Sunday, November 04, 2012
All Al Shabaab are not the Same
Those from the Somalia al Shabbab who recently appeared in Libya, for example are not affiliated with a recent Egyptian "al shabaab" group who support "their brothers in Libya and Syria"
-Shimron Issachar
Sunday, April 15, 2012
PAN ISLAMIC COMMUNIST PARTY OF PROLETARIAN ISLAM
The Green Resistance in Sabha Libya and The Pan African World RevolutionThe International Pan Islamic Communist Party of Proletarian Islam Statement on Palestinian Land Day.
The Toubou Front for The Salvation of Libya Must Unite in a Joint Pan Africanist Struggle With The Green Resistance to Bring Down The National Transitional Council.
For the past several months the Indigenous Toubou People have been subjected to a brutal campaign of Ethnic and Racial cleaning by Arab Supremacist the forces of The So-Called National Transitional Council
This brutal campaign of repression has bought many Member of The Toubou Ethic Group into The Fighting Ranks of The Green Resistance in Libya The Brutal campaign of Ethnic Cleansing of the Toubou and has also led to the formation of The Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya
The TFSL by other members of The Toubou Ethnic Group. if Libya is to ever be free from The evil grip of White Western Imperialism and The So-Called NTC
- The Toubou Front for The Salvation of Libya must Join Hands and Unite with their Comrades in The Green Resistance in One Joint Pan African United Front and Liberate Libya together. and Restore The Great Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya into State Power in All Parts of Libya
- Once Again so that Libya will Once More Be a Powerful Base Area of The Pan African World Revolution and the Pan Islamic World Socialist Revolution.
- The Linking up of The Struggles of The Toubou in Southern Libya with The ongoing Urban Insurgency in Tripoli led by The Libyan Islamic Working Class along with The Courageous Underground Resistance in Benghazi in The East will hasten and Speed up The Inevitable Day of Libya’s Final Liberation from White Western Imperialism and The Rats of The So-Called National Transitional Council.
Sunday, November 20, 2011
Viktor Bout and Murmar Gaddafi
According to the New York Daily News, the documents found by human rights activists indicate that Viktor Bout was trying to expand his operations in Libya while Gaddafi was still in power.
Bout was convicted in New York on Wednesday on federal charges that he conspired to kill Americans and US officials, deliver anti-aircraft missiles and aid terrorists.
The new records indicate that British officials in 2003 told then-Libyan intelligence chief Musa Kusa that Bout had a “considerable commercial presence in Libya” and wanted to expand his interests there. (ANI)
The Rest @ Truth Drive
Saturday, September 24, 2011
AQIM's New SA-7s Are Not "Point and Shoot" Weapons
REUTERS
Anti-Gaddafi fighters stand on Soviet-made SCUD missile outside a village near Sirte, one of Muammar Gaddafi's last remaining strongholds.
Thousands of surface-to-air missiles pillaged in Libya pose less of a risk than feared as most militant groups in sub-Saharan Africa lack the knowhow and the equipment to fire them, experts say.
The Soviet-made SA-7 is a man-portable low-altitude missile with a high explosive and passive infrared homing device that could pose a nightmare in the Sahel where an Al-Qaeda affiliate, among other groups, is active.
While some fear they could be used to target commercial flights if they fell into the wrong hands, others say that using them is not so simple and that they could turn out to be just scrap metal, if not properly stored.
The arsenal of toppled Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi comprised about 20 000 such missiles, initially manufactured in the former Soviet Union since 1972 and then in other east European countries, according to experts.
Several informed sources said many of them had found their way to clandestine markets in sub-Saharan Africa, where they could be offered to groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
“We have got wind of the fact that they are looking for instruction manuals in Arabic,” a French anti-terrorism expert told AFP on condition of anonymity.
“But there is nothing to indicate that these missiles are in a functional state. And using them is more difficult than it would seem.”
Another expert, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said: “We know that Tuareg arms traffickers have got their hands on Libyan SA-7 missiles. But they are going to have serious maintainence problems.”
“For a start, these missiles can only be used with thermal batteries, which need to be recharged. We do not think AQIM has the necessary networks to get these.”
The cylindrical 9B17 thermal battery allows the seeker to track the target by detecting infrared radiation and then hit targets up to an altitude of 4500 metres (14 850 feet).
The missiles and batteries are usually stored separately.
Following Gaddafi's ouster, journalists who were able to access some of his armouries saw empty missile crates with their contents looted, but the batteries had been left behind.
A top US general recently said the United States and the international community believe Libya's new rulers are responsible for preventing weapons proliferation in a region battling terrorism.
General Carter Ham, the head of the Africa command, Africom, said there was “a threat of the proliferation of the weapons from Libya and we are greatly concerned... about small arms, rifles and weapons similar to that, but also explosives and shoulder-fired air defence systems.”
Nearby Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger - all large but mainly poor countries - are prey to attacks by AQIM, which is battling the military in the Sahel nations, has taken Western hostages and is held to be engaged in arms trafficking.
Matthew Schroeder, the manager of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Washington-based Federation of American Scientists, downplayed the fears of the missiles wrecking havoc.
“These missiles have in theory a shelf life of 10 to 20 years. But lots of these missiles are old, some may not function properly. And if they are not handled properly, they can be damaged,” he said.
“It's not good for these weapons to be taken out of their crates and thrown in the back of a truck. It's not like an AK series rifle, you know.”
And using them was not child's play, he said.
“They do require some training. It's not as simple as it's often portrayed. If you're a trained operator, it's not complicated, but specially with the older ones, in order to be reasonably confident you're going to hit the target you've got to know what you are doing.”
In July last year, he wrote an article for the specialised magazine Foreign Policy entitled “Stop Panicking About the Stingers” in which he tried to calm fears that insurgents in Afghanistan, who had got hold of the heat-seeking missiles, could use them against US planes.
“In the recent conflict in Afghanistan, I don't know of any report of a Stinger missile used since 2001,” he said. “I don't know of any downed plane as a result of Stingers. It also depends on the storage conditions.” - AFP
The Rest @ AFP
Monday, September 05, 2011
Gaddafi Fleeing to Niger?
The convoy of between 200 and 250 vehicles was given an escort by the army of Niger, an impoverished and landlocked former French colony to the south of Libya, and might, according to a French military source, be joined by Gaddafi en route for neighboring Burkina Faso, which has offered him asylum.
It was not clear where the 69-year-old former leader was. He has broadcast defiance since being forced into hiding two weeks ago, and has previously vowed to die fighting on Libyan soil.
Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, the heir apparent before the uprising which ended his father's 42 years of personal rule two weeks ago, also was considering joining the convoy, the French source added. France played a leading role in the war against Gaddafi and such a large Libyan military convoy could hardly have moved safely without the knowledge and agreement of NATO air forces.
