Flintlock Underway in Mali

STUTTGART, Germany — A two-week joint military exercise intended to help prepare for future peacekeeping and humanitarian missions will start Monday in Mali, according to U.S. Africa Command.

The exercise, dubbed Flintlock, is the latest in a series of exercises conducted between Malian and U.S. military forces and partner nations throughout Africa.

The focus of the mission is to strengthen military and regional relationships, according to AFRICOM.

While in Mali, Malian and U.S. military personnel will conduct

• Medical Civic Action Programs
• Veterinary Civic Action Programs aimed at providing services to rural communities in Mali.
• American military aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules and the CV-22 Osprey also will be involved in the exercise.

Flintlock, which runs until Nov. 20, is an ongoing series of military exercises conducted under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program and involves the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development and the Defense Department.

The Rest @ Stars and Stripes

Nuriye Ali Farah Assinated by al Shabaab

Islamist groups waging war in Somalia against the country's feeble, foreign-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have been riled by a new fatwa issued earlier this month by self-appointed Somali clerics.

A spokesman for the clerics, Sheikh Nur Barud Gurhan, told an October 27 telephone press conference that the clerics issued a six-point fatwa regarding the internal dispute among Islamic Courts Union (ICU) leaders, who are divided over the Djibouti Agreement.

The group of clerics, including well-known religious authorities of Somali and Oromo ethnicity, decided to hold the meeting and issue the fatwa due to "the colonization of Somalia, the massacre of our people and destruction of our religion and country," Sheikh Gurhan said.

The Rest @ Rantburg

• Point one of the issued fatwa declares that "it is a duty for the jihad to continue until all enemy soldiers leave the country."
• A key clause calls for an emergency gathering of ICU executive and legislative officials, inside and outside the country, to be held within one month.
• "The signing of agreements must be stopped until after the dispute is resolved," said Sheikh Gurhan, while reading the document.
• The clerics' fatwa prohibited the exchange of conflicting statements over the media that "divide up the fighters and the public," while warning fighters against acts that cause more harm than good.
• Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the ICU's executive head, signed the peace agreement with the TFG on October 26, which calls for a ceasefire effective November 5 and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops within 120 days.
• But Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, chairman of the Shura (legislative) council, rejected the peace pact and urged guerrillas to continue the anti-Ethiopia insurgency.
• The two men helped form the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Eritrea in 2007, which included exiled Islamist leaders, ex-lawmakers and Diaspora activists.
• However, after the signing of the Djibouti Agreement, the ARS split into two rival wings, with a Djibouti-based faction led by Sheikh Sharif and an Eritrea-based faction led by the hardliner, Sheikh Aweys.

A spokesman for the ARS-Djibouti faction, Dahir Gelle, dismissed the clerics' fatwa in early comments to the media as "servicing the interests of Hassan Dahir [Aweys]." However, unconfirmed reports told Garowe Online that Sheikh Sharif might be reconsidering the clerics' call for an ICU general conference.

Key Islamist figures associated with the ARS-Eritrea faction have publicly denounced the clerics' fatwa. Sheikh Omar Iman, who was recently crowned ARS chairman by the Eritrea-based faction, said he welcomes the new title while condemning the Djibouti-based peace process as "being organized by Ethiopia and the U.S."

"The jihad will continue and no one can stop it as long as the enemy is in the country," Sheikh Omar said from Eritrea, where he lives in exile with Sheikh Aweys.

On the clerics' fatwa, Sheikh Omar Iman rejected calls for an ICU emergency gathering while dismissing notions that the Islamic clerics take control of the war until the dispute is resolved.

• Another figure, ex-warlord Yusuf Indha Ade, rejected the fatwa and accused the clerics of supporting the Djibouti-based ARS faction. Indha Ade, who was a notorious warlord in the early 2000s before joining the ICU as defense chief, is closely associated with the Eritrea-based faction.

Sheikh Dahir Addow, the ICU chief in Middle Shabelle region, returned to the provincial capital Jowhar on Thursday after attending the peace talks in Djibouti.

• Local reports said Sheikh Addow traveled by land through Hiran region, where he held meetings with ICU officials.
• Also Thursday, the ICU administrator in Hiran region, Sheikh Abdirahman Ibrahim Ma'ow, told a press conference in the regional capital Beletwein that all groups should support the clerics' decision. He held the press conference to respond to Abukar Mohamed, a top ICU military commander based in Hiran, who rejected the Djibouti Agreement and dismissed the ceasefire. "His [Abukar Mohamed] comments do not speak for the ICU administration in Hiran region," Sheikh Ma'ow said

• More divisions became evident when one of ex-warlord Indha Ade's top lieutenants, Nuriye Ali Farah, was assassinated in Lower Shabelle region.
• Indha Ade's supporters immediately blamed al Shabaab, with unconfirmed reports saying three al Shabaab members were killed in retaliation.

Richard Chichakli and Viktor Bout - From Richard's Own Web Site:

What follows is a direct quote from Richard Chichakli's web site. He is, or has been, by his own testimony, a close associate of Viktor Bout.

I will not challenge Richard's assertions in this post, but suffice it to say that:

• I believe Richard, as far as his testimony goes, that is to say that at least the relationship he says exists or existed, perhaps more
• His statement provides a plethora of information about Viktor Bouts operations.

I will provide the quote in its entirety, then will add coments:

-Shimron Issachar

...."Richard and Victor had professional relation on three encounters as follows:

Richard Chichakli first introduction to Victor Bout took place about 14 years ago, in August of 1995, in the state of Sharjah, one of the seven states in the United Arab Emirates. At that point of time Richard was an employee of the government of Sharjah, serving as the commercial manager of Sharjah Airport International Free Zone and Victor Bout was one of the hundreds of investors who were interested in setting up a business in that free zone.

Similar to meeting all potential customers, Richard, in his capacity as the commercial manager of the free zone met Victor and his accompanied party and received from him a copy of the business plan for the company he wanted to create in the free zone and which was an airline by the name of Aircess.

The standard plan included the usual financial details, projections, and all other related information, and Richard's duty was to assess the feasibility of the proposed business venture in meeting the objectives of the free zone. This is where and when Richard acquired the knowledge he possesses about Aircess.

Companies operating in the free zone were further required submitting periodic reports regarding their activities, and therefore updated information about Aircess was periodically available to Richard until July of 1996, when his contract ended and he returned with his family to the United States.

As the employment relation between Sharjah Free Zone and Richard ended, so were the relations between the companies operating in the free zone and Richard Chichakli.

Shortly after returning to the US from UAE in July 1996, Richard started a management consulting company while working toward receiving licensing to open a public accounting practice in the state of Texas.

About the second quarter of 1998, Victor who had moved from UAE to South Africa called Richard in Texas asking for his professional help in assessing the ability of Aircess to go public.

As a management consultant in finance and aviation, Richard accepted the job and quoted Mr. Bout a fee for the service, upon which acceptance Richard travelled to South Africa to assess the ability of Mr. Bout’s company to go public.

The job lasted for about 10 working days. In the course of doing the assessment, Richard was exposed to all details related to the structure and finance of Aircess and its related entities, and developed an understanding of the company’s operations.

In conclusion, Richard informed Mr. Bout that in his opinion the company cannot successfully initiate an initial public offering, an opinion that was equally shared by Aircess lawyers and public accountants in South Africa. That was the second encounter between Richard Chichakli and Victor Bout, and during that time there were no sanctions against Victor Bout and no reasons whatsoever not to accept the assignment.

The third encounter between Richard Chichakli and Victor Bout occurred about June of 2000, just upon the collapse of Victor’s business in South Africa. Victor called Richard and conveyed to him that his business was in dire financial trouble and he is not sure about what to do or where to go.

Richard advised Victor to settle and start a manufacturing business in the United States, where incentives, credit, and market are available. Victor agreed and asked Richard to start the process for business immigration for him, and so it was until Victor’s application for a US visa was rejected.

This occurrence took place in June of 2000 while Victor Bout was not under any sanctions, nor were there any publications against him or any reason to prevent transacting with him.

At the end of 2004 the United States government placed sanctions against Victor Bout, and on or after that point of time there was no business relation between Richard Chichakli and Victor Bout.

See the chronicle of events".........



...."Richard and Victor had professional relation on three encounters as follows:

Richard Chichakli first introduction to Victor Bout took place about 14 years ago, in August of 1995, in the state of Sharjah, one of the seven states in the United Arab Emirates. At that point of time Richard was an employee of the government of Sharjah, serving as the commercial manager of Sharjah Airport International Free Zone and Victor Bout was one of the hundreds of investors who were interested in setting up a business in that free zone.
Similar to meeting all potential customers, Richard, in his capacity as the commercial manager of the free zone met Victor and his accompanied party and received from him a copy of the business plan for the company he wanted to create in the free zone and which was an airline by the name of Aircess.

• As Commercial Manager o the Free zone Richard was in a position to faciliate Shipping documents and flight plans for all the cargo coming trhough the airport. While he would see these documents day to day, he was in a position to see that the paperwork was processed without question. I do not know if he did, but he was in a position to see cargos and expidite paper work.

The standard plan included the usual financial details, projections, and all other related information, and Richard's duty was to assess the feasibility of the proposed business venture in meeting the objectives of the free zone. This is where and when Richard acquired the knowledge he possesses about Aircess.

