8/05/2009
Abderrazak El Para announces his "repentance" and called terrorists to disarm 08/05/2009 Amari Saifi, alias Abderrazak El Para, in a document entitled "Repentance and denunciation, posting have forsworn military action, saying that jihad was not legitimate" in Algeria.

TSA-algerie.com which obtained a copy of this document, dated February. [ in the document,] El Para-called elements of the GSPC, now Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), still in the bush, to give up the fighting army and to make weapons for the provisions of the law on civil concord.

Former senior GSPC in the Sahara region, Amari Saifi said he now believes that military action is no longer justified in Algeria.

He also acknowledged that AQIM had chosen a path that had left the religion in committing bombings and deadly criminals who do not differentiate between "small and great."

He compared the current methods of the GSPC to those of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the 1990s who had committed many massacres of civilians.

Abderrazak El Para was also sent to officials of the GSPC in the Sahara.

In particular, they advised to stop kidnapping foreigners.

"I advise you to stop kidnapping foreigners, as these actions do a disservice to our religion.

I was the first to have conducted such actions and I regret having done so because they are not lawful, "he said.

Calling Abderrazak El Para to repentance is the second former senior GSPC since the beginning of the year.

Beginning in January, Hassan Hattab called terrorists to lay down their weapons for the provisions of the law on civil concord.

The Rest @ TSA- Algeria

AQIM Remains Desperat for Kidnappings to be Profitable

(Said Jameh , Magharebia) 2008-10-17

Algerian security forces have caused disruption in al-Qaeda's support networks and, cornered by persistent search operations, terrorists have found it hard to lure new recruits. For a desperate AQIM, ransoms have replaced extortion and banditry as a way to finance terror.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is suffering from financial problems and a severe shortage of personnel, Algerian security forces have observed in recent weeks.

• Terrorists have been forced to resort to abducting civilians and demanding ransoms as a new way to generate money.
• In late 2005, when two civilians were held for ransom in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou, no one could have known that a kidnapping wave across Algeria was about to begin, Le Quotidien d'Oran noted on October 12th.
• "Today, not a week passes without a case of kidnapping reported in the region," the paper added.
• On average, Algeria registered one kidnapping for ransom each day last year, Interior Minister Nourredine Yazid Zerhouni told the Senate in May. "In total, 375 cases of kidnapping were registered in 2007…115 having a relationship with terrorism," he said.

Terrorists routinely extorted money from landowners, but with the improvement of security conditions people refused to give in to blackmail. Criminals and terrorists then turned to another method to obtain much-needed funds: kidnapping.

• Magharebia interviewed security expert Mouloud Merchedi about this growing phenomenon and what it means for al-Qaeda.
• "Money and weapons were, and still are, the decisive factor in determining who wins the leadership of these organisations, which are controlled by no rules other than power," he said, citing how al-Qaeda terrorists holding two Austrian tourists since February 22nd hope to profit from their acts.
• "Should the kidnappers manage to receive the ransom they have demanded from Austrian authorities for the release of the two tourists, the money will be used to buy more weapons and to consolidate the ranks of the armed group by luring new recruits."

."...The objective, he said, is for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to "include the whole North African region".

They are betting on a large ransom for the safe return of Wolfgang Ebner and girlfriend Andrea Kloiber to beef up their finances.

According to Merchedi, the terrorist group was decimated by a crackdown imposed on its logistics and support operatives by Algerian security forces, particularly in AQIM's "second district" (Algiers and the capital's surrounding suburbs), considered one of the most prominent strongholds of al-Qaeda.

Ambassadors to Mali Abdelkrim Gheraieb of Algeria, Reinhard Schwarzer of Germany and Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon of France (right) met in Bamako in March 2008. The three countries are working closely with Austria to find a solution to the kidnapping of two

Algerian authorities will not be pleased if Austria accedes to the kidnappers' demands, experts agree. The authorities are convinced that the money will be used to buy weapons, an expectation later confirmed when two trucks loaded with weapons, bound for al-Qaeda strongholds in the Kabylia region, were seized coming across Algeria's southern border with Mali.

Eight months after the tourists' kidnapping, "pressures are mounting on Austrian authorities to accelerate the release of the two hostages", he said.

Meanwhile, the kidnappers have relinquished previous demands for the release of al-Qaeda leaders held in Algerian and Tunisian prisons, including Amari Saifi, a.k.a. Abderrazzak El Para, the mastermind of a large-scale tourist abduction in 2005, and Abdelfetah Abou Bassir, the architect of the bombings against the Government Palace in April 2007.

The armed group's demand for the release of their jailed leaders was mere posturing, since the kidnappers knew full well that neither Algerian nor Tunisian authorities would meet their demands, security expert Ghoumrassa Bouelame told Magharebia.

