso submitted a request to the USG to train their existing, approximately 150-person antiterrorism unit under the President's Security Force.

Burundi

Burundi’s counterterrorism efforts were hindered by domestic ethnic tension, the unsteadiness of a transitional period after a decade plus of civil war, a lack of mature governmental institutions, considerable corruption, and porous borders that enabled various rebel groups in Tanzania and Eastern Congo to freely enter Burundi. Due to Burundi's small size and overtly Christian identity, it is likely that any radical Muslim influence would be quickly noted and reported to both Burundian government institutions and the international diplomatic community. The Burundi National Police's financial crimes unit was severely crippled by both a lack of resources and trained investigators, resulting in little or no oversight of Burundi's financial community by law enforcement officials, which could be exploited by terrorists for financing terrorism. Transnational criminals, for example, laundered illegal drug money through Burundian front companies.

Comoros

International terrorism concerns in Comoros focused on Comorian national Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun Fazul), who is suspected of involvement in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. His whereabouts were unknown, but he was believed to have maintained contacts in the Comoros. The Comorian government's security forces had limited resources and training in counterterrorism and maritime security, so the country remained vulnerable to terrorist transit. Comorian police and security forces participated in USG antiterrorism assistance programs and cooperated with the Rewards for Justice Program.


President Sambi, a devout Muslim democratically elected in May 2006, reconfirmed Comoros' rejection of terrorism and, with Comoros' religious leaders, publicly rejected Islamist extremism. In September, military and port officials participated in a USG-hosted Maritime Security Conference in Mombasa, Kenya. President Sambi has sought close partnership with the United States to develop Comoros and to create opportunities for the country's youth. In April, Foreign Minister Jaffar hosted a joint committee to improve bilateral relations, which included counterterrorism cooperation.

The Government of the Union of the Comoros did not provide safe haven to terrorist organizations on the islands of Grande Comore and Moheli. Colonel Mohamed Bacar, former island president of Anjouan and current illegitimate leader, runs his island for personal profit outside the authority of the Union. Among Bacar’s illicit activities were licensing for shell banks. The extent of his dealings and contacts with criminal or terrorist networks in the Indian Ocean Region was unknown.

Cote d'Ivoire

Cote d'Ivoire has been in the throes of a political-military crisis since 2002, leaving the country politically and, until recently, geographically divided.1 Despite this instability, violence associated with the country’s crisis has not been linked with any international terrorist organizations, and there was little evidence to indicate a threat of terrorist attacks. While some Lebanese private communities living in Cote d'Ivoire were known to be active in donating personal income to Hizballah, it is unlikely that the Government of Cote d'Ivoire supported or subsidized it, although it was likely that it was aware of this.

Djibouti

Djibouti hosted the only military base in Sub-Saharan Africa for United States and Coalition Forces and was one of the most forward-leaning Arab League members supporting ongoing efforts against terrorism. President Ismail Omar Guelleh and many top leaders in Djibouti repeatedly expressed their country's full and unqualified support for the War on Terror.
United States security personnel continued to work closely with Djiboutian counterparts to monitor intelligence and follow up on prospective terrorism-related leads. Although the government's capabilities were limited, Djiboutian counterparts were very proactive, and were highly receptive and responsive to United States requests for cooperation. The Djiboutian National Security Services took extraordinary measures with its limited resources to ensure the safety and security of American citizens, the U.S. embassy, and the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonier.

Eritrea

The Government of Eritrea was not an active partner on counterterrorism programs. The government linked broader cooperation in USG counterterrorism programs to the unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia, publicly stating that cooperation will occur only after the final demarcation of the border.

During the March kidnapping of British diplomats in Ethiopia by an ethnic Afari rebel group, the Eritrean government played a role in securing their release.

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated under both UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and Executive Order 13224, was publicly reported as being in Asmara as recently as November.

Ethiopia

The Government of Ethiopia, after conducting a counter offensive in late 2006 in response to threats against its security and in support of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, battled insurgents and extremists that were formerly affiliated with the Council of Islamic Courts, including the AQ-affiliated al-Shabaab militia. Ethiopian forces provided critical support in the stand up of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force which was also targeted by extremist elements. In addition, Ethiopian forces countered Somali-based extremists who attempted to conduct attacks inside Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s location within the Horn of Africa made it vulnerable to money laundering activities perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations, terrorists and narcotics traffickers. As the economy continued to grow and become more liberalized, federal police investigation sources reported expectations that bank fraud, electronic/computer crimes, and laundering activities would continue to rise. On November 6, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and the United States Department of the Treasury signed the terms of reference and work plan for a technical assistance package to strengthen Ethiopia’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. The assistance will aid the NBE in establishing a financial intelligence unit and provide training to Ethiopia’s government-owned and private banks.

Ethiopia's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), with broad authority for intelligence, border security, and criminal investigation; was responsible for overall counterterrorism management. Federal and local police counterterrorism capabilities were primarily focused on being able to respond to terrorist incidents. Draft counterterrorism legislation was submitted to Parliament in late 2006, but there was no legislative action in 2007.
Ethiopia was an active participant in AU counterterrorism efforts, served as a focal point for the AU's Center for Study and Research on Terrorism, and participated in meetings of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa.


Kenya

Following the late 2006 Ethiopian action to remove the radical Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Somalia, Kenyan Ministry of Defense efforts largely prevented the flight of violent extremists across the Somalia-Kenya border. The Kenyan military drastically increased its numbers on the Somalia border, and worked closely with police elements in the region to block CIC forces and associated individuals from infiltrating Kenyan territory. Kenyan security forces apprehended several suspected extremist leaders during these operations. However, human rights organizations criticized the Kenyan government for closing the border and claimed that large numbers of refugees fleeing the fighting were forcibly returned to Somalia. At the same time, the Kenyan government suspended all flights to and from Somalia except for humanitarian aid flights and flights to the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG) seat in Baidoa. The Kenyan government ended the suspension in August, but continued to require all flights from Somalia to first stop at Wajir Airport for immigration, customs, and security processing before proceeding to their final destinations in Kenya.

The Government of Kenya did not knowingly provide safe haven for terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, Kenya's borders remained porous and vulnerable to movement of potential terrorists as well as small arms and other contraband. Supporters of AQ and other extremist groups were active in the East Africa region. As a result of the continuing conflict in Somalia, many members of these organizations have sought to relocate elsewhere in the region and some were believed to have traveled to Kenya.

Kenya continued to lack the counterterrorism legislation necessary to comply with the UN conventions it has signed. In addition, it was difficult to detain terror suspects and prosecute them effectively under existing laws. The issue of counterterrorism legislation remained highly controversial in Kenya with elements of the press, the human rights community, and Muslim leadership criticizing proposed legislation as anti-Muslim and giving the government too much power to potentially abuse human rights.

The Kenyan government wrote a revised draft of the defeated 2003 "Suppression of Terrorism Bill" in 2006, but the new bill was sharply criticized and subsequently did not pass. Progress also stalled on legislation for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The “Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering Bill” was submitted in March but the Parliament did not debate it.
Political and bureaucratic resistance remained to the formation of an interagency Kenyan Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Senior Kenyan officials sharply criticized the U.S. Public Announcement regarding the possibility of a terrorist threat to the Cross-Country World Championships in Mombasa in March, seeing this as an unfriendly act and a threat to the country’s vital tourism industry.

Liberia

Despite limited resources, inadequately trained personnel, and a weak judicial system – products of 14 years of civil war – the Government of Liberia demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the United States and the international community to combat terrorism.

Through rule of law and security sector reform assistance programs, the United States supported a number of initiatives that addressed Liberia's vulnerabilities, which included porous borders, rampant identification document fraud, lax immigration controls, wide-scale corruption, and underpaid law enforcement, security, and customs personnel.

There have never been any acts of transnational terrorism in Liberia. Of concern, however, were reports that hundreds of Middle Eastern businessmen purchased legitimately issued but fraudulently obtained Liberian diplomatic passports from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials.

These documents would permit free movement between the Middle East and West Africa. The government took steps to stop this Charles Taylor-era practice by requiring that diplomatic passports be issued only by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Monrovia. New restrictions on who qualified for Liberian diplomatic or official passports were being implemented by the new head of the Foreign Ministry's passport office.


Since 2003, there has been resurgence in the number of visits to Liberia by foreign Islamic proselytizing groups, overwhelmingly Sunni organizations from Pakistan, Egypt, and South Africa.

However, Liberian security services reported that none of these groups publicly espoused militant or anti-American messages. Liberia's indigenous, war-weary, and predominantly Sunni Muslim community, which represented at least 20 percent of the country's population, has demonstrated no interest in militant strains of Islam to date. That said, outstanding land disputes negatively affecting large numbers of Muslim land owners in Nimba and other counties could fan ethnic and religious tensions with the predominantly Christian central government.

As in other West African states, reports surfaced that Lebanese businessmen in Liberia provided financial support and engaged in fundraising activities for Hizballah. There were no other terrorist groups known to be operating within Liberia.

Madagascar

International terrorism was a concern in Madagascar because of the island nation's inadequately monitored 3,000 mile coastline. Limited equipment, personnel, and training for border control increased the risks of penetration. Following the International Maritime Conference in 2006, hosted by the Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Embassy, Madagascar military and port officials participated in a similar event in Mombassa in September. Malagasy police, military, intelligence, and security forces have not had much training in counterterrorism and maritime surveillance. Despite limited resources, government officials were willing to cooperate with the United States; international maritime conferences and the Rewards for Justice Program were two examples of cooperative ventures. At the main port in Tamatave, which handled 80 percent of maritime traffic and more than 90 percent of container traffic, access control and overall security improved substantially. The U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Liaison removed Tamatave Port from its Port Security Advisory for Madagascar, with an acknowledgement that the Port met minimum standards under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.


Mali

Inadequate resources continued to hamper the Malian government's ability to control its long and porous borders, thus limiting the effectiveness of military patrols and border control measures. Mali is currently more threatened by tribal insurgencies than by terrorist threats, but cooperated with United States counterterrorism efforts, and remained one of the largest recipients in the sub-region of military training and assistance through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and other United States assistance programs.

Northern Mali served as a potential safe haven for terrorists, traffickers, and smugglers due to the region's remoteness, harsh desert climate, and size. AQIM maintained a regular, small-scale presence, moving essentially without hindrance in the northern part of Malian territory, although it did not maintain any permanent facilities and was constantly on the move. There were no confrontations between the Malian military and the AQIM this year.


Mauritania

The December 2007 murder of four French tourists and the attack on a military checkpoint were both low-level attacks, but highlighted the fact that AQIM was active in the country despite the newly elected government’s significantly increased level of cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. The Mauritanian Government actively pursued the perpetrators of the December attacks. The government embarked on an ambitious political agenda to build national unity.

The Government of Mauritania continued working to prevent terrorist organizations, notably AQIM, from using its territory. These efforts remained constrained, however, by limited resources and training, and by the inherent challenges of controlling the sparsely-populated and porous regions bordering Algeria and Mali. The government continued to identify and respond to AQIM cells operating in country. Western Missions warned their citizens of AQIM efforts to target westerners in Mauritania, particularly those involved in the petroleum industry.

The new government established a new counterterrorism force which, despite USG assistance, was not fully functional at year’s end. The Mauritanian Army Camel Corps, responsible for patrolling the eastern border regions of the country, participated in USG antiterrorism training and the Mauritanian military participated in USG-sponsored regional counterterrorism exercises.

Nigeria

The apprehensions and trials of extremists by the Nigerian government seemed to indicate not just recognition of potential threats to itself and its citizens, but a responsiveness and willingness to act to protect American interests, including facilities and personnel. These arrests also suggested some degree of cooperation and facilitation among extremist groups in the Sahel, which were made possible by porous borders with minimal controls, and the logistical difficulties inherent in patrolling the Sahara desert. Since 2005, the Nigerian Taliban (which has no connection to the Taliban of Afghanistan) has been suspected of having connections to AQIM in Mali and AQ affiliates.

To date, no conclusive links have been definitively proven, although bin Ladin went on record in 2003 saying that Nigeria was fertile ground for action.

In December 2006, Mohammed Yusuf, a Maiduguri-based imam and alleged "Nigerian Taliban" leader was charged with five counts of illegally receiving foreign currency. His trial was still ongoing at the end of 2007.

Also in December 2006, Mohammed Ashafa of Kano was charged with receiving funds in 2004 from two AQ operatives based in Lahore, Pakistan to "identify and carry out terrorist attacks" on American residences in Nigeria. Deported from Pakistan for alleged ties to AQ, and said to have undergone terrorist training in Mauritania, Ashafa was charged in a Nigerian court with recruiting 21 fighters who were sent to Camp Agwan in Niger for terrorist training with AQIM.

Ashafa also stood accused of being a courier for AQ from 2003 to 2004, who passed coded messages from Pakistan to Nigerian Taliban members on how to carry out terrorist activities against American interests in Nigeria. In addition, Nigerian authorities alleged that Ashafa's home was used as an AQ safe house, and that he rendered logistical and intelligence support to AQ operatives.

