Al Shabaab's Executive Council and Their Clans

This was originally published 5 May 2001, and lays out key figures in al Shabaab leadership. Most names are well known, some are not, some are now dead.

- Shimron Issachar

*************************************

MOGADISHU (Sunatimes) The executive council of Al-Shabaab militant group in southern Somalia are 85 members of Somalis and foreigners. 42 of that figure are Somalis while the rest are Al-Qaeda operatives from different outside countries as indicated in a year long investigation made by reporters from Waagacusub Media and Radio Mogadishu.

The leader of the Al-Qaeda members fighting along side Al-Shabaab insurgent group in Somalia is Fazul Abdullah Mohamed of Comorous Islands as his deputy is Mohamed Faadil of Saudi Arabia while the head of the network's military operations was Khalid Al-Muhajir Al-Mustafa who was killed in the current ongoing fighting in Mogadishu between Al-Shabaab and the government troops backed by the African Union peacekeepers on 3 September 2010.

Foriegner Al-Qaeda fighters who escaped from thier origin countries and are still at large have a big influence in Al-Shabaab administration in Somalia and this may certainly create bigger security concern in the East Africa region.

The names, ranks and clans of the Somali executive members in Al-Shabaab are as here below:-

1. Ahmed Abdi Godane (Abu-Zubeyr), the leader of Al-Shabaab from Isaq clan of Arab sub-clan.

2. (Abu-Zalma)Ibrahim Haji Jama Meecaad Afkhani , the first deputy leader of Al-Shabaab and in charge of finance, from Isaq clan of Sacad Muse sub-clan.

3. Mukhtar Robow Ali (Abu-Mansor), the second deputy leader of Al-Shabaab, from Rahanweyn clan of Leesaan sub-clan.

4. Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (Ina-Shangole), the head of public awareness of Al-Shabaab, from Darod clan of Awrtabe sub-clan.

