Issa Osman Issa

Issa Osman Issa is a Somali resident, probably born in Somalia in the mid 70s’. (Some source claimed he was born in Kenya).

In 1998 Issa Osman Issa opened in Kismoayo, on the Indian Ocean in South Somalia, a lobsters fishing business with a partner - Omar Said Omar. Slowly and gradually Issa Osman Issa recruited Omar Said Omar to the cause of Global Jihad and to the affiliated group to Al Qaeda in Somalia – the “Itihad al-Islamiya” (Islamic Union) led by Sheikh Dahir Aweys.

On 11/20/2002 Issa Osman Issa and Abdul Malik smuggled across the border from Somalia to Kenya with a small boat, bought by Omar Said Omar. They left from a fishing village along the Eastern coast of Somalia, between Kismoayo port and Ras Kaambooni, near the Kenya border. In Mombasa they were joined by Saleh Ali Nabhan, a local resident of Mombasa area. The group was equipped with 2 SAM-7 “Sterla” missiles and located itself near Mombasa International Airport. After the Mombasa Paradise attack Issa Osman Issa and Abdul Malik fled back to Somalia in the same way. On the day of the Mombasa Paradise Attack, on 11/28/2002, Issa Osman Issa launched one of the missiles toward an Israeli “Arkia” airliner, when taking off from Mombasa International Airport.

After returning to Somalia Issa Osman Issa became a leading figure in a local radical Islamic “al-Shabab” (The Youth) organization, affiliated tothe Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) and commanded CIC militia near the interim capital of Baidoa.

On 03/10/2006 a special Somali force, trained by the CIA, came to arrest Issa Osman Issa in Mogadishu. He resisted arrest and blew himself with a hand grenade. (Some sources claimed that he was assembling an explosive belt for a planned suicide attack and he detonated the belt in order to kill himself and some of the arresting officers).

Ghana Became the Drug Transit Point

Torornto Star: Drug mystery grips Ghana

Massive amount of cocaine missing after raid at sea Drug traffickers allegedly seen at tribal king's palace ACCRA, Ghana—Under the black blanket of an April sky, narcotics control officers raided a boat bobbing in the waves off Ghana's main harbour.

Intelligence reports suggested more than 2,000 kg of South American cocaine was hidden in the boat's hold, packaged in 78 parcels weighing 30 kg each, with a rumoured street value of more than $270 million.

• Instead, the officers returned to shore virtually empty-handed.Only one packet of drugs was found on the boat; of that, another 5 kg went missing after it was submitted as evidence.
• Now a judicial commission looking into who tipped off the drug smugglers is painting a picture of Ghana as a gateway for drugs smuggled from Venezuela or Colombia to European cities in Spain, Portugal and the U.K.Each day's testimony — dissected with gusto on radio call-in shows and splashed across multiple page of the next day's newspapers — brings more claims that Ghanaian cops are in cahoots with South American drug lords.
• According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Dakar, Senegal, officers have seized more than 11.1 tonnes of cocaine en route to West Africa or leaving West Africa for Europe between 2000 and 2004.
• Ivory Coast, Ghana's westerly neighbour, was once seen as the major hub for heroin and cocaine, but since a civil war broke out in 2002, the drug trade has moved to some of the region's more stable countries.
• Ghana's growing image as a drug corridor is made worse by the fact that Eric Amoateng, a member of Parliament, sits in jail in New York on charges of drug trafficking.

Now it seems that a tribal king, usually seen in sumptuous traditional fabrics and dripping with gold trinkets from the mines that dot his accepted kingdom, is implicated.

• Witnesses have testified some of the suspected drug traffickers visited his palace.
• At least one witness alleged the king called for a delay in the police investigation into the missing drugs.
• His brother-in-law is one of four men charged with drug smuggling in connection with the case. (None of the allegations made at the commission have been proven in court)

The numbers certainly support the idea that Ghana is fast becoming a quick route for cocaine working its way to Europe.

