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Showing posts with label Dahabshiil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dahabshiil. Show all posts

Monday, August 08, 2011

The Anatomy of an Alms for Jihad Transaction

Zakat, a legitimate Sharia tax can be used for many different things, including alms for the poor and even paying a Mujahadiin's expenses. To the payer it is simply a mandatory religious tax on money left in the bank. Many of these funds are rerouted (called money laundering) and used to pay for terrorism.

Someone fighting a" religious cause" or Holy war is a legitimate candidate for Zakat funds under Sharia law. The following is a hypothetical anatamoy of what an alms for jihad transaction looks like:
  • A Jihadist logistical leader hunts down wealthy or well connected Ikhwans, (Muslim Brotherhood) believers who are ideologically aligned with a particular Jihad.
  • They meet them on line, at conferences, through funding Brokers (UBL brokered deals like this at high levels, for example the Golden Chain List).
  • They come to agreement about funding. The Funder need not be aware of the details of what the funding is for as long as he gets credit for the Zakat religious taxes they owe in accordance with Sharia.
  • Then they transfer the funds using a Hawala or remmitance company. For example, a not-so-hypothetical funder in UAE agrees to fund a Mujahadeen group in Northern Nigeria, Somalia, Cameroon, Western Sahara, or even the new country of South Sudan.
The Zakat transaction recorder gives the name and number of one or more of his independent Hawala agents to the fund provider who is located in the funder's country, in this case, the UAE.
  • The Agent looks up an agent in the receiving country from his agent directory, or more likely is given a preferred agent by the terrorist logistician in the country where the funds are needed; in our example, Northern Nigeria,
  • The Sending Hawala Agent calls the receiving Hawala agent, and they make a deal.
  • They then call the Hawala Agency, in our example, Dahabshiil (based in Somalia) and the Agency agrees to back the transaction.
  • Dahabshiil is supposed to ask questions about what the transaction is for. In our example, the sending Independent Hawala Agent tells the agency that he thinks it is for "farm equipment".
  • The Funder gives the funds to the sending Independent Hawala agent. The agent charges a 4% commission for the transfer. He keeps 25% of the commission, the agency (Dahabshiil in this case) keeps 50% of the commission, and the receiving Independent Hawala Agent keeps 25% of the commission.
  • There are many transactions like this a month, and Dahabshiil settles up with the Independent Agents by receiving and paying the funds out in Aggregate every week or month.
  • The terrorist in the receiving country gets a phone call with an agent's contact information if needed, and a transaction code number.
  • The Terrorist goes to the receiving agent in Northern Nigeria and gets the cash.
  • The funder takes his Zakat religious tax receipt for "farm equipment"from the sending Hawala back to the Zakat accountant - he may never know to whom his Zakat is going, or what it is used for. This is permissible under Sharia.
The steps in this process provide deniability for terrorism support at every level. It may be true that someone thought their zakat funds were going for the medical needs of children, and they were actually used to buy an explosive vest used by a child.
  • The funder could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • The Sender could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • Dahabshiil could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • The receiver might say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • The fund user could say he did not know the funds were for childrens' medical needs, and he buys the child's explosive vest.
Only one person commits the crime, but no one else in the process accepts responsibility for equipping the war criminal to use a child as a bomb.

Note: Dahabshiil is used as an example. There are many many Hawalas in almost every country on earth. Dahabshiil and its leaders were severely sanctioned after 9-11 for a history of unaccountable transactions.

Since that time, they have taken steps to mitigate the process and many sanctions against Dahabshiil have been lifted by the US. This global corporation has taken strategic steps to look more like a bank, but every day diaspora around the world send money home to their families and clans using the Hawala system... And some of those transactions fund terrorists.

The following posts from a discussion among Hawala

Sunday, May 15, 2011

193.219.211.201


Dahabshiil Telecom. International
Somalia based IP address 193.219.211.201 demonstrates frequent intelligence gathering-like searches at times that demonstrate early knowledge of
al Shabaab activities.


Recently, users of this IP address went on the Google Botswana search page in search of the Golis telecom database

Visit Page:www.google.co.bwgolis Telecom database



15 May 2011 09:01:36 GWT
Browser:IE 8.0
Win XP
Resolution:

800x600


Sunday, January 16, 2011

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Leaders Captured by Milita, Given to goS

2:08 AM (20 hours ago)
Darfur JEM says government forces captured some of its officials

from Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan by SudanTribube.com
January 15, 2011 (KHARTOUM) – The Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) said that government troops ambushed its forces and managed to take into custody a number of its senior officials.

"Three days ago, a mobile administrative unit belong to JEM was touring the villages of Abu Jurouj, Bir Saliba and Garji Garji in west Darfur, close to El Geniena city. The unit was ambushed by a government force and its associated militia" said a statement by the rebel movement and signed by its military spokesperson.

JEM said it fought its way through the ambush but that some of its members " lost their way and were captured by militia affiliated to GoS " [government of Sudan]

"The militia bargained for a ransom from JEM in the same way they do against their western captives and ended up handing over their captives to GoS".

It gave the name of the captives as

1. Commander Al Maz Deng, Deputy President of JEM and Secretary for Southern Sudan Region.
2. Sir Gibriel Tia Kuku, Political Advisor to the President of JEM
3. Mahjoub Jazouli Izzalarab, Deputy Head of JEM Administration and Organization, Darfur Region.
4. Abdalla Abdalla Hasan
5. Yahia Abbaker Musa
6. Abdalla El-Tom Abdalla
7. Yahia Babikir Daldoum
8. Musa Omer
9. El Rasheed Ahmed
10. Mohamed Balla
11. Ibrahim Adam
12. Abdalla Khamees

"These heroes are now prisoners and are entitled for treatment in accordance with international conventions. JEM expect them to remain safe and will not hesitate to retaliate, if mistreated by their captors" the rebel group said.

