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Showing posts with label The Golden Chain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Golden Chain. Show all posts

Monday, August 08, 2011

The Anatomy of an Alms for Jihad Transaction

Zakat, a legitimate Sharia tax can be used for many different things, including alms for the poor and even paying a Mujahadiin's expenses. To the payer it is simply a mandatory religious tax on money left in the bank. Many of these funds are rerouted (called money laundering) and used to pay for terrorism.

Someone fighting a" religious cause" or Holy war is a legitimate candidate for Zakat funds under Sharia law. The following is a hypothetical anatamoy of what an alms for jihad transaction looks like:
  • A Jihadist logistical leader hunts down wealthy or well connected Ikhwans, (Muslim Brotherhood) believers who are ideologically aligned with a particular Jihad.
  • They meet them on line, at conferences, through funding Brokers (UBL brokered deals like this at high levels, for example the Golden Chain List).
  • They come to agreement about funding. The Funder need not be aware of the details of what the funding is for as long as he gets credit for the Zakat religious taxes they owe in accordance with Sharia.
  • Then they transfer the funds using a Hawala or remmitance company. For example, a not-so-hypothetical funder in UAE agrees to fund a Mujahadeen group in Northern Nigeria, Somalia, Cameroon, Western Sahara, or even the new country of South Sudan.
The Zakat transaction recorder gives the name and number of one or more of his independent Hawala agents to the fund provider who is located in the funder's country, in this case, the UAE.
  • The Agent looks up an agent in the receiving country from his agent directory, or more likely is given a preferred agent by the terrorist logistician in the country where the funds are needed; in our example, Northern Nigeria,
  • The Sending Hawala Agent calls the receiving Hawala agent, and they make a deal.
  • They then call the Hawala Agency, in our example, Dahabshiil (based in Somalia) and the Agency agrees to back the transaction.
  • Dahabshiil is supposed to ask questions about what the transaction is for. In our example, the sending Independent Hawala Agent tells the agency that he thinks it is for "farm equipment".
  • The Funder gives the funds to the sending Independent Hawala agent. The agent charges a 4% commission for the transfer. He keeps 25% of the commission, the agency (Dahabshiil in this case) keeps 50% of the commission, and the receiving Independent Hawala Agent keeps 25% of the commission.
  • There are many transactions like this a month, and Dahabshiil settles up with the Independent Agents by receiving and paying the funds out in Aggregate every week or month.
  • The terrorist in the receiving country gets a phone call with an agent's contact information if needed, and a transaction code number.
  • The Terrorist goes to the receiving agent in Northern Nigeria and gets the cash.
  • The funder takes his Zakat religious tax receipt for "farm equipment"from the sending Hawala back to the Zakat accountant - he may never know to whom his Zakat is going, or what it is used for. This is permissible under Sharia.
The steps in this process provide deniability for terrorism support at every level. It may be true that someone thought their zakat funds were going for the medical needs of children, and they were actually used to buy an explosive vest used by a child.
  • The funder could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • The Sender could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • Dahabshiil could say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • The receiver might say they did not know the funds were for a child's explosive vest
  • The fund user could say he did not know the funds were for childrens' medical needs, and he buys the child's explosive vest.
Only one person commits the crime, but no one else in the process accepts responsibility for equipping the war criminal to use a child as a bomb.

Note: Dahabshiil is used as an example. There are many many Hawalas in almost every country on earth. Dahabshiil and its leaders were severely sanctioned after 9-11 for a history of unaccountable transactions.

Since that time, they have taken steps to mitigate the process and many sanctions against Dahabshiil have been lifted by the US. This global corporation has taken strategic steps to look more like a bank, but every day diaspora around the world send money home to their families and clans using the Hawala system... And some of those transactions fund terrorists.

The following posts from a discussion among Hawala

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

ost Bin Laden Death Analysis of al Qaeda - Must Read Chapter 3


The year was 1979, and the outsized profits derived from the OPEC oil embargo had fueled the rise of BCCI, whose massive criminal enterprise was now expanding its operations into the United States. Meanwhile, radical Islamists had just taken control of Iran, and a man named Ivan Boesky was about to fly to Tehran, where he planned to spend a year developing relationships with the new regime.


These seemingly unrelated events would have figured in the thoughts of a man named Irving Kott, who one day that year got into his car and started the engine. But Kott suddenly remembered that he forgot something in the house, and he jumped out of the car. Lucky for him, because that’s when a powerful bomb exploded, turning Kott’s car into giant fireball of mangled metal. Kott took some shrapnel, but he survived, and the first thing he did, according to some of his associates, was call his friend, Ali Nazerali.

Kott was livid – he wanted to know what the deal was with the car bomb. Ali Nazerali said he’d ask around. After a few hours, Nazerali called back and said the word on the street was that a hit man named Cecil Kirby planted the bomb, and Kirby worked for Canadian mob boss Vic Controni. It seemed Kott had run a stock scam with Controni, who was then one of North America’s biggest market manipulators, and Kott stole Controni’s share of the deal.

Later court filings revealed that Kirby (and Kott) had also done some work for Antonio Commisso, a.k.a. L’avvocatu, or The Lawyer – a Toronto boss of the Ndrangheta Mafia organization, also known as the Siderno Group, because it has its origins in Siderno, Italy. One way or another, Nazerali offered to patch things up with the Mafia – and he did a good job of it. Commisso ordered Kirby to lay off, and a couple of years later Kott, Nazerali and the Mafia were all in business together, running a brokerage called First Commerce Securities.

Nazerali had spent his formative years working in key positions for the powerful Gokal family of Pakistan. According to “False Profits” (one of the definitive books on the BCCI scandal), as of the early 1980s, the Gokals (who were closely intertwined with Pakistan’s intelligence services) controlled the Gulf Group, which was BCCI’s most important satellite company. The Gokals had also become the most important business partners of the Iranian regime, and served that regime as semi-official financial advisers, handling everything from budgets to the procurement of sophisticated weaponry.