5. Mukhtar Abu-Muslim, the head of Fatwas, from Darod clan of Ogaden sub-clan.

6. Khalif Mohamud Warsame (Khalif Cadale) the head of tracking down the NGO's, from Hawiye clan of Habar-Gidir, Ayr.

7. Madey Mamad Karatay, the head of destroying the graves, from Tuni clan.

8. Omar Mohamud Jimale (Matan), the head of security guards of Godane, from Hawiye clan of Duduble sub-clan.

9. Ali Muhumad Rage (Ali Dhere), the spokesman for Al-Shabaab, from Hawiye clan of Murursade sub-clan.

10. Abdulahi Timo Jilic, the head of technician for the weapons and salesman, from Hawiye clan of Murursade.

11. Hassan Afgooye, the especial servant for Godane, from Dir clan of Biyo-Maal.

12. Abdulahi Nadir, the interpretor for Godane, from Isaq clan of Toljecel sub-clan.

13. Hussein Ali Fidow (Hussein Daynile), the head of regions, from Hawiye clan of Murursade sub-clan.

14. Hassan Dhere, the head of the roped property, from Hawiye clan of Habar Gidir, Ayr sub-clan.

15. Hassan Afrah, the head of relationship with pirates, from Hawiye clan of Saleban sub-clan.

16. Mohamed Omar, the head of services and caring for the foreign fighters, from Darod clan of Ogaden sub-clan.

17. Bashir Qoorgaab, the commander of mortar brigade, from Hawiye clan of Habar gidir, Saleban sub-clan.

18. Ahmed Osoble, the police commander, from Hawiye clan of Hawadle sub-clan.

19. Mahad Karatey but known as (Sheik Burhan), the head of trainings, from Hawiye clan of Ayr sub-clan.

20. Ahmed Fifle, the head of finance, from Hawiye clan of Habargidir,Eyr sub-clan.

21. Hassan Turki, the father of Mujahideens and leader of Raskamboni brigades, from Darod clan of Ogaden sub-clan.

22. Mohamed Dulyaden, the contector of Raskamboni and Al-Shabaab, from Darod clan of Ogaden sub-clan.

23. Farhan Moahmed Kahiye, the head of defence, from Hawiye clan of Saleban sub-clan.

24. Abdulahi Hirane, the head of lower Shabelle region, from Dir clan of Biyo-maal sub-clan.

25. Dahir Gamaey but uses the name (Abdi Al-Haq), the judge of Al-Shabaab, from Hawiye clan of Duduble sub-clan.

26. Ali Muse, the treasure, from Hawiye clan of Habargidir, Faqashini sub-clan.

27. ali Mohamed Hussein, the head of Banadir province, from Hawiye clan of Abgal sub-clan.

28. Abdulahi Haji (Daud), the head of assasinations, from Hawiye clan of Murursade sub-clan.

29. Omar Faruk, the head of police in Banadir province, from Darod clan of Majerteen sub-clan.

30. Mohamed Balli, the head of the propogandas (the man who described Hawiye as infedals) from Darod clan of Majerten sub-clan.

31. Aden Oonbe, the head of social affairs, not known yet for his clan.

32. Farah Ali Hussein, the head of Dacwa in middle Shabelle region, from Hawiye clan of Abgal sub-clan.

33. Yusuf Kaba Kudukade, the head of Galgadud region, from Hawiye clan of Abgal sub-clan.

34. Abdiqani Kaba Jecel, the deputy mayor of lower Shabelle region, from Darod clan of Ogaden sub-clan.

35. Abdirahim Ali Mudey, the head of taxes for coil production, from Hawiye clan of Galjecel sub-clan.

36. Hassan Qodax, the head of militias in Gedo, from Darod clan of Marehan sub-clan.

37. Hussein Daqare, the head of Gedo region, from Darod clan of Marehan sub-clan.

38. Ali Roti, the man in charge of burying the children killed in the war, from Darod clan of Majerten sub-clan.

39. Abshir Ali Bukhari, the head of middle Shabelle region, from Darod clan of Ogaden sub-clan.

40. Yusuf Moalim Abdukadir, deputy leader, not known yet for his clan.

41. Mohamud Mohamed Nor (MMNOR), the deputy commander in chief for the invasions, from Isaq clan of Habarjeclo sub-clan.

42. Sahal Isku Dhuuq, the head of kidnappings of aid workers for ransom, from Dir clan of Biyomaal sub-clan.


The Rest @ Sunatimes

Decisions for the Anglican Church in the Sudans

AFRICA/SUDAN - In October the Sudanese Bishops will decide whether to form two distinct Episcopal Conferences for the North and the South

Khartoum (Fides Service) - The Sudanese Bishops will meet in October in the Diocese of Wau (Southern Sudan) to decide whether to form two distinct Episcopal Conferences, after the separation between north and south Sudan (which officially became an independent state on July 9 ).

This is what is said by a source of the Sudan Catholic Radio News.

Currently there is only one Episcopal Conference with two independent Secretaries in Juba (the capital of southern Sudan) and in Khartoum.

This decision is likely to be affected by how the situation in the Church in northern Sudan will evolve.

• The number of faithful in the north is declining, as reported by John Ashworth, Consultant of the Church in Sudan to CISA Agency in Nairobi, since many Catholics living in the north, but born in the south, have been forced to return to their places of origin after the separation.
• "Others will likely be forced to do so in the coming months because of problems related to the granting of citizenship, as well as for the real possibility that the cultural and religious minorities in the Republic of Sudan (north) are subjected to harassment.
• This is why some churches and Catholic schools have had to close down. If Khartoum grants citizenship rights to the southern Sudanese, then the situation might improve, but it all depends on how the southerners and Christians are treated ", Ashworth said to CISA.

