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Showing posts with label Money Laundering. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Money Laundering. Show all posts

Monday, March 12, 2012

Al Shabaab Taxes Drug Trafficking, now that Khat is an International Market

nalysts believe that this benign-looking plant popular in the Middle East may be funding the Al Shabaab terrorist organization in southern Somalia.

A very popular narcotic in the Middle East, khat maybe be funding the terrorist organization Al Shabaab in Somalia, CNN reports. Chewing the red stems of Catha edulis produces mild euphoria and an alertness akin to that produced by caffeine, and it is openly and widely use in the Horn of Africa. In Yemen, growing Khat uses more water than the country can afford and takes priority over more sustaining crops. Now Dutch officials are banning khat in the Netherlands, where a large Somali community imports large quantities of the plant from farmers in Meru County, Kenya. Government spokespeople insist that this decision was taken to protect against grave economic, health, and social concerns, but analysts believe that funds generated by the trade are funneled to Al Shabaab and that the Dutch aim to curtail that.

Crippled Kenyan farmers

CNN reports that the pending ban will have a devastating impact on Kenyan farmers. “If the ban is accepted or if it is enforced, the whole Meru county, the economy of the Meru county will be crippled,” Kenyan farmer Edward Mutuura told CNN.

He exports most of his crops to the Nertherlands and worries that the entire population of Meru county will be “totally crippled” if the ban goes through. Emmanuel Kisiangani of the Institute of Security Studies explained to CNN that legitimate business owners export their crops, but people sympathetic to Al Shabaab’s cause send money to them.

Meanwhile, a UN report details how the violent group receives funds by taxing khat that is exported to Somalia. Dutch officials deny any security motivations behind their decision to ban khat, which is illegal in the rest of Europe and the United States. It is still legal in the United Kingdom.

Enabling terror

People who abuse the narcotic are reported to become violent, suicidal, and may even experience manic episodes and hallucinations, and constant users tend to abandon their daily responsibilities, which leads to economic troubles in the home.

Jessica Lincoln and Frans Barnard told CNN that although intelligence agencies suspect links between the international trade of khat and terrorist organizations linked to Al Qaeda, it has proved very difficult to prove since it is hard to trace the money.

But an anti-khat activist based in the UK, Abukar Awale told the paper that Al Shabaab recruits young British addicts to facilitate parts of the multimillion trade and claims that if Britain does not ban imports and sales, they are effectively enabling terror in Somalia.
Tafline Laylin writes for GreenProphet, from where this article is adapted.

The Rest @ Cutting Edge News

Monday, January 02, 2012

San Marino and Money Laundering

The small country of San Marino, surrounded by Italy, has banking sector that has been a target location for money laundering. In 2008 a European Commitee on Crime published a Report on San Marino and Money Laundering Issues.  Below are some excerpts from that report, as well as as a November, 2011 follow up report that suggesting that San Marino financial systems, in their present state, may be vulnerable to systematic money laundering attempts by terrorist organizations.

[Shimron Letters TBDA in 2009 first led us to identify San Marino as a source of one or more locations interested in Al Qaeda associated names, location and contact information activities, especially in North Africa. This is not the search pattern usually associated with  operational financial intelligence unit (FIU) Activity. That source also seemed to be link and data sharing with at least one location in Malta.

-Shimron Issachar

***************************************

San Marino has taken steps to ensure compliance with the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, however:
  •  the legal framework for the implementation of UN sanctions remainsincomplete and needs to be reviewed. There is no designating authority for 1373. 
  • The Supervision Department 1 of the Central Bank circulates the lists and informs of any updates.
  • No guidance, of which the evaluators were aware, was provided to the banking and financial institutions on their obligations to take actions under freezing mechanisms and the procedures to be followed. 
  • The authorities should also ensure that the mechanism applies to all targeted funds or other assets as described in the UN resolutions of individuals, groups and legal entities.
  • Financial institutions are checking the lists but it remained unclear when this is actually takingplace. The evaluators recommended also that the supervisory authority should be actively checking compliance with SR.III and that the legal framework for imposing administrative sanctions should be reviewed to adequately enable it to sanction failure to comply with the obligations. 
  • Also clear and publicly known procedure for de-listing and unfreezing requests; and appropriate procedures authorizing access to frozen funds for necessary basic expenses, payment of certain fees, service charges or extraordinary expenses should be established.
The evaluators found that a number of the basic obligations of Recommendation 5, which need
to be implemented by law or regulation were not provided for in legislation or regulations
issued or authorised by a legislative body.

  • In particular, while banks and financial companies are required to undertake identification measures in number of specified situations, there is no obligation in the law to carry out identification when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing or when the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. 
  • Furthermore the other elements of CDD are not required by law (e.g. beneficial ownership, and where necessary the source of funds). 
  • Additionally, the threshold applied to transactions is €15,500 rather than €15,000 limit referred to in FATF Recommendations.  
The following requirements to verify customers’ identity are not in the current legislation and
should be provided for:
  • use reliable, independent source documents, data or information; 
  • verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer (for customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements) is so authorised, and identify and verify the identity of that person; 
  • identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source such that  the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is
A Follow Up Report in November 2011 stated:

  • The evaluation confirmed that San Marino has made substantial progress in implementing MONEYVAL’s third round recommendations. Since 2008, the authorities have demonstrated a clear commitment to implement the AML/CFT standards and have strengthened the preventive regime by adopting a large number of legislative, regulatory and institutional measures.
  • San Marino authorities have become more attentive to money laundering risks and the use of the ML provisions. This is reflected by the results of the law enforcement and judicial system, showing a noticeable increase in the number of money laundering investigations, 4 convictions achieved for money laundering (as of September 2010) as well as helpful case law on provisional measures and confiscation. 
  • It is yet advised that the San Marino police officials play a more active role in AML/CFT efforts.
  • There remain a number of deficiencies to ensure that the financing of terrorism offence is fully in line with international standards.
  • Substantial progress has been made to establish an operational financial intelligence unit (FIU), which is now at the centre of the overall AML/CFT effort. 
  • However the additional functions entrusted to the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) and the over-reliance by other authorities on FIA impact on the workload of its staff and thus affects its effectiveness.
  • San Marino has strengthened its preventive regime, setting out a comprehensive legal framework for both financial and non-financial institutions. 
  • There remain several preventive provisions which need to be brought more closely into line with the FATF standards, and overall, more time is needed before all requirements are substantially implemented.
  • Supervisory action and the methodology applied need to be strengthened, and additional resources allocated to this task, in order to ensure that both financial and non-financial institutions are adequately implementing the AML/CFT requirements.
  • Co-operation at national and international level has generally improved, particularly as regards mutual legal assistance and FIU to FIU co-operation. 
  • Further action is required to ensure that there are effective gateways to facilitate exchange of information and provide assistance to foreign supervisory authorities and law enforcement authorities.
In May 2009, five top executives from San Marino’s largest bank, Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino, were arrested on charges of money laundering but were released six months later.

In January 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a report criticizing San Marino’s ability to combat money laundering.

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Al Shabaab Money Laundering Results in the Closing of Hawala in the US

Nairobi — Humanitarian groups in Somalia have raised the red flag as foreign banks prepare to pull out of money transfer business as the world seeks to paralyse Al-Shabaab operations.

Franklin Bank -- the last of the US financial institutions in the unregulated money transfer business (hawala) in Somalia -- plans to suspend money wiring services this week, putting at stake millions of dollars remitted from abroad.


Last week, Oxfam Group and the American Refugee Committee said the decision would disrupt aid from family members and well-wishers abroad, affecting 250,000 Somalis in need of urgent life-saving assistance.

"This is the worst time for this service to stop. Any gaps with remittance flows in the middle of the famine could be disastrous," Shannon Scribner, Oxfam America's humanitarian policy manager, said, adding that the $100 million in worth of remittances from US that is received each year in Somalia will be affected.

Franklin took the decision two weeks ago to ditch hawala, an unregulated money transfer service, at the end of this month saying it violates US counterterrorism financing regulations crafted after the September 11, 2001 al-Qaida bombings.

"The US government should give assurances to the bank that there will be no legal ramifications of providing this service to Somalis in need," Ms Scribner said. Under hawala which is widely practised in Islamic countries, a recipient simply claims money from a broker in home city on promise that the sender has deposited similar amount with another hawala broker abroad.

This way, currency worth billions of shillings is exchanged across borders without any documentation as the parties rely on trust embedded in Islamic law to conduct the business.In war-torn Somalia where many residents do not have bank accounts, hawala services have thrived.

In Nairobi, the growing number of hawala merchants in Eastleigh estate is seen as the channel through which billions of shillings sent by Somalis living in the diaspora has found its way into Kenya's real-estate segment.

The Rest @ AllAfrica

Monday, August 08, 2011

Somali Piracy Ransom Payments Funding Al Shabaab

Written July 6th, 2011

NAIROBI – Ransoms paid to Somali pirates to free merchant vessels are ending up in the hands of Islamist militants, laying shipping groups open to accusations of breaching international sanctions, U.N. officials told Reuters.

John Steed, the principal military adviser to the U.N. special envoy to Somalia and head of the envoy’s counter-piracy unit, said links between armed pirate gangs and Somalia’s al Qaeda-affiliated rebels were gradually firming.

“The payment of ransoms just like any other funding activity, illegal or otherwise, is technically in breach of the Somalia sanctions regime if it makes the security situation in Somalia worse,” said Steed.

“Especially if it is ending up in the hands of terrorists or militia leaders — and we believe it is, some directly, some more indirectly,” said Steed, a retired military officer.
Ransom demands have risen steadily in recent years. According to one study, the average ransom stood at $5.4 million (3.3 million pounds) in 2010, up from $150,000 in 2005, helping

Somali pirates rake in nearly $240 million last year.
Steed acknowledged he had no proof of an operational relationship between the pirates and the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab rebels who control much of southern and central Somalia and parts of the capital Mogadishu.

Some political analysts said the policy of some Western governments to endorse the payment of ransoms, seen as fuelling the insecurity, is at odds with their financial support for the Somali government and the African troops propping it up.

Under the terms of the arms embargo on Somalia, financial support to armed groups in the Horn of Africa country is banned. Both the United States and Britain regard al Shabaab as a terrorist organisation.

The U.N.’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) says pirates are increasingly launching their cross-ocean raids from the al Shabaab-controlled southern coastal city of Kismayu. Recruitment for pirates from the region was also on the rise, it said.

Detained pirates tell us that some level of cooperation with al Shabaab is necessary to run a criminal enterprise,” said Alan Cole, piracy program coordinator at UNODC.
Al Shabaab sources agree.

“If there was no relationship between us, there is no way the pirates would be able to operate, or carry their weapons within zones we control,” said an al Shabaab militant based in the pirate haven of Haradhere, north of Mogadishu.

BIGGEST GAMES IN TOWN

Natznet Tesfay of Executive Analysis said al Shabaab was heavily involved in
  • Smuggling through Kismayu,
  • Slapping taxes on illegal charcoal exports to the Gulf,
  • Arms shipments from Yemen
  • Electronic goods destined for the region.
“Piracy and contraband smuggling are the two biggest games around,” said Tesfay at the specialist intelligence company.

Tesfay said she had yet to see evidence of an “operational relationship” between the pirates and al Shabaab but that the militants had a reputation for monopolising key income-earning sectors once they had taken control of an area.