Nazerali was also a blood relative of Swaleh Naqvi, the chief executive officer of BCCI, and through his relative and his dealings with the Gokals, he had come to be a trusted business associate of the Iranian regime and of BCCI’s other principals. He was especially close to Sheikh Mahfouz, the future Al Qaeda Golden Chain financier, but he also sealed business relationships with the ruling families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It was through Sheikh Mahfouz that Nazerali came to be an important business partner of Yasin al Qadi, the future “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.”

Nazerali dabbled in arms dealing, delivering weapons to war zones in Africa and to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, but his primary line of business in the early 1980s was his Mafia brokerage, First Commerce Securities, which soon became an important component of the BCCI syndicate. The importance of First Commerce to BCCI was evidenced not only by Nazerali’s relationship to BCCI’s CEO, but also by the fact that the CEO dispatched his relative, Kazem Naqvi (who is also Nazerali’s relative), to visit First Commerce’s offices almost every day.

Meanwhile, according to “False Profits”, a number of First Commerce’s top executives were simultaneously employees of BCCI, or had worked for BCCI affiliates before joining the Kott-Nazerali operation. At least two of First Commerce’s top executives – Sinan Raouff and Walter Bonn – had previously worked, along with Nazerali, for the Gokal family in Pakistan. Raouff, who was not only a stock manipulator, but also an arms dealer, had previously worked for the Iraqi foreign ministry, and helped BCCI traffic weapons to both Iraq and Iran.

The Gokals brokered many of the weapons sales to Iran, laundering the money through BCCI, and skimming large amounts of the bank’s profits for themselves. The Gokal family patriarch, Abbas Gokal, would eventually be sentenced to 14 years in prison for his role in the BCCI scandal, and at his sentencing, the judge said that Gokal was among the most destructive criminals ever to be prosecuted. Gokal and his associates (including Sheikh Mahfouz, who paid a $200 million fine to settle charges for his role in the BCCI fraud) had, according to the judge, almost single-handedly “shattered the integrity” of the global financial system.

BCCI’s contribution to this destruction was accomplished with considerable help from Mafia-tied entities such as the Nazerali and Kott operation, First Commerce Securities, which is often referred to as “penny stock” brokerage, though that is to underestimate the extent to which it was involved not only in manipulating penny stocks, but also in undermining the broader markets.

One of First Commerce’s former business partners, himself an associate of the Mafia, says that the brokerage was a major player in the “death spiral” finance game, and that it took down many good companies. These were mostly small to mid-sized companies, but Nazerali and his associates would in later years move on to bigger prey.

* * * * * * * * *

Around the time that Nazerali opened First Commerce, Syed Ziauddin Ali Akbar, who had served as BCCI’s treasurer, formed Capcom Financial Services, a commodities futures and investment management firm. Akbar’s sister was married to Nazerali’s relative, Swaleh Naqvi, the chief executive officer of BCCI, and all of Capcom’s key shareholders were BCCI people. Soon, the firm, like First Commerce (and probably trading in concert with First Commerce), became one of BCCI’s most important affiliates.

Later, much of Capcom’s money would disappear into the hands of Saudi intelligence operatives who used the money to buy shares in and penetrate American communications companies, including Western Tele-Communications and American Telecommunications Corporation. A Congressional Subcommittee would later state that the purpose of this operation was probably to gain the capability to track communications in the United States.

Another purpose was to manipulate the companies’ stock prices, and the operation could not have succeeded without the full support and complicity of a man named Michael Milken, who was then the most powerful financial operator on Wall Street. Milken’s operation at the Beverly Hills offices of Drexel Burnham Lambert, which was, in the 1980s, one of the largest investment banks in America, brokered much of the trading conducted by BCCI’s Capcom unit. All told, according to Capcom’s former president, Milken’s operation transacted Capcom securities contracts worth more than $90 billion, an astounding sum at that time.

If you believe what you read in the press, Milken is a financial genius who revolutionized the markets for high-yield debt, also known as “junk bonds.” Most journalists refer to him as the “junk bond king” while noting with admiration that he is also a “prominent philanthropist.” Even the usually reliable Economist magazine published an article in September 2010 that hailed Milken as an “innovator” whose junk bond finance helped build some of America’s greatest companies.

It is true that Milken’s finance contributed to the growth a few major companies – Ted Turner’s CNN and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp., for example – but Milken and his cronies destroyed far more companies than they built. Among the many corporations that they wiped out were a number of America’s biggest savings and loans companies – massive financial operations whose collapse triggered the famous savings and loan crisis that inflicted serious damage on the economy and cost American tax-payers billions of dollars.

As was later noted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (one of the government agencies that cleaned up this mess), Milken and his closest associates “willfully, deliberately, and systematically plundered certain S&Ls.” And while Milken’s impressive public relations machine has successfully convinced America’s financial journalists to forget the past, it should be remembered that Milken was, in 1989, indicted on 99-counts of securities fraud, market manipulation, and insider trading. He was sentenced to ten years, two of which he served in a federal penitentiary. At the time, most people in America knew Milken as the greatest financial criminal ever to operate on Wall Street.

It is important to understand how the Milken criminal enterprise functioned, because some of the same tactics (and some of the same people) contributed to the financial collapse of 2008.

A principal feature of the Milken operation was a variation on what mobsters refer to as a “bust out.”

In the olden days, Mafia thugs would take over, say, the corner bar, load it up with debt, siphon out the cash, and declare bankruptcy. Milken elaborated on the “bust out” and brought it to the world of high finance. The best book on this is Ben Stein’s “License to Steal”, though Connie Bruck’s “The Predators’ Ball” describes Milken’s larger scheme as well.

The scheme worked as follows: Milken issued junk bonds to finance about a dozen of his closest associates, who used the finance to take over good companies. Under the direction of Milken’s cronies, the companies took on ever greater amounts of Milken’s junk bond debt. But rather than use the finance to grow the companies, the Milken cronies simply looted the companies of their cash.

To create the illusion that there was a liquid market for the junk bonds, the Milken cronies traded their bonds amongst each other at stair-stepping prices, in an illegal process known as “daisy-chaining.” As the government’s indictments of Milken made clear, this junk bond merry-go-round was conducted with Mafia-like secrecy – nobody other than Milken’s closest associates knew that the only buyers for the junk bonds were Milken’s other closest associates.