The Sudanese army confirmed the incident saying that it transferred a number of JEM figures to Khartoum after being arrested west of Jebel Moon after a chase that lasted for 67 km North of El Geniena

Last month, JEM clashed with Sudanese army south of El-Fasher, historic capital of Darfur and was reportedly joined by other rebel groups including one that has signed a peace agreement with Khartoum.

The Rest @ Sudan Tribune

Monday, April 12, 2010

Long War Update in The Horn and Yemen

Gulf of Aden Security Review - April 12, 2010
Yemen:

Yemen says it has not received U.S. intelligence on al Awlaki’s location; four al Houthi rebels on trial in Yemen for spying for Iran; Yemeni tribe warns U.S. against killing al Awlaki; Yemeni Foreign Minister says al Awlaki is not a terrorist; father offers deal for al Awlaki’s removal from list; protests continue in Dhale

Horn of Africa:

Bush official: President Obama’s policy towards Somalia remains the same as predecessor; Dahabshiil guards reject disarmament attempts by Hizb al Islam; BBC responds to al Shabaab censoring; hundreds of Somali refugees reach Somali-Kenyan border town; civilians arrested in Galga'o for breaking curfew

Yemen Security Brief

Yemeni authorities say they are looking for the radical cleric Anwar al Awlaki, but have received no American intelligence about his whereabouts or role within al Qaeda. The Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al Qirbi did not elaborate on the steps taken to apprehend al Awlaki, but mentioned an air strike in December on an al Qaeda meeting where the cleric was reportedly in attendance.[i]

Four men associated with the al Houthi movement in northern Yemen are being tried on suspicions of spying for Iran. The men are charged with passing “photographs of security installations, military camps, ports, islands and maritime installations” to Iran. The four were also accused of “receiving funds, supplies and arms from different parties and delivering them to the Houthis.”[ii]

Anwar al Awlaki’s tribe in Yemen threatened violence against anyone who harms him. The threat by the al Awaliq tribe is ostensibly aimed at the United States, which recently placed al Awlaki on its capture or kill list. The tribe is located mainly in Abyan and Shabwah governorates in southern Yemen.[iii]

Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al Qirbi said in a statement Saturday that Yemen does not consider Anwar al Awlaki a terrorist. He also said that Yemeni authorities have no contact with the cleric.[iv]

Anwar al Awlaki’s father has promised the cleric will cease activity against the United States if he is taken off the capture or kill list. It is unclear whether Nasser al Awlaki, the former president of the University of Sana’a, made the statement with his son’s consent.[v]

Protests against the government continued on Monday in Dhale as a general strike shut down all economic activity in the city. Two explosions were heard near schools with no reported casualties. Gunfire was also heard sporadically throughout the city. Additional protests were held on Sunday in Dhale, Lahij, Abyan, and Aden.[vi]

Horn of Africa Brief

Jendayi E. Frazer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Bush Administration, stated President Obama is applying the same policies towards Somalia as President Bush. Frazer also commented on the upcoming TFG offensive in Mogadishu stating she does not anticipate any significant changes to occur.[vii]

Security guards at the Dahabshiil Bureau in Mogadishu's Bakara market have resisted disarmament attempts by Hizb al Islam forces. Dahabshiil officials stated fighters from Hizb al Islam “stormed” the bureau on Saturday in attempt to disarm the guards; however, the Islamist forces were met with such strong resistance, business were forced to close for an hour.[viii]

In response to al Shabaab’s BBC ban, BBC Africa head, Jerry Timmins, stated BBC always addresses all sides in the conflict, including al Shabaab, and adheres “to strict standards of impartiality and editorial independence” and rejects anything which suggests otherwise. Timmins also stated, “It is essential for the people of Somalia that the BBC is allowed to continue to report accurately and impartially on the situation in the country without undue interference from anyone.”[ix]

Hundreds of Somali families who fled the fighting in Mogadishu and southern Somalia have reached the Somali-Kenyan border town of Dhobley, which is controlled by the Somali Islamist group al Shabaab.[x]

Four civilians from the Hormar neighborhood, in the town of Galga'o in the Mudug region, have been arrested by Mudug police forces for violating the imposed night curfew, which was put in place to assure the “security of the towns, districts and villages under the control of Galmudug State.” Mudug police forces stated the detained civilians will be brought before a court and sentenced.[xi]

The Rest @ Critical Threats

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Monday, October 12, 2009

Hawala and bank Dahabshiil - Abdirashid Duale How It Works

What follows is an excerpt from an interview of Abdirashid Duale, the founder of Dahabshiil. It was published by Somaliland Express on 09/09/09.



-Shimron Issachar

What makes you different from the other money transfer service providers like Western Union and Money Gram?


We are totally different from Western Union and Money Gram because we are inexpensive and oriented towards business as well. Dahabshiil like the other international money transfer services is a truly global operation providing a broad range of financial services to businesses both large and small and international organisations as well as the private individuals. We also operate under full banking licenses in a number of East African countries and are expanding this aspect of our business month on month.

  • We have 1,000 branches and agents in over 40 countries around the world and international offices in London and Dubai.
  • We have offices in 18 states in the US. We are the leading financial services organisation in the Horn of Africa. We focused on the quality of service.
  • We can transfer as much as a business man wants within seconds while our competitors may take some time. Our services are internet based like theirs but we put a lot of emphasis on the time factor.

The other difference we have from them is that we allow our customers to negotiate with us. A person sending US $100 to the US or UK will only pay $2 as service fee and when it is an inland transaction say sending money from Kampala to Arua, $100 will be sent for less than $2. We aim at serving more people while charging less so as to earn more.