Sources told Reuters that France may have brokered an arrangement between the new Libyan government and Gaddafi.
But a spokesperson for the French foreign ministry in Paris could not confirm the report of the convoy's arrival in the northern Niger desert city of Agadez nor any offer to Gaddafi, who with Saif al-Islam is wanted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court at The Hague.
Officials in other Western governments and in Libya's new ruling council were not immediately available for comment.
The sources said the convoy, probably including officers from army units based in the south of Libya, may have looped through Algeria rather than crossing the Libyan-Niger frontier directly. It arrived late on Monday near the northern city of Agadez. Algeria last week took in Gaddafi's wife, daughter and two other sons, angering the rebels who ended his 42-year rule.
"HIGH SPIRITS"
NATO warplanes and reconnaissance aircraft have been scouring Libya's deserts for large convoys of vehicles that may be carrying the other Gaddafis, making it unlikely that it could have crossed the border without some form of deal being struck.
Libya's new rulers have said they want to try Gaddafi before, possibly, handing him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has charged him with crimes against humanity.
Earlier on Monday, Gaddafi's fugitive spokesman Moussa Ibrahim said he was in good health and good spirits somewhere in Libya. "Muammar Gaddafi is in excellent health and in very, very high spirits," Ibrahim said in remarks broadcast on television.
"He is in a place that will not be reached by those fractious groups, and he is in Libya," Ibrahim told Arrai TV.
The head of Gaddafi's security brigades, Mansour Dhao, along with more than 10 other Libyans, crossed into Niger on Sunday, two Niger officials had said earlier on Monday.
The French military source said he had been told the commander of Libya's southern forces, General Ali Khana, may also be in Niger, not far from the Libyan border.
He said he had been told that Gaddafi and Saif al-Islam would join Khana and catch up with the convoy should they choose to accept Burkina Faso's offer of exile.
Burkina Faso, also once a French colony and a former recipient of large amounts of Libyan aid, offered Gaddafi exile about two weeks ago but has also recognised the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) as Libya's government.
Burkinabe Foreign Minister Yipene Djibril Bassolet said that Gaddafi could go into exile in his country even though it is a signatory of the ICC treaty.
Gaddafi has said he is ready to fight to the death on Libyan soil, although there have been a number of reports that he might seek refuge in one of the African nations on whom he once lavished some of Libya's oil wealth.
His spokesman Ibrahim said: "We will prevail in this struggle until victory ... We are still strong, and we can turn the tables over against those traitors and NATO allies."
BESIEGED TOWN
Last week, a senior NTC military commander said he believed Gaddafi was in Bani Walid, 150 km south of Tripoli, along with Saif al-Islam. Libyan forces have massed outside the town -- that has refused to surrender -- building a field hospital in preparation for a possible last stand.
Some NTC officials said they had information that Saif al-Islam had fled Bani Walid on Saturday for the southern deserts that lead to the Niger and Algerian borders.
On-off talks involving tribal elders from Bani Walid and a fog of contradictory messages in recent days, have reflected the complexities of dismantling the remnants of Gaddafi's rule and building a new political system.
At a military checkpoint some 60 km (40 miles) north of the town on the road to the capital, Abdallah Kanshil, who is running talks for the interim government, told journalists a peaceful handover was coming soon. Nevertheless, a dozen vehicles carrying NTC fighters arrived at the checkpoint.
"The surrender of the city is imminent," he said on Monday. "It is a matter of avoiding civilian casualties. Some snipers have surrendered their weapons ... Our forces are ready."
Similar statements have been made for days, however. With communications cut, there was no word from inside Bani Walid.
But 20 km closer to the town, NTC forces built a field hospital and installed 10 volunteer doctors to prepare for the possibility that Gaddafi loyalists would not give up.
"The presence of pro-Gaddafi forces in Bani Walid is the main problem. This is their last fight," said Mohamed Bin Dalla, one of the doctors. "If Bani Walid is resolved peacefully then other remaining conflicts will be also be resolved peacefully."
Forces loyal to the National Transitional Council are also trying to squeeze Gaddafi loyalists out of his home town of Sirte, on the coast, and a swathe of territory in the desert.
(Reporting by Mohammed Abbas and Alex Dziadosz in Tripoli, Sherine El Madany in Ras Lanuff, Emma Farge in Benghazi, Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Barry Malone and Alastair Macdonald in Tunis, Sami Aboudi, Amena Bakr and Omar Fahmy in Cairo, Abdoulaye Massalatchi and Nathalie Prevost in Agadez and Richard Valdmanis in Dakar; Writing by Barry Malone; Editing by Alastair Macdonald and Michael Roddy)
The Toubou and Qaddafi
Many of Chad's leaders have been Toubou, including Presidents Goukouni Oueddei, Hissène Habré and Idriss Déby.
The Toubou minority in Libya suffered persecution under the Gaddafi regime. In a report released by the UNHCR, the Society for Threatened Peoples (STP) reported "massive discrimination" against the Toubou minority, which resides in the southeastern corner of the country around the oasis town of Kufra.
- In December 2007, the Gaddafi government stripped Toubou Libyans of their citizenship, claiming that they were not Libyans, but rather Chadians.
- In addition, local authorities denied Toubou people access to education and healthcare.
- In response, an armed group called the Front for the Salvation of Toubou Libyans staged an uprising in November 2008 which lasted for five days and claimed 33 lives before being crushed by government security forces.
- Despite resistance and public condemnation, the Gaddafi regime continued its persecution of the Toubou minority in Libya.
- Beginning in November 2009, the government began a program of forced eviction and demolition of Toubou homes, rendering many Toubou homeless.
- Several dozen who protested the destruction were arrested, and families who refused to leave their homes were beaten.[2]
French Weapons Given to NTC in LIbya in AQIM Hands
Officials have cautioned that the chaos in the past weeks has allowed people to loot weapons stockpiles and that many people are making off with significant weapons, including shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
Human Rights Watch added warnings that anti-tank missiles had also been looted in the west even before he rebels conquered the area, and that Libya was virtually awash in weapons after decades of build-up by the regime.
The influx of foreign weapons in the civil war didn’t help matters either.
- French warplanes dropped weapons into Western Libya during the civil war, and already those weapons were turning up in the hands of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) fighters within a matter of days.
Friday, September 02, 2011
BeltechExport Cataloge in Qaddafi's Headquarters
Among Qaddafi's Intelligence Papers in LIbya, a Beltech Export weapons catlaogue. The Belorus Arns Dealer has exported arms to most African Countries, Monday, August 29, 2011
Saturday, August 27, 2011
Friday, August 26, 2011
Bashir Saleh is Key to Gaddafi's Africa investments, possible location in Hiding
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Who Will Control the Army in the New Libya?