• Narcotics control officers monitoring Ghana's international airport seized more than 600 kg of cocaine and another 71.5 kg of heroin in 2004.
• "Most are from so-called stuffers and swallowers, who secrete narcotics in their bodily orifices or swallow them wrapped in condoms, for later retrieval," said Amado Philip de Andrés, deputy regional representative for the UN's office on drugs and crime.
• The sting operation is not high tech — suspected drug couriers are taken to hospital and X-rayed — but that's a massive jump from the 17 kg of cocaine seized in 2000.

The five-member commission investigating the whereabouts of the missing drugs was initially expected to point the finger at the narcotics control board. Then a secret tape-recording of Assistant Police Commissioner Kofi Boakye discussing the missing coke with known drug traffickers was turned over to a local newspaper.

• And the glamorous Ghanaian girlfriend of one of the suspected Venezuelan drug smugglers came forward with the story of a $200,000 bribe she hand-delivered to Boakye.

De Andrés said although few drug officers think politicians are working with drug dealers, there have been several cases where trials have been halted or charges dropped on the instructions of a person in power.

• "It's fair to say that law enforcement in Ghana are generally professional and honest," de Andrés said. "There are numerous examples of the success of Ghanaian law enforcement agencies in fighting organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking."The West African country is considered by the international community and charities alike to be a model of stability and good governance in a region awash in corruption and conflict.
• Still, most Ghanaians aren't surprised by the idea that the cops may be on the take.More than 90 per cent of people polled by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development said they'd either bribed or been asked to bribe a police officer.The committee's report on its findings are expected next month.

The Rest @ The Toronto Star

Hawala

Since 9/11, investigations into the al Qaeda financial network have led to several notable successes in the United States and Europe. Much of this achievement in the United States has resulted from strengthening the financial investigatory powers of domestic law enforcement agencies and coordinating them through the Treasury Department's new Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.

In other countries, the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, for example, is helping to coordinate the tracking of terrorist funds through the global banking system and cracking down on countries that fail to improve transparency and regulation.

These efforts are already proving useful in uncovering large-scale drug-trafficking and money-laundering operations. They have also helped reveal important information on terrorist groups, particularly those operating in the West.

• Financial investigators tracking al Qaeda assets rely heavily on data and paper trails from commercial banks and financial regulators in pursuing and investigating leads.
• Such data have included the tracing of wire transfers between suspected hijacker Mohammed Atta and Shaykh Saiid of Dubai, believed to be one of Osama bin Laden's key financial operatives.

Unfortunately, these efforts have achieved little success to date in reaching the core of the al Qaeda financial network.

• The problem is that much of the organization's funding mechanisms—like its cells—are small and inconspicuous, often using a traditional Muslim method of money exchange called Hawala.

Workings of the Hawala System

The word "hawala" means "transfer" in Arabic.

In some contexts, the word "hawala" is used synonymously with "trust," usually to express the personal connection between participants and the informal nature of the transactions.

In essence, Hawala is a transfer or remittance from one party to another, without use of a formal financial institution such as a bank or money exchange, and is, in this sense, an "informal" transaction. There are several other common aspects to Hawala.

• First, in most cases, Hawala transactions go across international lines, such as with worker remittances to their home countries.
• Second, Hawala usually involves more than one currency, although again this is not absolutely required.
• Third, a Hawala transaction usually entails principals and intermediaries. To accommodate requests of the principals, the intermediaries usually take financial positions.
• Later, much as in the case of conventional banking practices, these transactions will be cleared amongst the units to balance their books.

A typical transaction often involves an expatriate remittance. For example, an expatriate Pakistani worker in the United Arab Emirates wishes to send money back home. To do this he goes to an intermediary, the Hawaladar, to arrange the transfer.

He makes payment in dollars or other convertible currency. The Hawaladar in the UAE contacts a counterpart in Pakistan, who makes payment in rupees to the remitter's family or other beneficiary.

Obviously, some network of family or connections among Hawaladars is required to make such a system work on a large-scale and ongoing basis.

It is important to note that although the remitter in this case wished money be sent to a distinct location, no money actually crossed the border physically and no money necessarily entered the conventional or official banking system (unless of course the Pakistani recipient decided to place it there).

The transaction rests upon a single communication between Hawaladars and is often not recorded or guaranteed by a written contract.