The Rest @ Somaliland Express





Monday, June 01, 2009

Dahabshiil Opening an Islamic Bank in Djibouti?

Dahabshiil is runnng advertisments in Keny to staff Banking positions inf Djibouti.
Interpretation:

Dahabshiil is opening up full scale islamic bank in Djibouti. This is an interesting move on their part... see the adds below.

-Shimron Issachar


Our client is a leading International Financial Services Provider, registered in UK and UAE (Dubai) with more than 1000 branches and agents in 44 countries around the world.

Currently our client is in the process of setting up an Islamic Bank in the Republic of Djibouti. The new bank seeks to fill a number of senior executive positions with dynamic individuals that have solid experience and a successful track record in banking and finance.

These positions require superior leadership and communication skills as well as ability to work with others in a multicultural environment. Fluency in English -written and oral is essential whilst ability to speak Arabic or French is desirable. Prior experience of Islamic Banking is also highly desirable.

The new bank offers opportunities for rewarding career growth and a competitive compensation package designed for attracting and retaining the best talents in the respective fields.

Immediate vacant posts include:
Chief Executive Officer
Head of IT & Project Manager
Head of Finance
Head of Treasury
Head of Credit
Administration & HR Manager
Database & System Administrator
Technical Support & Network Administrator
If you have the prerequisite skills and experience please forward your updated CV with contact details to:

Before the closing date of 12th June 2009.

Thursday, October 09, 2008

Mohammed Usman Maye Assassinated in Baidao, Somalia

The Transitional Federal Government lost a Member of Parliament earlier today on September 9, 2008 after he was shot with a pistol at a close range three times by an unidentified Gunmen In Baidao, the interim Capital of the war-torn Somalia.Several witnesses said the killers shot MP Mohammed Usman Maye near Dahabshiil office in Baidao. He died at the scene while the assassins escaped un-confronted by anyone.

It is rare that the culprits are caught in assassinations like this, said one witness.According to Dalkanews.com the dead MP complained about his safety in Baidao recently as he was threatened by other TFG government members. Recently, there were threats on his life coming from other MPs such as MP Shati Gudud and Sh. Aden Madobe.

The city's residents have seen a surge of assassinations, bombings, and armed clashes between the TFG and anti-goverment forces.

Currently, the city is surrounded by Al-Shabab fighters in all corners while the Parliament is surrounded by a mix of Ethiopian and TFG forces for the security of the MPs.

However, all over the city, Al-Shabab fighters walk about freely.Contrary to the believes of Baidao's residents - that the city is not safe - MP Shati Gudud who is from Baidao told the press after MP Mohammed Usman Maye's assassination that the city is safe for everyone to live in.

So far, no one claimed responsibility which is in line with previous assassinations in Somalia.

Saturday, August 30, 2008

Dahabshiil, The Qutbist Jihadi's Best Friend

Somalia based, Dahabshiil has many locations in:

Austria
Bahrain
Canada
Denmark
Djibouti
Egypt
Ethiopea
Finland
India
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
New Zealand
Norway
Qatar
Sengal
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Uganda
United Arab Emirites
United Kingopm
United States
Yemen

Find Cities Here

Anyone Who can fill out this application can join their Hawala Network.

dahabsiil
dahabsiil
dahabsil
dahabshil

Don't worry they trust your good judegment. al Taqiyya is really a Shi'ia problem. They will believe what you say.

Do they really check to see if these anti terror ism standards are being met?

(THIS POST or SITE IS NOT AFFILIATED OR A SUPPORTER of Dahabshiil )

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Hawala , Money Laundering , and Terror Financing

What Follows is an excerpt from an excellent book ,if you want to understand how groups like al Qaieda fund their operations:

Hawala, or the Bank that Never Was

By: Sam Vaknin, Ph.D.
Also published by United Press International (UPI)

-Shimron

I. OVERVIEW
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, attention was drawn to the age-old, secretive, and globe-spanning banking system developed in Asia and known as "Hawala" (to change, in Arabic). It is based on a short term, discountable, negotiable, promissory note (or bill of exchange) called "Hundi". While not limited to Moslems, it has come to be identified with "Islamic Banking".

Islamic Law (Sharia'a) regulates commerce and finance in the Fiqh Al Mua'malat, (transactions amongst people). Modern Islamic banks are overseen by the Shari'a Supervisory Board of Islamic Banks and Institutions ("The Shari'a Committee").

The Shi'a "Islamic Laws according to the Fatawa of Ayatullah al Uzama Syed Ali al-Husaini Seestani" has this to say about Hawala banking:

"2298. If a debtor directs his creditor to collect his debt from the third person, and the creditor accepts the arrangement, the third person will, on completion of all the conditions to be explained later, become the debtor. Thereafter, the creditor cannot demand his debt from the first debtor."

The prophet Muhammad (a cross border trader of goods and commodities by profession) encouraged the free movement of goods and the development of markets. Numerous Moslem scholars railed against hoarding and harmful speculation (market cornering and manipulation known as "Gharar").

Moslems were the first to use promissory notes and assignment, or transfer of debts via bills of exchange ("Hawala"). Among modern banking instruments, only floating and, therefore, uncertain, interest payments ("Riba" and "Jahala"), futures contracts, and forfeiting are frowned upon.

But agile Moslem traders easily and often circumvent these religious restrictions by creating "synthetic Murabaha (contracts)" identical to Western forward and futures contracts. Actually, the only allowed transfer or trading of debts (as distinct from the underlying commodities or goods) is under the Hawala.