On January 16, 2007, Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun, a Nigerian cleric described by prosecutors as a primary sponsor of the Nigerian Taliban, was arraigned on three counts of terrorism. Damagun was accused of receiving the sum of 300,000 USD from Sudanese extremists or an AQ affiliate in Sudan "with the intent that said money shall be used in the execution of acts of terrorism."

He also allegedly sent three young men to train with AQIM in Mauritania. The final count in Damagun's indictment was for aiding terrorist activities in Nigeria. This trial was ongoing with the defendant out on bail. These trials were still in progress due to a combination of procedural appeals, lengthy adjournments, and the additional time necessary to translate the proceedings from English to Hausa and back.


There was an attack in April that was likely perpetrated by the Nigerian Taliban, however this was not proven. On April 17, a police station in Panshekera, a small village outside Kano city, was attacked by militants subsequently described by the media as the "Nigerian Taliban," though the exact identities of the militants and their ideological affiliations (if any) remain unknown. While reports are conflicting, it was widely believed that the attackers were targeting the state and its uniformed security.

On July 27, the Government of Nigeria introduced e-passports containing a data chip, which will allow for easier passport authentication and fraudulent documentation detection. Besides enhanced security, the system will provide the country's first electronic database of biometric information.

The U.S. Embassy issued a warden message to American citizens on September 7, advising that American and other Western interests in Lagos and Abuja, both official and commercial, were at risk for terrorist attack. In an October 31 press report about the arrest of two men in Kano, "a senior officer" of the Nigerian State Security Service said that the men detained were the individuals whose activities had prompted the U.S. warden message.

On November 12, Nigerian law enforcement announced the arrests in Kano, Kaduna, and Yobe states of at least 10 suspected terrorists with alleged ties to AQIM, which included the two men from the October 31 report. On November 22, five of these individuals were charged with conspiracy and planning to commit a terrorist act. Two were also charged with attempted murder. The defendants were denied bail and the case was adjourned. The others were allegedly in custody, undergoing interrogation. Local news reports described a collaborative effort between Nigerian and American intelligence services.
The Sultan of Sokoto, the supreme Muslim authority in the country, has stated "There is no AQ cell of Taliban in Nigeria." The Sultan received information from a longstanding network of traditional local and regional leaders (emirs), and maintained that it would be extremely difficult for terrorist groups to operate without detection by this network. Nonetheless, poverty and unemployment, especially acute in the Muslim-majority north, helped create a climate potentially conducive to the radicalization of marginalized individuals.


In September 2005, a draft antiterrorism bill was approved by the Nigerian cabinet and sent to the National Assembly. The bill provided for sentences of up to 35 years for those convicted of a terrorist offense. Membership in a banned organization carried lighter jail sentences that could be replaced by a fine of up to 50,000 naira (400 USD). The bill was withdrawn, however, the day of its second reading in the Senate due to opposition from northern Senators who argued that the motivation for such a bill was anti-Muslim sentiment.

Rwanda

The Government of Rwanda combated terrorist financing and reinforced border control measures to identify potential terrorists and to prevent entry of armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Rwanda had an intergovernmental counterterrorism committee and a counterterrorism reaction team in the police intelligence unit. Rwandan police and marines conducted anti-narcotrafficking patrols on Lake Kivu. Central Bank and Ministry of Finance officials provided outstanding cooperation on terrorist financing issues. While the Government of Rwanda had not yet fully developed its laws and regulations in accordance with international conventions and protocols concerning terrorism, it had the authority under local law to identify, freeze, and seize terrorist-related financial assets. Rwanda participated in regional initiatives on international counterterrorism cooperation, including the East African Standby Brigade.

In November, Rwanda hosted a meeting of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa, which brought intelligence and security officials together to address security challenges faced by members of the African Union through information sharing and strategic intelligence coordination. Also in November, Rwanda hosted a six-week training course for East African police commanders in cooperation with the United Kingdom.


Besides reinforcing border security, the Government of Rwanda developed terrorism response strategies. The Rwandan national tourist office hired a consultant to develop a communications policy to alert embassies should their citizens be harmed in Rwanda’s national parks, and to increase disaster preparedness. The national Civil Aviation Authority worked to develop a crisis plan to address terrorist attacks and/or other disasters, and installed more cameras at Kigali International Airport to increase surveillance capability.

Senegal

The Government of Senegal cooperated with the United States to identify terrorist groups operating in Senegalese territory. More work remained to be done, however, to develop first responder services, to facilitate the quick sharing of information between agencies, and to control porous borders where police and security services are undermanned and ill-equipped to prevent illicit crossborder trafficking. The Government of Senegal affirmed its commitment to United States government-assisted efforts to augment its border security.

Senegal continued to enhance its ability to combat terrorism, prosecute terror suspects, and respond to emergencies. Despite advances, however, Senegal lacked specific counterterrorism
Legislation, and current laws made it difficult to prosecute terror suspects. As participants in the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, more than 318 Senegalese government officials
participated in ATA programs. Senegalese military officials attended a counterterrorism seminar in Rabat and attended the Chiefs of Defense and Directors of Military Intelligence conferences. The Defense International Institute of Legal Studies, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) gave separate seminars on the legal aspects of fighting terrorism.


Senegal did not provide safe haven for terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, five Mauritanians, two of whom claimed to be members of al-Qa’ida, were allegedly involved in the December 24 murder of four French tourists in Mauritania; the five traveled through Senegal before being captured in a hotel in Guinea-Bissau by Bissau-Guinean police, aided by French authorities. The Mauritanians were able to cross four Senegalese borders without being stopped by Senegalese authorities. This event demonstrated Senegal's porous borders and its lack of capacity to identify and combat terrorist threats and the need for further training.

Somalia

Somalia's fragile central government, protracted state of violent instability, long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula made the country an attractive location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point for conducting operations in Somalia or elsewhere. Despite the late 2006 defeat of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Mogadishu by Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, the ensuing low-level conflict that engulfed Mogadishu and parts of south central Somalia for the remainder of the year continued to make Somalia a permissive operating environment and safe haven for both Somali and foreign terrorists.

The extremist al-Shabaab (The Youth), the militant "shock troops" of the CIC whose radicalism and violent means led to the CIC's undoing, initially dispersed and fled south along the Kenyan border. Al-Shabaab, some of whom are affiliated with AQ, consists of radicalized young men, between 20 and 30 years of age. A few of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with AQ in Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab extremists participated in attacks against Ethiopian and TFG security forces. Al-Shabaab and other extremists were also behind suicide bombings, the use of landmines, remote controlled roadside bombs, and targeted assassinations against Ethiopian and TFG security forces, other government officials, journalists, and civil society leaders.

The African Union Peace Support Mission (AMISOM), which deployed in March to secure the air and sea ports and presidential compound, lost six soldiers to extremist attacks during the year.

Among the foreign AQ operatives believed to have enjoyed protection by the former CIC and al-Shabaab leadership were individuals wanted for the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and a 2002 hotel bombing in Kenya, including Fazul Abdallah Mohammed (aka Harun Fazul), and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. At the end of the year, Ethiopian and TFG forces remained nominally in control of Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia, though institutions of government remained weak and ineffective. Regional efforts to bring about national reconciliation and establish peace and stability in Somalia are ongoing. The capability of the TFG and other Somali local and regional authorities to carry out counterterrorism activities was limited.


South Africa

South Africa supported efforts to counter international terrorism and shared financial, law enforcement, and limited intelligence information with the United States. The South African government adopted broad counterterrorism legislation under the title “Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Bill” in 2004.
It was unclear to what extent foreign terrorist groups were present in South Africa. Some analysts held the view that AQ or other extremist groups had a presence within South Africa’s generally moderate Muslim community. In January, the Department of the Treasury designated South African nationals Farhad and Junaid Dockrat as AQ financiers and facilitators, subjecting them to United States sanctions.
Border security challenges and document fraud negatively affected the government’s efforts to pursue counterterrorism initiatives. South African documents often included good security measures, but because of corruption within the immigration services, thousands of South African identity cards, passports, and work/residence permits were fraudulently issued.

Sudan
See Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Tanzania


Tanzania took significant steps to establish a National Counterterrorism Center to build its capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, and worked closely with the United States to disrupt terrorist networks. Tanzania law enforcement cooperated with the United States to exchange evidence and testimony on cases related to the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar Es Salaam.

Tanzania continued its participation in several multi-year programs to strengthen its law enforcement and military capacity, improve aviation and border security, and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania showed ongoing willingness to combat terrorist financing. In December 2006, the Tanzanian Parliament passed the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Bill, ending a legislative process that began in 2002 with support from the United States. The AML Bill created a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and bolstered Tanzania's ability to combat financial crime, including counterterrorist financing.
With the Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program, the United States supported Tanzania as it equipped and staffed the FIU. Tanzanian law enforcement and security forces attempted to identify and monitor terrorist activities and deny use of Tanzanian territory as a safe haven for terrorists. The government was aware that terrorists could use its territory for transit purposes and did not provide any kind of material assistance to terrorists or terrorist groups.

Uganda

Porous borders in a region rife with insecurity have left Uganda vulnerable to terrorist activity. In response, the Government of Uganda stepped up efforts to track, capture, and hold suspected terror suspects. Uganda also worked with the United States to push forward on peace and security initiatives in the Great Lakes Region. While the Ugandan government was a strong advocate for crossborder solutions to persistent problems, resource limitations and corruption hampered more effective measures. In March, the Ugandan military's counterterrorism units engaged some 100 Allied Defense Force (ADF) rebels, killing 60-80 and capturing 10-20. The Ugandan government engaged the Democratic Republic of Congo on the ADF through various regional mechanisms.

Zambia

Zambia demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the United States and the international community to combat terrorism. In June, Zambia endorsed the U.S. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In July, the government submitted an Antiterrorism Bill to Parliament. The Bill criminalized acts of terrorism, including terrorist training and incitement; and granted the government significant authority to investigate, prevent, and prosecute acts of terrorism. Inadequate resources and training impeded Zambia’s law enforcement agencies’ counterterrorism capabilities. Zambia’s borders are long and porous, and its ports of entry are vulnerable transit points for human trafficking and international crime.
Zambia made no progress in ratifying the counterterrorism conventions listed in UNSC 1373. In November, Zambia participated in an African regional workshop on implementing UNSC 1540. Despite offers of assistance from the United States, the Zambian government does not have an internationally-compliant antimoney laundering or counterterrorist financing regime. The Cabinet is reviewing a national antimoney laundering policy and draft antimoney laundering and asset forfeiture bills.

Zimbabwe

Despite the Government of Zimbabwe's self-imposed isolation on most diplomatic issues, local intelligence and criminal investigative agencies were responsive to our counterterrorism needs. Government agencies routinely provided assistance by conducting investigative inquiries, traces, and border checks of individuals thought to be threats to USG facilities or personnel.
During the year, the government attempted to strengthen its ability to prevent and suppress terrorism and money laundering activities. On August 3, Parliament passed the Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Bill, which provided a maximum punishment of life in prison for engaging in or recruiting for foreign or international terrorist activities. It also contained penalties for harboring, concealing, or failing to report foreign or international terrorists. An enactment date for the Bill had not been set by the end of 2007.
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe installed a new IT system that provided enhanced capability to detect, analyze, and disseminate information on suspicious financial transactions. Working with law enforcement and other government agencies, the Reserve Bank maintained export/import desks at ports of entry and conducted audits of mining entities to detect and prevent illegal mineral smuggling and money laundering activities. An increase in suspicious transaction reports and prosecutions of financial crime cases was attributed to these efforts.
The Government of Zimbabwe entered into talks with several other countries in the region to sign MOUs, similar to the MOU signed with South Africa last year, to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Thursday, May 01, 2008

Al Qaeda Running out of Money to fund African Islamic Jihadists?

It appears al Qaeda may be running out of Money....

-Shimron

Matt Levitt of the Washington Institute reports on Al Qaeda finances:

"What remains to be seen is whether the al-Qa`ida senior leadership’s lack of funds degrades the core group’s power to control activities and direct operations. Without the power of the purse, would local terrorist cells still need the al-Qa`ida core as much as that core would need these cells?

Part of what drew the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria into the al-Qa`ida fold, according to intelligence analysts, was the financial dividend of such a relationship. Should this trend continue, it could lead to the further degeneration of the al-Qa`ida core and the devolution of al-Qa`ida’s organized global insurgency into a more localized—and controllable—terrorist threat.

Toward that end, and in light of recent successes disrupting and deterring al-Qa`ida’s finances, constricting the terrorist operating environment—with an eye toward al-Qa`ida’s financial streams in particular—should remain a strategic priority."

The Rest of the report from The Washington Institute

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

AQIM groups in Mali in Kidal - Says Fagaga

Colonel Hassan Fagaga - Commader of Tuareg Rebels in Mali, claims to be keeping out al Qaeda (AQIM) groups trying to infiltrate from Algeria, but aknowledges that there are AQIM groups elsewhere in Niger...

See the following article..