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
Libya's Scud B Missils
As his regime collapsed, Qadhafi’s forces fired a Scud-B missile at the advancing rebels. This was same type of missile that Qadhafi agreed to eliminate as part of his renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.
Obviously, that didn’t happen. So, how did Qadhafi’s Scud force outlast Qadhafi himself? That’s an interesting story,
Initially, Qadhafi only pledged to “modify” Libya’s Scud-B missiles to comply with the MTCR. According to an April 2004 article by Judy Miller, Libya “had decided to convert the missiles so that their range was less than 185 miles with a payload of less than 1,100 pounds.” Libyan and US officials, according to Miller, were discussing a monitoring arrangement to ensure that the conversion was “irreversible.” If that sounds odd to you, it certainly sounded odd to Paul Kerr who got a US official to admit that “the United States is ‘not sure’ the plan is feasible.” (Apparently, the Libyans considered reducing the fuel tanks or adding weight to the missile.)
Eventually the United States persuaded Qadhafi to just eliminate the Scud-B force. In September 2004, the US, UK and Libya signed a Trilateral “Agreement on the Disposition of Scud-B Missiles” that committed Libya to eliminate its Scud-Bs by a generous September 2009 deadline.
The US offered to take 10 Scud-B missiles off Qadhafi’s hands, according to a February 2005 Yedi’ot Aharonot article (full text in the comments), but “the Libyans seized the opportunity to demand from them to buy all the 417 missiles in their possession at the astronomic total of $834 million.” The US does, on occasion, use live Scuds in missile defense tests, but wasn’t willing to part with more than $800 million for a Scud force that was ” aging and suffers from maintenance problems.”
Once Libya agreed to eliminate, rather than modify, the Scud-B force, Libya began seeking a replacement. Qadhafi, as Alex Bollfrass reported in 2007 in Arms Control Today, eventually settled on the Russian Iskander-E. Libyan officials may have believed that the United States was obligated to help Libya procure a replacement. They appear to have been upset to learn that the United States objected to the Iskander sale, instead suggesting shorter-range Russian and Ukranian alternatives that Libya deemed unacceptable. Washington was also not enthusiastic about Libya’s bid to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, which Tripoli believed would ease future missile procurement.
It seems the United States relented on the issue of the Iskander-E after a few months, but by then the Russian price had doubled. The Libyans were incensed — or at least acted incensed — by all this and refused to eliminate the Scud-B force until a replacement was procured, preferably the Iskander-E at the original purchase price. The September 2009 deadline came a went. A pair of cables released by Wikileaks pick up the story at this point and fill in some of the details outlined by the two articles in Arms Control Today.
There are any number of interesting cables that document the broader Libyan disillusionment with the United States, including a standoff over the removal of some highly enriched uranium that Max Fisher detailed in The Atlantic.
The most detailed cable on the Scud-B issue is an account of a February 2010 meeting between General Ahmed Azwai, the head of Libya’s Scud-B destruction program, and Gene Cretz, the US Ambassador in Tripoli, entitled, “Libya Insists Ball in U.S. Court on Scud B Alternative.” Azwai recounts the torturous negotiations over the Scud-B missiles following the 2004 trilateral agreement, ultimately arguing somewhat melodramatically that “I will not allow 12,000 Libyan soldiers to remain unarmed and vulnerable. If I give up their weapons before I have a replacement, they will turn on me.”
Obviously, they may have had other reasons for turning on him.
A second cable adds an interesting wrinkle to this story. While the US, UK and Libya were formally haggling over the Iskander-E issue, Saif al-Qadhafi approached the US Ambassador in Tripoli in September 2009 and suggested that France might sell Libya the SCALP air-launched cruise missile. (I have discussed SCALP sales to the UAE and Saudi Arabia in a pair of previous posts.) France separately, however, told the US that selling SCALP to Libya was “too sensitive.” In the February 2010 cable, Cretz speculated that the “the proposal may have been an independent move by Saif.”
This is, as far as I can tell, basically where we were when the Arab Spring hit, Qadhafi’s grip faltered and allied aircraft started a noncooperative threat reduction program aimed at eliminating the remaining Scud-Bs. The initial launch of a Scud-B prompted speculation about an impending “blitz” of Scud missiles that never materialized.
There are any number of really interesting aspects to this story.
The most interesting aspect to me is Libya’s insistence on getting as close to the MTCR threshold as possible. It seems likely that Libya intended to reduce the amount of conventional explosive in the warhead of any replacement system, as Iraq did with the al-Husayn missile, to maintain a conventional deterrent at ranges significantly in excess of 300 km. I had forgotten that, after the 1986 US-led bombing raid on Tripoli, Libya fired two conventionally-armed Scud-B missiles at US naval facilities on the Italian island of Lampedusa. “If we had a deterrent force of missiles able to reach New York we would have directed them at that very moment,” Qadhafi explained.
I am always struck at how much value certain Middle Eastern potentates place in conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. I have never really understood the Saudi decision to purchase medium-range ballistic missiles from China because such missiles are simply too inaccurate for a conventional warhead to offer much military utility. Perhaps, however, I might feel differently about the political value of such weapons if I had, as the Saudis did, a front row seat for the War of the Cities. Saddam certainly decided that 190 kg of explosive was enough as long as it got there.
This is, in a way, the question that Brian Palmer at Slate attempted to answer in his essay “Why Do So Many Dictators Use Scud Missiles?“ Palmer’s conclusion is that a Scud is “the easiest way to terrorize nearby enemies.” It is easy to forget that the first use of ballistic and cruise missiles — the V weapons — were Nazi efforts to terrorize the British during World War II. It seems Middle Eastern leaders value being able to shoot back, if only for the sake of reprisal. Libya’s interest in SCALP — a very expensive air launched cruise missile — as a replacement for the relatively low-tech SCUD-B casts recent cruise missile purchases by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in this somewhat different light.
Perhaps there is a missile race underway in the Middle East, but we just haven’t noticed it.
Late Update | August 23, 10:33 am A colleague objected to my “assumption that the NKs had provided Scud-B” force. I don’t think I assumed that, but just to be clear I was under the impression that Libya’s Scud B purchases were a mid-1970s acquisition from the Soviet Union, while North Korea supplied the Scud C program.
Monday, August 08, 2011
AQIM with About a ton of Libyan Semtex
The safety device has been strengthened in Algiers. Bomb attacks against convoys of the army, suicide ...
For three months, there has been an upsurge in terrorist violence. Trafficking of arms from Libya are not strangers and authorities feared the worst during Ramadan. Algeria is under surveillance ...
On the eve of Ramadan, the month in which the jihadists of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) mission is to increase the coup, Abu Musab Abdelwadoud - Abdelmalek Droukdel real name - national emir of terrorist organization, confirmed that the group recovered nearly a ton of Semtex from Libya arsenals in June.