In February al Shabaab seized a number of pirate gang leaders in Haradhere and forced them to accept a multi-million dollar deal under which the pirates would hand over 20 percent of future ransoms.

A Reuters investigation found the following payments had been made to al Shabaab’s “marine office”:

  • On February 25: $200,000 from the release of the Japanese-owned MV Izumi after pirates received a $4.5 million ransom.
  • On March 8: $80,000 from the $2 million release of the St Vincent & Grenadines-flagged MV Rak Africana.
  • On March 9: $100,000 after the Singapore-flagged MV York was freed for $4.5 million.
  • On April 13: $600,000 from the release of the German ship Beluga Nomination after a $5.5 million ransom was paid.
  • On April 15: A $66,000 share of the $3.6 million ransom handed over for the Panama-flagged MV Asphalt Venture.
  • On May 14: $100,000 from the release of two Spanish crew of the Spanish-owned FV VEGA 5.
The amounts were corroborated by pirates, al Shabaab militants and residents of Haradhere.

ONLY WAY TO FREE HOSTAGES

“Some money has to be ending up in al Shabaab’s hands,” said Michael Frodl, a Washington Lawyer and head of C-level Maritime Risks, which advises Lloyd’s of London underwriters.

Frodl questioned whether payment of ransoms would be even an indirect breach of the arms embargo, but said that if proved, it might break laws in the United States and Britain against funding terrorism.

Sanctions experts said ransoms could violate the arms embargo if they were voluntary financial support to armed groups in Somalia, but said the payments could be considered extortion, and therefore involuntary, blurring the issue.

Some Horn of Africa experts argued there appeared to be no clear systematic link between pirates and al Shabaab’s central command, but there probably were ties at a more local level.

It was likely there was a bleeding of pirate money to local rebel commanders through clan ties, “taxes” or even protection money, they said.

C-level Maritime’s Frodl said the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) carried out reviews of all potential ransom payments to determine if the pirate group in question had ever handed over part of a ransom to al Shabaab.

  • “Most times OFAC has authorised payment because it has found no link,” Frodl said. “But if there is indeed a 20 percent ‘tax’ being applied by Shabaab against pirate ransoms in Haradhere, a major pirate hub it now controls, then things could change.”
In April 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order barring any financial dealings with 11 masterminds of the Somali conflict. According to the OFAC, two of them are in charge of pirate gangs.

While Washington has firmly opposed ransom payments, counter-piracy experts say London — home to the world’s shipping and insurance industries — has demonstrated a conspicuous lack of appetite to follow suit.

The UK Chamber of Shipping said it would continue to consider piracy a criminal activity, until proof emerged of financial ties between the sea-bandits and insurgents.

The association welcomed what it called the government’s “balanced view” in refraining from preventing ransom deals.

“Frankly, that’s the only way we get people released,” said Mark Brownrigg, the chamber’s director-general.

(Additional reporting by Mohamed Ahmed in Mogadishu and Jonathan Saul in London, editing by Tim Pearce)

Friday, May 13, 2011

Sharik Afindi Connection to Money Laundering

115.167.113.72 in Kirachi was looking for a connection beween Sharik Afindi and Money Laundering,
IE 8.0
Win7
1024x576 ">Sharik Saeed AfandiAddress:Suit No 901, Kashif Center, Shahrah-e-Faisal Karachi.NTN:09000127City:KarachiPhone:+92-135640116Mobile:+92-212447284Fax:021-35640118URL:N/AEmail:index_marble@yahoo.comVolume(per annum):10000


Karachi,
Sindh,
Pakistan 115.167.113.72

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Hashi Money Wiring

TBDA


Seattle

Principle

Owner Abdulakim Hashi Wrote this response to FinCen when several banks rejected his request to carry his money wiring accounts.

hashi03@msn.com


Abdulhakim Hashi
Owner

(206) 246-5048

(206) 244-3192


Business Hours:
9:00 Am to 06:00 PM
Sun 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Mon 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Tues 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Weds 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Thurs 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Fri 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Sat 9:30 AM to 6:00 PM





In 03/06/2008 he regisrered as a Foreign Limited Liability Company (LLC)
He claimed then to be a
303 Congress St.
Boston, MA 02210

-this has not been verified


Address:

15211 INTERNATIONAL BLVD

Seattle, Washington 98188

USA

(206) 246-5048

Classification:

Financial Transactions Processing, Reserve, and Clearinghouse Activities



  • < 25


Seattle License

5211 International Boulevard South
Seatac, WA 98188
206-246-5048
License Number: 52061
License Type: Corporation
License Start Date: 6/27/2008
License Expiration Date: 12/31/2009
License Status: ACTIVE
Hodan Global Money Services, Inc.
2910 Pillsbury Ave S, Ste 208
Minneapolis MN 55408
612-822-6800
License Number: 51988
License Type: Corporation
License Start Date: 3/21/2002
License Expiration Date: 12/31/2009
License Status: ACTIVE


15211 International BlvdPhone: (206) 246-5048
Seattle, WA
98188-2296
United States








Monday, January 17, 2011

Money Laundering Update

A review of FATF news shows that Argentina has not made adequate progress in preventing money laundiering from known sources, and new payment methods (NPM) are being abused more frequently as traditional measures close up.

The full report of FATF’s third mutual evaluation of Argentina (and second joint FATF/GAFISUD evaluation of Argentina) is now available for download, the executive summary was published on 5 November 2010. Since the last evaluation, finalised in June 2004, Argentina has not made adequate progress in addressing a number of deficiencies identified at that time, and the legal and preventive AML/CFT measures that are in place lack effectiveness.