-Shimron

Malian Tuareg rebels’ military commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Fagaga:“We will eliminate any of Al-Qaeda elements on our controlled areas”

The military commandant of the Tuareg rebels in Mali, Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Fagaga has threatened eliminating elements belonging to Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC activating in the Sahara, [renamed AQIM] in case attempting approaching areas being controlled by the rebels, southern the Algerian borders.

  • Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Fagaga told El Khabar in a phone call yesterday [05-03-08], the rebels have managed intercepting movements of GSPC elements, converted into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, inside Mali and Kidal region, the nearest Malian province to the Algerian borders
  • Hassan Fagaga has further denied the presence in the rebels’ controlled areas of any elements belonging to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb since Yahia Djouadi, alias Yahia Abu Amar, has succeeded Mokhtar Belm ElKhabarokhtar as the Emir of the ninth region a year ago.
  • He further made allusion to armed clashes took place with Belmokhtar fellows two years ago as being the last time Al-Qaeda elements had attempted penetrating to areas controlled by the rebels.
  • However, Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Fagaga has not denied the presence of GSPC elements on the Malian territories, saying: “we do acquire information disclosing the infiltration of some of them to villages near Kidal region in the north.”
  • Fagaga has further reiterated the will of his Movement continuing chasing off Al-Qaeda elements from its areas, saying “we have already told them and we still do telling them go away from our territories and do what you want.”
06-03-2008By A.K/ Translation A.A

The Rest @El Khabar

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

AQIM Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel Assets to be Frozen

This is a notice from the US Treasury department organisation: It was posted on 4/12/07. In light of 2 Bombings in Algiers 5 days later, some claim by AQIM, I suggest this is the prime suspect.

-Shimron

Treasury Designates AQIM Emir

DOB: 20 April 1970
POB: Meftah, Algeria
Alt. POB: Khemis El Khechna, Algeria
Address: Meftah, Algeria
Nationality: Algerian

Washington, DC--The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Abdelmalek Droukdel (Droukdel), the leader or emir of Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM, a violent extremist group based in Algeria, merged with al Qaida in September 2006.

"As emir of AQIM, Droukdel has supervised and ordered deadly terrorist attacks against innocents," said Adam J. Szubin, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). "We will continue efforts to dismantle AQIM's financial infrastructure and financially isolate its members."

As a result of the merger with Al Qaida, AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), changed its name to AQIM. Droukdel assumed leadership of AQIM in mid-2004.

Today's action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets the financial networks of terrorist groups and their facilitators. As a result of the designation, any assets Droukdel may have under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons are prohibited from doing business with Droukdel.

Droukdel reportedly supervised the April 2007 AQIM bombings of the Prime Minister's office and police facilities in Algiers, killing 33. Droukdel used an April 2007 Internet video addressing these bombings as a vehicle to urge his followers to become suicide bombers. He also ordered the December 2006 attack on a U.S. company's bus in Algiers that killed one and wounded nine, including a U.S. citizen. Further, Droukdel ordered the March 2006 assassination of a former AQIM leader who had surrendered to Algerian authorities.

In a May 2007 video announcement, Droukdel publicly called on regional AQIM commanders to seek recruits and select targets for suicide bombings. Speaking on behalf of AQIM, Droukdel has announced AQIM's formal allegiance to al Qaida, encouraging other jihadist movements to join al Qaida, and reaffirmed allegiance to Usama bin Laden (UBL). Droukdel publicly announced GSPC's name change to Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, and stated AQIM's decision in May 2007 to use "future martyrdom operations."

Droukdel in 2006 stated that he had consulted with al Qaida second-in-command and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Ayman al-Zawahiri regarding AQIM's upcoming plans and missions in Algeria and the Maghreb countries.

GSPC was one of the fifteen entities originally named as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224 on September 23, 2001 and was added to the UN's consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with UBL, al Qaida and the Taliban on October 6, 2001.

Identifying Information

AKAs: Abdelmalek Droukdal
Abdelmalek Droukadal
Abdelmalek Dardakil
Abdelmalek Drokdal
Abdelmalek Dourkdal
Abdelmalek Drougdel
Abdelmalek Droukbel
Abdelmalek Derdoukal
Abdel Malek Deroudel
Abdel Malek Droukdel
Abdelmalik Droukdal
`Abd al-Malik Drukdal
`Abd al-Malik Durikdal
`Abd-al-Malik Drokdal
Abd-al-Malik Dridqal
Abdelouadour Droukdel
Abu-Mus'ab Abd-al-Wadud
ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL
Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud
Abu Musab Abdeloudoud
Abu Mussaab Abdelouadodud
Abu Mus'ab Abdelouadoud
Abu Mossab Abdelouadoud
Abou Moussaab Abdelouadoude
Abou Moussab Abdelouadoud
Abou Mousaab Abdelouadoud
Abou Musab Abdelouadoud
Abu Musab Oudoud
Abou Mossab Abdelouadoud
Abou Mossab
Abd El Ouadoud
Abou Mousab
Abd El Ouadoud
Abi Mossaab
Abd El-Ouadoud
Abi Mousaab
Abdelouadoud
Abu Mossaab
Abdel El-Wadoud
Abou Mossab
Abdel Wadoud
Abou Mossab
Abdel wadoud
Abou Moussaab
Abdel Wadoud
Abdou Moussa
Abd al-Wadoub
Abou Mosaab
Abkelwadoud
Abou Abdelwadoud
Abdelouadoud
Abou Mossab
Abdelouadoud
Abou Mossaah
Abdelwadoud
Abou Mossaab
Abdelwadoud
abu Musab Droukdal
Abdelmalek Drokdal
Abdelmalek Droukdel
Abdelmalek

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

AQIM - two Car Bombs in Algiers- Ben Aknoun and Hydra

ALGIERS, Dec 11 (Reuters) (Algerina French News Video)

Suspected Al Qaeda militants detonated twin car bombs in the Algerian capital on Tuesday, killing at least 26 people and possibly up to 67 in one of the bloodiest attacks since an undeclared civil war in the 1990s.

Al Qaeda's North African wing said in a statement on an Islamist Internet site that two of its members carried out the bombings in the North African oil and gas exporting country.

The group posted pictures of what it said were the two suicide bombers holding assault rifles. No independent verification of the statement was immediately available.

An official tally put the death toll at 26 and wounded at 177, while a Health Ministry source said 67 people were killed.

Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem said the government had no reason to hide casualties and that it was immoral for international media to "bid up" the death toll.

The United Nations said at least five of its employees were feared to have been killed when one blast destroyed the offices of the U.N. Development Program and severely damaged the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

"I have no doubt that the U.N. was targeted," the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, told BBC television. The United Nations has a low profile in Algeria.

Algerian Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni accused the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of being behind the attacks, using the former name of Al Qaeda's North African wing.

Al Qaeda's North African wing claimed responsibility for a similar bombing in Algiers in April and other blasts east of the capital this year that have worried foreign investors in the OPEC member state.

The White House, concerned by Islamist militancy in North Africa, described the attackers as "enemies of humanity".

One of Tuesday's blasts occurred near the Constitutional Court building in the Ben Aknoun district
  • The other was near the U.N. offices and a police station in the Hydra area. Several Western companies have offices in the two areas.
  • Students travelling in a school bus were among the casualties in Ben Aknoun, the official APS news agency said.