July 16, in fact, a double suicide bombing targeted the police station in Bordj Ménaïl, 60 km east of Algiers. Result: two dead, including a civilian, and a dozen injured. Nine days later, Thénia in Kabylia, an Atos - a low-end car manufacturer Hyundai South Korean popular in Algeria - is intercepted at a roadblock. On board, three suicide bombers, including Abdelqahar Benhadj (see box below).
When police ordered him to stop, the driver refused and darkens. One of the gendarmes draws and fires a single bullet. The vehicle exploded. The violence of the explosion is such that a police source estimated that the three men were carrying several hundred kilograms of explosives. Were they in Algiers to commit their crimes? "Not likely, said a police superintendent. The terrorists know they have no chance with el-fnek. "
The "Fennec", an explosive detector about the size of a remote control, with an antenna, powers all the barriers controlling access to capital. "Since we have this equipment, acquired in 2008 from a U.S. firm, or any car bomb containing explosives could not enter Algiers, said the Commissioner. This is why suicide bombers avoid the city, but it's not like they lack. "In fact, the last suicide bomber that hit the capital was in December 2007.
A jihadist drove his truck against the UN headquarters on the heights of Algiers, killing 67 people including 10 UN employees. Since then, this type of attack focuses on Kabylia, which houses the headquarters of maquis Abdelmalek Droukdel. "It is much easier to secure the capital by building barriers around the Kabylie filter with its dense road network," said a senior officer (since June, a presidential decree has placed all of the forces responsible for the fight terrorism under the command of the army). The fact remains that the safety was further strengthened in Algiers . The increased activity of AQIM is not limited to suicide attacks, the organization conducts operations knuckle-fist against the police. "Since mid-April, we lost about fifty soldiers, police and gendarmes, said the officer.
The Rest @ GrendelReport
Saturday, July 23, 2011
More on the AQIM Aquisition of Libya Weapons
The uprising of Libyan rebels against Muammar al-Gaddafi’s rule has led to some unwanted consequences: Al Qaeda-linked militants across North Africa have been benefiting from the lack of control over the Libyan Army’s hardware depots. This will present challenges to regional security for years to come.
It was a Sunday just before mid-June in the desert of Northern Niger. A convoy of three Toyota 4x4s had just entered the sleepy desert town of Ourarene, about 80 kilometres north of Arlit, a regional uranium mining centre essentially run by the French company Areva. All three vehicles, containing only one driver each, came to a stop in the almost unbearable desert heat.

Map of the border region between Libya, Algeria and Niger - Google Earth/io magazine
Then the shooting started.
- Hidden at some distance, a patrol of Niger’s Presidential Guard opened fire at the Toyotas with heavy machine guns and automatic rifles.
- One of the vehicles immediately got hit, while the drivers grabbed their weapons and fired back.
- Soon, the men belonging to the undamaged cars jumped in, shifted into reverse gear, swerved around and made a full-throttle dash amidst the sound of rattling automatic gun fire, incoming bullets whizzing by and clouds of desert dust popping up, according to accounts assembled by French and local media, citing witnesses and security sources.
- One soldier was fatally wounded in the exchange, six others injured.
- The security forces on site quickly called for reinforcements from the regular army, the Presidential Guard and the Gendarmerie.
- Helicopters were launched from Arlit, and a small surveillance aircraft soon arrived in the airspace over Ourarene, scanning the surroundings for the two 4x4s that had escaped the initial attack.
- When soldiers approached the smoking wreck of the Toyota they had hit first, they found the driver shot dead. It did not take them long to discover hints at the identity of the dead man: He was a ‘Barbu’, or ‘bearded one’, a regional synonym for Islamists of Arab origin.
- In the back of the 4×4, the presidential guards found no less than 640 kilograms of military-grade ‘Semtex’ plastic explosives, neatly packed into 40 boxes of 16 kilograms each.
- Dozens of Czech-made detonators, several military uniforms, various documents and 90,000 US Dollars in cash were also stashed in the car. The explosives and the detonators were clearly labelled – ‘Libya’.

Semtex plastic explosives, of which more than half a ton was recently smuggled from Libya - Wikipedia/US Government
- It took the thin-stretched Nigerien authorities three more days, until 15 June, to locate the remaining two cars.
- One had been abandoned about 40 kilometres north of Agadez, with more than 80,000 inhabitants the largest city in Northern Niger.
Abta Hamaidi Mohammed, a shadowy Nigerien weapons trafficker and former government adviser, surrendered to the authorities in Agadez.
Sources close to the investigation claim that Mohammed was piloting one of the Toyotas, and that he was ‘guiding’ the convoy through the desert.
The catch in Niger’s desert in June highlights some of the unwanted fallout that the Libyan uprising has had across North Africa. Not long after Libyan rebels took up protest banners and arms in February, Western and African security experts pointed to the uneasy ramifications the situation could have. As ragtag rebel forces drove the Libyan Army out of the country’s East, ammunition depots were abandoned by their guards and left to looters.
A whole range of people took advantage of the security vacuum: Pro-Western rebels, bandits, and of course some Jihadis and their sympathisers, who have a traditionally strong support base in and around the ‘rebel capital’ Benghazi. This way, weapons ranging from heavy machine guns to anti-aircraft guns to ‘SAM-7’ portable anti-aircraft missile launchers have most likely found their way into the arsenal of ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ (AQIM).
AQIM is the new name of the Algeria-based ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat’ (GSPC, or ‘Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat’) which was re-branded as an Al Qaeda affiliate in early 2007. At the time, the GSPC had been under heavy pressure from authorities, its strength was dwindling. The move was intended to open up new sources of funding from pro-jihadi donors in the Gulf region and elsewhere, and to attract badly needed recruits.
However, the re-branding was perceived as controversial amongst the group’s leadership and their rank and file. Despite the occasional attack in its homeland Algeria and some kidnappings of Westerners across the Sahara plains, AQIM basically remained stuck with their backs to the wall. Membership was going down to merely 300 by some accounts, as the group was struggling to get their hands on explosives and was in need of cash and weapons. That was until earlier this year; the Libyan uprising has unintentionally provided the Al Qaeda-linked extremists with a new perspective, putting yet more stress on the already shaky regional security situation.
The discovery and disabling of the weapons convoy in Niger in mid-June again shows the collaboration with regional nomadic tribes that the GSPC and later AQIM have long relied on. The place where the three Toyotas were fired upon by Nigerien soldiers, Ourarene, lies deep within Touareg territory, situated well away from routes that are normally used by overland traffic. But the case also demonstrates that even such clandestine convoys are not immune from detection.