• Richard knew the business plan of Aircess, knew where the planes would be operating, and the gartet markets. Richard is a US miltiary veteran and knew what was going on in those countries.

Companies operating in the free zone were further required submitting periodic reports regarding their activities, and therefore updated information about Aircess was periodically available to Richard until July of 1996, when his contract ended and he returned with his family to the United States.

• While it is true that Viktor Bout is infamous for creating dummy reports, I find it hard to believe that He was not aware of the massive Arms being shipped through the airport.

As the employment relation between Sharjah Free Zone and Richard ended, so were the relations between the companies operating in the free zone and Richard Chichakli.

• Quite possibly true

Shortly after returning to the US from UAE in July 1996, Richard started a management consulting company while working toward receiving licensing to open a public accounting practice in the state of Texas.

• This is true, on rcpord
  

About the second quarter of 1998, Victor who had moved from UAE to South Africa called Richard in Texas asking for his professional help in assessing the ability of Aircess to go public.

• Why did Viktor Bout move to South Africa? perhaps because he no longer had a "facilitator" in UAE, and business was picking up in Africa.
• Why would Viktor trust his entire nefarious arms, drugs and diamond dealing operations to Richard?

As a management consultant in finance and aviation, Richard accepted the job and quoted Mr. Bout a fee for the service, upon which acceptance Richard travelled to South Africa to assess the ability of Mr. Bout’s company to go public.

The job lasted for about 10 working days. In the course of doing the assessment, Richard was exposed to all details related to the structure and finance of Aircess and its related entities, and developed an understanding of the company’s operations.

• He acknowledges a deeper understanding of the financail structures of the company and concluded that it could not go puclic. Typically, this is for three possible reasons:
• The Business itelf was not financially sound- this is possible, since the company was a shell through which money flowed, and was therefore itself financially unstable.
• The Business was profitable, but would not stand the scruitney of regulators that would look more closely into business operations
• The names of the keystakeholders woould not hold up to public scruitiny. For example, if Aircess has a key relationship as the primary African transit company for a hughe arms company like beltechexport in Belorus, this is a highly profitibale business relationship that makes the company alot of money. However, since neither Beltech nor Belorus wants this relationship listed in a Initial Public Offering floating around the world. it could not be listed.

In conclusion, Richard informed Mr. Bout that in his opinion the company cannot successfully initiate an initial public offering, an opinion that was equally shared by Aircess lawyers and public accountants in South Africa. That was the second encounter between Richard Chichakli and Victor Bout, and during that time there were no sanctions against Victor Bout and no reasons whatsoever not to accept the assignment.

• Therefore, Richard Chichakli would have explained to Viktor Bout that his key financail relationships could not be listed in an IPO, and recommeded that the IPO could not happen.
• In any of these situations, Richard Chichakli would have been fully ware of what was going on, that therfore complicit ( an assessroy ) in the arms trade.

The third encounter between Richard Chichakli and Victor Bout occurred about June of 2000, just upon the collapse of Victor’s business in South Africa. Victor called Richard and conveyed to him that his business was in dire financial trouble and he is not sure about what to do or where to go.

• Viktor knew he was in trouble, that his arms business in Africa waws being exposed, and that he had to close it down.
• Also, the wars he had fueled had accelerated to a point that some of Viktor's customers had become unlreliabile, unable to pay for their arms, dead or out of power.

Richard advised Victor to settle and start a manufacturing business in the United States, where incentives, credit, and market are available. Victor agreed and asked Richard to start the process for business immigration for him, and so it was until Victor’s application for a US visa was rejected.

• Viktor Bout already had a relationship with some people in the US, and they did not want him living here
• It is possible Richard was unaware of Viktor's business with the US.

This occurrence took place in June of 2000 while Victor Bout was not under any sanctions, nor were there any publications against him or any reason to prevent transacting with him.

At the end of 2004 the United States government placed sanctions against Victor Bout, and on or after that point of time there was no business relation between Richard Chichakli and Victor Bout.

• Just before this time Richard was the point man for an Italian Journalist who was trying to find and interview the infamnous arms dealer Viktor Bout, who was in hiding. Richard Chichakli alegedly arranged the interview.
• Besides the professional relationship, Ricahrd claims that Viktor's Family and his family wer close, and he called VIktor a "Friend and a Brother"

This account demonstrates that Richard Chichakli and Viktor Bout had a relationship, both personal and professional. I do not know if Richard Chichakli commited a crime, but since Richard claims to be a US Armky Veteran ( I have not Personally check this fact), and is a Certified Public Accountant, I find it unbelievable for him not to have known that Viktor Bout was selling arms to fuel African wars, paid for by illeaglly obtained diamonds mined by Child soldiers.

One of these things must be true:

• Richard Chichakli is misrepresenting what he knew
• His dear friend Viktor Bout made a fool of him

I did not contact Richard Chichkli for his comment, since I am an analyst and a commentator, and make no claims to be a journalist. However, I will print any response he cares to make.

31 Killed in Hargeisa, Somali Suicide Bombing

A wave of synchronized suicide attacks on UN, diplomatic and government institutions in northern Somalia killed up to 31 people today.

Three car bombs detonated in Hargeisa, the capital of the breakaway Somaliland region. Another two vehicles exploded in neighbouring Puntland, which, like Somaliland, has been relative peaceful compared to the rest of the country.

The careful coordination and nature of the attacks is unprecedented in Somalia and marks a serious deterioration in an already dire security situation.

Suspicion immediately fell on the radical Shabaab militia, which is part of much broader Islamist-led resistance fighting against the Somali government and occupying Ethiopian troops.

• In Hargeisa, the Ethiopian consulate suffered the greatest damage, with up to 20 people reported dead.
• An attack on the president's palace killed at three people, including the presidential secretary,
• Two workers died at the headquarters of the UN Development Programme (UNPD).
• In Bossaso, at separate interior ministry offices responsible for combating terrorism, several car bombs killed six people.

Dozens were injured in the five attacks.

"A vehicle forced its way into the compound and then exploded," said a UNPD spokesperson in Nairobi. "It appears that the driver of the car was still inside."

The suicide bombers, who were reported to have used driving four-wheel drive vehicles, struck within a few minutes of each other.

In Bossaso, Puntland's main city, explosive-laden cars detonated at separate interior ministry offices responsible for combating terrorism, killing six people. Dozens were injured in the five attacks.

"I fear that this is exactly what it looks like - the Shabaab," said a military expert on Somalia, who cannot be named because of his position. "We expected them to launch high-profile attacks, but this was extraordinary, requiring a large coordinated and concealed effort."

• Analysts believe the timing of the bombings was no accident. Regional heads of state, including Somalia's president, Abdullahi Yusuf, were meeting yesterday in Nairobi to discuss the country's future.
• Peace efforts had received a boost over the weekend when Yusuf's government and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) signed a deal in Djibouti agreeing to a ceasefire, and a phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.
• But a breakaway wing of the ARS, as well as the Shabaab, rejected the deal. They refuse to enter negotiations before the complete withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces that invaded Somalia in December 2006 to oust an Islamist authority from power.

Previously during peace negotiations the Shabaab has launched large attacks, mainly in Mogadishu, to demonstrate that they have control on the ground.
"It's clear that the Shabaab, or jihadis or whatever you want to call them, are trying to make a statement that they target any place in Somalia, not just the south," said a Western diplomat in Nairobi. "But we cannot let this undermine the Djibouti agreement, and we have to expect and accept that these sort of attacks may continue in the short term."

Previously there have only been one or two small suicide attacks in Somalia.

Yesterday, in the Islamist-controlled port city of Kismayo, a 23-year woman accused of adultery was stoned to death in public - the first such execution in two years.

The Rest @ The Guardian

The Pirate Business in Puntlad Somalia

Medeshi Oct 29, 2008

Somali pirates living the high life
By Robyn Hunter BBC News

"No information today. No comment," a Somali pirate shouts over the sound of breaking waves, before abruptly ending the satellite telephone call.

They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars; new guns
Garowe resident Abdi Farah Juha

He sounds uptight - anxious to see if a multi-million dollar ransom demand will be met.He is on board the hijacked Ukrainian vessel, MV Faina - the ship laden with 33 Russian battle tanks that has highlighted the problem of piracy off the Somali coast since it was captured almost a month ago.

But who are these modern-day pirates?According to residents in the Somali region of Puntland where most of the pirates come from, they live a lavish life. Fashionable"They have money; they have power and they are getting stronger by the day," says Abdi Farah Juha who lives in the regional capital, Garowe.

"They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars; new guns," he says."Piracy in many ways is socially acceptable. They have become fashionable."

Most of them are aged between 20 and 35 years - in it for the money. And the rewards they receive are rich in a country where almost half the population need food aid after 17 years of non-stop conflict.

Most vessels captured in the busy shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden fetch on average a ransom of $2m. This is why their hostages are well looked after.

The BBC's reporter in Puntland, Ahmed Mohamed Ali, says it also explains the tight operation the pirates run.

• They are never seen fighting because the promise of money keeps them together
• Wounded pirates are seldom seen and our reporter says he has never heard of residents along Puntland's coast finding a body washed ashore.
• Given Somalia's history of clan warfare, this is quite a feat.It probably explains why a report of a deadly shoot-out amongst the pirates onboard the MV Faina was denied by the vessel's hijackers.Pirate spokesman Sugule Ali told the BBC Somali Service at the time: "Everybody is happy. We were firing guns to celebrate Eid."