The Rest @ Reuters Africa

Tuesday, December 04, 2007

Alms for Jihad

Alms for Jihad
by
Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World

J. Millard Burr
Robert O. Collins

Provide a list of people and NGOs

Abbadi, Shafiq Abbas, Prime Minister Mahmoud 232
Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Saud, King (Ibn Saud) 58, 60, 65
Abd Allahi, Khalifa 17
Abdalla, Dr. Hassan Osman 107
Abdallah, Dr. Said 114
Abd al-Dahab, Khaled 270
Abd al-Quddus 119
Abd al-Rahman, Shaykh Omar Ahmad Ali 89, 91–92, 117, 119, 141, 190, 267, 270, 279
al-Abdin, Al Tayib Zein 139
Abduh, Muhammad 4, 78
Abdullah, Abdailah Kamil 191
Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Prince (now King) 29, 36, 41, 216, 231, 232
Abdullah bin Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki, Prince 34
Abdulrahim, Abudhamid 276
Abdul Basit Karim: see Yousef, Ramzi
Abedia, Agha Hasan 66
Abouhalima, Mahmoud 99–100
Abu Ali Group 110
Abu Bakar, Shukri 219, 272, 273, 276
Abu Bakr 203
Abu Barra: see Khalifa, Muhammad Jamal
Abu Dahdeh 259
Abu Hasan al-Madani: see Julaidan, Wael Hamza
Abu al-Kanadi: see Khadr, Ahmed Said
Abu Khattab 33
Abu Lubaba 102
Abu Mahmoud al-Suri: see Arnaout, Enaam M.
Abu Nasir, Sayed 36
Abu Omar (Ahmad al-Hamwi) 189
Abu Qutada (Omar Mahmud Othman) 259
Abu Salih, Colonel Faisal Ali 113
Abu Samad: see Bashir, Abu Bakar
Abu Sayyaf (Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf) 79, 81, 82, 83, 192
Abu Sayyaf (Shaykh Fathi) 176
Abu Sayyaf Group 184–185, 188, 190, 191–197
Abu Seif (Abu Omar Mohammed al-Seif) 39
Abu Walid 178
Abu Zubayda 99
Active Islamic Youth 149
Adam, Ahmad Sheik 128
Adhijo, Ahmadou 107
al-Adnani, Shaykh Tamim 89
Adolat (Equity) Movement (Uzbekistan) 166
Afghan Support Committee 147
al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 4, 78
Afghanistan beginnings 77–104, 300
Afghan charities 103
Al Kifah 89
Al Qaeda 77–81
Ayman al-Zawahiri 89–91
Balkans and 133–137
Emir of Jihad 83–86
foot-soldiers 96–100
Osama bin Laden and MAK 87–88
Pakistan and Al Rashid Trust 101–104
peripatetic mujahideen 92–96
Qutb 81–83
Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman 91–92
Wael Hamza Julaidan and Rabita Trust 100–101
Afghanistan Rescue Effort 271
Africa Confidential 123
Africa Help 98
African Muslim Agency 281, 282
Agency for Information and Documentation (Bosnia) 141
Agency for International Development (AID) (US) 196, 275
Ahmad, Babar 258
Ahmad, Dr. Israr 249
Ahmad, Maulana Mufti Rasheed 102
Ahmadiyya Muslim Association 261
Ahmed, Senator Qazi Hussain 249
Ahmer, Suleman 46
AIAI (Al Itihad al-Islamiyya) 40
Aid Organization of the Ulama 101, 103
see also Al Rashid Trust
Aideed, General Muhammad Farah 124, 125, 126
Ajaj, Ahmad 99–100, 190
al-Ajuz, Shaykh Ahmad 233
Akhtar, Qari Saifullah 102, 301
Akhwan-ul-Muslimen (Afghanistan) 82
Akida Bank Private Ltd. 70, 71, 283
Akromaya 167
Al Akhtar Trust 101, 103, 249
Al Ansar (journal) 259
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 226
Al Aqsa Foundation 221, 222, 224, 226, 229, 230, 231, 232, 241, 253, 256, 275, 281
Al Aqsa Foundation (South Africa) 44
Al Aqsa Fund 216
Al Aqsa International Foundation (AAIF) 242
Al Aqsa Intifada 225, 226, 236
Al Aqsa Islamic Bank 68, 221
Al Awda (Palestine Right to Return Coalition) 244
Al Baraka Bank 109, 179
Al Baraka Exchange 68
Al Baraka Group 62, 63, 107
Al Baraka Investment and Development Company (BIDC) 68, 179
Al Barakaat Bank 40, 74
Al-Da‘wa 17
Al Ehsan charity 271
Al Farouq Mosque (Brooklyn) 89, 98, 100, 242, 270
Al Fatah (Palestinian National Liberation Movement) 212, 226, 227
Al Fatiha Foundation 188
Al Furkan Islamic Heritage Foundation 257
Al Furqan Mosque (Eindhoven) 252
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF, Al Haramain Foundation) 38–41, 146, 148, 154–155, 174, 177, 179, 202, 210, 222, 228, 237, 248, 253, 258, 265, 270, 284
Al Haramain wa al-Masjed al-Aqsa 123, 154–155
Al Imam al-Shafi‘i Center 191
Al Islamiyya Revolutionary Tabiligh 189
Al Jamiya al-Islamiyya 232
Al Jihad (magazine) 32, 89
Al Khilafah Publications 260
Al Kifah 89, 238, 249, 268, 269–271
Al Muhajiroun (AM) 260, 262
Al Mustazafin Fund 234
Al Muwafaq Brigade 137, 145
Al Nahda (Tunisia) 70, 245
Al Nour Charity Association 232
Al Nur Islamic Information office 256
Al Nur Mosque (Berlin) 237, 240
Al Qaeda 3, 25, 26, 32, 37, 39, 44, 47, 50, 55, 56, 57, 74–75, 78, 77–81, 94, 97, 99, 106, 125–126, 127–128, 149, 151, 154, 163, 167, 175, 177, 179, 180, 183–184, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 198, 199, 200, 202, 209–210, 229, 238, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 259, 262, 268, 269, 276–277, 278, 280
see also Golden Chain
Al Qaeda al-Askariya 87
Al Quds Brigades 215, 217, 227
Al Quds Fund 215, 216, 229
Intifada and 226, 227, 230
Al Quds Press 220
Al Quds al-Sharif 215
Al Rajhi Bank 65, 67, 121
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation 35, 45, 52, 56, 65–66, 227, 280
Al Rajhi Company for Industry and Trade 66
Al Rashid Trust 101–104, 249, 301
see also Aid Organization of the Ulama
Al Riad Foundation 174
Al Risala (HAMAS weekly) 223
Al Riyadh Bank 45, 51, 228
Al Sabah, Shaykh Jaber al-Ahmed 179
Al Salah Association 231, 232
Al Shahid Fund 234
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 52, 94, 107, 109, 121
Osama bin Laden and 109, 110
Al Taqwa Management Organization 69
Al Tawhid Mosque and Foundation 253
Al Wafa Humanitarian Foundation 26, 43–45, 229, 230
Al Wafa Rehabilitation and Health Center 44, 229
Al Wafa Scrap Copper Recycling Company 44
Al Wafa Women’s Charity Association 44, 228
Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation 252, 253
al-Alami, Imad 222
Alamoudi, Abd al-Rahman 274
Albania 146–149
Albright, Madeleine 150
Albuthi, Suliman: see al-Buthe, Soliman
Alehssan Society 236
al-Alfy, Hassan 103
Algeria 248–251
Algerian Relief Foundation 271
Algerian Relief Fund 271
Al-Hijra Construction Company 94
Ali ibn Abi Talib 13, 14
Ali, Sharif Husayn bin 58
al-Ali, Suliman 153, 282–283
Ali, Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq 99
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 128
‘al-Masada’ mujahideen camp 46
Al-Nasr International (charity) 142, 265
Al-Watan (The Nation) 50
Amana Mutual Funds Trust 281
Amanah Bank 193
American Muslim Coalition 267
American Muslim Council 274
“Amin” (Yemeni businessman) 184
Anati, Rahman 219, 274
Andang, Ghalib: see Commander Robot
ANZ International 62
Aodouni, Mehrez 305
al-Aqeel, Aqeel: see al-Uqayl, Shaykh Uqayl bin Abdul Aziz
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) 106, 107
Arab Bank Ltd. 214, 228
Arab Commercial Bank 62
Arab Human Rights Committee 49
Arab Islamic Bank 63
Arab League 90, 107, 223
Arab News 46
Arab People’s Bank 62
Arab Socialism 212
Arab-Albanian Bank 148
Arab–European League (AEL) 253, 255
Arab–Israeli wars 34, 60, 215, 233
Arafat, Dr. Fathi 233
Arafat, Suha 223
Arafat 4, 118, 212–213, 215, 218, 223–224, 225, 226, 233, 250, 251
Arakan Liberation Front 119
Aramco 66
al-Arian, Sami 278, 279, 281
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 194, 196
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 79, 120
Algeria 70, 187, 244, 245, 251
Europe and 238, 258, 259
Armed Islamist International 118
Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State Richard 50
Arnaout, Enaam M. (Abu Mahmoud al-Suri)
North America and 267, 268, 276, 277
Saudi Arabia and 46, 47
Arroyo, President Gloria 195
Asat Trust 245
Asia: see Russia and Central Asia; Southeast Asia
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 55, 199, 210
Association de Secours Palestinien (ASP) 221
Association des Alpes Mari 247
Association des Musulmans de la Gironde 247
Association of Islamic Banks 62
Association of Islamic Charitable Projects 233
Association of Preaching Islam 208
ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms) 9
Atta, Mohamed 53, 202, 241
Attiya, Shawki Salama 147
Australia 29, 198, 203, 222, 240
Austria 31, 62, 69, 136, 137, 141
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 187, 194
Awami League 206, 208
al-Awda, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz 216
awqaf: see waqf
Ayadi, Chafiq 122, 252
Ayatollah Khomeini Society 146
Azam, Professor Golam 207, 208
Azerbaijan 39, 156, 159, 179, 180
Transcaucasia and 173, 174
Azerbaijan Islam Party (AIP) 173
Azhar, Maulana Masood 102
Aziz, Abdul 44, 45, 229
Aziz, Abu Abdul 134
Azzam, Dr. Abdullah Yusuf 32, 34, 35, 59, 83–86, 87–88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 100, 112
foot-soldiers and 96, 97, 98
Journey of Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahidin 32
North America and 267, 268, 270, 276
SARKS and 32
Azzam, Mahfouz 90
Badakhshan Province (Afghanistan) 81, 163
Badri, Dr. Gasim 18
Bahamas 25, 245
banks and 55, 62, 65, 71
Dallah Al Baraka 68, 69, 70, 71
Bahjat, Saad Khalil Al 110
Bahrain 16, 44, 196, 224, 231, 271
banks and 59, 62, 63, 64, 65
Bahzfulla, Hassan 283
Bakre, Hassan Mustafa 196
Bakri, Abdel Qader 100
Baksh, Taha 110
Baku 39, 120, 158, 173, 174
Bali 203, 205, 206
Balkans 131–155
Afghanistan in Bosnia 133–137
after 9/11 153–155
Muwafaq Brigade 137
Albanian imbroglio 146–149
Bosnian aftermath 143–146
Kosovo war 149–153
Third World Relief Agency 140–143
Bangkok 199, 205
Bangladesh 16, 36, 39, 101, 205, 206–210
banks and 62, 64, 66
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) 209
“Bangladesh Taliban” 209
Bangsamoro Youth League (BYL) 190
Bank Al Taqwa 25, 65, 68–71, 244, 283
Holy Land and 219, 220
Bank of Almusia 110
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) 66, 67, 85
Bank of England 63
Bank of Hindustan 71
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 64
Bank Leumi 223
banks 51–76
American banking 67
investigating 53–57
Islamic banking 61–65
Saudi banking 57–61
Sudan banking 106–109
al-Banna, Shaykh Hasan 6, 33, 80, 81, 159, 246
banks and 59, 61
Banque Al Saoudi 110
Banque de France 110
Banque Française pour l’Orient 110
Banque Indosuez 110
Banuri, Maulana Yusuf 101, 102
Barclays Bank PLC 52, 55, 261
Bari, Siraj al-Din Abdel 122, 123
Baring Brothers 59
Barre, President Mohamed Siad 124
Barzinji, Jamal 280, 281, 283
Basayev, Shamil 177, 178, 179, 181
Bashir, Abu Bakar (Abu Samad) 198, 200, 201, 203
al-Bashir, President Omar Hassan Ahmad 3, 18, 94
Balkans and 139, 140
Sudan and 113, 115, 117
Basilan 184, 185
Abu Sayyaf and 192, 193, 194, 195, 196
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 55
Batargy (Battargee), Shaykh Adil Galil Abdul 45, 46, 114, 267
bay‘a (oath of loyalty) 79, 98
Bayazid, Mohammed Loay 46, 47, 190, 268
Bayt al-Ashuhada (House of the Martyrs) 84, 97, 99
Baz, Grand Mufti Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin 88
Bearden, Milton 87
Beghal, Jamal 99
Beirut 214, 220, 230, 233, 234, 235
Belgium, Denmark and 251–256
Benouis, Abdelkader 247
Berisha, President Sali 146, 148, 150
Bermuda Trading Company 184
Bhutto, Prime Minister Benazir 96
BIC (Benevolence International Corporation) 45, 46, 188, 189
BIF (Benevolence International Foundation) 45–47
BIF (Bosanska Idealna Futura) 46, 51
9/11 and 154
Bosnia and 144, 145, 146
Biheiri, Soliman 282, 283
Holy Land and 219
Bin Laden, Abdullah 42, 267
Bin Laden, Ghalib Mohammed 70
Bin Laden, Haydar Mohamed 65
Bin Laden, Huta 70
Bin Laden, Iman 70
Bin Laden, Osama 32, 34–35, 47, 51, 55, 56, 57, 59, 87–88, 93–95, 97, 100, 109–110, 127, 128, 148, 154, 167, 177, 180, 183–184, 186, 188, 190, 192, 197, 198, 201, 208, 209, 239, 242, 243, 245, 250, 258–259, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 277, 278, 284
UN and 55
Bin Laden, Salem 110
Bin Laden, Tariq 161
Bin Laden family 65, 66, 67, 69, 244
Bin Laden Group 161, 197
Bin Mahfouz, Abdul Rahman 122
Bin Mahfouz, Khaled 138, 240, 259, 281, 282
banks and 66, 67
Sudan 107, 110, 114, 123
al-Qadi and 121, 122, 123
Bin Mahfouz, Rais 122
Bin Mahfouz, Salim Ahmad 60, 66
Birlik (Uzbek political party) 165
Blackwell Publishers 123
Blessed Relief Foundation 179
BMI bank 219, 282, 283
Bodansky, Yossef 139