In fact, as Nigerien security officials contend, ‘human intelligence’ about the convoy was picked up well before the vehicles actually entered Niger. According to a tip-off, two Toyotas packed with explosives and other weapons passed the city of Sebah in south-west Libya in early June. Instead of heading directly south to the border with Niger, the cars first drove west into Algeria. There, the 4x4s turned left towards the Hoggar, a region characterised by a bizarre rock landscape, scarcely inhabited by Touareg nomads.
Sometime between 08 and 10 June, the two Toyotas crossed from Algeria into Niger, where they linked up with a third vehicle – most likely the one with weapons trafficker Abta Mohammed at the steering wheel. At this stage, the convoy was almost doomed. Phone calls made by the passengers were tapped and their movements tracked until the convoy was raided on 12 June in Ourarene.
Despite the counterterrorism success in June, security services in the West look upon the newly energised weapons flows in North Africa with great concern. In the past few months, similar weapons convoys have been reported heading to Mali and even into Senegal. Untold amounts of explosives have entered the black market in the region since the advent of the ‘Libyan spring’. Not least, the potential terrorist threat against civilian and other aircraft by portable air defence weapons, not just in Africa, is rising again after decades of laborious counter-proliferation efforts. Whatever the outcome of the Libyan rebellion, regional security will remain affected by the unintended consequences for years to come.
The Rest @ at I-O- Magazine
Friday, June 10, 2011
Sahel Countries Prepare for Presumed AQIM Offensive
Local Echorouk newspaper on Monday quoted a security source as saying that since last Thursday, special forces from Algeria, Mali and Niger have been conducting training in a closed military zone on borders with Niger and Mali in the extreme south of Tamnaresset province, some 2,000 km south to Algiers.
The source revealed that such training are ahead of a probable joint military operation in the Sahara by the three countries, according to the recommendation of the meeting of African Sahel chiefs of staff, which urged to boost joint maneuvers.
The newspaper speculated that a large-scale joint operation is likely to be launched this summer against AQIM in the Sahara and the Sahel region, noting that the Algerian Army has set up 30 frontline checkpoints along border with Mali.
Algeria, Mali and Niger met in Bamako, the capital city of Mali, a couple of days ago to draw up a joint ground military operation to respond to the crisis in Libya and the increasingly terrorist threats in the Sahel region.
Sunday, May 29, 2011
African Union Calls for NATO To Stop Bombing Libya
At the conclusion of an extra-ordinary summit in Addis Ababa on Thursday, the political executives, according to outgoing Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa, condemned NATO members for exceeding the mandate given by UN Security Council resolution 1973.
- "The resolution authorised protection of civilians but due to indiscriminate bombing, civilians are now dying," Mr Kutesa said. "Africa takes the position that the only way we can go forward [in Libya] is to have a ceasefire, commence dialogue and an inclusive transitional mechanism emphasising necessary reforms to meet aspirations of the Libyan people."
Mr Kutesa, who accompanied President Museveni to the AU meeting, said they tasked Africa's representatives on the UN Security Council - Gabon, South Africa and Nigeria - to push for an audit of violations of resolution 1973. Mr Museveni returned from the summit on Thursday.
The summit did not say what would happen if such inquiry succeeded - and it is uncertain if their disparate position would influence the West's stand.
The unanimous AU resolutions came a day after President Obama and his host, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, announced in London on Wednesday that Col. Gaddafi must leave power before any meaningful dialogue.
Yesterday, Mr Kutesa said African leaders consider that talks that exempt the Libyan leader would not be "substantive" since Col. Gaddafi is party to the fighting.
"In our view, the talks should be without pre-conditions. Otherwise there will not be progress," he said by telephone. "Also the attempt to try to assassinate the leader of a sovereign country violates international law."
In the past three weeks, NATO bombs have fallen on Col. Gaddafi's compound and a missile that slammed into a house he was in killed one of his sons and two grandchildren, raising suspicion the West is targeting to kill him.
Amid allegations government forces were heading to annihilate residents of Benghazi, a stranglehold of the Transitional National Council, France and Britain under initial US command invoked UN Security Council resolution 1973 and in March imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and began bombing.
The allied forces report dismantling the capability of much of Col. Gaddafi's forces although experts warn of a stalemate in Libya unless Western powers deploy ground troops.
Yesterday, the leaders, aiming to keep foreign militaries out of African conflicts, agreed to fast-track the formation of the delayed AU Standby Brigade as a home-grown solution and they highlighted the need for early warning systems.
UK's The Independent reported yesterday that Libya's Prime Minister, Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, has, in a letter incorporating recommendations of the five-member AU High-Level Ad hoc Committee, asked foreign governments to support its proposals for an immediate ceasefire to be monitored by both UN and AU; unconditional talks with the opposition; amnesty for both sides in the conflict and drafting of a new Constitution.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon attended the Addis deliberations that tackled the fragile security situation in Somalia, Ivory Coast and Sudan
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
AQIM Smuggling May Increase in the Short Terms
Gaddafi worked closely with his neighbors to keep Islamists at bay. Now that he has fallen into tough times, AQIM Smuggling Routs in North Africa will be more active for the short term. Expect more arms, cash, drugs and people traffic to and from Europe in this window of opportunity.
A side note:
The Moor Next Door has consistently show deep cultural insight about Magreb over the last few years, so as soon as North Africa Lit up with the"arab Spring"I have been following closer than ever. I agree with the assessment that follows.
Increased AQIM activity in southern Tunisia is likely to be one consequence of the Libyan crisis although it will probably become more manageable in the next few months as the authorities adjust to its patterns of activity in an area with a relatively small population, generally qualified border security personnel and a largely unsympathetic host population.
-The Moor Next Door
RE: AQIM in Tunisia
A reader asked for comment on AQIM and Tunisia. At the moment only limited comment is possible given the lack of extensive public information, the difficulty in assessing the validity of confessions of individuals captured and claiming to be members of AQIM and the complexity of the group’s presence in Tunisia and Libya in light of the Libyan uprising and the NFZ there. Below are very brief thoughts attempting to integrate these problems taken form notes from the last two weeks on the Algerian position on Libya and the arrests of AQIM suspects in Tunisia. Readers with more information/knowledge on the issue are encouraged to comment and correct.
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and AQIM.
- Algeria has strongly opposed the No Fly Zone in Libya decrying it publicly with Russia as well as other African and non-Allied states. This has been clear from the start; whether or to what extent Algiers has provided the Libyan government with material, financial or other support is less clear. The Libyan rebels have accused the Algerians of actively supported the Qadhafi regime by providing areal transport for mercenaries and providing money or even personnel. Most of these reports are unsubstantiated by conclusive evidence; the rebels claim to have captured Algerian mercenaries as well as Saharawis from the POLISARIO camps in Algeria. The Algerians cite fear of terrorists exploiting the implosion of the Libyan state as their main fear resulting from the intervention in Libya (they also fear the normalization of the “responsibility to protect” norm which they view as potentially destabilizing). Algerian officials have spoken (usually anonymously) to regional and international media on how AQIM might exploit Libya’s unrest to procure Libyan armaments and transport them to Mali or elsewhere. Algerian security sources have said AQIM has acquired weapons from Libyan stocks (Strelas, Duskas,) since the conflict began, and have warned that the fall of the Qadhafi regime would lead to regional chaos and allow AQIM to extend its reach farther north. Smuggling routes into Algeria via Tunisia and Libya have very probably become more active and lucrative in recent months (higher risk, less enforcement, etc.)
