AQIM with About a ton of Libyan Semtex

AQIM: how to protect Algeria suicide bomber 05/08/2011 at 09h: 30

 The safety device has been strengthened in Algiers. Bomb attacks against convoys of the army, suicide ...

 For three months, there has been an upsurge in terrorist violence. Trafficking of arms from Libya are not strangers and authorities feared the worst during Ramadan. Algeria is under surveillance ...

 On the eve of Ramadan, the month in which the jihadists of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) mission is to increase the coup, Abu Musab Abdelwadoud - Abdelmalek Droukdel real name - national emir of terrorist organization, confirmed that the group recovered nearly a ton of Semtex from Libya arsenals in June. 

 July 16, in fact, a double suicide bombing targeted the police station in Bordj Ménaïl, 60 km east of Algiers. Result: two dead, including a civilian, and a dozen injured. Nine days later, Thénia in Kabylia, an Atos - a low-end car manufacturer Hyundai South Korean popular in Algeria - is intercepted at a roadblock. On board, three suicide bombers, including Abdelqahar Benhadj (see box below).

When police ordered him to stop, the driver refused and darkens. One of the gendarmes draws and fires a single bullet. The vehicle exploded. The violence of the explosion is such that a police source estimated that the three men were carrying several hundred kilograms of explosives. Were they in Algiers to commit their crimes? "Not likely, said a police superintendent. The terrorists know they have no chance with el-fnek. " 

The "Fennec", an explosive detector about the size of a remote control, with an antenna, powers all the barriers controlling access to capital. "Since we have this equipment, acquired in 2008 from a U.S. firm, or any car bomb containing explosives could not enter Algiers, said the Commissioner. This is why suicide bombers avoid the city, but it's not like they lack. "In fact, the last suicide bomber that hit the capital was in December 2007.

A jihadist drove his truck against the UN headquarters on the heights of Algiers, killing 67 people including 10 UN employees. Since then, this type of attack focuses on Kabylia, which houses the headquarters of maquis Abdelmalek Droukdel. "It is much easier to secure the capital by building barriers around the Kabylie filter with its dense road network," said a senior officer (since June, a presidential decree has placed all of the forces responsible for the fight terrorism under the command of the army). The fact remains that the safety was further strengthened in Algiers . The increased activity of AQIM is not limited to suicide attacks, the organization conducts operations knuckle-fist against the police. "Since mid-April, we lost about fifty soldiers, police and gendarmes, said the officer.

 The Rest @ GrendelReport

AQIM May no longer be United in Suporting Al Qaeda Objectives

According to a recent analysis by Geoff D. Porter of Jamestown.org AQIM is having difficulties setting Global Objetives when many joined for local reasons.

-Shimron


The current split is due to two related disagreements:

• should the group try to redefine its struggle as part of a global jihad,
• or should it remain focused on overthrowing the secular government of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika?

Second, is it legitimate to attack civilians, or is the government the only permissible target?

Droudkel's AQIM wants to expand throughout North Africa and join forces in neighboring countries along the Mediterranean coast and in the Sahel. In his worldview, anyone who is not AQIM is against it and therefore a legitimate target. The September 6 attack on a crowd awaiting the arrival of President Bouteflika that resulted in at least 15 civilian deaths is a case in point (Le Quotidien d'Oran, September 6).

The GSPC's grievance was with the government that scuttled an Islamist electoral victory in 1991. It drew a clear distinction between the government and the populace at large. The GSPC's evolution has significant ramifications for Droudkel and the AQIM's continued viability.

Benmessaoud was the commander of the GSPC/AQIM's Zone IX, a long corridor down the middle of the country stretching from the high plateaus in the north to a large swath of Sahara Desert along Algeria's borders with Mali and Niger.

Benmessaoud took over the position after its previous incumbent, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, entered into negotiations with the Algerian government (through interlocutors in Tamanrasset) to surrender and decamp to Mali where his wife and children live (El Watan, June 16).

Zone IX has historically been critical for the viability of GSPC/AQIM activities in the north of the country.

• Through contraband smuggling, drug-running and weapons sales, Belmokhtar and Benmessaoud funneled funds and guns to the group's northern zones.
• With Belmokhtar's resignation and Benmessaoud's surrender, however, Droudkel is deprived of this key source of money and arms.

Benmessaoud also said that Droudkel responded repressively to a spate of defections following the alliance with al-Qaeda. According to Benmessaoud, Droudkel's trouble retaining recruits prompted him to forbid new AQIM members from straying out of sight of trusted veteran fighters.

Three car bombs used in the April 11 attacks in Algiers were wired with remote detonation devices in addition to the detonation devices triggered by the drivers because Droudkel feared that the bombers would abort their missions.

--end of excerpt---

There is much more quality analysis from Geoff D. Porter of Jamestown.org

The bottom line, is that AQIM, the once shining example of how al Qaeda franchises its operations, is failing along the fault line of national verses interational interests.

Radicalized Muslims seem to be saying:

• I am willing to be a martyr for my own islamic state
• Al Qaeda leaders are showing themselves to be bad Muslims
• I dont trust al Qaeda to make my martyrdom worthy of heaven

-Shimron