Observers see the situation as a repeat of El Para's 2005 kidnapping of 32 German, Austrian and Swiss tourists. The German government ultimately paid a ransom estimated at 5 million euros.

Terrorists used that money to buy weapons and ammunition, which they then smuggled across the southern border with Mali to northern Algeria.

The case of the two kidnapped Austrian nationals shows how desperate the Maghreb branch of al-Qaeda has become.

Little has changed since 2006, when its leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, sent an urgent message to Osama bin Laden wherein he complained that the North African group's lack of funds prevented it from attracting new recruits. Operations would decline, he warned, if he did not receive money as soon as possible.

Out of desperation, the terror group began to form bandit teams tasked with robbing farmers, especially in Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou and the Metija Valley, south of the capital. This was followed by kidnapping operations against wealthy people, contractors and their children.

Algerian media reports new abductions every week.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb uses ransoms to finance attacks, including suicide operations that require more resources.

The money also pays salaries, especially for married terrorists, and lures young men into joining armed groups on promises of improving their families' living standards.

In its October 9th issue, Echorouk reported that the suspicions of security authorities were aroused when many families in Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdès suddenly appeared wealthier.

• Investigators looking into the source of the new wealth found only one common denominator: each family included a relative who had recently joined the terrorist group.
• While some Algerian families profit from an association with al-Qaeda, others find themselves forced to purchase the safe return of a loved one.
• In one such case reported October 9th by El Khabar newspaper, a contractor from Khenchela paid 200 million centimes for the release of his son. Soon after paying the ransom, he was imprisoned for failing to report the kidnapping and thus enabling terrorists to obtain money.
  

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Indeed, many wealthy individuals have changed their habits to thwart the plans of kidnappers. Others have even opted to surround themselves with bodyguards.

Faced with a spike in recorded kidnappings in recent months, Algerian authorities recently took decisive action to halt this phenomenon or at least mitigate its magnitude.

To keep the families of abductees from paying terrorists' ransom demands, security officers closely monitor all bank accounts belonging to kidnap victims and their relatives, Liberte reported on October 12th.

Authorities may even temporarily block the accounts if they learn of plans to give money to terrorists. Officials hope the plan proves to be a daunting deterrent to terrorist groups and other kidnappers, the newspaper added.

The Rest @ Magharebia

Mourad Seghir Killed by Algerian Security Forces

in a car bomb targeting a police station in the centre of Tizi Ouzou Sunday morning (August 3rd). The blast came days after authorities reportedly killed al-Qaeda's principal financer in Algeria.

Residents of the city's Elkalitousse district woke up to the sound of the blast at approximately 5:00am. The police station is reportedly situated near a military barracks and a dormitory for intelligence personnel.

The explosion left 25 people injured, including four policemen. The only person to die was the suicide bomber himself, who was driving an explosives-laden car from neighbouring Boumerdès wilaya.

The bomber's body parts were strewn about the scene of the attack.
Ambulances rushed to the scene and carried the injured to the city hospital for treatment. Hospital officials said Sunday evening that 24 of the 25 injured people were discharged from the hospital. One victim underwent minor surgery.

Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni and General Director of National Security Ali Tounsi arrived to inspect the situation shortly after the bombing was announced.
Eyewitnesses said damage from the attack might have been more extensive had it taken place days ago, as the dormitory was emptied last week when agency personnel moved to a new building.

Speaking to the press, the interior minister said the intelligence agency had been targeted because of the role it played in killing several important members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) over the past two years.

Several similar attacks in recent months have been blamed on the terror organisation, led by Abdelmalek Droukdel.

• Security experts say that with the success of Algeria's intelligence agencies in penetrating the ranks of al-Qaeda, a number of key terrorists have been eliminated.
• AQIM second-in-command Samir Sayoud, alias Samir Abou Mosaab, was killed in April 2007. \
• Droukdel's top aide and military advisor Ali Dix was eliminated in July of the same year.
• In October, the authorities dismantled the terrorist cell responsible for the April 11th attacks and killed the mastermind of the operation, Zoheir Harik.
• And in April of this year, they killed Abderahmane Bouzegza, emir of the Farouq Battalion.
  

The most recent elimination of a top al-Qaeda terrorist was that of Mourad Seghir, aka El Pompier, by Algerian security forces on July 31st.

A former fire fighter, 43 year old Segir was AQIM's principal financer in Algeria, security forces say. El Pompier terrorised the local population, kidnapping the wealthy and demanding taxes from the poor. Those who did not pay the ransoms or taxes were threatened with death, or their crops destroyed, sending them into financial ruin.

El Pompier and his assistant Ben Dahman Muhamad were killed early Thursday morning when police stormed the downtown Boumerdès apartment where the two were hiding. Kalashnikovs and more than 20 million dinars in ransom and blackmail money were found on the premises.

