Statement from Abu Mansoor al-Amriki

What follows is most of a staetment from Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, alegedly a former US Special Forces trainer who went to Bosnia to fight, the fought and trained in Caucases, now Somalia.

He is now a Commander with the Shabaab in Somalia. He recently made a video recruiting American Muslims, and may have been involved in recruiting American Somalia Immigrant Parents to send their children, the Minnesotta Mujahadeen to Somalia, some of which ended up as suicide bombers.

What it reveals

• His believes are classic Sunni Salfist of the Qutbist vareity, cut from the same cloth as Ossamah Ben ladin, who who clearly holds in High Regard.
• His description of the differences between the Islamic Courts Union and the Shabaab is one of a first hand witness, and is therefore useful.
• He demonstrates that the Islamist's objectives will never be comfortable with any National identity for very long. That The Umma belong to the Calipha.
• He, along with other islamist true Mujahadeen, believe their lives have been and will be of the higest service to Allah, a distant and exacting God whom they love.
• He illustrates to western readers an example of the Mujadeens devotion. They will be armed Mujahadeen fighting Jihad whether on the battle field, working in western jobs, until they are in prison or dead. Then, they believe that will have earned paradise, to the best of theri ability.
• This is his life; he will choose no other.

It is saddnes to me that one of such devotion is based on a near-miss of his aim to reconcile with God. He seems destined for experiencing and creating tragedy and destruction, only to find that this his Aqidah is fraud, and that Paradise does not await him.

-Shimron

Abu Mansoor al-Amriki

I saw it very important in these recent days to clarify some facts that might be unknown to many. In specific I am referring to that which relates to the Islaamic Courts and the Shabaab.

It is well-know amongst the practicing Muslims of Somalia that these two groups have a long history and they are not from the new groups that have come on the scene. Rather, the founding officers of the Shabaab go back to the fall of Siad Barre and the first battles with the Americans.

However, more important than establishing their presence from a long time is establishing the large and essential difference between the two groups from the very beginning.

• While the Courts used to judge over each individual tribe, the Shabaab were made up of many different tribes and they used to cooperate with the Muhaajireen from the outside.
• Also, while the Courts had a goal limited to the boundaries placed by the Taaghoot, the Shabaab had a global goal including the establishment of the Islaamic Khilaafah in all parts of the world.

This difference did not go away in the days of victory nor has it gone away even up until today. But rather it has grown larger and clearer to everyone; including the stupid Kuffaar.

As for the days of victory, then it is known that the picture presented to the world was the “moderate” picture of the Courts (as they describe them) and they strived in that period to control the financial sources, the direction of the Jihaad, and the foreign affairs.

Despite these facts even the Kuffaar could see something else behind the scenes.

• They publicized that there is an “extremist” group (according to their description) lurking within the government of the Courts. They were right on about most of this except for mistakenly believing that the leader of this extremist group was Hasan Thaahir Uways.
• Therefore, more deservingly, the Shabaab also knew about this reality and they used to encounter many difficulties because of the policies of the Courts.
• Similar to them were the Muhaahijreen who were welcomed at the airport by the Islaamic Courts with terrible statements like: “We don’t need the Muhaajireen,” and they tried to send them back; if it were not for a few of the Shabaab (like Shaykh Fu’aad and Abu Talhah as-Sudaani) who saved many of these Muhaajireen at the airport and tended to their affairs.
• The situation remained like this until the defeat befell and some of the best of the Shabaab became shuhadaa’.

So due to that, many of these realities became hidden to the new fighters who had witnessed the unity in the early days (which was for the purpose of combining the strength of each group, to avoid fitnah in accordance with (Cooperate upon righteousness and piety and do not cooperate upon sin and transgression)), and in order to judge by what Allaah revealed, as all groups claimed to want)

but they did not witness the hidden reality that was lived by those who preceded them on this path.

Therefore, this matter was in need of clarification, without a doubt, but we did not realize the seriousness of this need until after the conferences in Asmara.

These conferences invoked doubt within us for several reasons:

The first : is that Eritrea has not ceased opposing the Mujaahideen in their land. So how could they want to help the Mujaahideen in the neighboring lands? There is no doubt that they are not looking out for what is in our best interest or what is in the best interests of the Jihaad.

The second : is that Eritrea rooted out the Mujaahideen in their land due to a very despicable trick on behalf of the Sudanese government. Namely, they opened the door of politics in order for them to forget armed resistance which is the true solution to the problems of the Ummah today.