Download the report (2.3Mb)

This report is builds on the 2006 Typologies report on New Payment Methods (NPMs). Since 2006, there has been a significant rise in the number of transactions and the volume of funds moving through NPMs. Consequently, the number of discovered cases where such payment systems were misused for ML/TF purposes has also increased.


This report compares the "potential risks" described in the 2006 report to the "actual risks" based on new case studies and typologies. The report also describes a number of indicators of suspicious activity. These red flag indicators will help NPM service providers and other financial institutions to detect ML/TF activities. The report describes the challenges presented in developing appropriate legislation and regulations for NPMs and the different approaches taken by national legislators and regulators.


The New Payment Methods report is the result of analysis of questionnaire responses and publications about NPMs as well as input by relevant private sector representatives such as NPM service providers, including the


  • Internet payment sector,

  • the mobile payment sector

  • prepaid card technology providers.

The report will be made available on the FATF website within the next few weeks.






The Rest @ FATF

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Leaders Captured by Milita, Given to goS

2:08 AM (20 hours ago)
Darfur JEM says government forces captured some of its officials

from Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan by SudanTribube.com
January 15, 2011 (KHARTOUM) – The Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) said that government troops ambushed its forces and managed to take into custody a number of its senior officials.

"Three days ago, a mobile administrative unit belong to JEM was touring the villages of Abu Jurouj, Bir Saliba and Garji Garji in west Darfur, close to El Geniena city. The unit was ambushed by a government force and its associated militia" said a statement by the rebel movement and signed by its military spokesperson.

JEM said it fought its way through the ambush but that some of its members " lost their way and were captured by militia affiliated to GoS " [government of Sudan]

"The militia bargained for a ransom from JEM in the same way they do against their western captives and ended up handing over their captives to GoS".

It gave the name of the captives as

1. Commander Al Maz Deng, Deputy President of JEM and Secretary for Southern Sudan Region.
2. Sir Gibriel Tia Kuku, Political Advisor to the President of JEM
3. Mahjoub Jazouli Izzalarab, Deputy Head of JEM Administration and Organization, Darfur Region.
4. Abdalla Abdalla Hasan
5. Yahia Abbaker Musa
6. Abdalla El-Tom Abdalla
7. Yahia Babikir Daldoum
8. Musa Omer
9. El Rasheed Ahmed
10. Mohamed Balla
11. Ibrahim Adam
12. Abdalla Khamees

"These heroes are now prisoners and are entitled for treatment in accordance with international conventions. JEM expect them to remain safe and will not hesitate to retaliate, if mistreated by their captors" the rebel group said.

The Sudanese army confirmed the incident saying that it transferred a number of JEM figures to Khartoum after being arrested west of Jebel Moon after a chase that lasted for 67 km North of El Geniena

Last month, JEM clashed with Sudanese army south of El-Fasher, historic capital of Darfur and was reportedly joined by other rebel groups including one that has signed a peace agreement with Khartoum.

The Rest @ Sudan Tribune

Friday, December 24, 2010

India Identified Terrorist Money Laundering Through Foreign Credit Card Use

On instructions from Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the Intelligence Bureau has taken up the task of identifying a sudden quantum jump in the amount of foreign money flowing in the country through withdrawals by foreigners on credit and debit cards issued by foreign banks.

In his monthly review meetings, Mukherjee sought updates on this subject.

The IB warned that such money poses a serious security risk as it can be pumped into terrorist and other anti-national activities.

It started probing withdrawals after intercepting a highly volatile conversation on transfer of funds through credit cards.

Investigations led to eight states in particular, including
  • Andhra Pradesh,
  • Goa,
  • Gujarat
  • Maharashtra

....that have witnessed in recent times withdrawal of large sums of money by foreigners using the cards.

There is no way to track down the source of money and it is possible that some such withdrawals may be from funds transferred by terror organisations, sources said.

"If a terrorist outfit anywhere in the world deposits huge funds in a foreigner's account and he withdraws them daily in India in small quantum, we have no help from our banks to plug the mischief," the sources said.

They point out that the small withdrawals do not create suspicion, but totalling the money taken out on a daily basis will throw up a mind-boggling figure.

The sources said that IB has, therefore, not only alerted Union Home Secretary G K Pillai on this new form of funding for suspected anti-national activities, but it has also written to the finance ministry and the Reserve Bank of India to quickly put in place a system to monitor withdrawals of money by foreigners on their credit and debit cards.

Presently, there is no system to monitor transactions made by foreigners using these cards as they are recorded on the computer servers located abroad, which cannot be tracked unlike. Indian transactions, on the other hand, can be tracked as they are managed by the servers based in India, the sources said.

The IB hopes that the system will be able to assess and check the total amount of foreign money getting into the Indian system through these cards.

Last week, Pranab Mukherjee chaired a meeting on the inflow of the terror funds through different modes like hawala, ATMs and Western Union money transfers.


Since international obligations do not permit India to stop money transfers through Western Union, Mukherjee asked the banking department, RBI and IB to work together to find out a solution to check suspicious transfers. Other nations face the same problem

"We do not have control over the transfers that take place through servers in foreign countries," an official said.

As the withdrawals are in the Indian Rupee while the deposits in the foreign banks are in the US $ or other foreign currencies, there is also a risk of heavy foreign exchange outflow, the sources said.

They point out that India is not the only country facing this boom in credit and debit card withdrawals.

The United States is battling the problem as seen from a circular put up by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on its website irs.gov about "repatriation of offshore funds using credit cards."

The circular says, "Credit cards (such as MasterCard and VISA) issued by tax haven domiciled banks are a preferred method used by US taxpayers to anonymously and covertly repatriate offshore funds that may or may not have been previously taxed.

American Express cards are used in the same way but differ in that these cards are issued directly by American Express rather than by member banks."