Out of the nine Sudanese dioceses, only two are in the North, Khartoum and El Obeid, the others (Malakal, Juba, Yei, Wau, Rumbek, Tombura-Yambio and Torit) are in the south. (L.M.) (Agenzia Fides 04/08/2011)

The Rest @ Fides

The Anatomy of an Alms for Jihad Transaction

Zakat, a legitimate Sharia tax can be used for many different things, including alms for the poor and even paying a Mujahadiin's expenses. To the payer it is simply a mandatory religious tax on money left in the bank. Many of these funds are rerouted (called money laundering) and used to pay for terrorism.

Someone fighting a" religious cause" or Holy war is a legitimate candidate for Zakat funds under Sharia law. The following is a hypothetical anatamoy of what an alms for jihad transaction looks like:

• A Jihadist logistical leader hunts down wealthy or well connected Ikhwans, (Muslim Brotherhood) believers who are ideologically aligned with a particular Jihad.
• They meet them on line, at conferences, through funding Brokers (UBL brokered deals like this at high levels, for example the Golden Chain List).
• They come to agreement about funding. The Funder need not be aware of the details of what the funding is for as long as he gets credit for the Zakat religious taxes they owe in accordance with Sharia.

• Then they transfer the funds using a Hawala or remmitance company. For example, a not-so-hypothetical funder in UAE agrees to fund a Mujahadeen group in Northern Nigeria, Somalia, Cameroon, Western Sahara, or even the new country of South Sudan.

The Zakat transaction recorder gives the name and number of one or more of his independent Hawala agents to the fund provider who is located in the funder's country, in this case, the UAE.

• The Agent looks up an agent in the receiving country from his agent directory, or more likely is given a preferred agent by the terrorist logistician in the country where the funds are needed; in our example, Northern Nigeria,
• The Sending Hawala Agent calls the receiving Hawala agent, and they make a deal.
• They then call the Hawala Agency, in our example, Dahabshiil (based in Somalia) and the Agency agrees to back the transaction.
• Dahabshiil is supposed to ask questions about what the transaction is for. In our example, the sending Independent Hawala Agent tells the agency that he thinks it is for "farm equipment".
• The Funder gives the funds to the sending Independent Hawala agent. The agent charges a 4% commission for the transfer. He keeps 25% of the commission, the agency (Dahabshiil in this case) keeps 50% of the commission, and the receiving Independent Hawala Agent keeps 25% of the commission.
• There are many transactions like this a month, and Dahabshiil settles up with the Independent Agents by receiving and paying the funds out in Aggregate every week or month.
• The terrorist in the receiving country gets a phone call with an agent's contact information if needed, and a transaction code number.
• The Terrorist goes to the receiving agent in Northern Nigeria and gets the cash.
• The funder takes his Zakat religious tax receipt for "farm equipment"from the sending Hawala back to the Zakat accountant - he may never know to whom his Zakat is going, or what it is used for. This is permissible under Sharia.

The steps in this process provide deniability for terrorism support at every level. It may be true that someone thought their zakat funds were going for the medical needs of children, and they were actually used to buy an explosive vest used by a child.

• The funder could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
• The Sender could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
• Dahabshiil could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
• The receiver might say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
• The fund user could say he did not know the funds were for childrens' medical needs, and he buys the child's explosive vest.

Only one person commits the crime, but no one else in the process accepts responsibility for equipping the war criminal to use a child as a bomb.

Note: Dahabshiil is used as an example. There are many many Hawalas in almost every country on earth. Dahabshiil and its leaders were severely sanctioned after 9-11 for a history of unaccountable transactions.

Since that time, they have taken steps to mitigate the process and many sanctions against Dahabshiil have been lifted by the US. This global corporation has taken strategic steps to look more like a bank, but every day diaspora around the world send money home to their families and clans using the Hawala system... And some of those transactions fund terrorists.

The following posts from a discussion among Hawala

AQIM with About a ton of Libyan Semtex

AQIM: how to protect Algeria suicide bomber 05/08/2011 at 09h: 30

 The safety device has been strengthened in Algiers. Bomb attacks against convoys of the army, suicide ...