So here we have the members of the Courts in the lands of the Kuffaar, underneath their control, sitting in the road of politics which leads to the loss and defeat they were running from.

The third : is that they chose a nationalistic look for these conferences. The very name of their party indicates that this issue is strictly Somali, leaving no room for interference from foreigners (as they call the Muhaajireen) unless the interference comes from John, or Tom, or George! In that case such interference is allowed!

• So, while they deny the presence of Muhaajireen in Somalia (despite the fact that I was seen on al-Jazeerah in a Somali training camp under the name of the Courts before realizing that the Manhaj had become extremely distorted)
• and while they say that they are not in any need of foreigners, their actions indicate that they ARE in need of the apostates from ‘Abdullaah Yusuf’s parliament and the original Kuffaar of Eritrea. Subhaan Allaah! How have the scales of allegiance and enmity been flipped!

The fourth : is that they tried to steal the efforts of the Shabaab by claiming that they are in control of the direction of the Jihaad and the events taking place on the ground from their hotels.All of these affairs would have lead- if not for the proclamation of innocence from these conferences on behalf of the Shabaab- to many problems:

• The first is a lack of clarity of the issue for the Muslims on the outside (even for those on the inside as we have seen from some of the fighters) who might aid us with self, wealth, or supplication.
• The second is a lack of a clear example to guide the Mujaahideen in the future. We see that despite the fact that the Ikhwaan had a good example in Sayyid Qutub and al-Mawdoodi –who both refused to accept entering into the kaafir governments as a solution- it seems that there is no other solution for the problems of the Ummah, according to those who ascribe themselves to the Ikhwaan today, except for the ballot box!

So how would it have been if their beginning was characterized by their exemplary figure compromising his principles and having an unclear manhaj?

• The third is that this matter will be unclear to the populace after coming to power. If the Shabaab differ with the Courts after obtaining victory, the people will see the Shabaab like the Khawaarij, or Jamaa’ah at-Takfeer, or benefit seekers (similar to how they said that the Courts are just one tribe and they didn’t really want to establish Shari’ah in the days of victory). This will lead to many tribulations and a loss of previous gains.
• The fourth is a lack of ability to control the direction of the Jihaad because the wealth and media is in their hands.

Therefore, due to this huge danger the Shabaab- may Allaah reward them- announced that they are free of these conferences.

• At the same time the Muhaajireen (who came to Somalia after the capture of Mogadishu in stages) also felt the need to do this. In due course the Muhaajireen wrote a word of advice to some of those in charge of the Courts regarding these matters.
• Then, after learning that they will continue upon this dangerous path, the Muhaajireen declared their innocence from the Courts alongside their brothers from the Shabaab.

Here now is their announcement that they are free of the deviant leadership of the Courts before all of the Muslims.

This is in regards to what we have seen of the Courts. As for the Manhaj of the Shabaab then we see that they are focused upon the pure manhaj which is adopted by the Mujaahideen in the rest of the blessed lands of Jihaad.

It is the same manhaj repeatedly heard from the mouth of the mujaahid shaykh Usaamah bin Laden. It is the same manhaj heard in the addresses of the lion, the genius, the doctor Ayman ath-Thawaahiri and the one heard in the advices of the shaheed (in shaa’ Allaah), the hero, Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqaawi .The list of the heroes of this time goes on.

We stress here that we are striving to establish the Islaamic Khilaafah from East to West after removing the occupier and killing the apostates.

We will do this while holding on to the Book and the Sunnah, upon the manhaj of the salaf, with the mus-haf in one hand and the sword in the other, beneath the black banner.

We do not care about the blame of the blamers or the threats of scarce provision and we do not need doubtful finances....

...Here is an important point that must be made. Indeed this point is that it is befitting to cooperate with any group from the Muslims (as long as they are truly Muslims) whether the group is the Courts or otherwise.

This must, of course, be in accordance with the guidelines of the correct manhaj.

Finally, before closing this address of mine I would like to mention that there has not ceased to be sincere people amongst the Islaamic Courts. I see them to be sincere, but Allaah is the One who will truly bring them to account.

Therefore, these words do not mean that all of them want to destroy the religion and betray the Somali Jihaad.

However, sometimes unmindful people require a harsh reminder to wake them from their deep sleep......