The IB has urged the RBI to devise a method to ensure that foreigners' card withdrawals are put under scrutiny and those taking out huge sums through ATMs in India are reported to the authorities to keep a check on their activities.

It has also suggested that ATMs should be calibrated to refuse withdrawals on foreign banks' cards after an individual reaches a particular limit of money taken out over the period of his or her stay in India.

The Rest @ Rediff

Thursday, September 16, 2010

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project - Non Profits Who Support Terrorists are on Notice

Several months old, but This US Supreme Court Decision has far reaching conclusions, and will likely be used to prosecute US citizens and residents who contribute to non-profits in Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, Gaza, Jordan, an Pakistan.


-Shimron Issachar


Thursday, June 24, 2010, 6:08:49 AM Jean-Charles Brisard

In its ruling of June 21, 2010 (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project), the U.S. Supreme Court further clarified the notion of “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and brushed aside so-called “peaceful or humanitarian” support to such organizations.
The “material support” statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) adopted in 1996, prohibits the provision of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization. “Material support or resources” is defined as “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials”.

The main question was the legality of providing non-violent resources to support the humanitarian and peaceful efforts of terrorist organizations.

  • The Court found that not only there was no distinction between the violent and non-violent wings of terrorist groups, but that terrorist groups benefit from any support given to them, even peaceful or humanitarian.
  • The Court conceded that FTOs may engage in political and humanitarian activities, but insisted that “Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”
  • The Supreme Court therefore confirmed that it was necessary “to prohibit providing material support in the form of training, expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even if the supporters meant to promote only the groups’ nonviolent ends”, because this aid would “legitimize” the organization.


Referring to such humanitarian support during the oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts stated “It's going to make their hospital run better. People are going to like their hospital. So the party, the group, will be legitimized.”

Justice Scalia insisted that “The theory of the legislation is that when you aid any of their enterprises, you're aiding the organization.

Hamas, for example, gained support among the Palestinians by activities that are perfectly lawful, perhaps running hospitals, all sorts of things.”

Solicitor General Kagan clearly emphasized that "when you help a terrorist, foreign terrorist organization's legal activities, you're also helping the foreign terrorist organization's illegal activities".

"Hezbollah builds bombs. Hezbollah also builds homes. What Congress decided was when you help Hezbollah build homes, your are also helping Hezbollah build bombs."

The Supreme Court held that "Material support meant to 'promote peaceable, lawful conduct' can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways.

Material support is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends.

It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks."

By its unambiguous ruling the Supreme Court clarifies the debate about “political wings” or “humanitarian wings” of terrorist organizations including the Hamas and Hezbollah, and sends a strong message to those promoting a dialog with so-called “moderate” elements within designated terrorist organizations.

The Rest @ Jean-Charles Brisard

Thursday, September 09, 2010

Xenel

Ahmed Alireza (now deceased) has four sons controlling the company.
  • Khalid Ahmed Zainal Alireza is the current director
  • Discover where Corporate Zakat payments are going -not listed n public records
  • Note any ownership or partershiips with Remmittance companiesm(Hawalas)
  • Track transactions documented in a Hawala through a subsiderary or by an employee assistant to senior leadership.
  • Note Zakat finanace specialists on staff
  • Note Zakat "consultants" payed in accounts payable

TBDA Suggests regular visitations to news

-Shimron Issachar

********************

Structure

Xenel's structure involves a series of joint ventures, which has enabled it to build up experience in a variety of fields. It is a decentralised company model in which each enterprise must succeed on a standalone basis. The Xenel Industries base company in Jeddah mainly exists to provide financing capabilities and oversee its diverse shareholding interests.

-Source @ Access my Library


IBRAHIM AFANDI (IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD AFANDI), was on the list as CEO of SISCO a subsiderary of Xenel - all privately held with limited financial data released.

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation (President: Prince Salman,
VP: Abdulaziz bin Fahd) Board member,
IIRO Chairman, Al Afandi Establishment (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO Al Afandi Germany (Frankenberg)
CEO, Sky Muzn Holding Co. BV (Netherlands)
CEO, Saudi Industrial Services Company (Sisco) with partners Xenel Industries and Dallah Al Baraka Founder,
Great Saudi Development & Investment Co. (GSDIC) Founder, Arabian Company for Development and Investment Limited (ACDIL) Chairman, National Committee of Saudi Contractors Partner, African Company (Sudan), with Al Rajhi Bank and Dallah Al Baraka Former General manager and shareholder of Al Amoudi Group Owner, Gang Ranch (Canada), second largest ranch in North America Owner, Skylight Corp, Georgia, USA Owner, BSA Investments (complaint from LTV Steel Company, Inc) US address: 6914 Los Verdes Dr Apt 6, Rch Palos Vrd, CA 90275

Xenel is a diversified company based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.



XENEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED P.O. Box 2824,s Jeddah 21461. Saudi Arabia (+966) (02) 604 8000 (+966) (02) 643 6344 (+966) (02) 643 8405 ...




Thunderbird School of Global Management Partners with Xenel




Thunderbird School of Global Management1 Global Place, Glendale, AZ 85306-6000+1 (602) 978-7000 800-848-9084 (US)




Xenel Parters with AECOM




July 29, 2010 – Officials of the Jizan Province awarded a management contract to Resources Sciences Arabia Limited, a joint venture between Xenel Group and U.S. company AECOM Technology Corporation, for a housing development project in the Kingdom.




The two year agreement, worth $16 million (SR60 million), will provide program management services for the housing community to be built in Jizan. The development includes the creation of five new villages totaling 6,000 housing units, which will provide free accommodations for local citizens displaced from their homes by the conflict with Yemen in late 2009.