Meanwhile, Milken presided over a nationwide network of brokerages and fund managers who traded on inside information about these companies and manipulated their stock prices.

When the Milken junk bond cronies were done looting their companies, Milken would cut off access to credit and other traders in his network would attack the companies with waves of short selling. This sent the companies’ stock price spiraling downwards, so that even if the companies’ boards were to remove the Milken cronies, the company would be unable to raise finance from more reputable sources.

When the companies went bankrupt, Milken and the other short sellers would make a fortune. Other Milken cronies would make still more money by purchasing the companies’ assets at fire-sale prices in the bankruptcy proceedings. And then they would repeat the process all over again, assured that junk bond merry-go-round would supply a constant stream of lootable finance.

But, of course, this scheme eventually collapsed – and it must be stressed, the vast majority of the companies that Milken financed ultimately disappeared.

In later years, the “bust out” concept was refined into such schemes as the “death spiral” PIPEs finance that was pioneered with help from Al Qaeda Golden Chain member Shiekh Yamani’s Investcorp and other outfits. Always, the basic idea is to finance a company, load it with debt, and then take it down.

In the 1980s, Milken and his cronies orchestrated a number of bust outs in league with BCCI and its proprietors, including future Al Qaeda Golden Chain member Shiekh Mahfouz, who remained one of Milken’s closest associates until Sheikh Mahfouz’s death in 2009.

I need to be specific about what I mean by “closest associate.” Milken has thousands of associates and not all of them are bad. But the three dozen or so people who are his closest associates are, every one of them, criminals. These include the dozen or so people who benefited the most from his junk bond merry go-round; his former top employees at Drexel Burnham; and a select number of brokers and fund managers, many of them best known as short sellers.

One of the outfits that benefited the most from Milken’s junk bond merry-go-round and the subsequent bust outs was, as I mentioned, BCCI. For example, Milken’s junk bonds financed the take-over of a savings and loan called Centrust, which became a BCCI subsidiary. Centrust was eventually looted and destroyed, but not before it played a role in the larger panoply of BCCI crimes.

Another key participant in Milken junk bond “bust out” schemes was a monumental criminal named Charles Keating. With Milken’s finance, Keating seized control of the giant Lincoln Savings and Loan, and began looting the company with help from two BCCI big wigs – Alfred Hartmann (a BCCI board member and head of BCCI’s Swiss subsidiary, Banque de Commerce et de Placements), and Abbas Gokal (the BCCI conspirator, adivsor to the the Iranian regime, and Pakistani intelligence asset who had formerly employed Ali Nazerali).

Meanwhile, back at First Commerce Securities, Ali Nazerali and BCCI’s Kazem Naqvi were busy stuffing cash and checks into large sacks that they tossed into the back of a white van, and then drove to Schiphol Airport, where they loaded the sacks onto a private jet destined for Geneva. When the sacks of proceeds of various stock manipulation schemes arrived in Geneva, they were delivered to Milken crony Charles Keating’s partner in crime, Alfred Hartmann, who laundered the money through BCCI’s Swiss subsidiary, Banque de Commerce et de Placements.

Later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began investigating BCCI for its role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear program. In announcing the investigation, the Committee said that it intended to take close look at Keating’s relationships with the Gokal family.

While it is unclear what came out of that investigation, it is certain that BCCI did, in fact, play a major role in Pakistan’s nuclear profliferation efforts. The top two scientists for that program, Abdul Qadeer Khan (known as the “Father of the Islamic Bomb”) and Bashiruddin Mahmood, have since both met with Al Qaeda. Mahmood especially is believed to have shared nuclear know-how directly with Osama bin Laden.

Of course, this is not to suggest that Keating himself had anything to do with Al Qaeda, which had not yet been created , but he was definitely a major figure in the overall BCCI criminal enterprise. It is also certain that Lincoln and Savings and Loan was one of the biggest bust outs in history. When Keating was finished looting Lincoln and Savings, the multi-billion dollar financial institution was an empty husk. And by way of complicated foreign exchange transactions, much of Lincoln’s money was diverted to an outfit called TrendInvest, which was, in effect, another subsidiary of BCCI.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meanwhile, investigated the business relationships between BCCI and another of Michael Milken’s closest associates, Marc Rich, who was (and is) the most powerful commodities trader in the world. In 1983, Rich had been indicted for illegally trading with Iran during the Iran hostage crisis. Key to Marc Rich’s transactions with Iran was the Gokal family and probably BCCI itself.

While Rich was illegally trading with Iran, his office was located in a New York building at 650 Fifth Avenue that was owned by the Alavi Foundation, which advertised itself as a charity. The FBI later discovered that the Alavi Foundation was not a charity – it was a front for the Iranian regime’s covert activities in the United States. In 2009, the Justice Department convicted the Alavi Foundation and its subsidiary, the Assa Corporation, which was a vast business enterprise, with espionage and funding Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program.

Also working out of the Alavi Foundation’s building in the 1980s was Ivan Boesky, the fellow who had spent a year in Tehran in the late 1970s. Boesky ran what was then one of the nation’s most powerful arbitrage funds (today it would be called a hedge fund), and quickly gained a reputation on the Street as a mysterious character who liked to operate in the shadows – a guy known to deliver suitcases full of cash to gorillas with handguns holstered on their hips. Boesky often told people that he had spent his time in Iran working as a CIA agent.

In 1989, when Boesky was indicted on multiple counts of stock manipulation and insider trading, prosecutors described in colorful detail his suitcases full of cash, but Boesky’s claims to have been working as a CIA agent in Iran were dubious to say the least.

Boesky is the most famous of Michael Milken’s criminal co-conspirators, and prosecutors made it clear that he was a key figure in the stock manipulation network that Milken ran in the 1980s. It is more than likely, as one of Boesky’s former business colleagues confirmed in an interview with Deep Capture, that Boesky (like Marc Rich, the Gokals, and the other BCCI figures in Milken’s network) had deep ties not to the CIA, but to one of America’s most dangerous foes – the regime in Iran.