The MV Faina was initially attacked by a gang of 62 men. BBC Somalia analyst Mohamed Mohamed says such pirate gangs are usually made up of three different types:

• Ex-fishermen, who are considered the brains of the operation because they know the sea·
• Ex-militiamen, who are considered the muscle - having fought for various Somali clan warlords
• The technical experts, who are the computer geeks and know how to operate the hi-tech equipment needed to operate as a pirate - satellite phones, GPS and military hardware

The three groups share the ever-increasing illicit profits - ransoms paid in cash by the shipping companies.

A report by UK think-tank Chatham House says piracy off the coast of Somalia has cost up to $30m (£17m) in ransoms so far this year. The study also notes that the pirates are becoming more aggressive and assertive - something the initial $22m ransom demanded for MV Faina proves. The asking price has apparently since fallen to $8m.

Calling the shots

Yemen, across the Gulf of Aden, is reportedly where the pirates get most of their weapons from.

A significant amount is also bought directly from the Somali capital, Mogadishu.

• Observers say Mogadishu weapon dealers receive deposits for orders via a "hawala" company - an informal money transfer system based on honour.
• Militiamen then drive the arms north to the pirates in Puntland, where they are paid the balance on delivery.
• It has been reported in the past that wealthy businessmen in Dubai were financing the pirates.
• But the BBC's Somali Service says these days it is the businessmen asking the pirates for loans.

Such success is a great attraction for Puntland's youngsters, who have little hope of alternative careers in the war-torn country.

Once a pirate makes his fortune, he tends to take on a second and third wife - often very young women from poor nomadic clans, who are renowned for their beauty. But not everyone is smitten by Somalia's new elite.

"This piracy has a negative impact on several aspects of our life in Garowe," resident Mohamed Hassan laments.He cites an escalating lack of security because "hundreds of armed men" are coming to join the pirates.They have made life more expensive for ordinary people because they "pump huge amounts of US dollars" into the local economy which results in fluctuations in the exchange rate, he says.

Their lifestyle also makes some unhappy.

"They promote the use of drugs - chewing khat [a stimulant which keeps one alert] and smoking hashish - and alcohol," Mr Hassan says.

The trappings of success may be new, but piracy has been a problem in Somali waters for at least 10 years - when Somali fishermen began losing their livelihoods.

Their traditional fishing methods were no match for the illegal trawlers that were raiding their waters.Piracy initially started along Somalia's southern coast but began shifting north in 2007 - and as a result, the pirate gangs in the Gulf of Aden are now multi-clan operations.

But Garowe resident Abdulkadil Mohamed says, they do not see themselves as pirates."Illegal fishing is the root cause of the piracy problem," he says."They call themselves coastguards."

The Rest @ Medishi.com

World Politics Review

In this set of WPR analyses, the agenda seems to be, "let us try another framework to understand what is happening, since a global war is more than we can conceive of at this time"

Nathan Field especially proposes that al Qaeda's recruiting ability is really fed by the Poor, the Hungry, the disenfranchised and that the war on terror will not ever address these issues.

For those who keep trying this line of discussion,

Consider these three and frequently overlooked concepts when you write again:

• Understand the concept of the Da'wa of Taqiyya as it relates to al Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood
• Understand the organization of the Musim Brotherhood, their written goals and objectives
• Understand that this is a matter of faith. There are many who, when given perfect economic opportunity, perfect opportunity for enlightened engagement, when highly educated in the West seek, destruction of the west out of faith and principle.

Your sound reasoning will not prevail in such a place in time and space. The West and those that believe in such a way, are at war. Whether the West started it or not, wants it or not, or believes it or not.

-Shimron Issachar

WPR Feature: The Al-Qaida We Don't Know

The Editors 28 Oct 2008World Politics Review Exclusive

Ten years after al-Qaida declared war against the U.S., and seven years after the U.S. followed suit, much of what we know about the group is filtered through the lens of the Global War on Terror, a rubric that hides and distorts as much as it reveals. But in reducing al-Qaida to a terrorist organization, we have ignored the broader socio-cultural movement it represents.

The result has been to overlook the range of its activities on the one hand, while exaggerating its strategic outlook on the other.To formulate a sound strategic response to al-Qaida, we must first have a clear understanding of just what kind of enemy it is.

To provide a fuller picture of the group's origins and goals, its future prospects, as well as the conventional component of its activities, WPR examines the Al-Qaida We Don't Know.

In The 055 Brigade, Brian Glyn Williams of the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth and an expert witness in the military commission hearing of Salim Hamdan, discusses the little-known history of al-Qaida's conventional fighting force.

In AQIM, the North African Franchise, Joseph Kirschke examines the potential threat posed by local al-Qaida franchises, as well as the challenges they face.

In The Limits of the Counterterrorism Approach, Nathan Field examines the historical origins and socio-economic context of al-Qaida to determine its strategic outlook.

The Rest @ World Politics Review

Robow & Shabaab Refuse Peace Discussions

A spokesman for Somalia’s al Shabaab insurgent group has rejected a peace agreement signed between the country’s interim government and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).

Muktar Robow “Abu Mansur,” the al Shabaab spokesman, told local radio stations that “the Djibouti Agreement does not concern us [al Shabaab].”

While pledging to continue the insurgency, Abu Mansur said: “The Agreement is false because it cannot stop the bullets.”

He indicated that United Nations peacekeepers or African Union peacekeepers are “no different than Ethiopian troops,” while promising to “continue the jihad until the country [Somalia] is ruled by Islamic law.”

Delegations from Somalia’s interim government and the ARS are currently in Djibouti, where they have established a Joint Political Committee and a Joint Security Committee, which would oversee implementation of the UN-brokered Djibouti Agreement.

The Rest @ Methoxybenzeneboronic-acid.cn

NACIRIA, Algeria — Hiding in the caves and woodlands surrounding this hill-country town, Algerian insurgents were all but washed up a few years ago.

Their nationalist battle against the Algerian military was faltering. “We didn’t have enough weapons,” recalled a former militant lieutenant, Mourad Khettab, 34. “The people didn’t want to join. And money, we didn’t have enough money.”

Then the leader of the group, a university mathematics graduate named Abdelmalek Droukdal, sent a secret message to Iraq in the fall of 2004.

The recipient was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, and the two men on opposite ends of the Arab world engaged in what one firsthand observer describes as a corporate merger.

Today, as Islamist violence wanes in some parts of the world, the Algerian militants — renamed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb — have grown into one of the most potent Osama bin Laden affiliates, reinvigorated with fresh recruits and a zeal for Western targets.

Their gunfights with Algerian forces have evolved into suicide truck bombings of iconic sites like the United Nations offices in Algiers. They have kidnapped and killed European tourists as their reach expands throughout northern Africa.

Last month, they capped a string of attacks with an operation that evoked the horrors of Iraq:

...a pair of bombs outside a train station east of Algiers, the second one timed to hit emergency responders. A French engineer and his driver were killed by the first bomb; the second one failed to explode....

The transformation of the group from a nationalist insurgency to a force in the global jihad is a page out of Mr. bin Laden’s playbook: expanding his reach by bringing local militants under the Qaeda brand.

The Algerian group offers Al Qaeda hundreds of experienced fighters and a potential connection to militants living in Europe.

Over the past 20 months, suspects of North African origin have been arrested in Spain, France, Switzerland and Italy, although their connection to the Algerians is not always clear.

The inside story of the group, pieced together through dozens of interviews with militants and with intelligence, military and diplomatic officials, shows that the Algerians’ decision to join Al Qaeda was driven by both practical forces and the global fault line of Sept. 11, 2001.

Mr. Droukdal cited religious motivations for his group’s merger with Al Qaeda. Some militants also said that Washington’s designation of the Algerians as a terrorist organization after Sept. 11 — despite its categorization by some American government experts as a regional insurgency — had the effect of turning the group against the United States.

“If the U.S. administration sees that its war against the Muslims is legitimate, then what makes us believe that our war on its territories is not legitimate?” Mr. Droukdal said in an audiotape in response to a list of questions from The New York Times, apparently his first contact with a journalist.
“Everyone must know that we will not hesitate in targeting it whenever we can and wherever it is on this planet,” he said.

Interviews with American, European and Arab officials and a former lieutenant in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb indicate that more opportunistic factors were at play in the growth of the group.

A long-running government offensive against the Algerian insurgents had nearly crushed the group, officials said. They needed the al Qaeda imprimatur to raise money and to shed their outlaw status in radical Muslim circles as a result of their slaughtering of civilians in the 1990s.

The Iraq war also was drawing many of the group’s best fighters, according to Mr. Khettab and a militant who trained Algerians in Iraq for Mr. Zarqawi.

Embracing the global jihad was seen as a way to keep more of these men under the Algerian group’s control and recruit new members.

Then, in March 2004, a covert American military operation led to the capture of one of the group’s top deputies. A few months later, Mr. Droukdal reached out to Mr. Zarqawi to get the man released. Mr. Zarqawi seized the opportunity to convince him that Al Qaeda could revive his operations, a former top leader of the Algerian group says.

Just as the Qaeda leadership has been able to reconstitute itself in Pakistan’s ungoverned tribal areas, Al Qaeda’s North Africa offshoot is now running small training camps for militants from Morocco, Tunisia and as far away as Nigeria, according to the State Department and Mr. Droukdal. The State Department in April categorized the tribal areas and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as the two top hot spots in its annual report on global terrorism.