• The trust between the two Hawaladars secures the debt and allows the debt to stand with no legal means of reclamation.
• There is an implicit guarantee on payments, however, because a broken trust would result in community ostracism constituting economic suicide for the Hawaladar (Jost and Sandhu, 2002).

Typically, poorer individuals use the Hawala system to take advantage of the low cost and quick delivery that the system provides.

For the blue-collared worker who transfers a monthly stipend of $100, the unofficial Hawala is a far cheaper way to send money back home than the official banking system, at a rate of around 1% of the amount transferred.

Because of its low overhead costs, Hawala provides a more favorable market exchange rate than the official one.

In short, the economic attraction of Hawala to the customer is usually the speed, low cost, and reliability of the system compared to use of established financial institutions such as banks, money exchanges, or Western Union.

The system is ideal for use in isolated localities like the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan where formal financial institutions are rare.

Extent of the System

Hawala agents work in a range of settings—from curbside stalls and modest offices in South Asia to back rooms and secret locations in Europe and North America. The only limits to the size of a transaction are the willingness of the sender to carry cash and the capacity of the receiving agent to cover the transaction; exchanges in the tens of thousands of dollars are frequent.

Although Pakistan, India, and the Persian Gulf states are home to the largest concentration of Hawala organizations, Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, perhaps handles the largest volume of transactions.

The system has global reach. Investigators believe Hawala organizations exist throughout the United States and Europe.

Given its informal nature, there is no precise measure of the size of the system. Estimates abound though (Jost and Sandhu, 2002).

Pakistani officials estimate that over $5 billion in transactions occur through Hawala networks every year, making it in effect an extremely large foreign exchange clearing house.

One third of these transactions reportedly consists of the repatriation of funds from expatriate Pakistanis to their families. Pakistani nationals may hold between $40 billion and $60 billion in overseas financial assets—an amount roughly equivalent to the country's gross domestic product.