There might, in fact, be something to be gleaned from the court documents that were made public during the prosecution of the Alavi Foundation, the Iranian outfit that owned the building where Boesky and Marc Rich kept their offices. The court documents describe how the Iranian agents who ran the Alavi Foundation and its subsidiary, the Assa Corporation, took their orders from Iranian diplomats, including the Iranian ambassador, assigned to United Nation’s mission in New York.

These are the same diplomats who helped direct the activities of Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Sami al-Arian, who was among the more important figures in the SAAR Network of terrorist financiers that included some BCCI principals, such as the Al Qaeda Golden Chain member Shiekh Mahfouz. The court documents also describe notes found by the FBI in the files of the Alavi Foundation’s one-time director, Ali Ebrahami. The stream-of-consciousness notes are strange and hardly conclusive, but they nonetheless worth considering.

They say, in part, “Conspiracy…to tell the truth"; "lie"; "risk" "Imam’s birthday gathering…urgent situation"; "talk" "everything";= "Mafia…”

The word “Mafia” was italicized in the original.

After the word “Mafia,” Ebrahami wrote – “Duty.”

It is not clear to what Ebrahami was referring, but if Iranian agents (or, for that matter, Al Qaeda financiers, Pakistani intelligence assets, and Saudi spies such as those who traded with Milken) ever desired to carry out a “conspiracy” with the “Mafia”, there would certainly be an abundance of Mafia-tied financiers for them to contact. Indeed, they already have made contact with Mafia-tied financiers, many of whom are close associates of Michael Milken.

In upcoming installments, we will explore these contacts in detail. And we will see what this network might have had to do with the financial crisis of 2008. First, though, I must present evidence that the Milken network is, in fact, tied to organized crime, and that these relationships are by no means incidental.

Regular readers of Deep Capture will know that this point has been proved and proved again. But the Milken network’s ties to organized crime are deeper than what we have previously revealed. Indeed, as we will begin to see in the next chapter, it is not an exaggeration to say that Michael Milken’s closest associates were, more than anyone else, responsible for bringing La Cosa Nostra and the Russian Mafia to Wall Street.

To be continued…Click Here to Read Chapter 4

The Rest @ Deep Capture

Sunday, September 12, 2010

Khalid A. Alireza of Xenel

Khalid A. Alireza

Chief Executive Officer, Xenel GroupKhalid Alireza is the Chief Executive Officer of Xenel Group, a prominent holding company in Saudi Arabia with investments in petrochemicals, engineering, construction, services, and trading.

A respected leader in the Saudi business community, Mr. Alireza has led a number of companies inside the Kingdom. He is the Former Chairman and CEO of the Saudi Cable Company, Alujain Corporation, Hidada Limited, and Safra Company. He was Chairman of Nippon Electric Co. Saudi Arabia, Ltd. and Vice Chairman of AMI Saudi Arabia, Ltd.

Mr. Alireza is a Member of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry, where he is Chairman of the Industrial Committee. He is a Member of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council; the World Business Council of the World Economic Forum in Geneva, Switzerland; and the Prince of Wales Business Leader Forum. He formerly served on the Board of Directors of the Saudi Arabian Standards Organization.

Involved in the area of higher education, Mr. Alireza is a Member of the Board of Trustees for the U.C. Berkeley Foundation. He is a Trustee for the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies at Oxford University, where he is Chairman of Finance.

In addition, he is a Trustee for the Al-Falah Advisory Committee at the University of California, Berkeley and is Vice President of the Board of Trustees at the Al-Falah School of Engineering and Technology in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Alireza has a B.S. and M.S. in Industrial Engineering

The Rest @ The US Saudi Arabian business Council

Thursday, September 09, 2010

Xenel

Ahmed Alireza (now deceased) has four sons controlling the company.
  • Khalid Ahmed Zainal Alireza is the current director
  • Discover where Corporate Zakat payments are going -not listed n public records
  • Note any ownership or partershiips with Remmittance companiesm(Hawalas)
  • Track transactions documented in a Hawala through a subsiderary or by an employee assistant to senior leadership.
  • Note Zakat finanace specialists on staff
  • Note Zakat "consultants" payed in accounts payable

TBDA Suggests regular visitations to news

-Shimron Issachar

********************

Structure

Xenel's structure involves a series of joint ventures, which has enabled it to build up experience in a variety of fields. It is a decentralised company model in which each enterprise must succeed on a standalone basis. The Xenel Industries base company in Jeddah mainly exists to provide financing capabilities and oversee its diverse shareholding interests.

-Source @ Access my Library


IBRAHIM AFANDI (IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD AFANDI), was on the list as CEO of SISCO a subsiderary of Xenel - all privately held with limited financial data released.

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation (President: Prince Salman,
VP: Abdulaziz bin Fahd) Board member,
IIRO Chairman, Al Afandi Establishment (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO Al Afandi Germany (Frankenberg)
CEO, Sky Muzn Holding Co. BV (Netherlands)
CEO, Saudi Industrial Services Company (Sisco) with partners Xenel Industries and Dallah Al Baraka Founder,
Great Saudi Development & Investment Co. (GSDIC) Founder, Arabian Company for Development and Investment Limited (ACDIL) Chairman, National Committee of Saudi Contractors Partner, African Company (Sudan), with Al Rajhi Bank and Dallah Al Baraka Former General manager and shareholder of Al Amoudi Group Owner, Gang Ranch (Canada), second largest ranch in North America Owner, Skylight Corp, Georgia, USA Owner, BSA Investments (complaint from LTV Steel Company, Inc) US address: 6914 Los Verdes Dr Apt 6, Rch Palos Vrd, CA 90275

Xenel is a diversified company based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.



XENEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED P.O. Box 2824,s Jeddah 21461. Saudi Arabia (+966) (02) 604 8000 (+966) (02) 643 6344 (+966) (02) 643 8405 ...




Thunderbird School of Global Management Partners with Xenel




Thunderbird School of Global Management1 Global Place, Glendale, AZ 85306-6000+1 (602) 978-7000 800-848-9084 (US)




Xenel Parters with AECOM




July 29, 2010 – Officials of the Jizan Province awarded a management contract to Resources Sciences Arabia Limited, a joint venture between Xenel Group and U.S. company AECOM Technology Corporation, for a housing development project in the Kingdom.