Bogshan, Salam Ahmed 110
Bosnia-Herzegovina 131, 132, 133–137, 138, 143–146, 225
American Relief Fund 142
UN Mission 142
Boubakeur, Dalil 246
Bouyeri, Muhammad 254
Bouziane, Abdelkader 248
Brisard, Jean-Charles 57
Brooklyn 117, 270, 279
Afghanistan and 89, 92, 98, 99
Europe and 242, 243
Brown, Gordon 259
Bulgaria 137, 252
Bush, President George W. 8, 10, 44, 199, 264, 267
Holy Land and 230, 231
Bushra, Issa 116
al-Buthe, Soliman 41, 270
CA Bankverein 69
CAIR (Council of American–Islamic Relations) 34, 264, 272, 274
Callen, Michael 67
Camp David Israeli–Palestinian negotiations 226
Campione d’Italia 69, 71, 244
Canada 276–278
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency 278
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 97, 276, 277
Canadian War Crimes Unit 277
Capital Investment Management Corporation 223
Capital Trust Bank 67
CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere) 126, 212, 265
Care International, Inc. 265
Cengic, Mufti Hassan 140, 141
Center for International Policy Studies 42
Center for Muslim Studies 277
Center for Research and Revival of Islamic Heritage (Saudi Arabia) 147
Central Bank of Khartoum 109
Central Mosque (London) 237
Central Spiritual Management of the Muslims of Russia 181
Chagyrush Society 174
Chamber of Zakat and Taxes (Sudan) 18
Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) 243
Charity Coalition 224, 225, 231
Charity Commission for England and Wales 221, 256, 258, 259
Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 156, 175
Chechen–Ingush Society of the USA 271
Chechnya 175–180
Chehade, Muhammad 268–269
Cheppih, Ahmed 252
Cheppih, Muhammad 252, 253
Child Development Foundation 283
China 47, 156, 158, 172
Chirac, President Jaques 250, 251
Chirkeisk, Said 178
Chrétien, Prime Minister Jean 277
Christian Democrats (Netherlands) 254
Citibank 62, 67
Clark, Janine A. 13
Clinton, President Bill 22, 47, 183, 265, 266, 284
Balkans and 142
Holy Land Fund for Relief and Development (HLF) 273, 274, 275
Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP) 221, 248, 250
Commander Robot (Ghalib Andang) 195, 196
Commission on National Security/21st Century (USA) 274
Commission on Scientific Signs in the Quran 97
Committee for Aid to Orphans and Prisoners 224
Committee for Assistance and Solidarity with Palestine 224
Committee for Charity (Qatar) 179
Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights 258
Committee on Religious Affairs (Kyrgyzstan) 171
Committee for Support of the Al Quds Intifada 227, 230
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 161, 162, 180
Communist Party (Afghanistan) 82
Communist Party (Uzbekistan) 165
Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare (USA) 232
Conseil de Reflexion sur l’Islam de France (CORIF) 246
Conseil Française du Culte Musulman (CFCM) 246, 248
Cordesman, Dr. Anthony 29
Corriere della Serra 219, 243
Council of Foreign Relations 44, 230
Council of Guardians (Iran) 136
Council for International People’s Friendship (CIPF) 126, 139
counterterrorism 55, 210, 262, 275
Croatia 122, 132, 141, 150, 238
Bosnia and 134, 135, 144
Saudi Arabia and 36, 39, 40
Cromer, Lord Evelyn Baring 59
al-Dabbas, Dabbas 41
Dafalla, Dr. al-Juzuli 114
Dagestan 39, 120, 158, 161
Chechnya and 178, 179
lost opportunities and 180
Dagestan–Georgia–Chechnya tri-point 175
al-Dahab,General Siwar Abd al-Rahman Muhammad 113, 115
Dallah Al Baraka Bank 64, 85
Dallah Al Baraka Exchange LLC 74
Dallah Al Baraka Group 56, 68–71, 109, 174, 221
Dallah Works and Maintenance Corporation 68
Dam, Kenneth 9
Damra, Fawaz 279
Dar Al Hijrah Mosque (Falls Church) 263
Dar al-Mal al-Islami Bank 64, 85
Dar al-Mal al-Islami Investment Corporation (DMI) 108, 129
Dar al-Mal al-Islami Trust 64–65
Dar ul-Hijra Foundation 188, 189, 192
Dar ul-Islam 200
al-Daraan, Abd al-Latif bin Abd al-Karim 39
Darkazanli, Mamoun 241
Darul Arqan movement 197
Darul Istiqamah al Haramain 204
Darul-Iman Charitable Association 23
da‘wa (establishing Islam) 6, 129, 152, 157, 232
Afghanistan and 85, 92
Europe and 237, 239
Saudi Arabia and 39, 42, 46
Southeast Asia and 188, 200
Da‘wa Committee, National 260
Da‘wa Program, Comprehensive (Sudan) 114
Dayton Peace Accords 143, 144, 145, 150, 177
de Villepin, Dominique 248
Deeb, Mustafa Hashim al-Shaykh 230
Defense of Islamic Countries as an Inherent Duty 88
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 149
Denmark 36, 95, 137, 222, 251–256
Dharb-i-mumin 103
al-Din, Shaykh Iz 136
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire 246
Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi 238
Djeranskyi, Maghomed 178
Dostum, Abdul Rashid 157
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson 62
Dubai 45, 55, 56, 68, 74, 75, 137, 184
banks and 55, 56, 68, 74, 75
Dubai Al Barakaat Bank 74
Dubai Islamic Bank 56, 62, 64
al-Dubayan, Ahmad 237–238
Dudayev, President Dzhokar (Chechnya) 120, 176, 177
Durrani, General Asad 238
Dushanbe 160, 162, 163
Dwikarna, Agus 202
East Africa 36, 113, 125, 127–128, 283
East Bengal Legislative Assembly 206
East Pakistan 206, 207
Eastern European Muslim Youth 146
Ebrahim, al-Hajj Murad 196
Educational Policy (Saudi Arabia), Higher Committee for 24
Effendi, Ibrahim 121
Egypt, zakat and 16–17
Egyptian nationalists 90
Ehrenfeld, Rachel 123–127
EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) 208
Afghanistan and 79, 85, 89, 92, 95, 96
al-Zawahiri 90, 91
Balkans and 142, 145
Albania 147, 148, 149
North America and 266, 270, 276, 279
Russia and 180
Saudi Arabia and 32, 36, 37, 47
see also Jama‘at al-Islamiyya
Eindhoven 252
El Banna, Dr. Hany 258
El Moujahed (Al Mujahideen) 138
Elashi, Ghassan 272, 273, 276
Elbarasse, Ismael 272
Elshayyal, Dr. Farid 42
El-Shifa pharmaceutical plant 67
Emdad Committee for Islamic Charity 234
Emerson, Steven 279
Jihad in America 279
Emir of Jihad: see Azzam, Dr. Abdullah Yusuf
Eritrea 112, 122, 271, 278
Erk (Uzbek political party) 165
Ershad, General H. M. 207
Erste Bank Österreich (First Austrian Bank) 140, 141, 143
Ethiopia 40, 69, 147, 244, 257
Sudan and 112, 125
al-Qadi 122, 123
Europe
Eastern 43, 111, 141, 153
Muslims in 239–240
Algeria and Palestine 248–251
France 245
Germany 240–242
Italy 242–245
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark 251–256
United Kingdom 256–259
Finsbury Park Mosque 260–262
European Council for Fatwa and Research 24
European Union (EU) 53, 54, 56, 214, 222, 223, 232
Executive Commission for Belgian Muslims 254, 256
External Security Organization 277
Eye to Eye 257
al-Fadl, Jamal Ahmed 98, 99
Fadlallah, Shaykh Muhammad Hussein 234, 235
Al Islam wa Mantaq al-Quwa (Islam and the Logic of Force) 234
al-Fagih, Dr. Saad 87
Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz, King 23, 66, 133, 216
Holy Land and 212, 216, 227, 230, 231
Saudi Arabia and 29, 34, 36
Faisal, King 19, 29, 65, 242
Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz, Prince 121, 129
banks and 60
Faisal Financial SA 64
Faisal Islamic Bank 64, 94, 110, 121
Sudanese practice and 107, 108, 109
Fakihi, Muhammad Jaber 237, 238, 239, 240
al-Falastini, Shaykh Taqiuddine an-Nabhani 159, 160
Falls Church 24, 142, 263, 280, 283
Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, 9/11 57
Farrakhan, Louis 119
al-Faruq, Omar 202, 210
al-Faruqi, Ismail 280
Fathi, Shaykh: see Abu Sayyaf
fatwa 40, 102, 140, 208, 258
Afghanistan and 91, 92, 102
Russia and 167, 179
Faubourg Saint-Denis Mosque 247
al-Fawaz, Khaled 258
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
banks and 52, 54, 71, 268
Holy Land Fund for Relief and Development (HLF) 273, 274, 275
investigating charities and 266
SAAR Foundation and 280, 281, 283
WISE and 279
Federation of Muslim Student Leaders 189
Felastine al-Muslemah 99
Fi Sabilillah 192, 195
Fifth International Conference on Zakat 15
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 49, 54–55, 57
Financing of Terrorism, International Convention for the Suppression of (UN) 54
Finsbury Park Mosque 152, 260–262
Fiqh Council of North America 283
First Conference of Jihad 89
FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) (Algeria) 70, 94, 143, 247
Sudan and 120
Fisk, Robert 137
Fortuyn, Pym 253, 254
Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama‘ah (Sunni Communication Forum) (FKAWJ) 201
Foundation for Chechnya 39, 174, 179
Foundation Secours Mondial (FSM) 255
France 245, 248–251
Friends of Charities Association (FOCA) 270
From Dawa to Jihad (AIVD report) 254
FTATC (Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center) 9–10
Funds Beyond Frontiers Foundation 253
al-Gannushi, Rashid 4, 117
Gaza Strip 9, 23, 99, 211, 212, 221, 229, 232, 236
Arafat’s corruption and 223, 224, 225
charities and 214, 215
Europe and 248, 257
HAMAS and 216, 217, 218, 219
Intifada and 225, 226, 228
North America and 271, 273, 274
Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and 212, 213
Saudi Arabia and 37, 44
Geneva Convention 31, 228
Geneva Organisation du Crime Organisé 245
Genoud, François 62
Georgia 39, 159, 174–175, 281
Germany 240–242
al-Ghozi, Fathur Rohman 195, 198, 202
Ghrewati, Baha Eldin 245
Gilan, Shaykh Mubarik Ali 267
Giro Credit 55, 110
Golden Chain 52, 51–53, 100, 145, 252
Gorbachev, President Mikhail 162, 176
Green Party (Germany) 240
GRF (Global Relief Foundation) 210, 255, 265, 267–269
Group of Twenty 55
Gufron, Perjalanan Ali (Mukhlas) 203
Gul, General Hamid 82
Gulf and African Chamber 244
Gulf Center SRL 245
Gulf Cooperation Council 61
Habib, Aadil 98
Haddad, Rabih Sami 255, 268, 269
Hadith (sayings of the Prophet) 11, 14, 58
al-Hady, Muhammad al-Bashir Muhammad 109
al-Hage, Wadih 94, 98, 128, 241, 269
hajj pilgrimage 27, 58, 158, 185
al-Halwagy, Professor Abdul Satar Abdul-Haq 130
Hamadabi, Ahmad Abd al-Rahman 119
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 70, 216–221, 229–233, 245, 251, 253, 262, 266, 267, 271–274, 275, 280, 281
Al Majd 218
Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin) 195, 197, 198, 205
Indonesia and 200, 203
Malaysia and 195, 197, 198, 199
Hamdan, Usama 223
Hamdi, Abdel Rahim 109
Hamdi, Tarik 281
al-Hamiani, Hallal Ahmed 249
al-Hamwi, Ahmad: see Abu Omar
Happy Hearts 284
Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Jihad Movement) (HUJI) 102, 208–209
Hasavyut, Tadjurin 178
Hashim, Nur 119
Hashim, Shaykh Salamat 187, 196
MILF and 185, 186
Hassan, Abd al-Bagi Muhammad 125
Hassan, Ahmad Bille 127
Hassan bin Talal, Crown Prince 15
Hassanein, Dr. al-Fatih Ali 140, 141, 142, 143, 238
Hassanein, Sukarno 140
Hassound, Adham Amin 271
hawala 71–75, 193, 259, 278
al-Haydar, Shaykh Abu Adil Uthman 144
Health and Education Project International 277
Health Partners International 277
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 79, 87, 92, 157, 163
Qutb and 81, 82, 83
al-Hennawi, Mahmud 180
Heritage Education Trust 282, 283
Herndon, Virginia 24, 263
SAAR Foundation and 279, 280, 281, 283
Hewitt, Ibrahim 221
Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) 82, 87, 109, 157
al-Hifnawi, Sami Mahmoud: see al-Zawahiri, Ayman
Himmat, Ali Ghaleb 69, 70, 71
Himmatzoda, Mohammadsharif 163
Hizb Nahda (Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan) (IRPT) 162–164
Hizb ut-Tahrir 256, 260
Hizb-i-Wahdat 82, 157
Hizbullah 233–236
Hizbullah Party 136
Hofmann, Dieter 141
“Hofstad Network” 254
Holy Cities 23, 27
Holy Land 211–236, 273
Arafat’s charitable corruption 223–225
charities in Palestine 214–216
HAMAS 216–221
Intifada 225–229
Lebanon and Hizbullah 233–236
Palestine and HAMAS 229–233
Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) 212–214
United States response 221–223
Holy Land Fund for Relief and Development (Holy Land Foundation, HLF) 271–276
Hong Kong 52, 110, 183, 188
al-Hosain, Shaykh Saleh 38
al-Houri, Ali Saed bin 54
Huber, Albert F. A. 70
Human Appeals International (HAI) 137, 154, 240
Human Concern International (HCI) 97, 148, 153, 238, 276–277, 278
Human Relief International 148
Humana Charitable Trust 283
al-Hussein, Abdullah Osman Abdul Rahman 252
al-Hussein, Hamad 252