Other Companies







Electricity Generating Public Company




Tepsco




Manweir Limited




Brunel Energy Inc.




SAAG Consolidated (M) Berhad




SPK-Sentosa Corporation Berhad




Ref-Chem, L.P.




Industrial Specialty Contractors, L.L.C.




National Industries Group Holding SAK




OKP Holdings Ltd







Where the money goes







Money
Company Information flysama, sama airlines, booking, Saudi Arabia ...
flysama put value for money at the heart of customer proposition. ... · Xenel Industries Ltd · Saudi Industrial Services Co. · Sara Development Company Ltd ...




Center For Middle Eastern Studies - UC Berkeley
... a generous endowment from Xenel Industries Ltd. and the families of Sheikh ... The Al-Falah Program awarded its first grants in 1998.




Officials Deny Allegations of Center's Link With Terrorism - Campus Watch
Home. About Campus Watch. About Us. Setting The Record Straight. CW ... program receives money from Xenel Industries, Ltd. The article alleges that the ...
Where is the Money From? - Campus Watch




The website lists Xenel Industries Ltd. as a primary donor to the Al-Falah Program. Xenel, a Saudi owned conglomerate, "provides development, manufacturing, ...




The Rest @ Company Database.org

Tuesday, September 07, 2010

Reapers and Predators Continue to Deplete Al Qaeda Leadership

Datta Khel is a hub of al Qaeda activity

The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.

The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.

A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.

Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.

The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.

In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasuryRead more:

The Rest @ The Long War Journal

Wednesday, August 04, 2010

IFTIN Part 2

IFTIN is more than just a Somali based international trading organization. It is a:

Digitial TV Network:

There is a Sonmali Music Group called IFTIN, but I am unaware of a direct association with a IFTIN corporate.

More to Follow on names associated with IFTIN

-Shimron Issachar

Monday, October 12, 2009

Hawala and bank Dahabshiil - Abdirashid Duale How It Works

What follows is an excerpt from an interview of Abdirashid Duale, the founder of Dahabshiil. It was published by Somaliland Express on 09/09/09.



-Shimron Issachar

What makes you different from the other money transfer service providers like Western Union and Money Gram?


We are totally different from Western Union and Money Gram because we are inexpensive and oriented towards business as well. Dahabshiil like the other international money transfer services is a truly global operation providing a broad range of financial services to businesses both large and small and international organisations as well as the private individuals. We also operate under full banking licenses in a number of East African countries and are expanding this aspect of our business month on month.

  • We have 1,000 branches and agents in over 40 countries around the world and international offices in London and Dubai.
  • We have offices in 18 states in the US. We are the leading financial services organisation in the Horn of Africa. We focused on the quality of service.
  • We can transfer as much as a business man wants within seconds while our competitors may take some time. Our services are internet based like theirs but we put a lot of emphasis on the time factor.

The other difference we have from them is that we allow our customers to negotiate with us. A person sending US $100 to the US or UK will only pay $2 as service fee and when it is an inland transaction say sending money from Kampala to Arua, $100 will be sent for less than $2. We aim at serving more people while charging less so as to earn more.

The Rest @ Somaliland Express





Thursday, October 08, 2009

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Money Laundering Scheme Exposed

Srinagar, Oct 8 (IANS)

A money laundering (hawala) racket run to fund the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) seperatist group was busted in Jammu and Kashmir, a police official said Thursday.
On a tip-off, police arrested a trader from the uptown Hyderpora locality of Srinagar a few days back, the official said.

“During interrogation, the trader revealed that he and his accomplices in Jammu and Amritsar (in Punjab) have been running a hawala racket to fund LeT cadres,” the officer told IANS here.

On the revelations made by the trader, police have also arrested a trader in Jammu and another in Amritsar, he said.

“The arrested traders had been taking a 40 percent cut for running and supporting the racket and passing on the other 60 percent to LeT militant group,” the officer said.

According to police, traders would receive pulses and other goods from Pakistan-administered Kashmir through the Line of Control (LOC) and sell the received merchandize here without sending any goods in return. The trade along the LoC is on a barter basis.

The Rest @ The Indian



Friday, September 11, 2009

Hawala By Mobil Phone?

Earlier this week I had an opportunity to speak with Zahir Khoja, Executive Director - Mobile Money (M-PAISA) at Roshan. As the world’s focus turns once again to Afghanistan during the country’s elections process, I wanted to get Zahir’s perspective on launching mobile money in this complex environment.

The challenges in the country are well known, but Zahir was quick to highlight the opportunities that come with advancing financial inclusion and developing important communication and payments infrastructure as the country rebuilds.

Paul Leishman: Zahir, can you start by providing us with a 10,000 ft view of M-PAISA in Afghanistan?

Zahir Khoja: We re-launched our service in October, 2008. When we piloted M-PAISA in Afghanistan, the idea was to bring a service to customers to repay their microfinance loans and serve those who didn’t have access to a bank because of distance. We created a trial partnership with First Microfinance Bank Afghanistan (FMFB) and today have about 5,000 customers using the service for microfinance loan repayments. From there, we moved the product into something similar to what you’d see in Kenya today - customers have the ability to send money, pay bills, receive salaries and buy Roshan airtime.

Over the last few months we’ve analysed our business and number of factors emerged. The first is that our tariff schedule was tiered and not easily understood. As a result, in August we launched a new tariff schedule which simplifies everything for the customer: sending money is now one flat fee regardless of how much a customer sends and the same goes for withdrawals. This simplifies the service for the average customer, who typically doesn’t have much education and 75% of whom are illiterate.

Paul Leishman: Where does M-PAISA stand by way of adoption today?

Zahir Khoja: Each month since launch we’ve seen an increase in gross registrations. As customers are interested to learn more about the service, the challenge of driving education still exists.