 For three months, there has been an upsurge in terrorist violence. Trafficking of arms from Libya are not strangers and authorities feared the worst during Ramadan. Algeria is under surveillance ...

 On the eve of Ramadan, the month in which the jihadists of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) mission is to increase the coup, Abu Musab Abdelwadoud - Abdelmalek Droukdel real name - national emir of terrorist organization, confirmed that the group recovered nearly a ton of Semtex from Libya arsenals in June. 

 July 16, in fact, a double suicide bombing targeted the police station in Bordj Ménaïl, 60 km east of Algiers. Result: two dead, including a civilian, and a dozen injured. Nine days later, Thénia in Kabylia, an Atos - a low-end car manufacturer Hyundai South Korean popular in Algeria - is intercepted at a roadblock. On board, three suicide bombers, including Abdelqahar Benhadj (see box below).

When police ordered him to stop, the driver refused and darkens. One of the gendarmes draws and fires a single bullet. The vehicle exploded. The violence of the explosion is such that a police source estimated that the three men were carrying several hundred kilograms of explosives. Were they in Algiers to commit their crimes? "Not likely, said a police superintendent. The terrorists know they have no chance with el-fnek. " 

The "Fennec", an explosive detector about the size of a remote control, with an antenna, powers all the barriers controlling access to capital. "Since we have this equipment, acquired in 2008 from a U.S. firm, or any car bomb containing explosives could not enter Algiers, said the Commissioner. This is why suicide bombers avoid the city, but it's not like they lack. "In fact, the last suicide bomber that hit the capital was in December 2007.

A jihadist drove his truck against the UN headquarters on the heights of Algiers, killing 67 people including 10 UN employees. Since then, this type of attack focuses on Kabylia, which houses the headquarters of maquis Abdelmalek Droukdel. "It is much easier to secure the capital by building barriers around the Kabylie filter with its dense road network," said a senior officer (since June, a presidential decree has placed all of the forces responsible for the fight terrorism under the command of the army). The fact remains that the safety was further strengthened in Algiers . The increased activity of AQIM is not limited to suicide attacks, the organization conducts operations knuckle-fist against the police. "Since mid-April, we lost about fifty soldiers, police and gendarmes, said the officer.

 The Rest @ GrendelReport

Somali Piracy Ransom Payments Funding Al Shabaab

Written July 6th, 2011

NAIROBI – Ransoms paid to Somali pirates to free merchant vessels are ending up in the hands of Islamist militants, laying shipping groups open to accusations of breaching international sanctions, U.N. officials told Reuters.

John Steed, the principal military adviser to the U.N. special envoy to Somalia and head of the envoy’s counter-piracy unit, said links between armed pirate gangs and Somalia’s al Qaeda-affiliated rebels were gradually firming.

“The payment of ransoms just like any other funding activity, illegal or otherwise, is technically in breach of the Somalia sanctions regime if it makes the security situation in Somalia worse,” said Steed.

“Especially if it is ending up in the hands of terrorists or militia leaders — and we believe it is, some directly, some more indirectly,” said Steed, a retired military officer.
Ransom demands have risen steadily in recent years. According to one study, the average ransom stood at $5.4 million (3.3 million pounds) in 2010, up from $150,000 in 2005, helping

Somali pirates rake in nearly $240 million last year.
Steed acknowledged he had no proof of an operational relationship between the pirates and the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab rebels who control much of southern and central Somalia and parts of the capital Mogadishu.

Some political analysts said the policy of some Western governments to endorse the payment of ransoms, seen as fuelling the insecurity, is at odds with their financial support for the Somali government and the African troops propping it up.

Under the terms of the arms embargo on Somalia, financial support to armed groups in the Horn of Africa country is banned. Both the United States and Britain regard al Shabaab as a terrorist organisation.