"Hawala" consists of transferring money (usually across borders and in order to avoid taxes or the need to bribe officials) without physical or electronic transfer of funds. Money changers ("Hawaladar") receive cash in one country, no questions asked. Correspondent hawaladars in another country dispense an identical amount (minus minimal fees and commissions) to a recipient or, less often, to a bank account. E-mail, or letter ("Hundi") carrying couriers are used to convey the necessary information (the amount of money, the date it has to be paid on) between Hawaladars. The sender provides the recipient with code words (or numbers, for instance the serial numbers of currency notes), a digital encrypted message, or agreed signals (like handshakes), to be used to retrieve the money. Big Hawaladars use a chain of middlemen in cities around the globe.

But most Hawaladars are small businesses.

  • Their Hawala activity is a sideline or moonlighting operation.
  • "Chits" (verbal agreements) substitute for certain written records.
  • In bigger operations there are human "memorizers" who serve as arbiters in case of dispute.
  • The Hawala system requires unbounded trust. Hawaladars are often members of the same family, village, clan, or ethnic group. It is a system older than the West.

The ancient Chinese had their own "Hawala" - "fei qian" (or "flying money"). Arab traders used it to avoid being robbed on the Silk Road.

  • Cheating is punished by effective ex-communication and "loss of honour" - the equivalent of an economic death sentence.
  • Physical violence is rarer but not unheard of. Violence sometimes also erupts between money recipients and robbers who are after the huge quantities of physical cash sloshing about the system.
  • But these, too, are rare events, as rare as bank robberies. One result of this effective social regulation is that commodity traders in Asia shift hundreds of millions of US dollars per trade based solely on trust and the verbal commitment of their counterparts

Purpose

Hawala arrangements are used to avoid customs duties, consumption taxes, and other trade-related levies.

  • Suppliers provide importers with lower prices on their invoices, and get paid the difference via Hawala.
  • Legitimate transactions and tax evasion constitute the bulk of Hawala operations.

Modern Hawala networks emerged in the 1960's and 1970's to circumvent official bans on gold imports in Southeast Asia and to facilitate the transfer of hard earned wages of expatriates to their families ("home remittances") and their conversion at rates more favourable (often double) than the government's.

Hawala provides a cheap (it costs c. 1% of the amount transferred), efficient, and frictionless alternative to morbid and corrupt domestic financial institutions. It is Western Union without the hi-tech gear and the exorbitant transfer fees.

Hawala use in Terror Financing and Reverse Money Laundering

Unfortunately, these networks have been hijacked and compromised by drug traffickers (mainly in Afganistan and Pakistan), corrupt officials, secret services, money launderers, organized crime, and terrorists.

  • Pakistani Hawala networks alone move up to 5 billion US dollars annually according to estimates by Pakistan's Minister of Finance, Shaukut Aziz.
  • In 1999, Institutional Investor Magazine identified 1100 money brokers in Pakistan and transactions that ran as high as 10 million US dollars apiece.
  • As opposed to stereotypes, most Hawala networks are not controlled by Arabs, but by Indian and Pakistani expatriates and immigrants in the Gulf.
  • The Hawala network in India has been brutally and ruthlessly demolished by Indira Ghandi (during the emergency regime imposed in 1975), but Indian nationals still play a big part in international Hawala networks.
  • Similar networks in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Bangladesh have also been eradicated.

The OECD's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) says that:

"Hawala remains a significant method for large numbers of businesses of all sizes and individuals to repatriate funds and purchase gold.... It is favoured because it usually costs less than moving funds through the banking system, it operates 24 hours per day and every day of the year, it is virtually completely reliable, and there is minimal paperwork required."

  • (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), "Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1999-2000," Financial Action Task Force, FATF-XI, February 3, 2000, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY2000_en.pdf )

Hawala networks closely feed into Islamic banks throughout the world and to commodity trading in South Asia.

  • There are more than 200 Islamic banks in the USA alone and many thousands in Europe, North and South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states (especially in the free zone of Dubai and in Bahrain), Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other South East Asian countries.
  • By the end of 1998, the overt (read: tip of the iceberg) liabilities of these financial institutions amounted to 148 billion US dollars. They dabbled in equipment leasing, real estate leasing and development, corporate equity, and trade/structured trade and commodities financing (usually in consortia called "Mudaraba").

While previously confined to the Arab peninsula and to south and east Asia, this mode of traditional banking became truly international in the 1970's, following the unprecedented flow of wealth to many Moslem nations due to the oil shocks and the emergence of the Asian tigers.

Islamic banks joined forces with corporations, multinationals, and banks in the West to finance oil exploration and drilling, mining, and agribusiness. Many leading law firms in the West (such as Norton Rose, Freshfields, Clyde and Co. and Clifford Chance) have "Islamic Finance" teams which are familiar with Islam-compatible commercial contracts.

II. HAWALA AND TERRORISM

  • Recent anti-terrorist legislation in the US and the UK allows government agencies to regularly supervise and inspect businesses that are suspected of being a front for the ''Hawala'' banking system, makes it a crime to smuggle more than $10,000 in cash across USA borders, and empowers the Treasury secretary (and its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - FinCEN) to tighten record-keeping and reporting rules for banks and financial institutions based in the USA.
  • A new inter-agency Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT) was set up. A 1993 moribund proposed law requiring US-based Halawadar to register and to report suspicious transactions may be revived.
  • These relatively radical measures reflect the belief that the al-Qaida network of Osama bin Laden uses the Hawala system to raise and move funds across national borders.
  • A Hawaladar in Pakistan (Dihab Shill) was identified as the financier in the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

But the USA is not the only country to face terrorism financed by Hawala networks.