Hussein, King 217, 225
Hussein, Saddam 193
Hussein, Siraj Mohamed 123
HuT (Islamic Liberation Party) 159–160, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 172
Uzbekistan and 166, 167
IAC (Islamic African Center) 113
IAP (Islamic Association for Palestine) 265, 270, 275
IARA (Islamic African Relief Agency) 85, 113, 114, 116, 126, 262, 265, 277
Sudanese charities and 112, 113
Ibadulla, Kazi Hajji Nasrullah ibn 168
IBC (Islamic Benevolence Committee) 85, 114, 117, 144, 267
Saudi Arabia and 45, 46
Ibn Saud: see Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Saud
Ibn Saud, Muhammad 57, 58
Ibn Taymiyya 80
Ibrahim, Mahdi 140
Ibrahim bin Abdul-Aziz al-Ibrahim Fund 134, 163
ICC (Islamic Coordinating Council) 85, 112, 151
ICF (Islamic Charter Front) 3
Ichkeria, Republic of (Chechnya) 176
ICP (Islamic Committee for Palestine) 117, 217, 224
North America and 266, 278, 279
IDF (Israel Defense Force) 214, 223, 226, 228, 232
Idris, King 69
Idris, Salah 67
IHH (Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation, International Humanitaire Hilfsorganization) 143, 238, 240
IICO (International Islamic Charitable Organization) 70, 137
IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization) 35–38
Ikhwan: see Muslim Brotherhood
Ikraa 161, 174, 180, 181
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 223
Imperial Bank of Persia 59
Imron, Ali 204
India 21, 36, 71, 75, 103
Europe and 258, 259
Southeast Asia and 198, 205, 208
Indonesia 200–204
infaq (spending) 11, 18
Infaq Sabilallah-Jihad Fund 200
InfoCom 275
Ingushetia 47, 176, 178, 179
Institute of the Arab World (Paris) 246
internally displaced persons (IDPs) 135, 151
International Council for Islamic Information (ICII) 200
International Development Foundation 259
International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT) 280, 281, 282
International Islamic Aid (IIA) 247
International Islamic Alliance of Muslim Missionaries 189
International Islamic Brigade (IIB) 177, 178, 192
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders 208, 209
International Muslim Aid Committee to the Palestinian Nation 220
International Programme of the National Lottery Charities Board 257
INTERPAL (Palestine Relief and Development Fund) 220, 221, 224, 257, 259, 275
Intifada 117, 225–229, 233, 272, 278
HAMAS and 217, 218, 230, 232
IQRA Trust Prisoners’ Welfare 257
Iran 7, 27, 57, 64, 94, 96, 139, 277
Balkans and 134, 136, 143, 145
Albania 146, 148
Bosnia 134, 135, 136
Third World Relief Agency 141, 142
Holy Land and 234
Russia and 162, 163, 164, 166, 173
Sudan and 105, 116, 119, 126, 139
Iran–Palestine Friendship Society 234
Iranian Culture Center (Belgrade) 146
Iranian Humanitarian Aid Organization 144
Iranian Revolutionary Guards 148, 151, 235
Liberation Organization Bureau 234
Iraq 50, 96, 105, 117, 118, 160
banks and 57, 58, 61, 64
Europe and 244, 247
Holy Land and 211, 212, 218
IRIC (Islamic Research and Information Center) 189, 190, 197
IRSA (Islamic Relief Agency) 112, 113, 114, 139, 221, 262
revolution and 113, 114
Isamuddin, Riduan: see Hambali
ISCAG (Islamic Studies for Call and Guidance) 189, 191, 192
Islah (Islamic Reform Party) (Yemen) 97, 174, 242
Islah Women’s Charitable Society 13
Islamabad 83, 84, 136, 147, 277
al-Islambuli, Lieutenant Khalid Ahmad Shawki 80
Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) 208
Islami Oikya Jote (Islamic Unity Front) 209
Islamic Alliance to Liberate Afghanistan 82
Islamic Assembly of North America 265
Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) 272, 273, 274
Islamic Banking Research Institute 63
Islamic Banking System International 62, 107
Islamic Call Organization 111, 113, 126, 127, 253
revolution and 113, 114
Islamic Center Charity Society 13
Islamic centers 19, 129, 182, 191, 192
banks and 69, 70
cultural 152, 237
economic 16
Europe 244, 256
Geneva 33
Herndon 263
Tucson 264, 269, 270, 272
Washington DC 263
Islamic Charity Project International 146
Islamic Charity Societies 214
Islamic Charity for Zakat 231
Islamic Circle of North America 274
Islamic Civilization Project for Africa 112, 113
Islamic Community in Germany 242
Islamic Community of Ticino 244
Islamic Company for Investment 107
Islamic Concern Project 278
Islamic Countries Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (ICESCO) 246
Islamic Cultural Foundation 19
Islamic Cultural Institute 243, 274
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 21, 62, 106, 146, 157
Holy Land and 227, 231
Southeast Asia and 189, 196
Islamic Heritage orphanage 147
Islamic Human Rights Commission of France 250
Islamic Jihad Movement 3, 91, 92, 96, 226, 228, 236, 276
Palestine (IJMP) 216, 217, 220, 221, 231, 233
Yemen 97
Islamic Movement for Africa (IMA) 129
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 159, 166, 167, 168, 172
Islamic National Salvation Party 218
Islamic Presentation Committee (IPC) 189
Islamic Relief 146, 258
Islamic Relief (Secours Islamique) 248, 249, 250
Islamic Relief Worldwide 257, 258, 264
Islamic Relief Committee of Nazareth 274
Islamic Revival Foundation of Kuwait 149
Islamic Salvation Foundation 88
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 249, 264, 274
Islamic Solidarity Bank 107
Islamic Spiritual Directorates (Soviet) 158
Islamic Students’ Association 188, 208
Islamic Summit Conference of Kaaba, Third 239
Islamic Supreme Council of America 199, 230
Islamic Union of Freiburg 242
Islamic Waqf Organization 133
Islamic Wisdom Worldwide Mission 190, 192
Islamic Workers’ Union 242
Islamic World Committee 137
Islamic Young Women’s Association 231
Islamic Zakaat Fund 128
Islamic-American Zakat Foundation 271
Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus 238
Isle of Man 121, 123, 281, 283
Isma‘il, Dr. Mustafa Osman 139
ISRA (Islamic Studies and Research Association) 146
Israel 17, 47, 211, 217
Europe and 255, 259, 260, 261
North America and 272, 275, 279
Issar, Redouan 254
‘It-is-Truth’ internet campaign 97
Italian Muslim Association 243
Italy 31, 55, 69, 135, 219, 239, 242–245
Izetbegovic, President Alija 131–133, 144, 145, 153
Bosnia and 133, 134, 136
Islam Between East and West 132
“Islamic Declaration” (1970) 132
Third World Relief Agency and 140, 141, 142
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades 218, 225
Jabaliyya Charity Association 224
Ja‘far al-Sadiq 14
Jahjah, Dyab Abu 253, 255
Jaish-e-Muhammad 99, 101, 102, 103, 219
Jama‘at al-Islamiyya 37, 40, 70, 144, 208
Afghanistan and 79, 80, 89, 92, 94, 96
see also EIJ
Jama‘at-i-Islami 81, 82, 157, 207, 208, 209, 249, 260
Jameel, Abdul Latif 22
Jamiyat al-Islah al-Itjimai 170
Jammah Islamiyya (JI) 187, 205
Abu Sayyaf and 195, 196, 197
Indonesia and 200, 201, 202, 203, 204
Malaysia and 198, 199, 200
Janjalani, Abdurajak Abubakar 188, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197
Janjalani, Qaddafi 195, 196, 197
Jannati, Ayatollah Ahmad 136
Jawad, Salah al-Din Abdel 100
Jemal, Geidar 156, 157
Jersey 122, 123
Jerusalem Fund for Human Services 221
Jewish Defense League 250
al-Jihad 91, 92
Jihad al-Bina‘a 235
John Paul II, Pope 183, 184, 193
Jordan, Vernon 275
Jordan
Afghanistan and 83, 99
Holy Land and 211, 218, 224
Russia and 160, 170, 176, 180
Southeast Asia and 191, 201
Jordan Charity Coalition 224
Julaidan, Wael Hamza (Abu Hasan al-Madani) 32, 122, 145, 154, 269
Rabita Trust and 100–101
Saudi Arabia and 32, 35
Jumale, Ahmed Nur Ali 74
Kabbani, Shaykh Muhammad Hisham 199, 230
Kadyrov, Akhmad 179
Kahane, Meir 270
Kamel, Shaykh Saleh Abdallah 75, 174, 221
banks and 64, 68
Sudan and 109, 121
Karadzic, Radovan 132
Karavan Construction Company 149
Karimov, President Islam Abduganievich 165, 166, 167, 168
Kashmir Muslim Front 247
Kasim, Farid 260
Katz, Rita 273, 280–281
Kazakhstan 168–171
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 170
Kenya
Sudan and 110, 125
Al Qaeda 127, 128
Khadr, Ahmed Said (Abu al-Kanadi) 97, 276, 277
Khalid, King 29
Khalifa, Muhammad Jamal 187–191
Khalifah Trading Industries Ltd 188
Khalis, Yunnis 109
Khan, Khezretguly 168
Kharban, Kamar Eddin (Sid Ahmed Mourad) 120, 143, 238
Khartoum–Al Qaeda Nexus 106
Khatmiyya religious brotherhood 108
Khattab, Amir (Commander) 162, 164, 177, 178
Khomeini, Ayatollah 27, 91, 217, 234
King Faisal Foundation of Riyadh 65
King Faisal International Award for Islamic Studies 130
Konsojaya Trading Company 197, 198
Kor, Hakim 165
Kosovo 31, 39, 143, 146, 148, 149–153, 274
UN Mission in (UNMIK) 145, 152
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 148, 150, 151
Kozyrev, Andrei 156
Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) 197, 199, 205
Kurdish Cultural Centre (KCC) 257
Kurdistan 45
Kuwait
Balkans and 137, 146, 149, 151
banks and 56, 61, 62, 69, 70
Russia and 157, 170, 179, 180
Kuwait Finance Group 107
Kuwait Joint Relief Committee 144, 180
Kuwaiti Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage 174
Kuwaiti Zakat Fund 108
Kyagulanyi, Alirabaki (Shaykh Jamil Mukulu) 128
Kyrgyz National Security Council 171, 172
Kyrgyzstan 156, 157, 159, 171–173
La Vie 249
Laden International 94
al-Lahim, Shaykh Hamoud 189, 191
Principles of Islam 189
Lajnat al-Birr al-Islamiyya (LBI): see IBC
Lashkar-e-Jangvi 167
Lashkar-e-Toiba 49, 101, 103
Laskar Jihad (LJ) 197, 201
Lavrov, Sergei V. 181
League of Pakistani Islamic Propagation 189
Lebanon 116, 117, 119, 257, 269
Holy Land and 211, 213, 217, 221, 236
Hizbullah and 233–236
Lebed, Alexsandr 178
Leemount Limited 121
legislation
Bank Secrecy Act (USA) 41
Faisal Islamic Bank Act 1977 (Sudan) 107
Foreign Intelligence Service Act (FISA) (USA) 323
Income Tax Act (Canada) 278
Income Tax Act (Pakistan) 102
International Economic Powers Act (USA) 53
International Emergency Economic Powers Act 1979 (IEEPA) (USA) 275
Money Laundering Control Act (USA) 41
Patriot Act 2001 (USA) 54, 55
Public Association (1991) (Uzbekistan) 166
Saudi Banking Control Law 56
Terrorism Act (2000) (UK) 240
Libya 69, 94, 169
Southeast Asia and 185, 192, 195
Sudan and 111, 116
Liechtenstein 68, 70, 141, 245, 281
Lijnat al-Da‘wa (Kuwait) 137
Likud Party 226
Lindh, John Walker 97
Ljevakovic, Irfan 141
Lowey, Nita 274
Luxembourg 62, 67, 110, 245
Maasari, Shaykh Muhammad 258, 267
Mabrouk, Mohamed Ahmed Salama 147, 180
Macedonia 39, 135, 143, 144, 148, 258
Kosovo and 150, 151
al-Madani, Abu Hasan: see Julaidan, Wael Hamza
Madli 174
Madrasat al-Sulatiya al-Diniyah 186
Magen David Adom (Red Star of David) 228
Magtymguly Youth Association (Turkmenistan) 169
mahalla (neighborhood organization) 159
Mahdi, Ali 125, 126
al-Mahdi, Qutbi 277, 278
al-Mahdi, Prime Minister Sadiq 94, 113, 115
Mahir, Prime Minister Ahmad 90
majlis al-shura 39, 47
MAK (Mujahideen Services Bureau) 32, 51, 144, 268, 270
Afghanistan and 87–88, 89, 90
Emir of Jihad 84, 85
foot-soldiers 97, 98
mujahideen 93, 94, 96
Saudi Arabia and 32, 35, 46
Makkah Humanitarian Organization 133
Makkah Mukarramah Charity Trust, Inc. 281
Malaysia 197–200
Malaysian Central Bank 64
Malaysian Moujahedeen Group 197
Manji, Irshad 278
Trouble with Islam 278
al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad 256
Mar-Jac Investments 281
Margate Muslim Association 261
Martyrs Foundation 234
Marzouk, Musa Abu 267, 282, 283
Holy Land and 219, 223
Fund for Relief and Development (HLF) 271, 272, 275
Mash‘al, Khaled 222, 223, 225, 232
Maskhadov, General Aslan 178, 179
al-Masri, Abu Hamza 260, 261, 262
al-Masri, Hani 223
al-Masri, Saif al-Islam 47, 175, 179
al-Masri, Sayf-al-Adl 26
al-Masri, Shaykh Said 53
Massoud, Ahmad Shah 157
al-Maududi, Maulana Sayyid Abu al-‘Ala 80, 81, 186, 207
Mauritania 111, 128, 129, 137
Mawdudi Institute 201
Mecca 22, 23, 111, 159, 185
banks and 58, 68
Saudi Arabia and 27, 35, 38
“Mecca Declaration” 239
Medani, Shaykh Abbasi 247
Medical Aid for Palestine (MAP) 221, 257
Medina 58, 102
zakat and 11, 20, 23
al-Mekki, Ibrahim 91
Mena Investments, Inc. 281
Mendoza Jr., Rodolfo Bauzon 191
Mercy International Relief Organization (MIRO) 188, 189, 283
Balkans and 153
Sudan and 126, 128
United Kingdom 259
Meta, Prime Minister Ilir 149