The U.N.’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) says pirates are increasingly launching their cross-ocean raids from the al Shabaab-controlled southern coastal city of Kismayu. Recruitment for pirates from the region was also on the rise, it said.

“Detained pirates tell us that some level of cooperation with al Shabaab is necessary to run a criminal enterprise,” said Alan Cole, piracy program coordinator at UNODC.
Al Shabaab sources agree.

“If there was no relationship between us, there is no way the pirates would be able to operate, or carry their weapons within zones we control,” said an al Shabaab militant based in the pirate haven of Haradhere, north of Mogadishu.

BIGGEST GAMES IN TOWN

Natznet Tesfay of Executive Analysis said al Shabaab was heavily involved in

• Smuggling through Kismayu,
• Slapping taxes on illegal charcoal exports to the Gulf,
• Arms shipments from Yemen
• Electronic goods destined for the region.

“Piracy and contraband smuggling are the two biggest games around,” said Tesfay at the specialist intelligence company.

Tesfay said she had yet to see evidence of an “operational relationship” between the pirates and al Shabaab but that the militants had a reputation for monopolising key income-earning sectors once they had taken control of an area.


In February al Shabaab seized a number of pirate gang leaders in Haradhere and forced them to accept a multi-million dollar deal under which the pirates would hand over 20 percent of future ransoms.

A Reuters investigation found the following payments had been made to al Shabaab’s “marine office”:

• On February 25: $200,000 from the release of the Japanese-owned MV Izumi after pirates received a $4.5 million ransom.
• On March 8: $80,000 from the $2 million release of the St Vincent & Grenadines-flagged MV Rak Africana.
• On March 9: $100,000 after the Singapore-flagged MV York was freed for $4.5 million.
• On April 13: $600,000 from the release of the German ship Beluga Nomination after a $5.5 million ransom was paid.
• On April 15: A $66,000 share of the $3.6 million ransom handed over for the Panama-flagged MV Asphalt Venture.
• On May 14: $100,000 from the release of two Spanish crew of the Spanish-owned FV VEGA 5.

The amounts were corroborated by pirates, al Shabaab militants and residents of Haradhere.

ONLY WAY TO FREE HOSTAGES

“Some money has to be ending up in al Shabaab’s hands,” said Michael Frodl, a Washington Lawyer and head of C-level Maritime Risks, which advises Lloyd’s of London underwriters.

Frodl questioned whether payment of ransoms would be even an indirect breach of the arms embargo, but said that if proved, it might break laws in the United States and Britain against funding terrorism.

Sanctions experts said ransoms could violate the arms embargo if they were voluntary financial support to armed groups in Somalia, but said the payments could be considered extortion, and therefore involuntary, blurring the issue.

Some Horn of Africa experts argued there appeared to be no clear systematic link between pirates and al Shabaab’s central command, but there probably were ties at a more local level.

It was likely there was a bleeding of pirate money to local rebel commanders through clan ties, “taxes” or even protection money, they said.

C-level Maritime’s Frodl said the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) carried out reviews of all potential ransom payments to determine if the pirate group in question had ever handed over part of a ransom to al Shabaab.

• “Most times OFAC has authorised payment because it has found no link,” Frodl said. “But if there is indeed a 20 percent ‘tax’ being applied by Shabaab against pirate ransoms in Haradhere, a major pirate hub it now controls, then things could change.”

In April 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order barring any financial dealings with 11 masterminds of the Somali conflict. According to the OFAC, two of them are in charge of pirate gangs.

While Washington has firmly opposed ransom payments, counter-piracy experts say London — home to the world’s shipping and insurance industries — has demonstrated a conspicuous lack of appetite to follow suit.

The UK Chamber of Shipping said it would continue to consider piracy a criminal activity, until proof emerged of financial ties between the sea-bandits and insurgents.

The association welcomed what it called the government’s “balanced view” in refraining from preventing ransom deals.

“Frankly, that’s the only way we get people released,” said Mark Brownrigg, the chamber’s director-general.