  • In mid-2001, the Delhi police, the Indian government's Enforcement Directorate (ED), and the Military Intelligence (MI) arrested six Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF) terrorists.
  • The arrests led to the exposure of an enormous web of Hawala institutions in Delhi, aided and abetted, some say, by the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan's security services).
  • The Hawala network was used to funnel money to terrorist groups in the disputed Kashmir Valley.

Luckily, the common perception that Hawala financing is paperless is wrong.

  • The transfer of information regarding the funds often leaves digital (though heavily encrypted) trails.
  • Couriers and "contract memorizers", gold dealers, commodity merchants, transporters, and moneylenders can be apprehended and interrogated.
  • Written, physical, letters are still the favourite mode of communication among small and medium Hawaladars, who also invariably resort to extremely detailed single entry bookkeeping.
  • And the sudden appearance and disappearance of funds in bank accounts still have to be explained.

Moreover, the sheer scale of the amounts involved entails the collaboration of off shore banks and more established financial institutions in the West. Such flows of funds affect the local money markets in Asia and are instantaneously reflected in interest rates charged to frequent borrowers, such as wholesalers. Spending and consumption patterns change discernibly after such influxes.

Most of the money ends up in prime world banks behind flimsy business facades. Hackers in Germany claimed (without providing proof) to have infiltrated Hawala-related bank accounts.

The problem is that banks and financial institutions - and not only in dodgy offshore havens ("black holes" in the lingo) - clam up and refuse to divulge information about their clients.

Banking is largely a matter of fragile trust between bank and customer and tight secrecy. Bankers are reluctant to undermine either. Banks use mainframe computers which can rarely be hacked through cyberspace and can be compromised only physically in close co-operation with insiders.

The shadier the bank - the more formidable its digital defenses.

The use of numbered accounts (outlawed in Austria, for instance, only recently) and pseudonyms (still possible in Lichtenstein) complicates matters.

Bin Laden's accounts are unlikely to bear his name. He has collaborators.

Hawala networks are often used to launder money, or to evade taxes. Even when employed for legitimate purposes, to diversify the risk involved in the transfer of large sums, Hawaladars apply techniques borrowed from money laundering.

  • Deposits are fragmented and wired to hundreds of banks the world over ("starburst"). Sometimes, the money ends up in the account of origin ("boomerang").
  • Hence the focus on payment clearing and settlement systems. Most countries have only one such system, the repository of data regarding all banking (and most non-banking) transactions in the country. Yet, even this is a partial solution. Most national systems maintain records for 6-12 months, private settlement and clearing systems for even less.

Yet, the crux of the problem is not the Hawala or the Hawaladars. The corrupt and inept governments of Asia are to blame for not regulating their banking systems, for over-regulating everything else, for not fostering competition, for throwing public money at bad debts and at worse borrowers, for over-taxing, for robbing people of their life savings through capital controls, for tearing at the delicate fabric of trust between customer and bank (Pakistan, for instance, froze all foreign exchange accounts two years ago).

Perhaps if Asia had reasonably expedient, reasonably priced, reasonably regulated, user-friendly banks - Osama bin Laden would have found it impossible to finance his mischief so invisibly.

The Rest @ Samvak

Saturday, June 28, 2008

The Somali Money Transmitters Association (SOMTA)

I found this in google's Cache, and wanted to presearve the data before it disapears. Here is another website under development here, but I wanted to preserve the Officers names, for the record.

-Shimron

SOMTA

Somali is a poor country that has suffered massive internal conflict. There is no proper government and no banking system. Many Somalis live in other countries and send money home to support their families. Remittance companies provide a service that enables them to do so efficiently and economically. However, there is concern that the mechanisms used for this purpose can also be used for other, illegal, purposes.

Six leading Somalia money transmitters have therefore entered into a Memorandum of Understanding. The key features of this are - The adoption of strict membership requirements established an association to help ensure that the industry operates to the highest possible standards. They have been supported by the United Nations Development Program, which recognises the important role that remittance companies play in alleviating poverty and promoting economic development.

The Somali Money Transmitters Association (SOMTA) has the following objective:
To secure the future of the Somali remittance industry through a safe and healthy sector comprising of fully compliant money transmitters who are able to operate and compete globally, and to promote the image of the industry.

The members have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding:
Its based on compliance with registration and licensing requirements in the countries in which they operate and observation of legal requirements in respect of money laundering.
The establishment of compliance standards and an independent compliance audit that companies will have to pass in order to retain membership.

SOMTA has established rules governing membership and compliance arrangements. Other companies willing to comply with the rules are welcome to join.

SOMTA takes the form of a company limited by guarantee, registered in the UK. It is governed by a Council comprising of -

Council Members
  • Ali Yassin Farah (Amal Express)
  • Mr. Mustafa I. Said (Dahabshiil)
  • Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Kadiye (Qaran Express)
  • Ahmed Salad Waranle (Al-Mustaqbal Express)

Adminstration Group

  • Mohamed Djirdeh Hussein Chairman and Executive Director of The Council
  • Sh. Ciise Ali Wardere Vice Chairman
  • Cumar Cali Cabdallah Adminstration Assistant


Membership


Only corporate bodies may be become members. A company applying to be a member must meet the following conditions -

  • The member itself and the persons it entrusts with the tasks of management and administration for it in the domain of money transmission business must enjoy a good reputation with regard to their activity as money transmitters.
  • It and its agents must be registered or have a valid licence to conduct business as a money transmitter in all jurisdictions where they operate that have such requirements.
  • It must not use correspondents that are not registered or do not have licences in jurisdictions where this is required.
  • It must have a viable, written and verifiable compliance handbook and programme that meets requirements of all the countries they operate in.
  • It must operate in compliance with all applicable legal and regulatory requirements, and cooperate with law enforcement agencies when called upon.
  • It must use money transfer technology and procedures and controls that effectively protect the operator and its agents from money launderers and financiers of terrorism.
  • Members must use technology, systems and procedures that have been approved for the purpose by the Council.