Abu Mansoor al-Amriki

The Rest @ Prisoner of Joy

AQIM MOves into a ombing Offensive

August 20th 2008
COUNTRY BRIEFING

FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Some 60 people have been killed in a series of car bomb explosions over two days in a region to the south-east of Algiers, marking a major escalation in the activity of Islamist underground groups that have acquired new purpose since affiliating with al-Qaida in 2006. The upsurge in violence appears to reflect the concern of al-Qaida's leadership to open up new fronts in the Middle East and North Africa after the serious setbacks that the movement has suffered in Iraq. Some Algerian commentators have also blamed the escalation on the government's reconciliation policy, thereby raising questions over whether the president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, should be allowed to stay on for a third term.

The heaviest casualties from the latest attacks occurred when a suicide bomber exploded his vehicle outside a gendarmerie training college in Issers on August 19th where a large number of prospective new recruits were waiting for the gates to open. The government said that 43 people were killed and 45 injured. The next day there were two car bomb explosions in the nearby town of Bouira. The first, outside a military building, left four soldiers lightly wounded, according to the official Algerian Press Service. The second exploded outside a hotel, and killed 11 people. It was reported that the hotel was being used to house contractors working on the nearby Koudiet Acerdoune dam project. Companies from Canada, Turkey and Italy have been involved in this project, but it was not immediately clear whether any foreign nationals were among the casualties.

Summer offensive

In the first half of 2008 there was a lull in attacks by Islamist groups as the security forces stepped up their operations following the mid-December bombing of the UN headquarters in Algiers, which, together with another attack in the capital on the same day, left 41 people dead. However, there has been a marked increase in attacks in recent weeks. On August 3rd a police station in Tizi Ouzou, the capital of the Kabylia region, was damaged in a suicide bomb attack, leaving 25 people injured; six days later eight people—all civilians—were killed in an attack on a police station in Zemmouri al-Bahri, a seaside town to the east of Algiers; and the following day three policemen were killed in a bomb attack on the nearby beach of Tigzirt. On August 15th an army patrol was ambushed near Skikda, in the northeastern corner of Algeria and several soldiers, including one senior officer, were reported to have been killed.

All of these attacks are presumed to be the work of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the new incarnation of the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC). Prior to the proclamation of AQIM by Abdelmalek Droukdal, the former leader of the GSPC, with the blessing of Ayman al-Zawahri, al-Qaida's number two, Algeria's armed Islamist forces appeared to be close to extinction.

The bulk of these forces had been neutralised as a result of a truce with the army that went into effect in 1999, at the start of Mr Bouteflika's first term. Mr Bouteflika sought to persuade the remaining militants to lay down their arms in response to his Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which was approved in 2005, and which offered an amnesty for fighters as well as exempting members of the security services from prosecution. A hard core of the GSPC rejected the charter, and there is some evidence that the ranks of the movement may even have been swelled as a result of the government's release of more than 2,000 former militants as part of the Charter's provisions.

Mr Droukdal has presented the mission of AQIM as being to contribute to al-Qaida's global campaign by attacking Western interests in Algeria. These interests are clearly taken to include the Algerian security forces.

In denial

Mr Bouteflika has largely refrained from commenting on the increase in Islamist violence since AQIM's emergence, and has left it to his interior minister, Yazid Zerhouni, to present the government's view. Mr Zerhouni has consistently sought to downplay the significance of AQIM attacks, and has claimed on several occasions over the past two years that the group's resort to suicide bombings was a sign of desperation. Following the Issers attack, Mr Zerhouni was quoted as saying that AQIM was riven with divisions and rivalries, and that the recent incidents were a sign of rival factions trying to outbid each other.

Mr Bouteflika's concern to downplay the Islamist terrorist threat could reflect his sensitivity on the subject of his reconciliation initiative. The Charter has manifestly failed to deliver peace and security, and it could even be blamed for exacerbating the violence by fostering a permissive attitude towards past crimes.

Mr Bouteflika also recently vented his frustration at the relatively poor performance of the Algerian economy during his time in office, pinning part of the blame for this on foreign investors, whom he accused of profiteering at Algeria's expense. It has long been assumed that Mr Bouteflika would push through the necessary changes to the constitution to enable him to stand for a third term in April 2009. However, with security deteriorating and the economy failing to perform to its potential, the record of Mr Bouteflika's first two terms is looking steadily less impressive, and there are some indications that powerful figures in the military and political establishment are looking for an alternative—preferably someone who will take a more resolute line on AQIM.

The Economist Intelligence Unit

Source: ViewsWire