Quintan Wiktorowicz New Obamma Counter Terrosim Advisor

Someone to Watch....

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There's a pattern to recent terror attacks in the United States: Americans — either citizens or residents — have been behind them. In the past two years, dozens of American citizens and residents have been arrested on terrorism charges.

In some cases, the suspects were young Muslims traveling overseas to train for violent jihad. In others, they're accused of actually trying to launch attacks. Attorney General Eric Holder said homegrown terrorism is one of those things that keeps U.S. officials awake at night.

'The findings that [Quintan Wiktorowicz] came up with based upon his work really shattered some of the stereotypes we have about Muslims and radicalization.'

- Christine Fair, expert on terrorism and radicalization

Now there is someone new at the National Security Council who won't be getting much sleep: He's a former Rhodes College professor named Quintan Wiktorowicz, and he's an expert on, among other things, how some people decide to become terrorists.

"A number of years ago, before he went into government, he did some of the most path-breaking work not only on who was susceptible to being radicalized, but most importantly, who was the most resistant to being radicalized," says Christine Fair, an expert on terrorism and radicalization at Georgetown University. "And the findings that he came up with based upon his work really shattered some of the stereotypes we have about Muslims and radicalization."
As part of his research, Wiktorowicz interviewed hundreds of Islamists in the United Kingdom. After compiling his interviews he came to the conclusion that — contrary to popular belief — very religious Muslims were in fact the people who ended up being the most resistant to radicalization.

Fair, who has done a great deal of work on radicalization in Pakistan, said Wiktorowicz's work stayed with her forever. "It really was revelatory for me," she says.


Revelatory because, as it turns out, Wiktorowicz found that it was people who did not have a good grounding in the religion who were the most likely to be attracted by radical Islam.

Peter Neumann is the director of the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King's College, London. He got to know Wiktorowicz in London three years ago. Wiktorowicz was at the U.S. Embassy there, studying how the British dealt with radical Islamists and then finding ways to apply those lessons to the United States.

While in the U.K., Wiktorowicz reached out to a wide range of Muslim leaders — from moderates to extremists — and that set him apart from scholars who had preceded him, Neumann says.
"He very successfully mobilized a broad coalition of very different people in London that all came together in order to oppose extremism and terrorism. No one else before has accomplished that."

It is also on this point that Wiktorowicz apparently ran into trouble. His coalition of Muslims was controversial because it included people some conservatives in Britain found too extreme. As Neumann sees it, that was part of the strategy: "Wiktorowicz's approach has quite deliberately been: 'I want the tent to be as broad as possible. ... As long as they are opposed to extremism and terrorism, I want everyone to be part of the coalition.' "

At the White House, Wiktorowicz's title will be senior director for global engagement at the National Security Council.

He's seen by terrorism experts as bringing so much to his new job that he could fundamentally change the way the Obama administration deals with Muslims in America.

Right now, counterradicalization in the U.S. largely depends on law enforcement — on things like FBI outreach to Muslim communities. The sheer volume of homegrown terrorism cases in the U.S. over the past two years makes clear that isn't enough, Neumann says.

"One of the important things about counterradicalization is that about perhaps 10 percent of it is law enforcement and intelligence, 90 percent of it are things that have relatively little to do with that," he says. "Counterradicalization also has to include things like politicians visiting Muslim communities, messaging" and beefing up education about Islam among Muslims themselves, so they can better resist radical recruiters.

How Wiktorowitz will apply what he learned in Britain here is unclear. His first official day of work at the White House is Monday.

The Rest @ NPR

What is the Best Means for the world to Fall Under Islam?

The non Muslim world must understand that the aim of Salafi Islam is bring the world under the control of Islam. The only conflict occurs when discussing the means by which this must occur.
It is a matter of Roles, and who is to play which. There is no disagreement over if the roles discussed below are acceptable, including violent jihad.

"By means of this document we send a message to America and those behind it. We are coming, by the will of God almighty, no matter what America does. It will never be safe from the fury of Muslims. America is the one who began the war, and it will lose the battle by the permission of God almighty"


- Al-Qaeda statement, April 24, 2002 Source

Map from the World Islamic Mission Research Division- A salafi web site





The fundamental beliefe behind Salai islam is that the whole world will eventually come under the control of islam. They believe that it is the job of the faithful to work to this come to pass
Understand that they are all very clear that this will happen, and that they are bound to work toward an Islamist world.

What follows is a a 7 year old statement from Quintan Wiktorowicz explaining the conflict iside the Salafi movement over the best means for the whole world to fall under islam.

-Shirmron

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The 2002 statement is best understood as part of an ongoing debate about the use of violence in Islam. Al-Qaeda is a component of a broader "fundamentalist" community and as a result is actively engaged in debates about religious authority, the legitimacy of war and rules of engagement in combat. In the 1990s, most disputes focused on whether it was permissible to rebel against incumbent regimes in the Muslim world. Toward the late 1990s, this focus shifted to address the United States as an emerging enemy and the legitimacy of particular tactics in warfare against unbelievers.

The 2002 document is part of this latest debate and should therefore be understood as an argument that seeks not only to outline al-Qaeda's justification, but also address alternative, competing religious interpretations about acceptable violence in Islam.

DEBATING VIOLENCE
Al-Qaeda is a radical tendency within a broader Islamic movement known as the Salafi movement. The term Salafi is derived from the Arabic salaf, which means "to precede" and refers to the companions of the Prophet Muhammed. Because the salaf learned about Islam directly from the messenger of God, their example is an important illustration of piety and unadulterated religious practice. Salafis argue that centuries of syncretic cultural and popular religious rituals and interpretations distorted the purity of the message of God and that only by returning to the example of the prophet and his companions can Muslims achieve salvation.