The two year agreement, worth $16 million (SR60 million), will provide program management services for the housing community to be built in Jizan. The development includes the creation of five new villages totaling 6,000 housing units, which will provide free accommodations for local citizens displaced from their homes by the conflict with Yemen in late 2009.







Other Companies







Electricity Generating Public Company




Tepsco




Manweir Limited




Brunel Energy Inc.




SAAG Consolidated (M) Berhad




SPK-Sentosa Corporation Berhad




Ref-Chem, L.P.




Industrial Specialty Contractors, L.L.C.




National Industries Group Holding SAK




OKP Holdings Ltd







Where the money goes







Money
Company Information flysama, sama airlines, booking, Saudi Arabia ...
flysama put value for money at the heart of customer proposition. ... · Xenel Industries Ltd · Saudi Industrial Services Co. · Sara Development Company Ltd ...




Center For Middle Eastern Studies - UC Berkeley
... a generous endowment from Xenel Industries Ltd. and the families of Sheikh ... The Al-Falah Program awarded its first grants in 1998.




Officials Deny Allegations of Center's Link With Terrorism - Campus Watch
Home. About Campus Watch. About Us. Setting The Record Straight. CW ... program receives money from Xenel Industries, Ltd. The article alleges that the ...
Where is the Money From? - Campus Watch




The website lists Xenel Industries Ltd. as a primary donor to the Al-Falah Program. Xenel, a Saudi owned conglomerate, "provides development, manufacturing, ...




The Rest @ Company Database.org

Monday, August 24, 2009

Hidden South Africa Search for The Golden Chain

Someone in South Africa at the IP Range
41.208.203.94 appeared to be huting down Information from The Golden Chain List, on or about 8-18-09.

The Open Search String:

" @gmail.com saudi arabia commercial chamber "

The Hidden String:

http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=781&url=http A FF shimronletters.blogspot.com F2008 F10 Fgolden-chain-list.html gmail.com B saudi arabia commercial chamber

To be more precise
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=781&url=http%3A%2F%2Fshimronletters.blogspot.com%2F2008%2F10%2Fgolden-chain-list.html&ei=sRaKSpfHEpfUjAeq7blY&rct=j&q=%40gmail.com %2B saudi arabia commercial chamber&usg=AFQjCNE-ySLKKBArq38DnXWQyaW1y9


8/18/2009 3:49 Time Frame
8/18/2009 3:58

Monday, December 22, 2008

Ahmed Idris Nasreddin,

  • Nasreddine, Ahmed Idriss, was listed as a key contributor to al Qaeda on the Golden Chain list found in the caves of Tora Bora after Usamma ben Laudin escaped.
  • Most countries listed him and his companies on sancation lists.
  • His son publicacly owns and runs a Nigerian food processing company caled Nasco Foods
  • He then went undreground, may have bought property in Panama
  • He emerged on 14 November 2007 when the UN removed him and one of his a companies from its sanction list
  • No other companies removed him from their sanctiolns list, as of this date
  • He has been living publicly since then.
Eritea, which borders on Somalia, is his original home (you may read Ethiopia, but Eritrea ceded from Ethiopia after Idris Nassredin was born.

There, Aburrahim Nassredin has been appointed President of the Eritrea branch of NASCON, a construction company with Headquarters and projects in the UAE They appear to be in the busiess of building high end custom Villas for private individuals....Interesting in Eritrea, a poor country in the Horn of Africa,
Lets monitor his islamic bank transactions and connections (see below) and his connections in the Bahamas.
Lets examine the Nassredin Foundation, established with offices in Lichtenstein - a small European country famous for its bank fronts and money laundering. In fact it is one of the last countries whos laws still allow transactions on numbered accounts - no other id required.
Here is what we have
Nasreddine, Ahmed Idriss,
Nationality: Italian Passport no.: na ra or
National identification no.:
a) Italian Identity Card number AG 2028062 , expired on 7 Sep. 2005
b) Foreign ID card number K 5249
Five Addresses:

a) Corso Sempione 69, 20149 Milan, Italy
b) Piazzale Biancamano, Milan, Italy
c) 10 Route De Cap Spartel, Tangiers, Morocco
d) no: 10, Rmilat, Villa Nasreddin in Tangiers, Morocco
e) Via Maggio 21, P.O. Box 216, 6909 Lugano, Switzerland

Other information:

  • Italian Fiscal Code: NSRDRS29S22Z315Y.
  • Mr. Nasreddin left his residence at 1 via delle Scuole, 6900 Lugano, Switzerland in 1994 and moved to Morocco.
  • He is the president of Miga-Malaysian Swiss, Gulf and African Chamber (this entity was formerly listed under permanent reference number QE.M.78.02 and de-listed on 14 Nov. 2007).
Removed from list on: 14 Nov. 2007

QE.A.74.02. Name:
AKIDA BANK PRIVATE LIMITEDA.k.a.: na F.k.a.:
a) Akida Islamic Bank International Limited
b) Iksir International Bank Limited Address:
C/o Arthur D. Hanna & Company 10 Deveaux Street, Nassau, Bahamas
P.O. Box N-4877, Nassau, Bahamas OQE.A.75.02.
AKIDA INVESTMENT CO. LTD.A.k.a.: Akida Investment Company Limited F.k.a.: Akida Bank C/o Arthur D. Hanna & Company b) 10 Deveaux Street, Nassau, Bahamas c) P.O. Box N-4877, Nassau, Bahamas
GULF CENTER S.R.L.A.k.a.: na F.k.a.:
Corso Sempione 69, 20149 Milan, Italy
Fiscal Code: 07341170152 V.A.T. Number: IT 07341170152

MIGA-MALAYSIAN SWISS, GULF AND AFRICAN CHAMBERA.k.a.: na F.k.a.:
Gulf Office Assoc. Per Lo Sviluppo Comm. Ind. E Turis
Fra Gli Stati Arabi Del Golfo E La Svizzera
QE.H.80.02.
HOTEL NASCOA.k.a.: Nasco Business Residence Center SAS Di Nasreddin Ahmed Idris EC Address: Corso Sempione 69, 20149 Milan, Italy
Fiscal Code: 01406430155 V.A.T. Number: IT 01406430155