The threat is felt most acutely in Europe and in particular in France, which ruled Algeria for 132 years until 1962 and is a major trading partner with the authoritarian government in Algiers.

“We’re under a double threat now,” Bernard Squarcini, chief of France’s domestic and police intelligence service, said in an interview. “A group that had limited its terrorist activities to Algeria is now part of the global jihad movement.”

Last month, France signed military and nuclear development agreements with Algeria. Washington has also provided training to the Algerian military, and American companies have supplied equipment.

Even so, Western intelligence and diplomatic officials say the Algerian government has balked at making them full partners in investigating the group. Officials spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of security concerns.

In Europe, the authorities are eyeing the Algerian group warily, but are not convinced that the group can strike outside Africa.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said last week that the merger of Al Qaeda with the Algeria organization and others like it brought fresh risks.

“These groups, as best we can tell, have a fair amount of independence. They get inspiration, they get sometimes guidance, probably some training, probably some money from the Al Qaeda leadership,” he said, adding that “it’s not as centralized a movement as it was, say, in 2001. But in some ways, the fact that it has spread in the way that it has, in my view, makes it perhaps more dangerous.”

Adopting Qaeda Tactics

Last Christmas Eve, five French tourists from Lyon were picnicking in midafternoon near the town of Aleg in Mauritania, some 1,700 miles southwest of Algiers. Suddenly, they were ambushed by three men in a black Mercedes. One of the gunmen turned an AK-47 on the tourists, killing four and wounding the fifth, French investigators said.

“It was total horror,” said François Tollet, 74, a retired chemist who lost his two sons, a brother and a friend in the attack. He survived when the body of one of his sons fell on him. The gunmen fled across Senegal and Gambia before they were captured in an operation directed by French intelligence in Guinea-Bissau; agents determined that the men belonged to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. (Maghreb refers to the western edge of the Arab world.)

The attack reflected what officials and militants say are the group’s tentacles in the northern tier of Africa. Camps in Mali, for example, are being used to begin operations in Algeria and Mauritania, according to French intelligence.

Mr. Droukdal described a growing network of militants only partly controlled by his far-flung deputies — the kind of autonomous jihad cells that counterterrorism officials say are particularly hard to combat. His comments to The Times included an audio file that was verified by a private voice expert who works for federal agencies. The Times also reviewed a set of 12 photographs sent by the group to verify Mr. Droukdal’s identity.

Asked about the slayings in Mauritania, he said, “The brothers implementing the process are connected with us, and we have previously trained some of them, and we offer them adequate support for the implementation of such operations.”

The epicenter of the group remains in the hills east of Algiers, where the roads are blocked by skittish police officers who finger their rifle triggers when cars approach. “Who told you to get out of the car?” a checkpoint officer yelled at one driver, backing away as the other guards swung their weapons into the faces of the passengers.

Inside police headquarters in nearby Naciria, the commander said he was so busy battling militants that he had no time to hang photographs of three officers killed in recent suicide bombings. “These terrorists don’t know any mercy,” he said. “This is Al Qaeda, what do you think?”

Even as the group expands its ambitions beyond Algeria, parts of the country remain a bleak battleground between militants and an oppressive government that follows its citizens and limits political opposition.

The Algerian government killed or captured an estimated 1,100 militants last year — nearly double the number in 2006, according to the State Department. But the group has begun using sophisticated recruitment videos to replenish its ranks with a new generation of youth that the State Department says is “more hard-line.”

The group has also benefited from a national amnesty program. Wanted posters at police stations and checkpoints include numerous men who were pardoned and released only to join the new Qaeda franchise.

American military officials estimate that the group now has 300 to 400 fighters in the mountains east of Algiers, with another 200 supporters throughout the country. Led by Mr. Droukdal, 38, an explosives expert who joined the insurgency 12 years ago, the group has shifted to tactics “successfully employed by insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan,” according to the State Department.

In adopting these Qaeda-style tactics, it staged at least eight suicide bombings with vehicles last year, including two sets of attacks in central Algiers on the 11th of April and December, dates that now fill Algerians with dread. It dispatched the country’s first individual suicide bomber, who singled out President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria.

The group has also stepped up its use of remote-controlled roadside bombs, and there are increasingly deadly clashes with militias armed by the government to fight the militants.
“We don’t arrest them anymore,” said Mohammad Mendri, 65, the mayor of a village who leads a militia near the coastal city of Jijel. “We just kill them.”

Its list of Western targets is growing. In December 2006, militants bombed a bus carrying workers with an affiliate of Halliburton, an American oil services company.

Other attacks killed Russian and Chinese workers. North African men trained in the group’s camps shot at the Israeli Embassy in Mauritania’s capital, Nouakchott. The group is also holding two Austrian tourists whom they kidnapped in Tunisia in February.

Its most audacious attack came last December when suicide bombers struck the United Nations and court offices in Algiers, killing 41 people and injuring 170 others. The attack drew praise from Mr. bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, who compared it to the 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad by Mr. Zarqawi.

A Merger’s Rocky Start

The on-and-off relationship between Al Qaeda and the Algerian militants began more than a decade ago. In 1994, Mr. bin Laden was looking for a new base to set up operations for his fledgling group. Algeria, with its rugged terrain and proximity to Europe, was an ideal spot.
Already, some 1,500 Algerian Islamists had returned home after helping the C.I.A. force the Soviets from Afghanistan. The men helped form a coalition of militants called the Armed Islamic Group. They took up arms in the insurgency against Algeria’s military-backed government in a conflict that has left more than 100,000 dead.

Mr. bin Laden, in Sudan at the time, asked the militants to let him move to a mountainous area they controlled, according to Mr. Khettab, the former top militant leader. J. Cofer Black, who was stationed in Khartoum for the C.I.A., said he never heard this account, but found it plausible. “We knew he was looking for some place to go,” Mr. Black said.

Mr. Khettab said the militants turned down Mr. bin Laden. “We refused, and said we don’t have anything to do with anything outside,” he said. “We are interested in just Algeria.”

The West was already deeply concerned about the rise of radical Islam in Algeria. In 1991, an Islamic political party trounced Algeria’s secular government in national polling, and the Algerian military blocked the elections.

Moderate Arab states, along with Europe and Washington, feared the installation of a fundamentalist Islamic republic on the model of Iran or Sudan and backed the government.
The crisis escalated further when violence spread to Europe. In late 1994, Armed Islamic Group gunmen hijacked an Air France jet bound for Paris intending to use it as a missile before they were killed during a stop in Marseille, according to French security officials. The following summer, three Paris bombings killed eight people and injured dozens.

Algeria’s military turned to infiltrators to help defeat the group from within, according to accounts from three high-level defectors from the Algerian Army and security service. Several massacres of villagers, for which the Islamic group was blamed, were believed to have been arranged by the military.

Even Mr. bin Laden and his backers denounced civilian killings as counterproductive to their cause, and the group withered. In 1998 a faction of militants created a new organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

The new group revived the guerrilla war against the government, with minimal singling out of civilians, according to two United States Air Force officers at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who analyzed 10 years of its operations through early 2006. Their study concluded that the group “does not appear to be a ‘terrorist’ group as much as an internal insurgency against the government.”

The Bush administration took a different view of the group. On Sept. 23, 2001, President Bush included it on a list of organizations that “commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism.”
Shifting Strategies

The terrorist designation rankled Salafist group members, but there was dissent over whether to stay focused on the fight with the Algerian government. Two years later, the group’s leader, Nabil Sahraoui, issued a statement for the first time endorsing “Osama bin Laden’s jihad against the heretic America” and expressing his desire that the group join Al Qaeda. By this time, a United States Air Force general had the Algerian group in his sights.

“Africa had emerged strategically to the United States,” said Gen. Charles F. Wald, former deputy commander of the Pentagon’s European Command, which had responsibility for Africa.

“A significant amount of our energy is going to be coming from Africa in the future.”

The wide open spaces of the Sahara where arms, drugs and cigarette smugglers roam and tribal law reigns were also seen as potential jihadist havens. In March 2003, 32 European tourists were kidnapped there by one of the militant group’s top operatives.

“He was a very dynamic guy,” General Wald said of the kidnapper, Amari Saifi, who is known as El Para. “Could have played in a Hollywood movie. Handsome as hell. They’d take pictures of themselves out there posing.”

Expansion to Europe

Last December, French officials arrested eight men from Paris suburbs and seized:

• computers
• electronic material
• night-vision goggles
• global positioning equipment
• cellphones
• weapons-making machinery
• 20,000 euros, or about $30,000.
  

Investigators said they believed that the men, both French-Algerians and Algerian passport holders, were sending logistical equipment to support an attack to Algeria. Whether or not the case leads to convictions — six of the men have been released — investigators say they viewed the arrests as the first concrete link they had found between France and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known by its initials as AQIM.

The Spanish police said they made a similar discovery in June when they arrested eight Algerian-born men on suspicion of providing financial and logistical support to the Algerian group.

European investigators are examining a group of Tunisians with alleged ties to the North African Qaeda operation who are suspected of running a fund-raising and recruitment cell stretching from Paris to Milan.