- According to the Tunisian authorities men linked to AQIM arrested on 11 and 14 May carried suicide belts, grenades, AK-47s all of which came from Libya. Recent clashes between the Tunisian military and AQIM fighters at Rouhia (18 May) have lent credence to some of these fears, though the extent of AQIM’s presence in northern Libya since the beginning of the uprising and the NFZ remains unclear. AQIM previously had only a light presence in both Tunisia and Libya. Continued erosion of the Libyan state as the Libyan conflict drags on will likely lead to greater proliferation of conventional arms out of the country and into the hands of smugglers and groups like AQIM. Tunisians and Libyans have been less well represented in AQIM than other North Africans but recent arrests have included them distinctly, likely due to geography and their increased activity. It is yet determined whether these men are new recruits or “sleepers” or long active militants. As more information becomes available so will more clarity. Increased AQIM activity in southern Tunisia is likely to be one consequence of the Libyan crisis although it will probably become more manageable in the next few months as the authorities adjust to its patterns of activity in an area with a relatively small population, generally qualified border security personnel and a largely unsympathetic host population. More attacks or arrests will alarm Tunisians and increase western interest in the country’s security but Tunisia is unlikely to become a problem area as far as AQIM is concerned, particularly if the border with Libya is effectively policed. Refugee flows will complicate this and a study of the phases of migration into southern Tunisia from Libya and of the geographic origins of known Tunisian AQIM members (in comparison with recent incidents involving the group in Tunisia) would help improve analysis of AQIM’s presence in Libya
Sunday, May 15, 2011
Two AQIM Arms Smugglers Caught I Tunisia
The men were carrying Afghan identity papers and were of Libyan and Algerian origin, the source said, adding that they were also connected to two men arrested in Tunisia last week.
- Arab and Western officials have said that al Qaeda could be exploiting the Libyan conflict to acquire weapons and smuggle them into other countries.
- A senior security official in Algeria told Reuters last month there were signs al Qaeda was working to acquire arms to smuggle them to a stronghold in northern Mali.
Tunisian authorities have called on the public to report any suspect activity and warned them not to shelter any foreigners who might threaten national security.
The North African country, which is an important destination for Libyan migrants fleeing the conflict, has tightened security along its border with Libya since the start of the unrest, searching cars and questioning people trying to cross.
Wednesday, May 04, 2011
Libyan Tribes in The Context of Civil War
Libya has an estimated 140 tribes, only about 30 of which are viewed as having any real significance. They live in the three historical zones that make up Libya — regions which have only recently been grouped together as one political unit. These regions are Tripolitania, site of the capital city Tripoli on the Mediterranean coast in northwestern Libya; Cyrenaica, which touches the Mediterranean but also extends into the Sahara and serves as home to what was for a time the alternate capital of Benghazi; and Fezzan, the only region located entirely in the desert.
In an attempt to simplify an exceedingly confusing topic, we have divided Libya’s tribal groups into two overarching categories: the coastal tribes residing mostly in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and the interior tribes which mostly live in Fezzan. Not all of the “coastal” tribes live along the Mediterranean, but they do live within the rough vicinity of the Libyan core. The second category encompasses the tribes who reside solely in the desert interior.
Most people in Libya fall into the first category. The coastal strip is home to the typical Libyan — a person of mixed Arab-Berber descent (there are very few pure Berbers left, and though Bedouins in the interior take pride in their “pure” Arab blood, the amount of mixing over the years has made this very rare). There is a difference between the family trees of the Tripolitania tribes and those of the tribes in Cyrenaica dating back to the 11th century, when the Banu Hilal and Banu Salim Arabs settled in the respective regions. This division is felt to this day.
Cyrenaica is where the current uprising began in mid-February. This is a territory that Gadhafi — or any ruler of Tripolitania — has always struggled to control. In part, this is due to geography, as a vast stretch of desert and the Gulf of Sidra separate the regions. This division has reinforced their separate historical developments. Cyrenaica has long been oriented toward Egypt and the eastern Islamic world, with Tripolitania more oriented to the western Islamic world and the Maghreb. Cyrenaica was also the home region of modern Libya’s first ruler, King Idris I, who was overthrown by Gadhafi in 1969. (This is why so many towns in eastern Libya have begun flying the old flag of the Libyan monarchy in recent days.) Idris came from a line of rulers of the Sanussi order, a Sufi religious order founded in 1842 in Al Bayda, that practices a conservative and austere form of Islam. The Sanussiyah represented a political force in Cyrenaica that preceded the creation of the modern state of Libya, and whose reverberations continue to be felt to this day. It is no coincidence that this region is the home of Libyan jihadism, with groups like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). (The Gadhafi family has thus been calling the current uprising an elaborate Islamist plot, blaming nearly everything on the influence of al Qaeda, and accusing several people once imprisoned for their affiliations with LIFG of having established Islamic emirates in various eastern towns.)
A very small percentage of the Libyan population lives in the areas populated by the second category of tribes, including all of Fezzan and a significant portion of Cyrenaica. The desert simply does not allow for a large population to develop. Much of Libya’s oil and natural gas is within this region, however, and that is what makes an understanding of the tribal dynamics there important.
The Coastal Tribes
Tripolitania
The Gadhafi Tribe
This is the tribe of the Libyan leader, who was born in a desert town about 50 miles south of Sirte. There are six Gadhafi subtribes, whose members can be found in the two largest Libyan cities, Tripoli and Benghazi, but their main stronghold is in the territory stretching from Sirte to the Fezzan district of Sabha (where Gadhafi attended secondary school).
The Gadhafi tribe is not historically a force in Libya, in part because there simply are not that many members. The Gadhafi did not play a big role in the war against the Italian occupation, for example, nor did they have any influence during the monarchy, during which they mainly worked as herders. But the Gadhafi were allowed to join the armed forces and the police during this time, which is how the young Capt. Moammar Gadhafi found himself in the position to be able to lead the coup in 1969. (He promoted himself to colonel after the revolution.) As Gadhafi hails from the air force, this tribe continues to be very influential in this branch of the armed forces, which has been involved in some of the most severe crackdowns in eastern Libya and beyond.