al-Mezain, Imam Mohammad 267, 273
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) 226
Middle School Number One, Beslan 181
MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) 185–187
Millward, William 126
Milosevic, President Slobodan 132, 149, 150, 151
Mirza, Abduwal 165
Mirza, Yaqub 280
Misuari, Nur 185–187, 194
Mit Cham Savings Bank 62
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) 185, 187
Abu Sayyaf and 192, 194
Moafak el Hairiya (Blessed Relief) 123
al-Moayad, Shaykh Mohammad Ali Hassan 242
Mock, Alois 136
Mohammed, Ali 99–100, 127, 270
Mohammed, Prime Minister Mahathir 197, 198, 200
Morocco 42, 62, 132, 170, 244
Mostan International 282
“Mothers of Srebrenica and Podrinje” 145
Mourad, Sid Ahmed: see Kharban, Kamar
Moussaoui, Zacarias 54, 199
Movement for Islamic Reform 87
Movement for National Unity and Revival (Tajikistan) 164
MSA (Muslim Students’ Association of the United States and Canada) 263, 264, 277, 282, 291
Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan 13, 14
Mubarak, President Hosni 17, 83, 123, 147
mudarabah (partnerships) 63, 70
Mugniyah, Imad 235
Muhammad, Ali Mahdi 125
Muhammad, Khaled Shaykh 96, 97, 137, 184
Muhammad, Omar Bakri 260
Muhammad, Zahid Shaykh 137
Muhammad al-Faisal al-Saud, Prince 65, 68, 107, 109
Mukhlas: see Gufron, Perjalanan Ali
Mukhtar, Brigadier Kamal Ali 114
Mukhtar, Sharaf al-Din Ali 114
Multi-Donor Trust Fund 196
Murad, Abdul Hakim 183, 184
Museveni, President Yoweri Kaguta (Uganda) 140
Musharraf, President Pervez 101, 103, 168
Muslim Aid 221, 257, 258
Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) 273
Muslim Association 42, 261
Muslim Brotherhood
Abd al-Rahman and 91, 92
Al Qaeda and 79, 80
banks and 58, 59, 61, 62
HAMAS and 217, 219, 220
Holy Land and 214, 220, 221
Palestinan wing 215
Russia and 163, 176
al-Zawahiri and 90
Muslim Council of Britain 259–260
Muslim Council of France 245
Muslim Cultural Society of Enfield and Haringey 260, 261
Muslim Girls’ and Young Women’s Association 261
Muslim Hands 257
Muslim Investment Corporation 42
Muslim Religious Office for Kazakhstan 171
Muslim Salvation Organization of Burma 205
Muslim Welfare House 261
Muslim Youth 43
Muslim Youth Society 131, 219
Muslims of the Americas 267
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal coalition 249
Muwafaq Foundation 54, 248, 252
Balkans and 137, 138, 146, 149
Sudan and 113, 114, 117, 126, 240
Muwafaq Society 138
MWL (Muslim World League) 33–35, 263, 284
Myanmar (Burma) 206, 209
Nabiev, Rakhmon 162
Nada, Youssef Mustafa 69, 70, 71, 220
Italy and 244, 245
North America and 281, 282, 283
Nada International 281
Nada Management Organization 69, 71
Nafi, Dr. Bashir 266, 278–279
al-Naggar, Ahmed Ibrahim 147–148
Nahda Society 228
al-Nahyan, Shaykh Hamdan ibn Zayed 230
Naif bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, Prince 24, 101, 227, 230, 231
Naipaul, V. S. 200
Among the Believers 200
Najibullah, Mohammad 92–93
al-Najjar, Ahmad 62
Namangani, Juma 167
al-Namlah, Dr Ali bin Ibrahim 38, 41
Naqai, Shaykh Abu Abdul Aziz 44
Naqshabandi, Shaykh Bahauddin 165
Nasco Business Residence Center 245
Naseef, Dr. Abdullah Omar 101
Nasir, Lt. General Javed 103
Nasr, Fadlallah Burma 115
Nasreddin, Ahmed Idris 69, 70, 283
Italy and 244, 245
Nasreddin Company (Nasco SAS) 245
Nasreddin Foundation 69, 70
Nasreddin International Group 69, 245
Nasser, President Gamal Abdel 59, 60, 111, 130, 159, 212
Afghanistan and 79, 80, 90
zakat and 16, 17
National Arab Bank 45
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 107
National Commercial Bank (NCB) 45, 51, 56, 66–68, 121, 151, 227
Saudi banking and 59, 60, 61
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Sudan) 139
National Liberation Front (Algeria) 120
National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU) 261
National Youth Organization Associations 126
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 150, 151, 153, 155
Nawaf bin Abd al-Aziz, Prince 100, 101
Nazarov, Imam 166
Nazzal, Mohammad 99, 218–219
al-Nehdi, Khaled 68
Netanyahu, Benjamin 225
Netherlands Alislamic Aluok Foundation 146
Netherlands Antilles 55, 283
Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark 221, 251–256
“New Financiers of Terror” (Italy) 244
New Islamic Order 177
New Jersey 47, 142, 219, 270, 274, 282
New Jihad Group 91
New York Times 231, 269
Newsbreak 194
NGOs (non-government organizations) 10, 85, 140, 210
Europe and 238, 257
Holy Land and 212, 234
North America and 276, 278
Russia and 157, 159, 166, 167, 168, 174
Saudi Arabia and 35, 49
Sudan and 114, 117, 126
NIF (National Islamic Front) 3, 18
Balkans and 139, 141
Sudan and 109, 113, 114, 123
banking 108
People’s Defense Force (PDF) 115, 116
Nigeria 111, 128, 129, 130, 205
Nigeria Islamic Foundation 129
Nilein Industrial Bank 107
Nimatullahi Sufi order 248
nisab (property) 11, 18
Niyazov, President Saparmyrat (Turkmenistan) 168, 169–170
Ruhnama (The Book of the Soul) 169
NMCC (National Management Consultancy Center) 67, 121
Nomani, Shaykh 119
North American charities 263–286
Al Kifah and Al Haramain 269–271
BIF and GRF 267–269
Canadian connections 276–278
Holy Land Fund for Relief and Development (HLF) and 271–276
investigating 264–267
SAAR Foundation 279–284
WISE and 278–279
North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force 275
NSRCC (National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council) 114, 115, 116
NSSWO (Non-Sudanese Students Welfare Organization) 127
al-Numayri, President Ja‘far 108, 113, 115, 139
Nurhasyim, Amrozi bin Haji 204
al-Nuri, Nadir 280
Nurjaman, Encep: see Hambali
al-Obaid, Dr. Abdullah 34
Occupied Land Fund 219, 271, 272
Odeh, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz 117, 266
OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) 9, 41, 43, 53, 54, 71
Office of the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) 238, 240
Ogaden Islamic Union 119
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) 77, 159, 216, 236
Balkans and 135, 136
Southeast Asia and 187, 206
Olimpio, Guido 243
Om al-Qura Foundation 200, 205
Oman 16, 64, 230
Omar, Mullah Mohammed 97, 98, 102
Omar, Shaykh 262
Onos, Hadji 195
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 34, 60, 196
Open Society Institute 168
Operation Blue Marlin 184
Operation Bojinka 46, 96, 183, 184, 188
Malaysia and 197, 198
Operation Defensive Shield 228
Operation Green Quest 43, 54, 280, 281, 282, 283
Operation Green Veil 195
Operation Peace for Galilee 233
Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) 125, 127
Organization of Asian Students in Cairo 186
Orphans’ Assistance Association 232
Oslo Accords 213, 220, 225
Declaration of Principles 213
Othman, Omar Mahmud: see Abu Qutada
Ottoman Empire 15, 31, 58
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (USA) 223
Pacquette, Claude 277
Padilla, Jose 46
Pahlavi, Shah Reza 7
PAIC (Popular Arab and Islamic Congress) 128, 136, 156, 177
General Assembly 118, 119
al-Turabi and 118, 119, 120
Pakistan 101–104
Pakistan Muslim Social Welfare Association 247, 249
Pakistan National Economic Council 103
Pakistan Scholars/Ulema Society 208
Pakistan Second Constituent Assembly 206
Palestine 214–216, 229–233
Palestine Charity Committee 280
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 107, 117, 218, 220, 227, 236
North America and 266, 279
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 212, 213, 226, 233
Arafat’s corruption and 223
charities and 214, 215, 216
Europe and 250, 251
HAMAS and 217, 218, 219, 220
Palestinian Executive Committee 213
“PLO Bank” 214
Palestine National Council 213
Palestine Relief and Development Fund: see INTERPAL
Palestine Welfare Association (PWA) 214
Palestinian Association of Austria 221
Palestinian Monetary Authority 231
Palestinian Student Friends Association 231
Palestinian–Israeli peace agreement 68
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 198, 200
Pankisi Gorge 174, 175
“Paris Conference on Humanitarian and Charitable Societies” 49
Partisans Movement in Kashmir 208
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) (Bosnia) 132, 141, 144
Pasha-Sade, Shaykh-ul-Islam Allahshukyur 173
Pathfinder Investments 283
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 203, 204–205
Patterns of Global Terrorism (State Department) 266
PDF (People’s Defense Force) (Sudan) 115–117, 122
Peace Committee and “War of Liberation” (Pakistan) 208
Peace and Development Foundation 114, 126
Pearl, Daniel 103
Pentagon Group (Philippines) 188
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 82
Persian Gulf 23, 47, 59
Peshawar
Connection 86
Emir of Jihad and 84, 85
Osama bin Laden and 87, 88
Peshawar–Al Qaeda Nexus 78
al-Zawahiri and 90, 91
“Peshawar Seven” 82
Philippine Council for Peace and Development 194
Philippine Muslim Student Organization 186
Philippines
Indonesia and 200, 201, 202, 203
Malaysia and 197, 198, 200
Saudi Arabia and 36, 37, 45, 46
Pipes, Daniel 286
Popular Committee for Assisting the Palestinian Mujahideen (PCAPM) 215, 227
Popular Front (Tajikistan) 162
Powell, Colin 57
Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz Special Committee for Relief (SCR) 128
Putin, President Vladimir 179, 181
Qaddafi, Colonel Muammar 69, 111, 169, 185
Green Book 169
al-Qadi, Yassin Abdullah 121–124, 149, 154, 221, 240
al-Qaradawi, Shaykh Yousuf Abdullah 24–25, 61, 70, 179
Holy Land and 220, 224, 225
North America and 267, 271
Qasim, Talaat Fouad Abdul 36, 85, 96
Qatar 17, 24, 179, 271
Holy Land and 224, 230, 231
Qatar Charitable Society 137, 240
al-Qattan, Shaykh Ahmed 271
Quddus, Imtiaz 209
Quranic Literacy Institute 124
Qutb, Muhammad 59
Qutb, Sayyid 81–83, 163, 186
Fi Zilzal al-Quran (In the Shade of the Quran) 79
Ma‘aallim Fittareek (Milestones) 79
Rabbani, Burhanuddin 79, 81, 82
Rabita Trust 57, 100–101, 145, 157
Rabitatul Mujahideen coalition 203
Racak massacre 151
Radjab, Muhammad 165
Rahman, Abdur 176
Rahman, Bangabandu Shaykh Mujibur 206, 207, 208
“Our Charter of Survival” 206
Rahman, Mustafa 89
Rahman, General Ziaur “Zia” 207
Rajah Sulaiman Movement 196
al-Rajhi, Saleh Abd al-Aziz 282
al-Rajhi, Shaykh Suleiman Abd al-Aziz 66, 121, 280, 281, 282
al-Rajhi, Yousif Abdullah 66
Rakhmonov, President Imomali 160, 162, 164
Ramadan, Said 33
Ramadan, Tariq 246
Rantissi, Abdel Aziz 223, 232
al-Rashed, Abd al-Rahman 48
al-Rashid, Salah 189
al-Rashid, Suleiman 100
Rashidah, Khilafah 13
RCC: see NSRCC
Reagan, President Ronald 82
Red Army 156, 175
Red Crescent Societies 35, 100, 114, 169, 213
Afghanistan and 85, 90, 91
Balkans and 137, 144, 145
Holy Land and 212, 213, 229, 230
Lebanese 213, 233, 234
Palestinian (PRCS) 212–214, 215, 228
HAMAS 232
Lebanon 233
Saudi Arabia (SARCS) 31–33
Red Cross 6, 31, 169, 214
Holy Land and 212, 213, 214
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Commission for (ICRC) 16, 31, 33, 212, 213, 228
Regional Islamic Dawah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) 199–200
Rehman, Maulana Fazlur 249
Renseignements Généraux (RG) 246
Republica (Albania) 148
Ressemi, Ahmet 145
Reston Investments, Inc. 281
Rida, Rashid 4, 78
al-Ridi, Essam 110
Riyadh 47–50
Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) 209
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 278
royal family, Saudi 27, 34, 35, 36, 41, 94
banks and 57, 58, 62, 66
Holy Land and 214, 221, 229, 230
North America and 264, 281
Russia and 161, 173
Sudan and 108, 111
see also Saud, House of
Rugova, President Dr Ibrahim 149, 150
Russia and Central Asia 156–182
Chechnya 175–180
Georgia 174–175
Kyrgyzstan 171–173
lost opportunities 180–182
outsiders and 159–161
Russian army 162
Tajikistan 161–164
Transcaucasia 173–174
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 168–171
Uzbekistan 164–168
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) 39, 161, 178, 180
Russian–Saudi detente 161
Saad, Abd al-Salaam Sulayman 111
Saad, Servakh Abed 161, 180
al-Saadawi, Alaa 47
Saakashvili, Mikheil 175
SAAR (Suleiman Abd al-Aziz al-Rajhi) Foundation 157, 265, 279–284
Sabbagh, Hasib 214