So far, despite its stated intentions to strike Europe and the rest of the West, investigators say they see little evidence that the North Africa branch of Al Qaeda is exporting fighters and equipment for an attack in Europe.

“Their ambition is to attack in Europe, but I wouldn’t hard-sell it,” said Gilles de Kerchove, the head of counterterrorism for the European Union. “I wouldn’t say AQIM is poised to attack in Europe.”

Although the Algerian government has been a ready trading partner with the West, it has been a reluctant ally in the West’s effort against the Qaeda group. Algerian officials have declined to share key information on the United Nations bombing and have also refused to release the names of insurgents it freed from prison, according to American diplomatic and intelligence officials.

The F.B.I. recently opened an office in Algiers in an attempt to foster improved information-sharing between Algeria and the United States, as well as France. “We’re trying to make this like an extended family,” said Thomas Fuentes, the F.B.I.’s director of international operations.

The Rest @

Sheikh Saleh Kamel Comments on the Financial Crisis

Saleh Kamel, a Saudi entrepreneur who heads the General Council of Islamic Banks, said the global crisis suggested Islam was the "third way" after the failure of great ideologies.

• "Perhaps through this crisis, that is a great evil for the world, God will lead us to the school of moderation," he said. "Communism has failed and capitalism failed, and only now are they starting to admit this failure," he said.

(Writing by Andrew Hammond; editing by Anthony Barker)

The Rest @ Islamic Finance

Seven Steps to a Caliphate, Three years Later

I mostly just listen, study and pray, but occasionally I emerge from my hole in the watchman's wall and make a comment.

One of the early posts that I did from this blog years ago was an article from Jane Doe of Der Speigel, The Seven Steps to a World Wide Calipihate. The plan listed there seems to actually have been what al Qaeda has attempted to implement. In view of that, it is worthy of a re-look to see what happens next. How well have they accomplished the plan?

A side note:

I am well aware of the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, his Milestones, Hassan al Banna and others, and recognize that this plan is based on their teachings.

al Qaeda is the armed and unruly son in an Ikhwan family; The sons agree in world view, in the nature of the West, and in the final outcome. These brothers (no pun intended) do not like each other much, are frustrated by each others actions, yet they are familly.

....Let us make no mistake in thinking we can interact with one without dealing with the other. They support each other in private if not in public....

That being said, here was the al Qaeda plan, probably gathered in 2004 or 2005:

Phase One: "the awakening" This has already been carried out and was supposed to have lasted from 2000 to 2003, or more precisely from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. The aim of the attacks of 9/11 was to provoke the US into declaring war on the Islamic world and thereby "awakening" Muslims

• It is clear by most measures that this phase was successful. The US and the West has been provoked.

Phase Two: "Opening Eyes" According to Hussein's definition, the period we are now in and should last until 2006. Hussein says the terrorists hope to make the western conspiracy aware of the "Islamic community." Hussein believes this is a phase in which al-Qaida wants an organization to develop into a movement. The network is banking on recruiting young men during this period. Iraq should become the center for all global operations, with an "army" set up there and bases established in other Arabic states.

• As of October 2008, most of this phase is still incomplete. Some parts have failed, some are succeeding.
• The West is significantly more aware of the Islamic Community than it was before
• Al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood, though they have significant differences in tactics but not strategy, are in the ideological process of recruiting young men. They are having some success all over the world, but not as much as they had hoped.
• Their aims in Iraq have utterly failed. Even if there is a civil war when the US departs Iraq, Al Qaeda has been decisively discredited in Iraq and they will not get the credit for the US departure when Muslim men talk over coffee, and that is where it counts.
• However, because of their successful fund raising and recruiting of International Mujahadeen, they have shifted the war to other places, most notably Africa, Europe, Lebanon, Gaza and possibly South Asia.

Phase III The Rising Up" Should last from 2007 to 2010. "There will be a focus on Syria," prophesies Hussein, based on what his sources told him. The fighting cadres are supposedly already prepared and some are in Iraq. Attacks on Turkey and -- even more explosive -- in Israel are predicted. Al-Qaeda's masterminds hope that attacks on Israel will help the terrorist group become a recognized organization. The author also believes that countries neighboring Iraq, such as Jordan, are also in danger.

• Since their failure in Iraq, al Qaeda seems to have taken a decentralized approach to building the Caliphate by creating Islamist bases.
• Note the creation of the "Islamic Emirates" of Somalia (southern Somalia), Afghanistan (Taliban Held areas), the Caucuses (Chechnia) and Waziristan (Paksitan). Look for AQIM in the Sahel to try and do the same. While these are not real states, they are districts in which Al Qaeda has declared itself in charge, establishing Sharia, places into which they can send new recruits.
• Northern Nigeria is semi autonomous and acts as a de facto Emirate, and has no need to declare a separate state, which would provoke a reaction from the government andyway.
• Al Qaeda has failed in coming against secular Arab States, most notably in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and even Jordan, but Pakistan is in danager.

Phase Four: Between 2010 and 2013, Hussein writes that al-Qaida will aim to bring about the collapse of the hated Arabic governments. The estimate is that "the creeping loss of the regimes' power will lead to a steady growth in strength within al-Qaida." At the same time attacks will be carried out against oil suppliers and the US economy will be targeted using cyber terrorism.

• Since the Failure in Iraq and the Secular Kafir States has not been effective, Al Qaeda seems to be leaving the The Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) to bring on the collapse of the regimes' power.
• Al Qaeda has recently called for attacks against American and Western oil interests, and has engaged in attacks in many places, mostly with failed results. (note the attack on the American Embassy in Yemmen)
• Cyber Terrorism has largely failed, but Cyber communication and cyber recruiting, small scale cyber criminal enterprise, and cyber training for the Mujahadeen have been succesful.

Phase Five: This will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. The plan is that by this time, between 2013 and 2016, Western influence in the Islamic world will be so reduced and Israel weakened so much, that resistance will not be feared.

In the Future:

• Al Qaeda is hoping that the economic troubles in the West will lead to a reduction in their influence. We will see, but I doubt it.
• They will feed new recruits and money into their Emirates, work to strengthen Sharia, and expand the Jihad outward.
• Al Qaeda now leads the global jihad from the remote Mountains north of Islamibad, PK The fight for Pakistan is out of Wazieristan.
• al Qaeda would love to move out into the open in Pakistan or Afghanistan and declare the multi national Caliphate.
• If Usamma is still alive, they would try to bring him out to declare the Caliphate. They would start roumers with the Shi'ia that the leader is the Hidden Imam returning as prophesied. The leader would hedge, without actually denial, claiming that timing for the Imam's return is not yet right, hopoing to draw some Shi'ia into the movement

Phase Six: Hussein believes that from 2016 onwards there will a period of "total confrontation." As soon as the caliphate has been declared the "Islamic army" it will instigate the "fight between the believers and the non-believers" which has so often been predicted by Osama bin Laden.

• The war would continue from the Emirates, directed by the Caliphate, and they would muster every man of fighting age into military training for great war to come. Shabaab in Somalia made that very annoucmenet as soons as they declared the Islamic Emirate of Somalia.
• The Islamic Finance system will have been built by then, so that the end results of the Saleh Kamel-led Sharia finance qill be that al Qaeda and the Brothers no longer need any financial cooperation with western banks. This process is underway. With the Banking Centers in Dubai, how long before the Caliphate movement won't need Western Banks at all?

Phase Seven: This final stage is described as "definitive victory." Hussein writes that in the terrorists' eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the "one-and-a-half billion Muslims," the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. This phase should be completed by 2020, although the war shouldn't last longer than two years.

• This is pure fantasy, unless the West remains asleep, as it mostly is now.

What the West Can Do:

• The Energy Independence movement has been born in America, but is a decade away away from impacting al Qaeda. We need to nurture it.
• Fight this global war in a more coordinated strategic way.
• Chase he who believes that he must violently fight his god's own battle for him from one country to another.
• Keep sharing intelligence
• Keep reducing the cycle time from actionable intelligence to mission launch.
• Keep moving people deep into the Islamic banking movement, into every invisible transfer point.
• Keep monitoring the Shi'ia-Sunni interactons.
• Keep Tracking Recruiting efforts by all 70 Ikhwan front grous in the US and many more in Europe.
• Keep mnitoring the Ikhwan and martial arts training going on in every country, right under the nose of the authorities (Even Egypt).

finally, The West must regain its spiritual center, it's cultural purpose and take a passionate and moral message of its own about what the best of Western culture is really about, and carry its peace to the cultural Muslim, without destroying their cultural identity. To borrow a quote from Irwin Rommel ( It think) "no one every won a war from a defensive position"

The end of the beginning of the Long war is almost here. We have work to do.

Now, back to my hole in the wall.

-Shimron Issachar

US and Mali Military Excercises FLINTLOCK 3-20 November

APA-Washington DC (USA) The Government of Mali, in collaboration with other African, European nations and the United States, will host a joint military exercise on 3 - 20 November in Bamako, Mali.

This exercise, called FLINTLOCK, is the latest in a series of exercises conducted between Malian and U.S. military forces and partner nations throughout Africa.

The principal purpose of FLINTLOCK is to assist partner nations to establish and develop military interoperability and strengthen regional relationships, in support of future combined humanitarian, peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.

It includes participants from the Trans-Saharan nations and the U.S. as well as advisors from multiple European countries.

Malian and United States military personnel will conduct Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) and Veterinary Civic Action Programs (VETCAP) aimed at providing select medical and veterinary services to rural communities in Mali.