In the case of India, Interpol places the size of Hawala at possibly 40 percent of the country's gross domestic product. In 1998, the most recent year for which data are available, estimates place the amount of money in the country's Hawala system at $680 billion, roughly the size of Canada's entire economy (Baldauf, 2002).
In summary, the Hawala system, especially in South Asia, is extensive, extremely liquid and a rational choice for poorer segments of the population. While seeming a bit mysterious to outsiders, the fact is the Hawala is comparable in mechanics and economic structure to most other remittance alternatives, including those that run through licensed channels. The most obvious "legal" problem with Hawala in remitting countries is the lack of any registration or licensing, although the operations themselves are generally harmless. In receiving countries like India, there is in addition the more subtle potential clash between Hawala operations and exchange controls whereby Hawala transactions often result in increased black market transactions and expanded underground activity. The fact is, though, that Hawala is essentially an economic phenomenon. It would remain so even if there were no terrorist international transfers, drug trade, or money laundering.
Although the great bulk of Hawala transactions are as harmless as the remittance example noted above, the system has proved to be extremely useful for money laundering and masking the intricate financial operations required by terrorists, drug dealers and other criminal elements. Given its size and semi-legitimate status in South Asia, it is not hard for terrorists to transfer money using Hawala channels. They are labyrinths replete with pseudonyms, middlemen and dead-ends. Wealthy Arab patrons in the Middle East likely send funds to al Qaeda through Hawala organizations, as do myriad Arab charities acting as fund-raising fronts. The smaller the value of the transfer the less attention it is likely to attract, but it is still easy to transfer large amounts of money without raising questions.
Methods to Combat Terrorist Use of the System
In the war on terrorism, a major challenge will be to infiltrate and monitor Hawala networks in the Middle East. A crackdown by Arab and South Asian governments at the behest of Western governments is simply not feasible. The vast majority of the money is from legal, legitimate sources, and the Hawala organizations are numerous and extremely powerful.
Arab and South Asian governments have neither the effective means nor the will to closely monitor each transaction in these organizations. In any case, methods of this sort would most likely prove ineffective. As an amorphous collection of independent operators, Hawalas do not depend on a single location or infrastructure. A crackdown that attempts to ban the networks would simply drive them underground. Because many citizens in these countries would view actions of this sort as caving to Western demands at the expense of Muslim tradition, it could also create a backlash against the governments.
Instead, what may need to be done is to see how Hawalas can be licensed and or registered so that they will continue to serve those who need the service while, at the same time, not becoming abused by money launderers and criminals.
Along these lines, participants at a conference in Abu Dhabi held on May 16, 2002 recommended the setting up of control systems to monitor Hawalas with sufficient documentation about the remitters and recipients of funds, to guard against any diversion of such funds into illegal or criminal activities. They also called for government licensing and regulation of Hawala offices in the same way as insurance offices are regulated.
For its part, Pakistan is establishing a Special Investigation Group (SIG) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to counter terrorism. This group could help enforce Hawala regulations. In addition, crime wings of the FIA would help the SIG investigate cash flows to and from suspected groups and individuals through illegal monetary transactions.
If licensing, registration, or normal police work (described by Jenkins, 2002) is ineffective in stopping the abuse of the Hawala systems by terrorists, an economic approach should be considered. If the desire of the authorities is to constrain or significantly reduce the importance of Hawala activity, this means reducing the economic incentives to use the Hawala system. There is probably no better way to accomplish this than to facilitate cheap, fast remittances across international boundaries, and to do away with dual and parallel exchange markets, which are always an incentive to keep transactions underground.
In other words if those countries had reasonably expedient, well regulated and user-friendly banks, then the Hawala system would not have flourished and would not have been abused by terrorists and criminal elements. In this regard, there have been some encouraging signs. Several exchange companies in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Gulf countries have now adopted the door-to-door delivery of money in a manner similar to one that the Philippine banks have successfully introduced and implemented to stave off the unofficial market operators. The more innovative institutions in India are now using low-cost couriers to deliver door-to-door service. This compensates for the lack of presence of banks in different parts of the country. The smaller and more numerous exchange companies are also competing today with the Hawala system in speed, efficiency of execution, settlement, and delivery of money and services.
These factors may prove to be the demise of the Hawala system that has been prone to errors, fraud, and abuse by unscrupulous groups.
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home page.
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, email ccc@nps.navy.mil with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other purpose.
For Further Reading
Alden, Edward, "Terror's Money Trail" (Financial Times, October 18, 2002).
Baldauf, Scott, "The War on Terror's Money--India's Six Month Investigation Offers Lessons on Fighting Underground Banking" (Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 2002).
Farah, Douglas, "Al Qaeda's Gold: Following the Trail to Dubai" (Washington Post, February 18, 2002).
Frantz, Douglas, "Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally" (New York Times, October 3, 2001).
Jenkins, Holman, "How About al Qaeda's Moneymen?" (Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2002), p. A15.
Jost, Patrick, and Harjit Singh Sandhu, "The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering" (Interpol, October 2, 2002).
Sfakianakis, John, "Antiquated Laundering Ways Prevail" (Al-Ahram Weekly Online, April 4, 2002).
Siddiqui, Tahir, "Special Body to Counter Terrorism Planned" (Dawn, August 8, 2002).

The Rest @ Center for Contemporary Conflict

Abu Zubayr,Abu Zubaydah

Morocco Detainee Linked to Qaeda

Published: June 19, 2002
A senior agent for Al Qaeda with links to the group's former operations chief has been arrested in Morocco, goverment officials said today.

The man, Abu Zubayr, was taken into custody last week, the officials said. He is believed to have been associated with Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda's former operations chief, who is being held by the United States. American officials said they were uncertain whether Abu Zubayr was involved in the planning of the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States.

The officials added that while he was not as high-ranking in Al Qaeda's hierarchy as Abu Zubaydah, Abu Zubayr was still one of the most important members of Al Qaeda to be captured, ''maybe one of the top three or four,'' as one official put it.

Officials declined to say whether Abu Zubayr would be turned over to the United States. His nationality could not be determined.

Morocco said last week that it had broken up a plot by Al Qaeda to attack American and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Three Saudis, said to be members of Al Qaeda, were charged in Morocco on Monday in the plot, in which they were reportedly planning to sail small boats loaded with explosives into the shipping lanes.

Abu Zubayr has been under interrogation by the C.I.A. and F.B.I. for several months and has provided some valuable information, the agencies say. But he has not been cooperative, and his interrogators have had to manipulate him in order to get him to talk, they add. American officials say he is not being tortured.