Paul Leishman: So your offering includes money transfer, MFI loan repayment, salary distribution and airtime purchase. What types of market conditions or customer needs were taken into account when designing this offering?

Zahir Khoja: First, we considered is access to finance. When you look at what Afghanistan has to offer today in terms of a banking environment, only about 3% of the population are banked and there are about 300 bank branches which are owned by 17 banks. So most of the country doesn’t have access to financial services unless you’re in a large city, and even those who do have access generally don’t trust banks given the history they’ve had with them over the last 20-25 years. We also considered the transportation infrastructure.

It’s very hard to get around in Afghanistan: roads aren’t developed like they are in Europe or North America, and buses or cars aren’t as common: donkeys or walking are often the preferred mode of transportation here.

The third factor we considered is security. When you’re travelling with large sums of cash, and when I say large I mean $100 or more, you stand the risk of meeting someone on the road who wants to take your money. In the last 6 months of 2008, there were about $30 million in transit robberies.

There are a lot of obstacles in Afghanistan, but these do vary in severity depending on where you are in the country. Take Southern Afghanistan for example, where the rules of engagement are different than what they may be in the North, it’s not safe to walk around there with money or conduct business. For women in particular it’s a lot easier for them to have a business in Central or Northern Afghanistan than it is in the South due to instability.

Opening up the movement of money is the first step to financial inclusion and alleviating poverty: that’s where the money transfer offering comes into play.

P2P payments break down boundaries between different villages or communities so that people can expand their trading partners.

The second thing is that these customers now have access to are microfinance loans without actually having to visit a specific bank branch. They can repay their loan by changing cash at an agent.

Once they take a microfinance loan, they’re probably using it to develop their business. If they’re developing their business they’re employing more people. If they’re employing more people they’re probably generating more revenue.

Through all of this comes savings, which will probably be the next thing we explore: once these people have money they want somewhere to put it other than under their pillow. You can see that over 10-15 years all of this plays into making the community self sufficient and alleviating poverty. At Roshan we don’t just look at products from a commercial perspective. We also consider economic and personal development perspectives and they were obvious in bringing M-PAISA to market in Afghanistan.

Paul Leishman: We read a lot about the challenges facing Afghanistan as the country rebuilds and stabilizes. What’s your on-the-ground assessment of the opportunities and challenges of doing business in the country?

Zahir Khoja: Security is clearly a major issue: it’s hard to ask an agent to walk around in the field and talk to people about mobile money. If you look at some of the activities we’ve had over the last 60 days, they’ve been limited or non-existent due to the election. Also, because of some of the political issues and the war in the country, we face security challenges with a number of our sites which are located in the volatile South. With an interruption of service, someone can’t check their balance. When someone can’t check their balance they freak out. These are the types of challenges we face operating in Afghanistan.

Another major challenge is that of building a team - specifically from an agent perspective. The approach to team building is very different here than most developed countries. Like many emerging markets, Afghanistan is very transactional - ‘if I give you a dollar, you give me a good’ and that’s the end of our relationship. The idea of ‘customers for life’ doesn’t really exist here. This plays out in recruitment of agents.Paul Leishman: What would be your biggest barrier to scale or growth at the moment?

Zahir Khoja: Development of our agent network. The reason I say that is because getting agents to invest in the business so they can keep a float balance isn’t easy. Agents look at this and say, ‘well that’s $500 that I could use to do something else with.’ As I said, the country is very transactional (i.e. give me a dollar and I’ll give you a good). What we’re asking agents to do is put $500 into float and manage that as your business grows with the customer base. They’ll see returns on the money, but it would be over a period of time. That concept is hard for agents to understand. The concept of sending money over a phone also doesn’t yet register with an average customer. When we talk about getting agents to explain this to customers, agents look for the quick hit. They look for opportunities to maximize commissions today, which makes education really challenging.

Paul Leishman: MFIs play an important role in your model. What advice would you offer around selecting and working with MFI partners?

Zahir Khoja: MFIs are looking at this from an expansion perspective as well as a cost reduction perspective. They can now send a loan officer out into a village and sign up customers to MFI loans. Their loan officer then disburses the loan on site. The customer knows where the village agent is, and is able to make their payments. These are people who may never have considered getting an MFI loan because they a) might not have known about it, or b) the distance to an MFI was too hard. So we’re giving the MFI an opportunity to get more customers and customers the opportunity to access financial services. In the future, we’d like to integrate all of the MFIs on the M-PAISA system so the back end functions more efficiently.

Paul Leishman: What are the unique things that a mobile operator can contribute to an MFI?
Zahir Khoja: First, I think it’s the ability to communicate with customers using various communication channels offered by Roshan. Second, MFIs now have an ability to look at a customer’s transaction history - do they make loan payments, do they qualify for incentives, etc. In Afghanistan, we don’t have a credit bureau, so there’s no way of checking if someone is a good or bad applicant. This allows the customer to develop some type of credit history, and allows the bank on the other end to give $1000 instead of just $100 because they know that they’re dealing with a good customer.Paul Leishman: What’s been your experience from a regulatory perspective launching M-PAISA in Afghanistan?

Zahir Khoja: Mobile money products are a brand new concept to Afghanistan. Roshan, along with USAID, World Bank, CGAP and many other entities are working very closely with the Central Bank of Afghanistan (the regulator) in the development of new regulations. Best practices from Kenya, Philippines and other countries where mobile money has been successful are being taken into account.

Paul Leishman: Does the Central Bank see opportunity in gaining better visibility into financial flows in Afghanistan?

Zahir Khoja: Yes. One of the things the Central Bank asked us is ‘how can you be sure that criminals, won’t use this system?’ We have an Anti Money Laundering Officer that monitors transactions on a daily basis. Any transactions that look suspicious is flagged immediately. This enables the Central Bank to deal with these matters instantly rather than waiting for the outcome of what these funds would be used for.