FLINTLOCK will additionally feature the presence of American military aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules and the CV-22 Osprey, an airplane that flies both like an airplane and a helicopter, that are part of this training exercise.

It is the premier exercise to support future training and engagement in the Trans-Saharan Region.

FLINTLOCK is a series of military exercises conducted with theatre security cooperation partners in Africa, under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program.
The TSCTP initiative is an integrated, multi-agency effort of the U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Defense.


The Rest @ The African Press Agency

Chekry Harb of Hizbullah is Busted

COLOMBIA : US AND Colombian investigators have dismantled an international cocaine smuggling and money-laundering ring that allegedly used part of its profits to finance Hizbullah, the Lebanon-based Shia militia.

• After a two-year investigation, authorities have arrested at least 36 suspects in recent days, including an accused Lebanese kingpin in Bogota, Chekry Harb, who acted as the hub of an unusual alliance between South American cocaine traffickers and Middle Eastern militants, Colombian investigators alleged.
  

Authorities accuse Mr Harb of being a "world-class money-launderer" whose ring washed hundreds of millions of dollars a year, from Panama to Hong Kong, while paying a percentage to Hizbullah.

• Mr Harb was charged with drug-related crimes in a sealed indictment filed in Miami in July, but terror-related charges have not been filed.
• The suspects allegedly worked with a Colombian cartel and a paramilitary group to smuggle cocaine to the US, Europe and the Middle East.
• Mr Harb travelled to Lebanon, Syria and Egypt and was in phone contact with Hizbullah figures, according to Colombian officials.

"The profits from the sales of drugs went to finance Hizbullah," said Gladys Sanchez, lead investigator for the special prosecutor's office here. "This is an example of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists."

FARC is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the guerrilla group that was alleged to have had links with the IRA.

Iran, a Hizbullah sponsor, and donations from the Lebanese diaspora are two sources for a multimillion-dollar budget that pays for the militia's armed and political wings and social projects such as hospitals in Beirut.

However, investigations have shown that Hizbullah also funds itself through:

• drug dealing
• arms trafficking
• contraband smuggling
• other rackets in the Americas, Africa and elsewhere.
  

Western anti-terror agents have expressed concern about signs of an increasing Hizbullah presence in South America.

• In June, the US Treasury Department designated two Venezuelans of Lebanese descent, one a diplomat, as Hizbullah financiers and supporters.
• The case began as a money-laundering investigation, but agents discovered the alleged links between Mr Harb and Hizbullah operatives as they followed the money.
• Harb's group allegedly paid Hizbullah 12 per cent of its profits, investigators said, without giving a dollar figure.

- (LA Times, Washington Post Service)

The Rest @The Irish Times

MPAC

Here is the website

Staff , in alphabetical Order, according to the website

Sarah Abdelnaby - Research and Program Assistant
Salam Al-Marayati - Executive Director
Lydia Burgos - Administrative Assistant
Safiya Ghori - Government Relations Director
Aziza Hasan - Director of InterFaith Relations
Shazia Kamal - Hate Crime Prevention Coordinator
Edina Lekovic - Communications Director
Zabie Mansoory - Community Outreach Coordinator
Naoma Nagahawatte - New York City Office Director
Suhad Obeidi - Director of Operations
Fatma Ruhmatula - Hollywood Liaison
Hasnain Syed - Webmaster
Grace Tapia - Administrative Assistant
Haris Tarin - Community Development Director

MPAC Board of Directors

Dr. Maher Hathout - Senior Advisor
Nayyer Ali - Chairman
Hedab El Tarifi - Vice-Chairwoman
Doug Burpee - Treasurer
Patricia Abdullah - Secretary
Wayel Azmeh
Shams Ghoneim
Ramsey Hakim
Zaid Islam - ex officio
Hala Karam
Adil Khan
Zubeida Khan - MPAC Foundation representative
Rahmi Mowjood

Shabaab and Islamic Courts Union Shootout in Bal'ad

Somalia’s Islamist guerrillas battle each other, two killed20 Oct 20, 2008 - 10:07:13 AM

BAL'AD, Somalia Oct 20 (Garowe Online) - Islamist rebels fighting against Somalia's interim government battled each other Sunday in the town of which is located 30km north of the national capital Mogadishu, Puntland-based Radio Garowe reported.

The violence erupted in the western outskirts of Bal'ad town where the Islamic Courts militia set up a security checkpoint earlier in the day.

Local residents told Radio Garowe that a band of guerrillas loyal to Islamist opposition group al Shabaab attacked the checkpoint, sparking a bloody battle that killed at least two fighters and wounded eight people including civilians.

The Islamic Courts fighters withdrew only to return during the evening, when a second round of fighting over control of the checkpoint erupted and al Shabaab guerrillas withdrew.

"Gunmen shot directly at a vehicle transporting al Shabaab last night," said a witness in Bal’ad who did not want his name in print, saying most businesses were closed due to the violence.

The situation was reportedly calm but tense Monday, as Islamic clerics and traditional elders sought to diffuse the potentially dangerous state of affairs.

The Rest @ Garowe

GOLDEN CHAIN LIST

While the Golden Chain List been set aside in several court cases where it has been used as evidence of al Qaeda connections, even as last as 2006, this does not mean that the names and companies found on the list are not of interest in on going investigations into al Qaeda funding.

-Shimron Issachar


GOLDEN CHAIN LIST ANALYSIS & PROFILES

CONTEXT

The Golden Chain list (or list of wealthy Saudi sponsors) was presented by the US government as Exhibit 5 in the Department of Justice "Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements" in the case of USA v. Arnaout (USDC, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division) filed on January 29, 2003.

The list was also mentioned in the Indictment of Enaam Arnaout on October 9, 2002 (02 CR 892). According to the US government, the document is "a list of people referred to within Al Qaida as the "Golden Chain", wealthy donors to mujahideen efforts".

Originally, the document was seized by the Bosnian police during searches in the offices of Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo on March 2002. The list was part of a computer file labeled "Tareekh Osama", or "Osama History", containing scanned images of several documents. The computer files seized in Bosnia were delivered to the US Embassy soon after the raids. Our team was granted access to these documents following an order of the Supreme Court of Bosnia Herzegovina issued on March 6, 2003.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Al-Qaida list of top 20 Saudi financial sponsors include 6 bankers and 12 businessmen, among which 2 former ministers. Only two on the list have not been yet identified with certainty.

According to our estimates, their cumulative corporate net worth totals more than $85 billion US, or 42% of the Saudi annual GNP and equivalent to the annual GNP of Venezuela.

These prominent businessmen and bankers own or control 16 companies ranking among the top 100 Saudi companies.

The complete list of Saudi donors and Al-Qaida recipients (25 names) include 8 individuals already named in the complaint. We should note that the most virulent Saudi statements against the lawsuit were issued by those listed in the "Golden Chain", especially Saleh Abdullah Kamel.

Among the most notable findings, we should highlight the following :

-Confirmation that the Bin Laden family has been a major contributor to Usama, despite its statements denying such support
-Involvement of bankers representing the three largest Saudi banks (National Commercial Bank, Riyad Bank, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp)
-Involvement of former oil ministers Sheikh Yamani and Taher
-Involvement of most of them in charity organizations as founders or board members

AL QAIDA DONORS

SULEIMAN AL-RASHID

Al-Rashid Trading & Contracting (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)

ABDEL QADER BAKRI (ABDULKADER [AL] BAKRI)

CEO, Bakri Group of Cos
CEO, Al Bakri International Power Co. Ltd (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Al-Bakri Shipping Group (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Alkhomasia Shipping and Maintenance Company Ltd (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Red Sea Marine Services (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Diners Club International (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Bakri Group formed in April 2002 a JV with the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) to operate in Middle-East countries, including Yemen. MISC leased super tanker MT Limburg when it was attacked on October 6, 2002, coming from Ra's Tannura (Saudi Arabia).

BIN LADEN BROTHERS

Saudi Binladin Group (SBG)
Bakr Bin Laden

YOUSIF JAMEEL (YOUSSEF [YOUSEF] JAMEEL)

CEO, Abdul Lateef Jameel Group (donated SR8 million to support Saudi Red Crescent Society's relief work in Kosovo in 1999)
Former Board member, major shareholder, Global Natural Resources Inc. (Houston, Texas)

IBRAHIM AFANDI (IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD AFANDI)

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation (President: Prince Salman, VP: Abdulaziz bin Fahd)
Board member, IIRO
Chairman, Al Afandi Establishment (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO Al Afandi Germany (Frankenberg)
CEO, Sky Muzn Holding Co. BV (Netherlands)
CEO, Saudi Industrial Services Company (Sisco) with partners Xenel Industries and Dallah Al Baraka
Founder, Great Saudi Development & Investment Co. (GSDIC)
Founder, Arabian Company for Development and Investment Limited (ACDIL)
Chairman, National Committee of Saudi Contractors
Partner, African Company (Sudan), with Al Rajhi Bank and Dallah Al Baraka
Former General manager and shareholder of Al Amoudi Group
Owner, Gang Ranch (Canada), second largest ranch in North America
Owner, Skylight Corp, Georgia, USA
Owner, BSA Investments (complaint from LTV Steel Company, Inc)
US address: 6914 Los Verdes Dr Apt 6, Rch Palos Vrd, CA 90275