(Additional reporting by Mohamed Ahmed in Mogadishu and Jonathan Saul in London, editing by Tim Pearce)

The Rest @ Reuters via Somali Diaspora News

al Qaeda kidnapping Expands to Northern Nigeria

Nigerian Hostage Video being examined by Brits

VOA News August 4 2011

British authorities are checking the authenticity of a video claiming to show a British and Italian man kidnapped in May in Nigeria.

Britain's Foreign Office said Thursday officials are urgently examining the video, in which two men claim to have been kidnapped by al-Qaida.

The video was sent to news agency AFP's Ivory Coast office, but has not been made public.
Gunmen abducted the two men on May 12 in their apartment in the northwestern state of Kebbi. Both men were working as engineers for an Italian construction company.

British officials have confirmed that two men, including a British national, have been kidnapped, but have not released their names.

British officials say they are working to secure the hostages' release, and urged their captors to “show compassion and release them.”

Scores of kidnappings have been carried out in Nigeria's oil-rich southern Niger Delta region but such attacks are relatively rare in the north.

Several foreigners have been kidnapped in Nigeria's northern neighbor Niger in recent years. Nigeria's Kebbi state borders Niger and Benin.

The Rest @ VOA

Niger Travel Warnings Reissued by the US

August 05, 2011

The Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to Niger, and urges extreme caution due to increased kidnapping threats against Westerners. This replaces the Travel Warning for Niger dated January 12, to update information on security concerns, registering with the U.S. Embassy, and access to current security information.

Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a terrorist group, continues its attempts to kidnap Westerners in Niger, including U.S. citizens, and has been successful in kidnapping Europeans in the region.

• On January 7, two French nationals were kidnapped in the capital city of Niamey. They were found dead less than 24 hours later following a rescue attempt by French and Nigerien military forces.
• In September 2010, seven people, including five French citizens, a Togolese national, and a Malagasy citizen, were kidnapped by AQIM from the northern mining town of Arlit.
• Four French citizens are still being held hostage by AQIM.
• In April 2010, a French citizen and his Algerian driver were kidnapped. The Algerian was freed. AQIM claimed to have killed the French citizen in retaliation for the July attempted rescue operation conducted by Mauritanian and French military forces.
• In November 2009, heavily armed individuals attempted to kidnap U.S. Embassy officials in Tahoua.

Due to these ongoing security threats and in view of the January 7 incident, the U.S. Embassy in Niamey continues to restrict the travel of U.S. government employees and official visitors in areas north of Niamey.

The U.S. Embassy also continues to evaluate proposed travel, as well as both official and personal activities, on a case-by-case basis in light of the current security situation. The U.S. Embassy urges all U.S. citizens in Niger to maintain extremely high vigilance.

As a result of safety and security concerns, some organizations, including foreign companies, NGOs, and private aid organizations, have temporarily suspended operations in Niger or withdrawn some family members and/or staff.

Although the U.S. government places the highest priority on the safe recovery of kidnapped U.S. citizens, it is U.S. policy not to make concessions to kidnappers.

The U.S. Embassy in Niamey strongly encourages U.S. citizens who travel to or remain in Niger despite this Travel Warning to enroll in Smart Travel Enrollment Program (STEP) so you can receive the most up-to-date security information. You should remember to keep current all of your information in STEP, including your phone number and the email address where you can be reached in case of an emergency.

The U.S. Embassy in Niamey is located on Rue des Ambassades. The Embassy’s telephone number is (227) 20-72-26-61. You can contact the Embassy after-hours for emergencies at telephone: (227) 20-72-31-41. Click here to visit the Embassy website.

U.S. citizens should consult the Department of State’s website for the Country Specific Information for Niger and the Worldwide Caution. Up-to-date information on safety and security is available toll-free at 1-888-407-4747 from within the United States and Canada, or at regular toll rates at 1-202-501-4444 for callers from other countries from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except federal holidays).