NASCO NASREDDIN HOLDING
Demirhane Caddesi, No: 219,
Zemin Kat, Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, Turkey
Llast address listed for this entry in the Foreign Investment Archives of the Turkish Treasury is “Cobancesme San. Genc Osman Sok. No: 12, Yenibosna, Istanbul, Turkey”
NASCOSERVICE
Corso Sempione 69, 20149 Milan, Italy
Fiscal Code: 08557650150 V.A.T. Number: IT 08557650150

NASCOTEX
Industrie Generale De Filature Et Tissage
Industrie Generale De Textile
7 Route de Rabat, BP 285, Tangiers, Morocco
NASREDDIN COMPANY
NASCO SAS DI AHMED IDRIS NASREDDIN
Corso Sempione 69, 20149 Milan,
Fiscal Code: 03464040157 V.A.T. Number: IT 03464040157
NASREDDIN FOUNDATION
A.k.a.: Nasreddin Stiftung
C/o Rechta Treuhand-Anstalt, Vaduz, Liechtenstein

NASREDDIN GROUP INTERNATIONAL HOLDING LIMITED
A.k.a.: Nasreddin Group International Holdings Limited
C/o Arthur D. Hanna & Company b)
10 Deveaux Street, Nassau, Bahamas
P.O. Box N-4877, Nassau
Bahamas Other information:
All these companies were removed from the United Nations Sanctions list on Novermber 14th 2007. There was really no explanation except the following quote:
"The Committee’s Consolidate List is updated regularly on the basis of relevant information provided by Member States and regional organizations. This is the twenty-second update of the List in 2007.
An updated List is accessible in XML, PDF and HTML formats on the Committee’s website: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml
ia Maggio 21, P.O. Box 216, 6909, Lugano, Switzerland Other information:
The president of this entity is Ahmed Idris Nasreddin (this individual was formerly listed under permanent reference number QI.N.66.02 and de-listed on 14 Nov. 2007). Removed from list on: 14 Nov. 2007




***********************


Added November 11th, 2011:


"anonymous" has requested that this article be pulled, based on the fact that the both the OFAC and the UN has removed Ahmed Idris Nasreddin from the terrorist watch list. This fact is already listed in the above article.


The bottom line is that while Ahmed Idris Nasreddin has significant family connections to designated terrorists, it must also be said that he has gone through the process of submitting documents that demonstrate that his businesses are no longer directly connected to the businesses that funded al Qaeda.


However, it is our belief that both the listing and de-listing of Ahmed Idris Nasreddin from the terrorist watch lists needs to be a matter of public record.  In fairness, an article by the LA times commenting on the de-listing on 2007 follows:


-Shimron Issachar
****************************************

In 2002, the U.S. said a businessman was aiding Al Qaeda. Now he's quietly off the blacklist.
November 28, 2007|Josh Meyer | Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — With much fanfare in August 2002, the Bush administration formally designated prominent Italy-based businessman Ahmed Idris Nasreddin as a top financier of terrorism, saying he was a key moneyman for Al Qaeda's international network.

The United Nations quickly followed suit, requiring its 190 member nations to freeze the assets of Nasreddin and his vast web of business holdings, and to prohibit any individuals or entities in those countries from having any dealings with them.

Two weeks ago, the administration quietly took Nasreddin and a dozen of his financial companies and other holdings off the official blacklist, and the United Nations immediately did the same. Neither agency publicly announced the decision or explained why they were doing so; they simply published the delisting in an updated list of enforcement actions.

Some experts on terrorism financing found the decision puzzling. "You cannot for five years refer to someone as an international terrorist financier, seize all their funds, tell the world that this is a major-league bad guy, and then suddenly change your mind without public explanation," said lawyer Jonathan M. Winer, a former deputy assistant secretary of State for international law enforcement. He represents clients in terrorism financing cases involving sanctions.

"In order to have credibility, you have to explain to the world what has happened, and you have to justify both decisions," Winer said. "Was the initial decision a mistake? And if it wasn't, how do you justify the new decision? It screams out for a full explanation, and none has been provided."

United Nations officials in New York did not return calls and e-mails seeking comment. The Treasury Department declined to discuss the case in detail Tuesday, but issued a statement that suggested it believed that both the initial designation of Nasreddin and his recent "de-listing" were appropriate.

The department's Office of Foreign Assets Control "reviewed all of the information in its possession, including the information upon which Mr. Nasreddin's original designation was based, additional information, and Mr. Nasreddin's submissions in support of his delisting petition," the statement said.

Treasury also said that "a primary basis" for Nasreddin's earlier designation was his support for Youssef Nada, co-founder and co-director with Nasreddin of the prominent Bank al Taqwa, and Nasreddin's support for the bank itself. The bank and Nada, who according to the Treasury Department holds a controlling interest, were first designated as financiers of terrorism in November 2001 by the Bush administration and United Nations. They remain on the blacklist.

But now, the department said, Nasreddin "no longer fits the criteria for designation" because he has submitted signed statements to the Office of Foreign Assets Control certifying that he has terminated any business relationships with Nada, Bank al Taqwa, "and any other designated individuals and entities, and that he will have no such dealings in the future."

"In the event that Mr. Nasreddin recommences his support for designated terrorist entities, OFAC will not hesitate to re-designate him," the Treasury statement said.

A senior Treasury official said that Nasreddin's case was not unusual and that other designated terrorist entities and individuals had appealed and won by going through "a very fact- intensive inquiry."

"People are definitely able to get off [the list], and we've done a whole bunch of delistings where the circumstances warrant," said the Treasury official, who spoke on a condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the designation process.

Nasreddin, 78, could not be reached for comment, but in the past he has denied any connection to terrorism financing.

In official designation papers in 2002, the Treasury Department said it was joining the Italian government in blacklisting Nasreddin, based on evidence gathered by both countries and several other nations.

Nasreddin provided direct support for Nada and Bank al Taqwa, according to the Treasury Department, which also alleged that the bank and other parts of the broader financial group had "long acted as financial advisors to Al Qaeda" through its offices in Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Italy and the Caribbean.