SALEH KAMEL (SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL)

Born in 1941, Mecca, Saudi Arabia
CEO, Dallah Al Baraka (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) - 3rd largest Saudi company
Chairman Arab Radio & Television (ART)
Founding member and shareholder, Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Khartoum, Sudan)
Partner, Tamlik Company Ltd (with Mohamed Binladen Co., Saleh Bin Laden)
Shareholder, Jordan Islamic Bank
Vice Chairman Bank Al Jazira
Founder, Iqraa International Foundation

AL-RAJHI (SULEIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL RAJHI)

Board member, IIRO
Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
CEO, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Company (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) - 9th largest Saudi company, 4th largest Saudi commercial bank

AL-JUMAIH (MOHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH AL-JOMAIH)


Board member IIRO
Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
Member of the Committee for collection of donations for supporting the Intifada (Chairman Prince Salman
Chairman First Islamic Investment Bank
+300 companies
Al Birr donor
Bosnia donor

AL-SHARBATLY (ABDULRAHMAN HASSAN [ABBAS] SHARBATLY)

Founder and board member, Riyad Bank (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) - 7th largest Saudi company and 2nd largest Saudi commercial bank (Abdulrahman A. Al-Amoudi, Senior Executive Vice President)
Offices in Houston, Texas (Riyad Bank Houston Agency, 700 Louisiana, suite 4770, Houston, Texas 77002, USA)
Board member, Beirut Ryad Bank SAL (with Prince Khaled bin Turki and Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)
Board member, Saudi Arabian Refinery Company (Chairman Prince Khaled bin Turki, directors include Kaaki (bin Mahfouz) and Al Rajhi)
Shareholder, Middle East Capital Group (shareholders include Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, Henry Sarkissian -President Saudi Binladin Group International-, Sami Baarma -National Commercial Bank-)
CEO, Saudi Arabian Marketing Agencies and Company Ltd (Shareholder : Salem Mohammad Bin Laden) Ferrari, Porsche, Audi and Volkswagen dealer
Shareholder, Egyptian Gulf Bank
Shareholder, Golden Pyramids Plaza Co
Shareholder, Savola Snack Food Co. Ltd (with Saleh bin Mahfouz and Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)

MOHAMED YOUSEF AL-NAGHI

Al Naghi Brothers Co (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)

BIN MAHFOODH (KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ)

Former COO, BCCI
Former CEO, National Commercial Bank, 1st Saudi commercial bank
Founder, Muwafaq Foundation
Founder, International Development Foundation

ABDEL QADER FAQEEH (ADEL FAQIH)

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
Chairman, Bank Al Jazira
Chairman, Savola Group (Sharbatly), merged with Azizia Panda (Walid bin Talal) - 13th largest Saudi company
Chairman, Makkah Construction & Development Company

SALAH AL-DIN ABDEL JAWAD (SALAHUDDIN ABDULJAWAD)

CEO, General Machinery Agencies (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) Agent for General Motors, Wacker Corp, Mannesmann, Renault (RVI), Opel
Board member, United Gulf Industries Corp, Manama, Bahrain (with Khalil Bin Laden)
Partner, Savola Snack Food Co. Ltd (with Saleh Bin Mahfouz, Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, Prince Mishail Bin Abdullah Bin Turki, Abdulrahman Sharbatly)
Founder of several scholarship funds (Berkeley, Oxford -including the Salahuddin Abduljawad Fellowship in Islamic Art History) through Barakat Trust (UK) and Barakat Foundation (USA) with Xenel Industries Ltd and Khalid Alireza

AHMAD TURKI YAMANI (AHMED ZAKI YAMANI)

Born in 1930, Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Son of former Saudi Chief Justice
Former Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources
Former director, ARAMCO
Founder, Investcorp (Board members include Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)

ABDEL HADI TAHER (ABDUL HADI TAHER)

CEO, Taher Group of Companies, 52nd largest Saudi company
Owner, Marketing General Trading Corp (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Shareholder, Arab Company for Hotels & Contracting Ltd (with Ahmed Zaki Yamani)
Former Minister of State
Former Governor of the Saudi state oil company Petromin, under responsibility of Ahmed Zaki Yamani
Former director, Saudi European Bank (Paris), held 25% of the bank shares along with Ahmed Zaki Yamani

MOHAMMED OMAR

???

AL KUWAIT

???

AHMAD AL HARBI

CEO, Ahmad Al Harbi Group
(L'Houssaine Kherchtou testified on February 21, 2001, during the trial of suspected al-Qaida militants in connection with the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, that he was welcomed at Miram Shah guest house in Pakistan before joining Al-Qaida by "Abu Ahmed al Harbi").

AL ISSAEI (MOHAMMED AL-ISSAI)

Board member, Saudi Research & Marketing Company (with Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Bin Khalid Bin Mahfouz, Dallah Albaraka Group) - 20th largest Saudi company
CEO, Al Issai Trade Company (Daimler-Chrysler representative)
Deputy Chairman, Arab Cement Company (shareholders include Binladin Group, Bin Mahfouz, Al Rajhi - Chairman: Turki Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud)

HAMAD AL HUSAINI (HAMAD AL HUSSAINI)

CEO, Akel Trading Company
CEO, Akel Agricultural Investment Company LLC
CEO, Al Hussaini and Company
Board member of Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation (Netherlands)
Brother of Abdullah Osman Abdulrahman Al Hussaini, General Director of Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation, owner of Al Furqan Mosque in Netherlands (linked to MWL, Mounir El Motassadeq and Marwan El Shehhi
Family member include Walid Al Hussaini, representative of Abdullah Al Turki (former minister of Islamic Affairs, Secretary General of MWL, linked to Mohammad Zouaydi -Spanish procedure-)

AL-QAIDA RECIPIENTS

Major recipients appear to be Usama Bin laden and Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee. They receive donations from 13 donors.

USAMA (USAMA BIN LADEN)

Receives donations from the most prominent in the list: Bin Laden Brothers, Al Rajhi, Sharbatly, Al Naghi, Bin Mahfouz, Adel Faqih, Al Kuwait

WAIL (WAEL HAMZA JULAIDAN)

Former Secretary General of the Muslim World League and Rabita Trust in Pakistan, designated by the United States Treasury as SGDT
Receives donations from Suleiman Al Rashid, Abdulkader Bakri, Salahuddin Abduljawad, Abdul Tahi Taher

BATERJI (ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE)

Chairman Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Khartoum, Sudan)
Founder, Al-Birr Society, Benevolence International Foundation
Former Secretary General, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Receives donations from Yousef Jameel, Ibrahim Afandi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Jomaih, Ahmed Zaki Yamani and Mohammed Omar

ABU MAZIN ( ??? MAZIN M. BAHARETH)

Son of Mohammed Saleh Bahareth (brother of Usama Bin Laden father's wife and tutor of the Bin Laden family after patriarch Mohammad Bin Laden's death in 1968)
CEO, Bahareth Organization (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Shareholder, Triple B Trading GmbH (Germany) - with Hassan Bahfzallah and Shahir A. I. Batterjee, Secretary: Abdul-Martin Tatari
Receives donations from Hamad Al Hussaini

SALEM TAHER

Receives donations from Ahmad Al Harbi and Mohammed Al Issai


Source: Free Republic

GOLDEN CHAIN LIST

While the Golden Chain List been set aside in several court cases where it has been used as evidence of al Qaeda connections, even as last as 2006, this does not mean that the names and companies found on the list are not of interest in on going investigations into al Qaeda funding.

-Shimron Issachar


GOLDEN CHAIN LIST ANALYSIS & PROFILES

CONTEXT

The Golden Chain list (or list of wealthy Saudi sponsors) was presented by the US government as Exhibit 5 in the Department of Justice "Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements" in the case of USA v. Arnaout (USDC, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division) filed on January 29, 2003.

The list was also mentioned in the Indictment of Enaam Arnaout on October 9, 2002 (02 CR 892). According to the US government, the document is "a list of people referred to within Al Qaida as the "Golden Chain", wealthy donors to mujahideen efforts".

Originally, the document was seized by the Bosnian police during searches in the offices of Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo on March 2002. The list was part of a computer file labeled "Tareekh Osama", or "Osama History", containing scanned images of several documents. The computer files seized in Bosnia were delivered to the US Embassy soon after the raids. Our team was granted access to these documents following an order of the Supreme Court of Bosnia Herzegovina issued on March 6, 2003.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Al-Qaida list of top 20 Saudi financial sponsors include 6 bankers and 12 businessmen, among which 2 former ministers. Only two on the list have not been yet identified with certainty.

According to our estimates, their cumulative corporate net worth totals more than $85 billion US, or 42% of the Saudi annual GNP and equivalent to the annual GNP of Venezuela.

These prominent businessmen and bankers own or control 16 companies ranking among the top 100 Saudi companies.

The complete list of Saudi donors and Al-Qaida recipients (25 names) include 8 individuals already named in the complaint. We should note that the most virulent Saudi statements against the lawsuit were issued by those listed in the "Golden Chain", especially Saleh Abdullah Kamel.