Like any person in charge in a tribal society, Gadhafi has long favored members of his own tribe, especially in appointing leaders in the security forces, from regional military commanders to his personal bodyguard. But since the Gadhafi tribe is not especially large, the Libyan leader has been forced to form confederations with others. The foundation of the Gadhafi power structure for the past four decades has largely rested on an alliance with the two largest tribes in the country: the Warfallah and the Magariha, neither of which hails from eastern Libya.
When Gadhafi first took power, he was heavily influenced by the ideology of then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Arab nationalism was his guiding force. This later manifested in the Jamahiriya project that Gadhafi implemented in 1977. “Jamahiriya,” a word coined by Gadhafi which describes a new system of governance he defined as the “state of the masses,” was billed as a unique brand of Arab socialism. Ostensibly, it was to do away with antiquated notions of tribalism and focus on national identity. But in reality, these power relationships never went away.
The Warfallah Tribe
The Warfallah is the largest tribe in Libya. Its members can be found living in Tripoli and Benghazi but the tribe’s stronghold is centered on the Wadi Warfallah and Bani Walid and reaches into Sirte. With an estimated 1 million members, the Warfallah tribe represents roughly one-sixth of the country’s entire population. This is the dominant tribe in Tripolitania.
The Gadhafi and Warfallah have blood ties, and have been in alliance for much of Gadhafi’s 41 years in power. There have been times when all was not well between the Gadhafi and Warfallah tribes, however. In October 1993, after 55 military officers from the Warfallah tribe were implicated in a failed coup attempt, Gadhafi ordered a wave of arrests targeting the tribe. This sparked a backlash from among the Warfallah — most notably in Bani Walid, where there was an uprising in response. This event did not cause a permanent rupture in the alliance, but it would lead to the establishment of a law in March 1997 designed to prevent this kind of tribal unrest from happening again. The so-called “code of honor,” approved by the parliament in March 1997, meant that tribes and families could be collectively punished through the withdrawal of government services should members of the tribe get involved in opposition activities.
On Feb. 20, shortly after violence exploded in eastern Libya, a group known as the Warfallah Tribal Elders released a statement in which they condemned Gadhafi, his sons, and all members of his tribe. The Warfallah Tribal Elders speak on behalf of the Warfallah confederation, which consists of six subtribes: the Matarfa, Zakarwa, Lotyyin, Fogyyin, Faladna and Mrabtin.
Other Important Tribes in Tripolitania
The Bani Walid Tribe
The Bani Walid overlap geographically with the Warfallah, and also stretch northward toward the coastal town of Misurata. After African mercenaries contracted by Gadhafi were used to violently suppress demonstrations in Misurata, the Bani Walid defected en masse from their units, and are now part of the opposition.
The Tarhuna Tribe
The Tarhuna are another large Libyan tribe, especially in the capital, where they comprise an estimated one-third of the population. As just over 1 million people reside in Tripoli, that puts the total number of Tarhuna at a minimum of 350,000, with some estimates putting membership at two or three times that (though this is likely an exaggeration). There even used to be a district in Libya called Tarhuna district, located right next to Tripoli. The Tarhuna, who are heavily integrated into the Libyan military, have also joined in the anti-Gadhafi protests.
The Zentan Tribe
The Zentan are located around the towns of Nalut and Zentan, around 100 kilometers (km), or slightly more than 60 miles, southwest of Tripoli in the Nafoosa Mountain range, next to the Tunisian border. The Zentan are known as heavy participants in the Libyan army, but they, too, have shown signs of siding with the protesters.
There have been several reports of clashes between protesters and security forces in Zentan areas since Feb. 16, with images of people burning photos of Gadhafi and burning an armored personnel carrier belonging to the Libyan military, among other demonstrations.
Cyrenaica
The Zuwaya Tribe
The Zuwaya might not be the biggest tribe in Libya, but they are still a considerable force, if only because of the geography the tribe covers. Its members are spread out all across Cyrenaica, from the areas around the oil export facilities on the Gulf of Sidra to the interior regions around the actual oil deposits, as well as the Al Kufrah oasis.
The Zuwaya, along with the Warfallah, are one of the major tribes that have been the most vocal in their denunciations of Gadhafi since the crisis began. Zuwaya tribal leader Shaykh Faraj al-Zuway said in a Feb. 20 interview with Al Jazeera that the Zuwaya would halt oil exports if the army did not stop shooting at demonstrators. Faraj insisted that his words were to be taken as “a warning from the Zuwaya tribe,” and gave a 24-hour ultimatum for Gadhafi to order the military to cease in the use of force to suppress the revolt. There are no signs that the Zuwaya have carried out their threat, however.
The Zuwaya reportedly control the Sarir, Messla and Aquila oil fields. And though Libya’s oil production has been significantly affected by the overall environment of unrest in the country, this appears to be because the foreign companies and local technicians needed to operate the fields and export facilities have either evacuated or are no longer showing up for work. The Zuwaya, rather than attacking oil facilities, appear to be protecting them.
A WikiLeaks cable from 2008 stated that the Zuwaya are a heavily armed tribe, though these weapons are restricted to hunting rifles and other automatic rifles given to them by the Libyan government during the war with Chad over the Ouzou Strip in the 1980s. Their presence in the Toubou tribe’s traditional heartland, namely the oasis town of Jaloo, has caused tension between the two tribes, at times breaking out into clashes that the Libyan army is forced to suppress.
Other important tribes in Cyrenaica
The Misurata Tribe
The Misurata tribe is said by some to be the largest tribe in eastern Libya, though there are no concrete numbers to prove this. The tribe took its name from an area in northwestern Libya — the town called Misurata — where they used to live in great numbers before a wave of emigration after World War II. The town of Misurata is due west across the Gulf of Sidra from the Misurata stronghold in Cyrenaica. Today, the Misurata live mainly in the cities of Benghazi and Darnah.
The al-Awaqir Tribe
This tribe is most prevalent in Al Bayda, the city in which the Sanussi order was established and where the current uprising began in mid-February. When Gadhafi’s son Seif al-Islam made reference to those who had established the “Islamic Emirate of Al Bayda” in his Feb. 20 speech on Libyan state television, it is quite possible that he was referring to members of this tribe. The al-Awaqir are known for the prominent role they played in the war against Ottoman and Italian colonialism, and historically have played a prominent role in Libyan politics, both during the monarchy and during the Gadhafi era.
The Obeidat Tribe
The Obeidat are centered in the far northeastern military garrison town of Tobruk. Two top officials in the regime that come from this tribe have made very public defections in recent days: Maj. Gen. Suleiman Mahmud (whose full name is Suleiman Mahmud al-Obeidi), commander of the Tobruk military region, and Maj. Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis (whose full name also includes “al-Obeidi” at the end), the former interior minister. The latter announced his defection on Al Arabiya television Feb. 23. Mahmud, meanwhile, insisted after his defection that the tribes are not as fractious as Gadhafi claims, disputing the notion that Gadhafi’s removal would lead to chaos.