• The interior minister noted that many of the abductees' families had opted to call the police in lieu of paying the money demanded by the terrorists.

Had all families succumbed to the threat, Zerhouni said, al-Qaeda would have collected an additional 60 million dinars.
Residents of Boumerdès were breathing easy again after hearing the news of El Pompier's death. Le Soir d’Algerie reported on August 2nd that peasants and affluent families alike were happy to finally be rid of the terrorist, particularly with the approach of the grape harvesting season, known as a time when terror groups often threaten to sabotage crops in order to extract payments from farmers.

With the elimination of El Pompier, and the July 22nd announcement by Security Director Ali Tounsi that Algerian security services would soon cover all of the country's territory, including the Kabylia region, some security experts say the suicide attack in Tizi Ouzou was an attempt by AQIM to undercut the Algerian officials' optimism about the improved security situation in the country.

Speaking to Magharebia, security expert Bouelam Ghoumrassa said that through its most recent operation, al-Qaeda wanted to confirm that it was still able to hit and target symbols of the state.
Asking if al-Qaeda was successful in its attempt to destabilise the pillars of the Algerian state, Ghoumrassa suggested that it was not.

The Rest @ Magharebia

AQIM and their Global Strategy

It is about time the CFR did an update to the profile of AQIM.
Here is a summary.

-Shimron

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or L'Organisation Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (Formerly Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat)


Introduction
What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?
What's the connection between AQIM and al-Qaeda?
What are AQIM's goals?
What are the group's tactics?
Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?
Who are the group's main leaders?
How is the group funded?
Does AQIM have a significant presence in Iraq?

Introduction
Terrorist activity in North Africa has been reinvigorated in the last few years by a local Algerian Islamist group turned pan-Maghreb jihadi organization: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A Sunni group that previously called itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the organization has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, declared its intention to attack Western targets, and sent a squad of jihadis to Iraq.

Experts believe these actions suggest widening ambitions within the group's leadership, now pursuing a more global, sophisticated, and better-financed direction.

Long categorized as part of a strictly domestic insurgency against Algeria's military government, AQIM claims to be the local franchise operation for al-Qaeda, a worrying development for a region that has been relatively peaceful since the bloody Algerian civil war of the 1990s drew to a close.

European officials are taking AQIM's international threats seriously and are worried about the growing number of Europe-based cells, states this Europol Report (PDF) .

What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?
AQIM originated as an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. Its insurrection began after Algeria's military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 when it seemed that the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take power. In 1998, the group declared its independence from another terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), believing the GIA's brutal tactics were hurting the Islamist cause. The GSPC gained support from the Algerian population by vowing to continue fighting the government while avoiding the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The group has since surpassed the GIA in influence and numbers to become the primary force for Islamism in Algeria.

A government amnesty program and a persistent counterterrorism campaign by the Algerian army significantly decreased the number of local terrorists, which at its highest point in the 1990s was estimated as high as 28,000. According to the U.S. State Department, which compiles yearly statistics on terrorist groups, AQIM's membership is now in the hundreds.

But there are indications that terrorism in North Africa is on the rise and that AQIM is using the Iraq war and other unpopular Western policies to recruit new membership. "Despite the official happy talk," says Olivier Guitta, a Washington-based foreign affairs consultant, "kidnappings by Islamists to raise money for their cause are a routine occurrence in Algeria.


And not a day goes by without terrorists' attacking military personnel, government employees, or ordinary civilians, whom they regard as allies of the government."

What's the connection between AQIM and al-Qaeda?

Collusion between AQIM and al-Qaeda is not a new phenomenon. According to a 2007 report by Emily Hunt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden provided funding for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and was involved in the GSPC's early formation. Many of the group's founding members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially approved GSPC's merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006.
AQIM has since claimed responsibility for attacks under its new name.

What are AQIM's goals?

Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria's secular military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, a theocracy based on Islamic law that for twelve centuries spanned the Muslim world. Counterterrorism experts, however, say the group's folding into the global al-Qaeda structure may indicate a shift to take up the banner of global jihad and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq. "Pressed by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Algeria-centric GSPC has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself," said Henry A. Crumpton, U.S. ambassador for counterterrorism, during April 2006

Senate subcommittee testimony (PDF).

Algerian authorities consider the name change to be a last-ditch attempt to revitalize a domestic insurgency. However, AQIM's vocal support of al-Qaeda and declaration of solidarity (PDF) with Islamic extremists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya indicate broader intent. "Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother," AQIM's current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal, said in a July 2008 interview with the New York Times. In keeping with this statement, the group has issued several communiqués that expand its targets—originally the Algerian military and France—to include the United States. AQIM has accused America of propping up the "apostate" Algerian regime and leading a crusade against Muslims.

What are the group's tactics?