Application for membership

  • The Council may stipulate the manner in which applications may be made.
  • An application must contain a written declaration that the applicant agrees unreservedly to comply with the Articles of Association, bye laws and rules and regulations of the Association.
  • An applicant for membership shall provide with its application documentation providing information on its organisational structure and business activity. At a minimum, this shall include:
    Registered company name;
    Particulars of its corporate objectives and activities;
    A copy of its memorandum and articles of association or equivalent documents;
    Full contact details of places of business (address, telephone number, email address) and money transmitter networks, including details of all agents;
  • The names of the proprietor or beneficial owners, the members of the management and authorised signatories, together with their respective shareholdings; Information on membership of trade associations;
  • Details of licences or registration for all jurisdictions in which the member operates.
    The Council shall accept an application if it satisfied itself that the applicant meets the requirements of these Rules. Otherwise, the application shall be rejected.
  • If the Council rejects the application, the applicant may appeal to an independent arbitrator as provided for in paragraph 18 of these Rules.

Compliance audits

  • The Council shall make Rules governing compliance audits.
  • All full members shall have a satisfactory compliance audit not later than 31 October 2006. After 31 October 2006 an applicant for membership must have had a satisfactory compliance audit.
  • Members will be required to have a full compliance audit every year.
    A member that fails to have a satisfactory compliance audit in accordance with the Rules made by the Council shall automatically cease to be a member.

Standards for remaining a member

  • Members must at all times satisfy and comply with the membership standards as stipulated by the Council.
  • A member falling behind more than 30 days in their dues shall lose their membership. Should the member be reinstated within 12 months of such a lapse, the intervening months must be paid up.
  • The Executive Director shall periodically check the information available from public sources to ascertain whether members continue to satisfy the conditions for membership.

Expulsion from membership or imposition of conditions

  • The Council may expel a company from membership if it fails to comply with the Articles of Association or rules, regulations or bye laws made by the Council.
  • The Council will notify a member of any proposal to expel it and the reasons for doing so and shall invite the member to make representation to the Council at the meeting when the expulsion is considered.
  • The Council, as an alternative to expulsion, may impose conditions which a member must meet in order to retain membership.
  • If the Council resolves to expel a member or to impose conditions which must be met in order to retain membership, the member may appeal to an arbitrator as provided for in paragraph 18 of these rules.

Arbitration

  • The Council shall appoint an independent arbitrator who will be empowered to hear appeals against decisions of the Council on membership, expulsion or the imposition of conditions on membership.
  • The decision of the Arbitrator will be binding on the Association and the company.

Composition of the Council

  • The Council may determine its size.
  • The Council may determine its quorum subject to this being no fewer than half the members of the Council.
  • The founder members of the Association and any other members paying the maximum subscription shall each be entitled to nominate a member of the Council.
  • The Council may co-opt additional members of the Council.
  • The Council shall appoint a Chairman from among its members.

Powers of the Council

  • The Council shall decide on all matters which are not wholly reserved to the general meeting of the Association.
  • The Council may delegate any of its powers to another committee or to an individual.
    The Council shall, where necessary, issue rules laying down the powers of the other committees and organisational units.
  • The duties of the Council include, in particular:
    laying down, coordinating and supervising the various functions;
    issuing and amending the Rules; formulating compliance, training and development plans and arranging for their implementation;
  • Deciding on the appointment of auditors for verifying compliance with the membership requirements;
  • Taking decisions to accept or to expel members or to impose conditions on membership;
  • Appointing and terminating the contract of the Executive Director and any other staff;
    appointing the members of committees;
  • Selecting and appointing the auditor to the Association;
    managing the assets of the association;
  • Drawing up the annual budget at the proposal of the Executive Director and fixing the membership subscription;
  • Preparing and presenting motions to be put to a general meeting.
  • The Council shall also determine which persons are authorised to represent the Association and the manner in which the legally binding signature of the Association is to be exercised.
    The Council shall determine when and where its meetings shall be held, including holding meetings by electronic means.

Executive Director

  • The Council shall appoint an Executive Director, to be responsible for the management of the Association, and shall determine the terms and conditions of the appointment. The Council may delegate any of its functions to the Executive Director.

Associates

  • The Council may make rules allowing companies and other organisations that do not qualify for full membership to become associates of the Association, and to determine the fees to be paid and the rights and obligations of associates.
  • An associate will have no membership rights and may not describe itself as a member of the Association.

Meetings of members

  • The Association shall hold an annual general meeting not later than six months after the end of each financial year.
  • At least one third of the members of the Association, or the Council, may at any time require the Executive Director to convene a general meeting.
  • In convening such a meeting the Executive Director shall give not less than 21 days notice to members of the business to be transacted.
    At general meetings of the Association each member shall have one vote for each $1,000 of subscription income. [interesting-the richest members control the organization-Shimron]
  • The Council shall present an annual report of its activities to the annual meeting.

A meeting of members shall have the following powers -

  • To expel a member for non compliance with these Rules where the Council has failed to act of a recommendation of the Executive Director to do so.
  • To remove a member of the Council.
    To amend these Rules and any other rules, regulations or bye laws made by the Council.

Money Transfers in Somalia - One version of its Corrupt History

This intersting piece is from Aden Yabarow a writer for the Somaliland Times. Much of what is claimed here is unverifiable, though the general time line is consistent with other published work.

It claims to refute this article bublished on 14 May By Reuters Africa.

In reality, it also claims it also confirms the UNDP is corrupt. It also insight into the remmitance industry in Somalia, which is used by legitimate expora as well as terrorists to move money around.