• Officials said Abu Zubayr had helped to run Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before Sept. 11. In that role, they said, he worked closely with
• Abu Zubaydah, who screened individuals who wanted to enter the camps and later gave them assignments.
  Abu Zubayr's nickname is the Bear, which is not a play on his name but is said to come from the fact that he weighs more than 300 pounds.
  

The Rest @ NY Times

Chris Huber of Switzerland Accused in Congo War

I have been out of pocket, back now, sorry for the time off.

-Shimron


Swiss man is being accused of funding rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo through his lucrative mineral business.

Chris Huber is believed to be working closely with the Rwandan army through his business ventures in exporting a mineral called colombo tantalite, or coltan, widely used in electronic devices such as mobile phones.

• A new report by over 30 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) states that natural resources, such as coltan, are being smuggled from Congo by other countries involved in the current war, such as Rwanda, which are using revenues to sustain their war efforts.
  
• The report, presented in Brussels on behalf of the NGOs by the Antwerp-based International Peace Information Service (IPIS), calls on electronic manufacturers to ban the import of coltan from warring countries such as Congo, where the number of war victims since 1998 is estimated to be 2.5 million people.

Coltan is a metallic ore, which, when refined, changes into a heat-resistant powder that can hold a high electrical charge. This makes it a vital element in creating capacitors, the electronic elements inside miniature circuit boards used in mobile phones and laptops.

The recent technology boom has caused the price of coltan to rocket to as much as $400 per kilogram, with manufacturers such as Nokia and Sony struggling to meet demand.

Offshore companies

According to IPIS,

Huber has played an important part in financing war efforts in Rwanda, which is supporting rebel forces in eastern Congo.

Huber’s offshore companies, including Finmining and Raremet, purchase coltan from Rwanda Metals, a business affiliated to the Rwandan armed forces, says the report.

IPIS calls on the federal cabinet and the Swiss parliament to carry out a detailed investigation into Huber’s business activities.

Rapid reaction

Ieron Cuvelier, the co-author of the IPIS report, said it was imperative that the Swiss authorities act quickly, as Huber, who has been active in the trading of coltan since 1997, is one of the Rwandan army’s most important partners.

Speaking to swissinfo, Cuvelier added that Huber should be arrested unless he was able to provide evidence that his business activities were compliant with international trade regulations.

Questions regarding the sale of coltan in eastern Congo, which is valued at $100 million, were previously raised during a session of parliamentary question time last October.

The Swiss economic minister, Pascal Couchepin, responded to the query by saying that Bern had been working closely with a panel of United Nations experts on the matter.

As a result a report published by the UN on the sale of the mineral, both Swissair and the Belgian carrier, Sabena, had suspended flights originating from eastern Africa that were being used for the export of coltan in June 2000.

The UN report stated that although most illegal activities were organised by local businesses and individuals, there were also international companies involved in the trade of minerals in the region and it called for sanctions against these businesses.
The almost limitless mineral resources in Congo were a curse on the war-torn nation, the report said, with unscrupulous profiteers making the most of political instability in the country.
Endangered gorillas
The production of coltan is not only a political problem, but also an environmental one, because the material is being extracted from Congo’s national parks.
There are over 10,000 mineral workers active in the Kahuzi-Biega national park, one of the most important retreats of the endangered Grey Gorillas. In recent years, their numbers have dwindled from 8,000 to 1,000.
Since the workers moved into the area, gorillas are being slaughtered for meat.
Swiss-Congo trade
Despite the political instability in Congo, Hugo Salvisberg, a member of the Swiss Chamber of Commerce for African Countries, said Switzerland was keen to develop business ties with the country.
Salvisberg told swissinfo that great efforts were being made to build up contacts with the new Congolese leader, Joseph Kabila.
It was important to build up a presence in the region, said Salvisberg, and there were many small to medium-sized businesses interested in becoming involved in the region. He added that a Swiss congress in nearby Cameroon would take place in the near future, with the aim of introducing Swiss businesses to the region.

by Jean-Michel Berthoud

The Rest @ Swissinfo