Among the most notable findings, we should highlight the following :

-Confirmation that the Bin Laden family has been a major contributor to Usama, despite its statements denying such support
-Involvement of bankers representing the three largest Saudi banks (National Commercial Bank, Riyad Bank, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp)
-Involvement of former oil ministers Sheikh Yamani and Taher
-Involvement of most of them in charity organizations as founders or board members

AL QAIDA DONORS

SULEIMAN AL-RASHID

Al-Rashid Trading & Contracting (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)

ABDEL QADER BAKRI (ABDULKADER [AL] BAKRI)

CEO, Bakri Group of Cos
CEO, Al Bakri International Power Co. Ltd (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Al-Bakri Shipping Group (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Alkhomasia Shipping and Maintenance Company Ltd (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Red Sea Marine Services (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Diners Club International (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Bakri Group formed in April 2002 a JV with the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) to operate in Middle-East countries, including Yemen. MISC leased super tanker MT Limburg when it was attacked on October 6, 2002, coming from Ra's Tannura (Saudi Arabia).

BIN LADEN BROTHERS

Saudi Binladin Group (SBG)
Bakr Bin Laden

YOUSIF JAMEEL (YOUSSEF [YOUSEF] JAMEEL)

CEO, Abdul Lateef Jameel Group (donated SR8 million to support Saudi Red Crescent Society's relief work in Kosovo in 1999)
Former Board member, major shareholder, Global Natural Resources Inc. (Houston, Texas)

IBRAHIM AFANDI (IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD AFANDI)

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation (President: Prince Salman, VP: Abdulaziz bin Fahd)
Board member, IIRO
Chairman, Al Afandi Establishment (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO Al Afandi Germany (Frankenberg)
CEO, Sky Muzn Holding Co. BV (Netherlands)
CEO, Saudi Industrial Services Company (Sisco) with partners Xenel Industries and Dallah Al Baraka
Founder, Great Saudi Development & Investment Co. (GSDIC)
Founder, Arabian Company for Development and Investment Limited (ACDIL)
Chairman, National Committee of Saudi Contractors
Partner, African Company (Sudan), with Al Rajhi Bank and Dallah Al Baraka
Former General manager and shareholder of Al Amoudi Group
Owner, Gang Ranch (Canada), second largest ranch in North America
Owner, Skylight Corp, Georgia, USA
Owner, BSA Investments (complaint from LTV Steel Company, Inc)
US address: 6914 Los Verdes Dr Apt 6, Rch Palos Vrd, CA 90275

SALEH KAMEL (SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL)

Born in 1941, Mecca, Saudi Arabia
CEO, Dallah Al Baraka (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) - 3rd largest Saudi company
Chairman Arab Radio & Television (ART)
Founding member and shareholder, Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Khartoum, Sudan)
Partner, Tamlik Company Ltd (with Mohamed Binladen Co., Saleh Bin Laden)
Shareholder, Jordan Islamic Bank
Vice Chairman Bank Al Jazira
Founder, Iqraa International Foundation

AL-RAJHI (SULEIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL RAJHI)

Board member, IIRO
Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
CEO, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Company (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) - 9th largest Saudi company, 4th largest Saudi commercial bank

AL-JUMAIH (MOHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH AL-JOMAIH)


Board member IIRO
Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
Member of the Committee for collection of donations for supporting the Intifada (Chairman Prince Salman
Chairman First Islamic Investment Bank
+300 companies
Al Birr donor
Bosnia donor

AL-SHARBATLY (ABDULRAHMAN HASSAN [ABBAS] SHARBATLY)

Founder and board member, Riyad Bank (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) - 7th largest Saudi company and 2nd largest Saudi commercial bank (Abdulrahman A. Al-Amoudi, Senior Executive Vice President)
Offices in Houston, Texas (Riyad Bank Houston Agency, 700 Louisiana, suite 4770, Houston, Texas 77002, USA)
Board member, Beirut Ryad Bank SAL (with Prince Khaled bin Turki and Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)
Board member, Saudi Arabian Refinery Company (Chairman Prince Khaled bin Turki, directors include Kaaki (bin Mahfouz) and Al Rajhi)
Shareholder, Middle East Capital Group (shareholders include Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, Henry Sarkissian -President Saudi Binladin Group International-, Sami Baarma -National Commercial Bank-)
CEO, Saudi Arabian Marketing Agencies and Company Ltd (Shareholder : Salem Mohammad Bin Laden) Ferrari, Porsche, Audi and Volkswagen dealer
Shareholder, Egyptian Gulf Bank
Shareholder, Golden Pyramids Plaza Co
Shareholder, Savola Snack Food Co. Ltd (with Saleh bin Mahfouz and Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)

MOHAMED YOUSEF AL-NAGHI

Al Naghi Brothers Co (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)

BIN MAHFOODH (KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ)

Former COO, BCCI
Former CEO, National Commercial Bank, 1st Saudi commercial bank
Founder, Muwafaq Foundation
Founder, International Development Foundation

ABDEL QADER FAQEEH (ADEL FAQIH)

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
Chairman, Bank Al Jazira
Chairman, Savola Group (Sharbatly), merged with Azizia Panda (Walid bin Talal) - 13th largest Saudi company
Chairman, Makkah Construction & Development Company

SALAH AL-DIN ABDEL JAWAD (SALAHUDDIN ABDULJAWAD)

CEO, General Machinery Agencies (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) Agent for General Motors, Wacker Corp, Mannesmann, Renault (RVI), Opel
Board member, United Gulf Industries Corp, Manama, Bahrain (with Khalil Bin Laden)
Partner, Savola Snack Food Co. Ltd (with Saleh Bin Mahfouz, Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, Prince Mishail Bin Abdullah Bin Turki, Abdulrahman Sharbatly)
Founder of several scholarship funds (Berkeley, Oxford -including the Salahuddin Abduljawad Fellowship in Islamic Art History) through Barakat Trust (UK) and Barakat Foundation (USA) with Xenel Industries Ltd and Khalid Alireza

AHMAD TURKI YAMANI (AHMED ZAKI YAMANI)

Born in 1930, Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Son of former Saudi Chief Justice
Former Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources
Former director, ARAMCO
Founder, Investcorp (Board members include Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)

ABDEL HADI TAHER (ABDUL HADI TAHER)

CEO, Taher Group of Companies, 52nd largest Saudi company
Owner, Marketing General Trading Corp (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Shareholder, Arab Company for Hotels & Contracting Ltd (with Ahmed Zaki Yamani)
Former Minister of State
Former Governor of the Saudi state oil company Petromin, under responsibility of Ahmed Zaki Yamani
Former director, Saudi European Bank (Paris), held 25% of the bank shares along with Ahmed Zaki Yamani

MOHAMMED OMAR

???

AL KUWAIT

???

AHMAD AL HARBI

CEO, Ahmad Al Harbi Group
(L'Houssaine Kherchtou testified on February 21, 2001, during the trial of suspected al-Qaida militants in connection with the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, that he was welcomed at Miram Shah guest house in Pakistan before joining Al-Qaida by "Abu Ahmed al Harbi").

AL ISSAEI (MOHAMMED AL-ISSAI)

Board member, Saudi Research & Marketing Company (with Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Bin Khalid Bin Mahfouz, Dallah Albaraka Group) - 20th largest Saudi company
CEO, Al Issai Trade Company (Daimler-Chrysler representative)
Deputy Chairman, Arab Cement Company (shareholders include Binladin Group, Bin Mahfouz, Al Rajhi - Chairman: Turki Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud)

HAMAD AL HUSAINI (HAMAD AL HUSSAINI)

CEO, Akel Trading Company
CEO, Akel Agricultural Investment Company LLC
CEO, Al Hussaini and Company
Board member of Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation (Netherlands)
Brother of Abdullah Osman Abdulrahman Al Hussaini, General Director of Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation, owner of Al Furqan Mosque in Netherlands (linked to MWL, Mounir El Motassadeq and Marwan El Shehhi
Family member include Walid Al Hussaini, representative of Abdullah Al Turki (former minister of Islamic Affairs, Secretary General of MWL, linked to Mohammad Zouaydi -Spanish procedure-)

AL-QAIDA RECIPIENTS

Major recipients appear to be Usama Bin laden and Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee. They receive donations from 13 donors.

USAMA (USAMA BIN LADEN)

Receives donations from the most prominent in the list: Bin Laden Brothers, Al Rajhi, Sharbatly, Al Naghi, Bin Mahfouz, Adel Faqih, Al Kuwait

WAIL (WAEL HAMZA JULAIDAN)

Former Secretary General of the Muslim World League and Rabita Trust in Pakistan, designated by the United States Treasury as SGDT
Receives donations from Suleiman Al Rashid, Abdulkader Bakri, Salahuddin Abduljawad, Abdul Tahi Taher

BATERJI (ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE)

Chairman Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Khartoum, Sudan)
Founder, Al-Birr Society, Benevolence International Foundation
Former Secretary General, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Receives donations from Yousef Jameel, Ibrahim Afandi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Jomaih, Ahmed Zaki Yamani and Mohammed Omar

ABU MAZIN ( ??? MAZIN M. BAHARETH)

Son of Mohammed Saleh Bahareth (brother of Usama Bin Laden father's wife and tutor of the Bin Laden family after patriarch Mohammad Bin Laden's death in 1968)
CEO, Bahareth Organization (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Shareholder, Triple B Trading GmbH (Germany) - with Hassan Bahfzallah and Shahir A. I. Batterjee, Secretary: Abdul-Martin Tatari
Receives donations from Hamad Al Hussaini

SALEM TAHER

Receives donations from Ahmad Al Harbi and Mohammed Al Issai


Source: Free Republic