The label "Salafi" is thus used to connote "proper" religious adherence and moral legitimacy, implying that alternative understandings are corrupt deviations from the straight path of Islam.

While Salafis all agree about the importance of the prophetic model and the paradigm of the companions, there are important interpretive differences that have engendered schisms within the movement, particularly over the proper method to create an Islamic society and protect the umma (Muslim community).

Differences in interpretation tend to emphasize one of the following four basic methods for promoting Islam:

1) Propagation (dawa). Salafis who focus on this method emphasize personal piety, cleansing the corpus of hadiths (reported sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammed), and spreading proper Islam. For this group, the priority is for individuals to practice a pure understanding of Islam. This entails not only propagation and individual piety, but a program to eliminate any weak or false hadiths so that Muslims ensure they are truly following the prophetic model.

2) Advice. A large number of influential Salafis and their followers believe that it is the responsibility of the ulama (religious scholars) to advise leaders about Islamic legislation and regulations. In general, however, they believe this advice should be given in private.

3) Non-violent action. Some Salafis believe that it is the duty of Muslims (particularly the ulama) to openly speak out against un-Islamic actions, decisions and public policy. This can include the use of the khutba (Friday sermon), open letters, public speeches, demonstrations and rallies.

4) Violent action. A small, radical fringe in the Salafi community argues that it is an Islamic duty to use violence to remove leaders who do not properly follow or enforce Islam. Known as jihadis, these Salafis do not reject the other methods, but they do emphasize the necessity of violence. Al-Qaeda is part of this group.

These differences have produced debates about the proper methodology for promoting Islam, leading to often vitriolic conflicts. Because Salafis believe that there is only one accurate understanding of Islam -- the model of the prophet and his companions -- this creates a tendency to dismiss any differences of interpretation as deviations.

• It is quite common, for example, for one Salafi group to call scholars and followers from other clusters to "return to the straight path."
• This has even generated disagreements over who can be considered a Salafi. In particular, non-violent Salafis, who make up the vast majority of the movement, often vehemently reject use of the Salafi label to describe the violent or jihadi elements.
• The latter, however, identify themselves as Salafis and dismiss the other groups as misguided, ignorant (unknowledgeable about Islam) or corrupt.

The debate within the Salafi community over the use of violence has divided the movement more than any other issue.

• During the 1990s, as al-Qaeda developed, the initial debate between violent and non-violent Salafis was over takfir -- declaring a Muslim an apostate. Declaring a Muslim an unbeliever is a serious endeavor, since it could mean a death sentence. The central axis of divergence was over whether one could judge a ruler in the Muslim world an apostate according to his actions.
• Non-violent groups argued that one can never know with certainty what is in an individ-ual's heart and that so long as a ruler has a "mustard seed of iman (belief)," he is considered a Muslim, especially if he allows Muslims to pray and generally practice their religion.
• The jihadi Salafis, on the other hand, argued that the oneness of God (tawhid) demands that Muslims follow Islam in both belief and action. In other words, an un-Islamic belief is just as revealing as an un-Islamic action. As a result, the jihadis charged the Saudis and other regimes in the Muslim world with un-Islamic behavior and thus apostasy, and called for a jihad to remove them.

Quintan Wiktorowicz

"Quintan Wiktorowicz "


(2005 data)
Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz
Professor of International Studies
Rhodes Collegewiktorowiczq@rhodes.com
2000 North ParkwayDepartment of International Studies, Rhodes College
Memphis, TN 38112-1690(t)
901-843-3609(f)
901-843-3371
Areas of Expertise - Muslim Politics

The Jihadi Salafis Name Of The Enemy by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004)

• Dr. Wiktorowicz is the J.S. Seidman Research Fellow and assistant professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee.
• He is author of The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan (2001); Global Jihad:
• Understanding September 11; Radical Islam Rising: Al-Muhajiroun and High Risk Activism(forthcoming); and numerous articles and book chapters on Islamic movements in the Middle East and Europe.
• He has recently published an edited book titled Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. His current research examines Islamic fundamentalist debates about issues related to Jihad and violence.

Articles in Middle East Policy

• Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11Volume X, Summer 2003, Number 2
• EXCERPT: The New Global Threat:Transnational Salafis and JihadVolume VIII, December 2001, Number 4

THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN JORDAN
Quintan Wiktorowicz 1

Abstract

Since the 1970s, the Salafi movement in Jordan has grown substantially. Today, Salafis are ubiquitous in every major city in the kingdom, and Salafi bookshops, lessons, and activities are common.

• The purpose of the movement is to institute religious behavior and practices that capture the purity of Islam, as understood by the salaf (early Companions of the Prophet).
• Salafis believe that because the salaf learned about Islam directly from the Prophet or those who knew him, they commanded a pure understanding of the religion.
• All decisions in life must therefore be based upon evidence from the Qur[superset or implies]an and sunna, as recorded in authentic sayings (had[horizontal bar]iths) by the salaf. In instances where particular actions or behaviors were not sanctioned by the original sources of Islam, they are rejected as “not Muslim.”
• Those who strictly adhere to this religious understanding are considered Salafis.1
  
• Footnotes
  
• 1 Quintan Wiktorowicz is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Penn. 17257, USA.

Original Source @ The Journals of Cambridige

• Quintan Wiktorowicz Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the WestCanadian Journal of Sociology Online March-April 2006. Quintan Wiktorowicz (the Pdf)
• The theory of recruitmentQuintan Wiktorowicz, Department of International Studies, Rhodes College. INTRODUCTION ... Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington:
• Conceptualizing Islamic ActivismQUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ. 3 4. I S I M N E W S L E T T E R 1 4 / J U N E 2 0 0 4 ... 2. Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the ...http://www.isim.nl/files/newsl_14/newsl_14-34.pdf