Victor D. Comras, a former State Department official who participated in the global designation of Nasreddin and Nada when he belonged to the United Nations Al Qaeda Monitoring Group, said the statement by the Treasury Department raised more questions than it answered as to why one of the men was being taken off the blacklist after so many years. The decision itself will open the door for other alleged financiers of terrorism to demand that they be let off the hook as well, he said.

"They seem to be saying that he was a bad guy but that he has renounced being a bad guy," said Comras, now an attorney and consultant on terrorism financing. "If that's the criteria, wow, a lot of people will try to get off the list. All they have to do is say, We're not doing it anymore."

josh.meyer@latimes.com


Sunday, October 19, 2008

GOLDEN CHAIN LIST

While the Golden Chain List been set aside in several court cases where it has been used as evidence of al Qaeda connections, even as last as 2006, this does not mean that the names and companies found on the list are not of interest in on going investigations into al Qaeda funding.

-Shimron Issachar


GOLDEN CHAIN LIST ANALYSIS & PROFILES

CONTEXT

The Golden Chain list (or list of wealthy Saudi sponsors) was presented by the US government as Exhibit 5 in the Department of Justice "Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements" in the case of USA v. Arnaout (USDC, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division) filed on January 29, 2003.

The list was also mentioned in the Indictment of Enaam Arnaout on October 9, 2002 (02 CR 892). According to the US government, the document is "a list of people referred to within Al Qaida as the "Golden Chain", wealthy donors to mujahideen efforts".

Originally, the document was seized by the Bosnian police during searches in the offices of Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo on March 2002. The list was part of a computer file labeled "Tareekh Osama", or "Osama History", containing scanned images of several documents. The computer files seized in Bosnia were delivered to the US Embassy soon after the raids. Our team was granted access to these documents following an order of the Supreme Court of Bosnia Herzegovina issued on March 6, 2003.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Al-Qaida list of top 20 Saudi financial sponsors include 6 bankers and 12 businessmen, among which 2 former ministers. Only two on the list have not been yet identified with certainty.

According to our estimates, their cumulative corporate net worth totals more than $85 billion US, or 42% of the Saudi annual GNP and equivalent to the annual GNP of Venezuela.

These prominent businessmen and bankers own or control 16 companies ranking among the top 100 Saudi companies.

The complete list of Saudi donors and Al-Qaida recipients (25 names) include 8 individuals already named in the complaint. We should note that the most virulent Saudi statements against the lawsuit were issued by those listed in the "Golden Chain", especially Saleh Abdullah Kamel.

Among the most notable findings, we should highlight the following :

-Confirmation that the Bin Laden family has been a major contributor to Usama, despite its statements denying such support
-Involvement of bankers representing the three largest Saudi banks (National Commercial Bank, Riyad Bank, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp)
-Involvement of former oil ministers Sheikh Yamani and Taher
-Involvement of most of them in charity organizations as founders or board members

AL QAIDA DONORS

SULEIMAN AL-RASHID

Al-Rashid Trading & Contracting (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)

ABDEL QADER BAKRI (ABDULKADER [AL] BAKRI)

CEO, Bakri Group of Cos
CEO, Al Bakri International Power Co. Ltd (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Al-Bakri Shipping Group (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Alkhomasia Shipping and Maintenance Company Ltd (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Red Sea Marine Services (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Diners Club International (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Bakri Group formed in April 2002 a JV with the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) to operate in Middle-East countries, including Yemen. MISC leased super tanker MT Limburg when it was attacked on October 6, 2002, coming from Ra's Tannura (Saudi Arabia).

BIN LADEN BROTHERS

Saudi Binladin Group (SBG)
Bakr Bin Laden

YOUSIF JAMEEL (YOUSSEF [YOUSEF] JAMEEL)

CEO, Abdul Lateef Jameel Group (donated SR8 million to support Saudi Red Crescent Society's relief work in Kosovo in 1999)
Former Board member, major shareholder, Global Natural Resources Inc. (Houston, Texas)

IBRAHIM AFANDI (IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD AFANDI)

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation (President: Prince Salman, VP: Abdulaziz bin Fahd)
Board member, IIRO
Chairman, Al Afandi Establishment (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
CEO Al Afandi Germany (Frankenberg)
CEO, Sky Muzn Holding Co. BV (Netherlands)
CEO, Saudi Industrial Services Company (Sisco) with partners Xenel Industries and Dallah Al Baraka
Founder, Great Saudi Development & Investment Co. (GSDIC)
Founder, Arabian Company for Development and Investment Limited (ACDIL)
Chairman, National Committee of Saudi Contractors
Partner, African Company (Sudan), with Al Rajhi Bank and Dallah Al Baraka
Former General manager and shareholder of Al Amoudi Group
Owner, Gang Ranch (Canada), second largest ranch in North America
Owner, Skylight Corp, Georgia, USA
Owner, BSA Investments (complaint from LTV Steel Company, Inc)
US address: 6914 Los Verdes Dr Apt 6, Rch Palos Vrd, CA 90275

SALEH KAMEL (SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL)

Born in 1941, Mecca, Saudi Arabia
CEO, Dallah Al Baraka (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) - 3rd largest Saudi company
Chairman Arab Radio & Television (ART)
Founding member and shareholder, Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Khartoum, Sudan)
Partner, Tamlik Company Ltd (with Mohamed Binladen Co., Saleh Bin Laden)
Shareholder, Jordan Islamic Bank
Vice Chairman Bank Al Jazira
Founder, Iqraa International Foundation

AL-RAJHI (SULEIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL RAJHI)

Board member, IIRO
Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
CEO, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Company (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) - 9th largest Saudi company, 4th largest Saudi commercial bank

AL-JUMAIH (MOHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH AL-JOMAIH)


Board member IIRO
Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
Member of the Committee for collection of donations for supporting the Intifada (Chairman Prince Salman
Chairman First Islamic Investment Bank
+300 companies
Al Birr donor
Bosnia donor

AL-SHARBATLY (ABDULRAHMAN HASSAN [ABBAS] SHARBATLY)