-Shimron

In this article I will be highlighting the major events, which happened in the Somali Remittance Industry.

And I am proving that Mr Ismail Ahmed’s so-called whistle blowing interview to the Reuters http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN443502.html in which he accused Dalsan as a terrorism protégé was just ‘crocodile tears’. Readers will also get a brief awareness about UNDP [United Nations Development Program]Somalia’s corrupt deeds and how it mismanages Somalia’s funds.

Part I

I believe that desperation has created Mr Ismail’s attitude. During his employment with UNDP-Somalia, SOMTA [The Somali Money Transmitters Association] was established, and Mr Jirdeh was appointed as its chairman.

  • With the full involvement of Mr Eric Overvest funds were approved for SOMTA, anti-money laundering training programs were given for SOMTA’s members ONLY and a new agreement was signed with an American company to develop an IT Platform for the Remittance Companies (including SFSA member but without their knowledge).

  • More than USD 600,000 is allocated for PAYQUICK to design and execute the Platform. Over USD 170,000 were allocated for SOMTA’s operations in Dubai.
  • And since some Pretoria Salute (as South Africans call bribing) deals were involved a disagreement happened between the interest group.
  • Mr Eric Overvest of UNDP-Somalia sided with Mr Jirdeh, as he is the Chairman of SOMTA and controls the funds.
  • The infighting ended up in the sacking of Mr Ismail from his job with UNDP Somalia.
  • To take his revenge from the UNDP, Mr Ismail gave an interview to the Reuters. In that interview he singled out a non- existing company called Dalsan.
  • I believe that the main reason for choosing Dalsan is that the former chairman of SFSA Europe Mr Osman and SFSA members was against his employment with the UNDP-Somalia.
  • SFSA claimed at the time that Mr Ismail was an employee of Dahabshiil as mentioned by Mr Ulusow’s article.
  • And to kill two birds with one stone he accused UNDP-Somalia through Dalsan’s alleged connections with a terror group as he claimed.

To update the readers about the chain of events, here are the major milestones, which happened in the Industry since 2001.

Part II

2001 was the year that Albarakat Money Transfer Company was closed. This action triggered the need for an organisation, which regulates and protects the Somali remittance industry.·

  • In 2003 Somali Financial Services Association was launched in Dubai and London. The inception of SFSA was attended by representatives from the remittance companies and financial regulators from UK, Continental Europe and the US.
  • A quote from former UNDP Resident Country Director Mr Maxwell Gaylard is “The Association will help safeguard this lifeline into Somalia and contribute to the development of the economy and the capacity of those who drive it.”
  • Late 2005, UNDP Somalia employed Mr Ismail Ahmed. Most of the SFSA members were opposed to his employment. Dalsan’s UK representative and then chairman of SFSA was very vocal about this employment.
  • UNDP-Somalia insisted on its employment of Mr ismail and gave an opportunity to an interest group, which got the dossiers of all the remittance companies under its control.
  • Mr Mohamed Jirdeh Hussein – former secretary general of SFSA and father-in-law of Mr. Ismail Ahmed – supported UNDP-Somalia’s decision.
  • The relationship between SFSA and the interest group soured immediately.
  • A new association called SOMTA was established in London on 20/07/2006 as per http://www.somta.org/news/.[ [This website is apparently underconstruction @ CBJDigital
  • The new organisation represented only 4 remittance companies. UNDP-Somalia supported SOMTA and severed all ties with SFSA, which represents 7 money transfer companies.
  • SOMTA’s establishment divided the Somali Remittance Industry into two groups.

SFSA, which is the majority and self sustained

SOMTA, which is the minority supported and financed by the UNDP.