Fezzan
The Magariha
(The Magariha technically are not a coastal tribe, but since Gadhafi took power members of the tribe have come to play an integral role in the affairs of the Libyan core. Thus, we are grouping them into this category.)
The Magariha tribe is the second-largest in Libya. In addition to the Warfallah, it is the tribe that Gadhafi has consistently sought to keep in alliance throughout his time in power. The Magariha are the dominant tribe in Fezzan, though many Magariha live in Tripoli and other large cities on the coast, as is the case for almost all of the Arab-Berber tribes in Libya.
The most powerful member of the Magariha tribe is Col. Abdullah al-Sanussi, the head of the Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO), which includes both the Internal Security Organization and the External Security Organization, an organization which employed Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, better known as the Lockerbie bomber (Megrahi’s surname is a clear indication of the fact that he hails from the Magariha tribe). Al-Sanussi is married to a sister of Gadhafi’s second wife, Safia Farkash, and is famous for directing the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre in which more than 100 Islamist prisoners were executed. This incident has been often cited by the eastern opposition as a core grievance that has led to the current uprising.
Al-Sanussi remains loyal to Gadhafi, and was explicitly accused by Bani Walid tribal leaders of directing the crackdown on Misurata. Likewise, protesters in the northwestern city of Zawiya on Feb. 24 told reporters that a Gadhafi aide named Abdullah Megrahi (whose tribe is revealed by his surname) had come to the town Feb. 23 to deliver a warning: End the resistance, or “there will be a massacre.” One day later, Libyan military units allegedly used anti-aircraft missiles and automatic weapons to attack a mosque in Zawiya that contained protesters.
There are prominent Magarihas, however, who are said to have joined forces with the opposition. The most famous of this group is Abdel Salam Jalloud, al-Sanussi’s cousin and a former classmate of Gadhafi’s at Sabha. He is also one of the 12 members of the Revolutionary Command Council that carried out the 1969 coup. He served as prime minister for five years in the 1970s, and was once regarded as the second most powerful man in Libya. But after the failed 1993 coup, Jalloud fell out of favor with Gadhafi due to suspicions of his involvement. He was officially pushed out of the Jamahiriya leadership in 1995.
Jalloud has retained influence with the Magariha tribe, however, and a source included him as part of a rumored plot by several current or former military officers to overthrow Gadhafi. A separate source also reporting on this rumored plot indicated that another Magariha long known to be a member of Gadhafi’s inner circle, Brig. Gen. Al-Mahdi al-Arabi Abdel Hafiz, had been chosen to lead the revolt. If there are indeed such plans, they have yet to be implemented.
The stance of the Magariha as a tribal unit is unclear. While Al Jazeera reported Feb. 21 that the entire Magariha tribe had renounced Gadhafi, there are clearly certain elements that are not of this persuasion, and the exact extent of the divide is unknown. Certainly there are elements of the Magariha that have joined the opposition camp, but it does not appear to have been a clean break just yet. Gadhafi’s fate could hinge on this tribe’s decision.
Interior Tribes
Fezzan
The Tuaregs
As Fezzan is largely unpopulated, the tribal dynamics that affect only Fezzan and do not play out in the coastal areas are largely unimportant in terms of determining the outcome of the current conflict in Libya. The Tuaregs, however, matter because of their ability to attack oil and natural gas infrastructure deep in the Libyan desert.
The Tuaregs are a nomadic people who roam around the Sahara and Sahel regions. A Berber people, the Tuaregs have a much different culture and history (not to mention language and appearance) from the Arabic peoples along Libya’s coastal regions, as well as the “pure” Arab Bedouins who live in other parts of the Libyan desert. They live in small groups mainly in the southwestern part of the country, concentrated primarily around the Ghadamis and Ghat oases.
The Tuaregs have joined the calls of the Warfallah, Zuwaya and other tribes in demanding that Gadhafi step down, clashing with security forces in the towns of Ghat and Ubary on Feb. 20. Tuaregs live near the Waha natural gas deposits on the Algerian border, as well as in the vicinity of the large Elephant oil field owned in part by the partially state-owned Italian oil firm ENI and Libya’s state-owned National Oil Corporation. Indeed, Tuaregs reportedly took over the headquarters of an oil company in Ubari on Feb. 22, though details are scarce on what exactly transpired.
Cyrenaica
The Toubou Tribe
Like the Tuaregs, the Toubou tribe is not a substantial factor in the conflict under way within the Libyan core. The Toubou are the most distinct tribe in Libya simply because of their skin color: they more closely resemble sub-Saharan Africans than their countrymen to the north. (Indeed, when reports first emerged about African mercenaries employed by Gadhafi to suppress the uprising, there was some confusion as to whether they might have been Toubou elements of the Libyan military mistaken for foreigners.) Toubou, like the Tuaregs, live in small groups in harsh desert conditions, albeit on the other side of the country, in southeastern Libya near the Tibesti Mountains along the Chadian border and in the vicinity of the Al Kufrah Oasis.
Also like the Tuaregs, the main threat posed by the Toubou is to oil infrastructure. A rebel group called the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya threatened in 2008 to sabotage the Sarir oil field, located almost 400 kilometers from Al Kufrah.
The Toubou have shown allegiance to Gadhafi in the past, but this was based on money more than anything else. Their loyalty to anyone as far away as Tripoli is not going to be permanent. Indeed, the Toubou tribe reportedly denounced Gadhafi as well on Feb. 20.
The Tribes in Context
Eastern Libya is no longer under the control of the government in Tripoli, which is relatively normal in the history of this part of North Africa. The tribes of the east — who view themselves as descendants of the Sanussi order and, before that, the Arab Banu Salim who populated this region — have for the moment re-created the old region of Cyrenaica, which has not formally existed since before the days of the monarchy.
Across the Gulf of Sidra, in the capital of Tripoli, Gadhafi is holding on for the moment, and the portion of the armed forces still loyal to him are trying to push back against protesters fighting for control of cities in Tripolitania. Having lost the support of the largest tribe, the Warfallah, as well as all of the tribes of the east, Gadhafi is now relying primarily on members of his own tribe, individuals who feel more loyalty to the regime than to their own tribesmen who have revolted, and an unknown segment of Libya’s second largest tribe, the Magariha.
Tuaregs and Toubou in the Libyan desert continue to pose a threat to the country’s oil and gas production, but have not shown any serious inclination that they seek to shut down production at this time. Their activities are not of any pressing concern to Gadhafi, who for the moment is entirely focused on staying in power. To do that, he must ensure that the tribes loyal to him continue to stay loyal and hope that the use of force will help him to overcome the widespread opposition to his rule. Source: Stratfor
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