Founder and board member, Riyad Bank (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) - 7th largest Saudi company and 2nd largest Saudi commercial bank (Abdulrahman A. Al-Amoudi, Senior Executive Vice President)
Offices in Houston, Texas (Riyad Bank Houston Agency, 700 Louisiana, suite 4770, Houston, Texas 77002, USA)
Board member, Beirut Ryad Bank SAL (with Prince Khaled bin Turki and Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)
Board member, Saudi Arabian Refinery Company (Chairman Prince Khaled bin Turki, directors include Kaaki (bin Mahfouz) and Al Rajhi)
Shareholder, Middle East Capital Group (shareholders include Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, Henry Sarkissian -President Saudi Binladin Group International-, Sami Baarma -National Commercial Bank-)
CEO, Saudi Arabian Marketing Agencies and Company Ltd (Shareholder : Salem Mohammad Bin Laden) Ferrari, Porsche, Audi and Volkswagen dealer
Shareholder, Egyptian Gulf Bank
Shareholder, Golden Pyramids Plaza Co
Shareholder, Savola Snack Food Co. Ltd (with Saleh bin Mahfouz and Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)

MOHAMED YOUSEF AL-NAGHI

Al Naghi Brothers Co (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)

BIN MAHFOODH (KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ)

Former COO, BCCI
Former CEO, National Commercial Bank, 1st Saudi commercial bank
Founder, Muwafaq Foundation
Founder, International Development Foundation

ABDEL QADER FAQEEH (ADEL FAQIH)

Board member, Ibn Baz Foundation
Chairman, Bank Al Jazira
Chairman, Savola Group (Sharbatly), merged with Azizia Panda (Walid bin Talal) - 13th largest Saudi company
Chairman, Makkah Construction & Development Company

SALAH AL-DIN ABDEL JAWAD (SALAHUDDIN ABDULJAWAD)

CEO, General Machinery Agencies (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) Agent for General Motors, Wacker Corp, Mannesmann, Renault (RVI), Opel
Board member, United Gulf Industries Corp, Manama, Bahrain (with Khalil Bin Laden)
Partner, Savola Snack Food Co. Ltd (with Saleh Bin Mahfouz, Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, Prince Mishail Bin Abdullah Bin Turki, Abdulrahman Sharbatly)
Founder of several scholarship funds (Berkeley, Oxford -including the Salahuddin Abduljawad Fellowship in Islamic Art History) through Barakat Trust (UK) and Barakat Foundation (USA) with Xenel Industries Ltd and Khalid Alireza

AHMAD TURKI YAMANI (AHMED ZAKI YAMANI)

Born in 1930, Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Son of former Saudi Chief Justice
Former Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources
Former director, ARAMCO
Founder, Investcorp (Board members include Abdullah Taha Bakhsh)

ABDEL HADI TAHER (ABDUL HADI TAHER)

CEO, Taher Group of Companies, 52nd largest Saudi company
Owner, Marketing General Trading Corp (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Shareholder, Arab Company for Hotels & Contracting Ltd (with Ahmed Zaki Yamani)
Former Minister of State
Former Governor of the Saudi state oil company Petromin, under responsibility of Ahmed Zaki Yamani
Former director, Saudi European Bank (Paris), held 25% of the bank shares along with Ahmed Zaki Yamani

MOHAMMED OMAR

???

AL KUWAIT

???

AHMAD AL HARBI

CEO, Ahmad Al Harbi Group
(L'Houssaine Kherchtou testified on February 21, 2001, during the trial of suspected al-Qaida militants in connection with the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, that he was welcomed at Miram Shah guest house in Pakistan before joining Al-Qaida by "Abu Ahmed al Harbi").

AL ISSAEI (MOHAMMED AL-ISSAI)

Board member, Saudi Research & Marketing Company (with Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Bin Khalid Bin Mahfouz, Dallah Albaraka Group) - 20th largest Saudi company
CEO, Al Issai Trade Company (Daimler-Chrysler representative)
Deputy Chairman, Arab Cement Company (shareholders include Binladin Group, Bin Mahfouz, Al Rajhi - Chairman: Turki Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud)

HAMAD AL HUSAINI (HAMAD AL HUSSAINI)

CEO, Akel Trading Company
CEO, Akel Agricultural Investment Company LLC
CEO, Al Hussaini and Company
Board member of Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation (Netherlands)
Brother of Abdullah Osman Abdulrahman Al Hussaini, General Director of Al Waqf Al Islami Foundation, owner of Al Furqan Mosque in Netherlands (linked to MWL, Mounir El Motassadeq and Marwan El Shehhi
Family member include Walid Al Hussaini, representative of Abdullah Al Turki (former minister of Islamic Affairs, Secretary General of MWL, linked to Mohammad Zouaydi -Spanish procedure-)

AL-QAIDA RECIPIENTS

Major recipients appear to be Usama Bin laden and Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee. They receive donations from 13 donors.

USAMA (USAMA BIN LADEN)

Receives donations from the most prominent in the list: Bin Laden Brothers, Al Rajhi, Sharbatly, Al Naghi, Bin Mahfouz, Adel Faqih, Al Kuwait

WAIL (WAEL HAMZA JULAIDAN)

Former Secretary General of the Muslim World League and Rabita Trust in Pakistan, designated by the United States Treasury as SGDT
Receives donations from Suleiman Al Rashid, Abdulkader Bakri, Salahuddin Abduljawad, Abdul Tahi Taher

BATERJI (ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE)

Chairman Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Khartoum, Sudan)
Founder, Al-Birr Society, Benevolence International Foundation
Former Secretary General, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Receives donations from Yousef Jameel, Ibrahim Afandi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Jomaih, Ahmed Zaki Yamani and Mohammed Omar

ABU MAZIN ( ??? MAZIN M. BAHARETH)

Son of Mohammed Saleh Bahareth (brother of Usama Bin Laden father's wife and tutor of the Bin Laden family after patriarch Mohammad Bin Laden's death in 1968)
CEO, Bahareth Organization (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
Shareholder, Triple B Trading GmbH (Germany) - with Hassan Bahfzallah and Shahir A. I. Batterjee, Secretary: Abdul-Martin Tatari
Receives donations from Hamad Al Hussaini

SALEM TAHER

Receives donations from Ahmad Al Harbi and Mohammed Al Issai


Source: Free Republic
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