Sabra massacre 257
Sacirbey, Nedzib 131
sadaqa (gifts) 7, 11, 17, 43, 129, 265
Europe and 248, 250, 251
Holy Land and 214, 227
Sadat, President Anwar 147
Afghanistan and 80, 83, 89, 91, 92
zakat and 16, 17
al-Sadiq, Isma‘il 14
Safa Group 282, 283
Safa Trust 280, 281, 282
Salafi Brigade for Call and Combat (Algeria) 4, 244
Salafist Islamist movement 198
Salafiyya Movement 58, 78
Salim, Mamdouh 145, 268
Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, Prince 26, 32, 36, 41, 88
Balkans and 133, 144, 145
Holy Land and 216, 227
Salvation International Islamic Organization 180
SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority) 56, 57, 64, 65, 67, 68, 232
Samudra, Imam 204
Sana-Bell Al Kheer 283
Sanabel al-Khair (Seeds of Charity) 36
Sanabil Association for Relief and Development 221, 233
al-Sanoussi, Ibrahim 116
Sanusiyya Brotherhood 69
Sarkozy, Nicolas 246, 248
Satar, Shaykh Abdullah 243
Saud, House of 4, 29, 57, 60, 65
Saud bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, King 29, 60, 66, 263
Saudi American Bank 45, 227
Saudi Arab Finance Corporation 110
Saudi Arabia and Islamic charities 23–25, 26–50
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) 38–41
Al Wafa Humanitarian Organization 43–45
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) 46–47
donations 26–30
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) 35–38
Muslim World League (MWL) 33–35
Riyadh bombings and 47–50
Saudi Arabia Red Crescent Society (SARCS) 31–33
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 41–43
Saudi Arabia National Human Rights Association 34
Saudi Benevolent Society 36
Saudi French Bank 228
Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia (SHCB) 144, 154
Saudi High Relief Commission for Bosnia (SHRC) 33, 39, 134, 144, 145, 149, 153, 154
Kosovo and 151, 152
Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC) 100, 151, 304
Saudi-British Bank 228
Saudi-Sudanese Bank 107, 121
SAUDIFIN (Saudi Finance Corporation) 110
Save the Children 257
Sayadi, Nabil (Abu Zaynab) 241, 255
al-Sayari, Hamad 56, 57
Sayyaf, Abdul Rab Rasul: see Abu Sayyaf
Schily, Otto 241
Schumer, Senator Charles 222
Scottish Charities Office 257
SDGTs (specially designated global terrorists) 44, 54, 56, 100, 259
SEDCO (Saudi Economic and Development Company) 66
Sedki, Prime Minister Atef (Egypt) 103
Sedky, Dr. Cherif 282
al-Seif, Abu Omar Mohammed: see Abu Seif
Senegal 128, 129, 249
September 11 2001 (9/11) 1, 96, 134, 137, 199, 252, 284
see also North America charities
Serbia 132, 133, 140, 150, 153, 258
Bosnia and 134, 135, 136, 143
Kosovo and 150, 151
Shaban, Shaykh Said 117
al-Shafi‘i, Muhammad ibn Idris 5
Shah, Wali Khan Amin 184, 198
Shahid, Leila 251
Shalabi, Mustafa 89
Shallah, Ramadan Abdullah 279
Shamzai, Nizamuddin 102
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Charter for 173
Declaration of 172
“Shanghai Five” 172
Shaqaqi, Khalil 117
Shari‘a 114, 260
al-Sharif, Saad 54
Sharon, Ariel 226
Shatilla massacre 257
Shaykh, Sahid 259
al-Shaykh, Saleh 42
Shaykh Eid-ben Mohammed al-Thani Foundation 179
Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation 256
Shevardnadze, Eduard 175
al-Shibh, Ramzi bin 54
Shifa International Hospitals Ltd. 121
al-Shiqaqi, Dr Ahmad Fathi 216, 279
Shishli Children’s Hospital 21
SIDO (Sub-Saharan International Development Organization) 123
Singapore 183, 184, 195, 198, 200, 206
Indonesia and 201, 202, 203
Thailand and 206
Sipah-e-Sahaba 167
Six Day War 212, 234
Siyam, Shaykh Muhammad 273
Slovenia 135, 141, 144
Social Care Committee 231
Social Reform Society 137
Society of Converts to Islam 260
Society of Muslim Lawyers 260
Society for Social Reform (SSR) (Kuwait) 180
Somalia 124–127
Soros, George 168
South Kazakhstan Humanitarian Academy 170
South Relief Agency 32
Southeast Asia 53, 82, 83, 97, 183–210
Abu Sayyaf Group 191–197
Bangladesh 206–210
Indonesia 200–204
Malaysia 197–200
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 185–187
Muhammad Jamal Khalifa 187–191
Southern Thailand 204–206
Spain 43, 194, 202, 205
Europe and 240, 241, 244, 250, 259
Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (Saudi Arabia) 107
Spiritual Administration for Muslims of Central Asia 168, 173, 181
State Committee on Religious Affairs (Uzbekistan) 166
Sterling Charitable Gift Fund 281, 282, 283
Sterling Management Group 281
Success Foundation 283
Sudan, revolutionary 105–130
30 June Revolution 113, 115, 117
Sudan and Islamic charities 17–18, 105–130
Al Qaeda, East Africa and 127–128
banking 106–109
Hasan al-Turabi 117–121
Khartoum–Al Qaeda Nexus 106
Osama bin Laden 109–110
People’s Defense Force (PDF) 115–117
Revolution 113–115
in Somalia 124–127
in West Africa 128–130
Yassin Abdullah al-Qadi and Muwafaq 121–124
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 109, 115, 116
Sudanese Financial Committee for Supporting the Kosovo Muslims 152
Sudanese Islamist movement 96
Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) 58, 119, 158, 176
Sukarnoputri, President Megawati 203
Suliman, Fadil 42
Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, Prince 68, 128, 230
Sungkar, Abdullah 198
Supreme Authority of Senior Scholars (Saudi Arabia) 173
Supreme Committee for the Collection of Donations for the Muslims of Bosnia 133, 134
Supreme Council for the Funds of Al Aqsa and the Al Quds Intifada 227
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 30
al-Suwaylim, Mansur 33
al-Suwaylim, Samir Salih Abdallah: see Abu Khattab
Switzerland
banks and 68, 69, 70, 71
Islamic system 62, 64, 65, 74
Europe and 239, 244, 245, 246, 259
Syria 21, 22, 160, 176, 189, 192
banks and 58, 62, 64, 70
Holy Land and 211, 212, 213, 234
Taba Investments 94
Tadamon Bank 94, 107, 108, 109, 110
Taha, Ali Osman 114
Taha, Muhammad 215
Taher, Abdel Hadi 100
Tajikistan 161–164
Islamic Resistance Party of Tajikistan 82
Tajik Communist Party 162
Talaa al-Fateh (Egypt) 89, 91
Taliban 4, 6, 22, 209, 229, 259
Afghanistan and 98, 102, 103
banks and 53, 55
Europe and 253, 258, 261
Russia and 157, 160, 163, 167
Saudi Arabia and 26, 37, 44
Tanzania 2, 40, 49, 56, 98, 145, 154, 241, 243, 259, 269
Sudan and 110, 128
Tarikh Osama (“Osama’s history”) 51
Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare (US House of Representatives) 140
Tatarstan 157, 158, 181
Tawil, Raymonda 223
Tax and Zakat Commission 16
Terrorist Financing, Working Group on 57
terrorist lists
Islamist organizations 95
United Nations 68, 101, 181, 195
United States 195, 222, 234, 235, 266, 268
Thaci, Hashim 150
Thakur, Dr. Ayub 259
Thalib, Ustad Ja‘afar Umar 201
Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) 140–143
Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center 193
Times of London 116
Tita, Mohammed Hassan 147
Totonji, Ahmad 282
“Tottenham Ayatollah”: see Muhammad, Omar Bakri
Transcaucasia 173–174
Transitional Military Council (TMC) (Sudan) 113, 114
Trueco 22
Tudjman, Franjo 132
Tunisia 4, 62, 69, 245, 252
Holy Land and 217, 219
Russia and 160, 170
Sudan and 116, 117, 120
al-Turabi, Hasan 2–3, 117–121, 156–157, 177, 197, 267, 277, 279
Turajanzade, Mullah Akhbar 162, 163
Turkey 62, 92, 189, 220, 238, 256
Balkans and 136, 141, 142, 143, 144
Albania 146, 147
Russia and 157, 166, 170, 173, 182
zakat and 20, 21, 22
Turki al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, Prince 68, 88, 157
Turkish Advisory and Welfare Centre 257
Turkish Prosperity Party (RAFAH) 238, 241
Turkmenistan 157, 158, 168–171
UASR (United Association for Studies and Research) 271, 272
Uganda 21, 107, 112, 128, 140, 278
ulama (learned clerics) 7, 8, 33, 58, 166
zakat and 12, 14
Umar ibn al-Khattab, Caliph 13, 20
Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) 218, 314
Unified Treasury of the National Palestinian Authority 227
Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) 246
Union of Muslim Organizations of Italy (UCOII) 244, 245
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 17, 44, 157, 161, 196
banks and 68, 70, 74, 75
investigating 55, 56
Holy Land and 229, 230
United Kingdom (UK) 256–259
United Kingdom Islamic Education Foundation 257
United Malays National Organization 198
United Nations High Commission for Refugees 144, 229
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 126
United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF) 125
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 212, 232, 233
United States of America (USA) 221–223
see also North American charities
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 162, 163
Unity Bank 107
al-Uqayl, Shaykh Uqayl bin Abdul Aziz (Aqeel al-Aqeel) 40, 41, 253
Uthman, Caliph 13
Uzbekistan 164–168
van Aartsen, Jozias 254
van Gogh, Theo 254
Vitug, Marites Daguilan 194
Vlaams Blok Party (Belgium) 256
Voice of Saudi Arabia 161
Voluntary Agencies (Sudan), Commissioner General for 122
WAFA (Palestine news agency) 44
al-Wahhab, Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd 4, 23, 57, 58, 59
Wajed, Shaykh Hasina 208, 209
Wali Mekbal al-Juabirah Association 224
Wall Street Journal 103
Walton, Charles 194
WAMY (World Assembly of Muslim Youth) 15, 41–43, 222, 228, 232, 284
waqf (endowments) 18, 19–23, 36, 81, 129, 169
Holy Land and 214, 215, 218
Waqf Al Birr Education Trust 257
waqf khayr (charitable trust) 19, 44
“War of Liberation” (Bangladesh) 206, 207
Washington Post 8, 284
Washington Times 41
Welfare Association (Ta‘awoun) (UK) 257
West Africa 107, 113, 119, 128–130, 249
West Bank 9, 23, 68, 211, 212, 221, 236
Afghanistan and 83, 99
Arafat’s corruption and 223, 224, 225
Europe and 248, 257
HAMAS and 217, 218, 219, 229, 231
Intifada and 225, 226, 228
North America and 273, 274
Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and 212, 213
West Pakistan 206
Wisdom Enrichment Foundation (WEFOUND) 199, 200
Wisdom Journal 190
Wolfsberg Group 54
World Bank 196, 223
World Health Organization (WHO) 212
World and Islamic Studies Enterprise (WISE) 265, 278–280, 281
World Islamic Banking Conference (2002) 65
World Islamic League 161
World Kashmir Freedom Movement 259
World Trade Center 2, 8, 9, 30, 190, 241
Afghanistan and 96, 183, 184
Balkans and 137, 154
banks and 53, 68
North American charities and 267, 272
Xinjiang 172, 173
al-Yacoub, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed 54
Yahya of Yemen, Imam 58
Yakutsia 161, 181
al-Yamani, Mohammed Abed 161
Yaquby, Shaykh Nizam 63
Yasin, Shaykh Ahmed Isma‘il 215, 222, 225
HAMAS and 216, 217, 218
Palestine and 215, 232
Yeltsin, President Boris 177, 178
Yemen 13, 180, 184, 201, 205, 224
Afghanistan and 90, 93, 94, 97
Balkans and 133, 147, 154
banks and 58, 60, 66
Europe and 242, 243
North America and 275, 278
Yemen Society for Social Welfare 243
Yemeni Development Forum 257
Yew, Lee Kuan 206
York Foundation 281, 282
Yousef, Ahmed bin 272
Yousef, Ramzi 96–97, 184, 193, 197, 205
Muhammad Jamal Khalifa and 190
Yugoslavia 119, 131, 132, 135, 150
Yusuf, Azzam Mustafa 224
Zahiragic, Munib 154
zakat 11–25
waqf (endowments) 19–23
Zakat Account 39
zakat al-amwal al-batina 80
Zakat Board (Sudan) 18
Zakat Committee of Khan Younis 214
Zakat Committee of Ramallah 214
Zakat Committee of Tulkarem 214
Zakat Committee of Zenin 214
Zakat Fund, International 15
zakat, international conferences on 15, 24
Zalloum, Abdul Qadeem 159
Zamboanga Islamic Institute of the Philippines 193
Zarate, Juan 222
al-Zawahiri, Dr. Ayman 32, 47, 89–91, 92, 93, 95–96, 100, 125, 147, 148, 177, 180, 185, 202, 239, 251–252, 256, 267, 270, 278
al-Zawahiri, Mohammed 36, 147
al-Zawahiri, Muhammad al-Ahmadi 90
al-Zawahiri, Dr. Rabie 90
al-Zawahiri, Umayma (née Azzam) 90
Zawari, Shaykh: see al-Zawahiri, Dr. Ayman
Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation 152
Zenawi, Meles 119
Zia, Prime Minister Begum Khaleda 209
Zia-ul-Haq, President 101
al-Zindani, Shaykh Abdul Majeed 97, 174, 267
Zionist Action Group (GSC) 250
Zivalj, Huso 141
Zouaydi, Muhammad Galeb Kalaje 241, 255
Zubayr, Dr. Muhammad 189
Zubayr Philanthropic Foundation 152
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