  • As Mr Ulusow predicted and supported by a research conducted by independent concerned Somali parties, SOMTA is used only as a tool of funds embezzlement, and so far it hasn’t succeeded in protecting or regulating the Somali Remittance industry.
  • Another new development is the introduction of PAYQUICK. This US Company was assigned to design a Platform for the industry. Interestingly, the initial cost of the project is USD 640k and could run to about a million in few years.
  • In order to make things worse for the industry, Somali Remittance Companies’ compliance is linked to the acceptance and usage of PAYQUICK’s Platform. In other words, UNDP-Somalia is not recognising any money transfer company as a compliant organisation unless it utilises PAYQUICK’s platform.
  • PAYQUICK’s deal closes the door for the Somali IT experts, which are available in the market. Industry sources told me that Somali IT professionals are technically more advanced than PAYQUICK and can develop a better platform at a fraction of PAYQUICK’s costs. They are easily accessible and culturally compliant than a less know Foreign Service provider.
  • Nearly three years passed. UNDP-Somalia’s divide and rule policies spearheaded by Mr Eric Overvest failed.
  • PAYQUICK’s platform project couldn’t be implemented and the few remaining members of the group disintegrated. · After successive failures, UNDP-Somalia contacted SFSA and invited it to a meeting held in Dubai in February 2008. Some insiders believe that the main reason of SFSA’s invitation was to cover-up the wrong doings of the interest group. And to fulfil the agreement with PAYQUICK, but this time with the endorsement of the whole industry.
  • It was also a message intended to daunt some rouge members of the interest group. · 60% of the contracted funds were to be released for PAYQUICK in February 2008, but SFSA rejected to be a rubber stamp for this adventure at this final stage.
  • It is now Mr Jirdeh alone who is going to approve the release of the funds on behalf of SOMTA members only. Nonetheless, the execution of PAYQUICK’s Platform is far away as some SOMTA members showed reservations about its viability.·
  • Successive meetings in February and March 2008 with UNDP-Somalia, SFSA members proved to the UNDP that its members comply with the rules and regulations of the host countries.
  • Some SFSA members are registered and operate in countries where none of SOMTA members are registered. It was clearly stated to the UNDP’s Eric Overvest that it is unfair to stereotype SFSA to what others may say about it especially issues regarding compliance.
  • As usual UNDP-Somalia made promises to SFSA with regard to International Compliance Training globally and other supports similar to what it offers to SOMTA. According to insiders nothing has been done for SFSA and UNDP-Somalia once again broke its promises.
  • A separate meeting between Eric Overvest of UNDP-Somalia and SOMTA members happened in Dubai during March 2008.
  • SOMTA were willing to impeach their chairman and executive director, Mr M Jirdeh. The chairman was accused of having a corrupt relationship with UNDP and PAYQUICK and that is why he is advocating for the implementation of PAYQUICK’s Platform. He was also accused of misappropriating SOMTA’s funds and using them for his personal purposes.
  • Unfortunately, Mr Eric Overvest was directly opposed to the removing of Mr Jirdeh and the basic rights of SOMTA’s members were denied. This direct interference of the industry affairs shows another page of UNDP-Somalia’s blunders.·
  • An article based on Mr Ismail’s account was published on 14/05/2008 by the Reuters. Though the article highlighted UNDP-Somalia’s grey dealings it came from a former member of the interest group. The gentleman was taking revenge from the UNDP and from a former chairman of SFSA who was opposed to his employment with the UN.
  • Insofar compliance is concerned; this article is not based on the factuality on the ground. As all distinguished readers know, it is not possible for any money transfer company to operate in a western country without fully complying with its financial rules and regulations.
  • Whether it is a SOMTA member or SFSA member, all remittance companies operate in a transparent and compliant way in Europe and in the US. This fact contradicts with Reuter’s client’s claims, which are no more than tears shed by a crocodile after feasting with his prey.
  • Reuter’s article has exploded a shell within UNDP-Somalia and an independent commission was appointed to investigate the matter. It is not the first time that investigations were made into the corrupt affairs of UNDP-Somalia’s management of this project.
  • So far none of the enquiries were successful because the perpetuators were the suspects and the judges both.· The new independent commission did their assessment for two weeks and met with the same UNDP-Somalia managers who were accused in Nairobi.
  • Then they were given the names of their counterparts in Dubai. They visited Dubai in the early June 2008 and secretly met with the pre-assigned individuals. They didn’t meet anybody outside the sphere of the corrupt group.
  • I don’t expect that the outcome of this investigation to be different from its predecessors. The results will be dictated by the remnants of the interest group who are still in the UNDP offices in Nairobi.
  • Part III

The above paragraphs shed light on the history of the UNDP-Somalia and the Somali remittance industry. It also highlights the level of corruption that is happening and the integrity of UNDP-Somalia’s officials who are handling this project. It also stresses the lies and threats, which the remittance companies endure from rouge elements within UNDP-Somalia.

  • In some instances some members of the industry was indirectly threatened by using UN reports regarding arms embargo to Somalia.
  • Some members are in constant fear of closures. It is imperative to note that, if a small fraction of the Somalia’s aid is managed this way; how many corruptive dealings could happen in the tens of millions of US dollars poured into UNDP-Somalia’s account.
  • Though the UN had past history of corruption within its ranks, UNDP-Somalia’s case is very exceptional.Somalia has no functioning Central Bank and every penny of international aid comes through UNDP-Somalia.

It is a tragedy to have non-functioning government institutions and a corrupt organisation like UNDP-Somalia which serves as the cashier and the accountant general for poor Somalia. I urge the UN, the international community and the Somali intellectuals to give proper attention to the misappropriation of the aid money given to Somalia and funnelled through UNDP-Somalia. I recommend the UN Secretary General to appoint effective diplomats like Mr

Ahmed W Abdoulah to run the financial affairs of Somalia. I also urge the TFG to appoint effective and efficient counterparts to the UNDP-Somalia in order to safe guard the scarce resources they get from the international community.

Aden Yabarow E-

mail:ayabarow@yahoo.com

See the rest @ Somaliland Times

Mohammed Sulaymon Barre

The case of Mohammed Sulaymon Barre is being used by human rights groups to demonstrate why they believe the prison in Guantanamo bay is wrong-even if their efforts equip al Qaeda and others who want to destroy the West.

The article below illustrates this point.

-Shimron

Mohammed Sulaymon Barre is A Somliland Native, now 42 and college educated, and was working in Pakistan for the Dahabshiil Company, a financial transfer firm with agents in 34 countries including the U.S.,

He was allegedly taken from his home in the middle of the night by Pakistani authorities. Originally from Somalia, Barre fled civil war to Pakistan where he received the assistance of the UNH CR , [the UN Refugee Agency] in the early 1990’s.

He has been in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in a US prison for over 6 years.

The Center for Constitutional Rights has challenged his detention based on the recent supreme court decision.

[The CCR aledges that he wants to go back to Somaliland.]

The Rest @ The Center for Constitutional Rights

This will be an interesting case, since this will raise the visibility of the status of Somaliland's independence from greater Somalis. Dahabshiil was, and is still connected the the funding of the Mujaheddin (many of whom are al qaeda affiliates).

He was probably taken for his direct knowledge of Hawala Operations in general, and specifically for how Dahabshiil is a vehicle for funding both remittances and the expenses of Jihadis.

He could probably go right to work funding the Next-Caliphate efforts of al Qaeda and sympathetic Mujaheddin-which is why the US will fight to keep him from being released.

-Shimron

Monday, July 23, 2007

Dahabshiil The Largest Money Transfer Company in Somalia

Dahabshiil is the largest money transfer company serving migrants from the Horn of Africa.

abstract art Pictures, Images and Photos