AQIM employs conventional terrorist tactics (PDF) in Algeria, including guerilla-style ambushes against military personnel and truck bombs against government targets, according to the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) at the Manhattan Institute. GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. The ransom paid for their release is unknown but estimated to be from $5 million to as much as $10 million; the group may have used these funds to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment.

In December 2006, the group attacked two buses carrying contractors near Algiers, wounding several foreign nationals. Four months later, the group killed twenty-three people with twin bombings in Algiers. One of the bombs exploded outside the prime minister's office, a move CFR Senior Fellow Steven A. Cook describes as "a major escalation." In December 2007, the group was behind a double suicide bombing in Algiers that killed forty-one people, including seventeen UN staff members. These attacks, as well as a June 2008 twin suicide bombing of an army outpost, suggest the group is relying more on suicide attacks as its preferred method. The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism says this development is a nod to al-Qaeda and a wish to emulate the success of suicide bombings in Iraq.

Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?

Some experts warn the group's growing confidence could increase its willingness to target Westerners both inside and outside Algeria. The group has called for jihadis who can't reach the battlefields of Iraq to target Jews, Christians, and apostates (PDF) in their own regions.

• AQIM has taken over, and some say revitalized, many Europe-based cells of the former GIA for both fundraising and recruiting.
• In spite of its growing global presence, some experts doubt AQIM's ability to carry out a Qaeda-scale attack. "They haven't done anything spectacular," says Hugh Roberts, an expert on North African politics and former head of the International Crisis Group's North Africa project. "They have not actually pulled off a single terrorist attack in Europe in the eight years they've existed. And that's a fact that you have to put in balance against European security services that say the group is a major threat."
• On the other hand, Bruce Reidel, a former CIA counterterrorism official now with the Brookings Institution, writes that AQIM has been steadily building up its capability to carry out attacks in Western Europe and even North America. In June 2008, Spanish authorities uncovered a terrorist cell in Spain, arresting eight men and detaining ten accused of providing logistical and financial support to AQIM. This follows French police uncovering a similar cell in the outskirts of Paris in December 2007. Arrests of suspected terrorists with ties to AQIM have been made throughout Europe in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Some analysts point to thwarted attacks and arrests of AQIM-linked terrorists as evidence the group is capable of attacks in Western Europe.

Who are the group's main leaders?

After the 1979-1989 insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan, hundreds of North African volunteers known as "Afghan Arabs" returned to the region and radicalized Islamist movements. Most of the group's main leaders are believed to have trained in Afghanistan. Abdelmalek Droukdal, also known as Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, is the current chief of the group. University-educated as a science student and well known for his bomb-making abilities, he has led the group since 2004, when its previous leader, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed in a firefight with Algerian forces.

Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak el-Para because he was trained as an Algerian

paratrooper, is a former leader of the group that remains an important figure. Saifi is best known for organizing the lucrative 2003 kidnapping of European tourists in the Algerian Sahara. He was known as the "Bin Laden of the desert" and classified as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" by the United States, a title shared by top al-Qaeda commanders before he was captured in Chad in 2004 and eventually extradited to Algeria. In February 2008, AQIM militants kidnapped two Austrian tourists in Tunisia and listed el-Para's release as one of their demands. Algerian courts recently sentenced him to death, though the last execution in the country occurred in 1993.

How is the group funded?

Smuggling and petty crimes are a lucrative source of income, according to the CPT report. The porous, unpoliced borders of the Sahara region make smuggling vehicles, cigarettes, drugs, and arms particularly easy. Europe-based cells provide funds to AQIM through drug dealing, counterfeiting money, and other illegal activities, French and Italian police forces reported to Europol in 2008. The ransom paid as a result of the 2003 kidnapping provided a significant windfall for the group. To continue its tradition of self-financing, writes counterterrorism consultant Olivier Guitta, AQIM operatives may be turning more to kidnapping as a source of income. The group reportedly requested five million pounds for the ransom of two Austrian tourists in 2008. Algerian authorities have accused Iran and Sudan of giving material support to

AQIM, but experts say that is unlikely.

Does AQIM have a significant presence in Iraq?
Yes. AQIM has funneled North African insurgents to Iraq to fight as suicide bombers, foot soldiers, and mid-level commanders, says Hunt. Although counting foreign fighters is difficult, Evan Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant, estimates that North Africans represent between 9 percent and 25 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq, although the vast majority are still of Saudi and Jordanian origin. Adil Sakir al-Mukni, a key link between AQIM and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was deported by the Syrian government in 2005 for helping shuttle foreign fighters into Iraq. AQIM reportedly called on the Zarqawi network to attack French nationals in Iraq and applauded the 2005 killing of two Algerian diplomats there.

Authors: Andrew HansenLauren
The Rest @ The Council on Foreign Relations