Paul Leishman: What about other elements of regulation. Can non-bank agents perform account opening and cash in/out? Is there proportionate KYC in Afghanistan?

Zahir Khoja: To open an M-PAISA account, you need to have a valid passport, or a national ID card. You also need to have 2 colour photographs, name, fathers name, birth date, mobile phone number. We also ask whether the applicant is involved with any political party or if they’ve ever been involved in terrorist activity. All of our customers are screened through various sources, like the Dow Jones watch list, to make sure that applicants are legitimate.


Paul Leishman: What types of tactics do you use to convert registered customers into active users?

Zahir Khoja: There are a number of tactics, but the primary one is educating and training M-Paisa agents so that they are well equipped to talk to customers about the service.

That’s our main focal point. There are also a number of marketing initiatives utilizing the Roshan mobile network that we use to communicate with customers. The marketing services we deploy take into account the fact that 75% of the Afghan population is illiterate. These types of initiatives have been recently launched so we are still in the process of evaluating their effectiveness.

Paul Leishman: So your offering includes

  • money transfer,
  • MFI loan repayment
  • salary distribution
  • airtime purchase.

What types of market conditions or customer needs were taken into account when designing this offering?

Zahir Khoja: First, we considered is access to finance. When you look at what Afghanistan has to offer today in terms of a banking environment, only about 3% of the population are banked and there are about 300 bank branches which are owned by 17 banks. So most of the country doesn’t have access to financial services unless you’re in a large city, and even those who do have access generally don’t trust banks given the history they’ve had with them over the last 20-25 years. We also considered the transportation infrastructure.

It’s very hard to get around in Afghanistan: roads aren’t developed like they are in Europe or North America, and buses or cars aren’t as common: donkeys or walking are often the preferred mode of transportation here.

The third factor we considered is security. When you’re travelling with large sums of cash, and when I say large I mean $100 or more, you stand the risk of meeting someone on the road who wants to take your money. In the last 6 months of 2008, there were about $30 million in transit robberies.

There are a lot of obstacles in Afghanistan, but these do vary in severity depending on where you are in the country. Take Southern Afghanistan for example, where the rules of engagement are different than what they may be in the North, it’s not safe to walk around there with money or conduct business. For women in particular it’s a lot easier for them to have a business in Central or Northern Afghanistan than it is in the South due to instability.

Opening up the movement of money is the first step to financial inclusion and alleviating poverty: that’s where the money transfer offering comes into play.

P2P payments break down boundaries between different villages or communities so that people can expand their trading partners. The second thing is that these customers now have access to getting a microfinance loan without actually having to visit a specific bank branch. They can repay their loan by changing cash at an agent.

Once they take a microfinance loan, they’re probably using it to develop their business. If they’re developing their business they’re employing more people. If they’re employing more people they’re probably generating more revenue. Through all of this comes savings, which will probably be the next thing we explore: once these people have money they want somewhere to put it other than under their pillow. You can see that over 10-15 years all of this plays into making the community self sufficient and alleviating poverty.

At Roshan we don’t just look at products from a commercial perspective. We also consider economic and personal development perspectives and they were obvious in bringing M-PAISA to market in Afghanistan.

Paul Leishman: What other payment options exist in Afghanistan, given that just 3% of the country is banked?

Zahir Khoja:

If you want to send money today from one district to another, you’ll personally deliver that money by walking, taking a taxi, or taking a donkey.

Alternatively you would give the money to a friend, what’s referred to as a trusted agent, and say ‘please deliver this for me and you can keep 5-10% for yourself.’

Or finally you would go to a Hawala market and pay a set fee for the money to be sent to the recipient in a corresponding district, village or province.

These are the money transfer options that exist today, and we’re trying to educate people on how to send money on their mobile phone. 25% of the population in Afghanistan have a mobile phone and this is the group we’re targeting. The challenge we have is that people don’t trust banks, let alone the idea that their money is now just on an SMS. But recall that 75% of Afghans can’t read: that’s where our IVR comes in.

Paul Leishman: What have you done to driving understanding of the benefits and functionality of an IVR?

Zahir Khoja: That’s the challenge we’re having now: getting the IVR message into the marketplace. What we’re trying to do now is address the market based on their needs. Afghanistan just went through an election period which was an unsafe time for the country. In response, the campaign we’ve launched is ‘buy Roshan airtime using your M-PAISA wallet from the convenience of your home.’ This gets a customer to say ‘Yes, I’d like to continue to have airtime, so I’ll figure out how this M-PAISA thing works because I don’t want to leave my home and risk my safety.’

It’s important to use tactics like this that will make a customer say ‘Yes, I really need this’. Right now if you talk to the average Afghan person, there’s no desire to put money into a bank. In some sense, we need to create the need for them - illustrate how these services can make a difference in their lives. Right now we charge 50 Afghani, which is the equivalent of US$1, to send money.

The average person today sends between US$30 and US$50. The pitch to these people to justify our fee is that they no longer need to leave their home, take a taxi or donkey, or spend time going to a Hawala market. Yes, there is a fee but it’s cheaper than all other methods used today.

Paul Leishman: You’ve chosen to use the word ‘Hawala’ in your tagline: ‘The Hawala on your Mobile’. What is the significance or thought behind this?

Zahir Khoja: Hawalas have been around for hundreds of years and everyone knows that this is where you go to send money. Rather than recreate the wheel, we decided to go with what people understand. Our pitch is that we’re bringing the Hawala to you through your mobile.

Paul Leishman: Thanks Zahir.

The Rest @ Mobil Money for the Unbanked
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